

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

DOCUMENTS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE SECOND
RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT

A Compilation of Texts by Armando Liwanag

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Note from Foreign Languages Press

This text, which is part of Foreign Languages Press' Works of Maoism collection, is also part of a series of volumes covering several periods of the modern Philippine revolutionary movement—a sub-collection entitled Documents of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The focus of this volume is the Second Rectification Movement, which began in late 1991 and continued well into 1992.

Among the documents presented here are official articles published in the various outlets of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), such as the Theoretical and Political Journal of the Central Committee of the CPP and Ang Bayan, as well as texts that have had a relatively independent editorial history, such as “Stand For Socialism Against Modern Revisionism” (published by Foreign Languages Press in 2020).

The author of the documents contained in this book, Armando Liwanag, was the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Philippines during the late '80s and the People Power Revolution of 1986, which, largely through the efforts of the Party and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), succeeded in overthrowing the fascist dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Faced with the multi-faceted and deep ideological contradictions as well as “deviations and errors,” which were leading the Party, its front organizations and its military wing, the New People's Army, towards a growing crisis, Armando Liwanag initiated a Second Movement of Ideological Rectification. In line with the first Rectification Movement launched in 1968, the Second Rectification Movement aimed to bring the Party and its members back in line with revolutionary politics and the scientific outlook that had guided the Party during the entire period of the Marcos dictatorship.

FLP believes that the history of this critical period for the Philippine revolutionary movement and the international proletariat, contains invaluable lessons, especially in the struggle against revisionism—both in its right-wing opportunist and “left-wing” adventurist forms—and sets a high standard for the kind of criticism-self criticism required in a living revolutionary movement.

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Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism

1992

INTRODUCTION

Revisionism is the systematic revision of and deviation from Marxism, the basic revolutionary principles of the proletariat laid down by Marx and Engels and further developed by the series of thinkers and leaders in socialist revolution and construction. The revisionists call themselves Marxists, even claim to make an updated and creative application of it, but they do so essentially to sugarcoat the bourgeois anti-proletarian and anti-Marxist ideas that they propagate.

The classical revisionists who dominated the Second International in 1912 were in social-democratic parties that acted as tails to bourgeois regimes and supported the war budgets of the capitalist countries in Europe. They denied the revolutionary essence of Marxism and the necessity of proletarian dictatorship, engaged in bourgeois reformism and social pacifism and supported colonialism and modern imperialism. Lenin stood firmly against the classical revisionists, defended Marxism and led the Bolsheviks in establishing the first socialist state in 1917.

The modern revisionists were in the ruling communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. They systematically revised the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism by denying the continuing existence of exploiting classes and class struggle and the proletarian character of the party and the state in socialist society. And they proceeded to destroy the proletarian party and the socialist state from within. They masqueraded as communists even as they gave up Marxist-Leninist principles. They attacked Stalin in order to replace the principles of Lenin with the discredited fallacies of his social democratic opponents and claimed to make a “creative application” of Marxism-Leninism.

The total collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has made it so much easier than before for Marxist-Leninists to sum up the emergence and development of socialism and the peaceful evolution of socialism into capitalism through modern revisionism. It is necessary to trace the entire historical trajectory and draw the correct lessons in the face of the ceaseless efforts of the detractors of Marxism-Leninism to sow ideological and political confusion within the ranks of the revolutionary movement.

Among the most common lines of attack are the following: “genuine” socialism never came into existence; if socialism ever existed, it was afflicted with or distorted by the “curse” of “Stalinism,” which could never be exorcized by his anti-Stalin successors and therefore Stalin was responsible even for the anti-Stalin regimes after his death; and socialism existed up to 1989 or 1991 and was never overpowered by modern revisionism before then or that modern revisionism never existed and it was an irremediably “flawed” socialism that fell in 1989–1991.

There are, of course, continuities as well as discontinuities from the Stalin to the post-Stalin periods. But social science demands that a leader be held responsible mainly for the period of his leadership. The main responsibility of Gorbachev for his own period of leadership should not be shifted to Stalin, just as that of Marcos, for example, cannot be shifted to Quezon.

It is necessary to trace the continuities between the Stalin and the post-Stalin regimes. And it is also necessary to recognize the discontinuities, especially because the post-Stalin regimes were anti-Stalin in character. In the face of the efforts of the imperialists, the revisionists and the un-remolded petty bourgeois to explain everything in anti-Stalin terms and to condemn the essential principles and the entire lot of Marxism-Leninism, there is a strong reason and necessity to recognize the sharp differences between the Stalin and post-Stalin regimes. The phenomenon of modern revisionism deserves attention, if we are to explain the blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship in 1989–91.

After his death, the positive achievements of Stalin (such as the socialist construction, the defense of the Soviet Union, the high rate of growth of the Soviet economy, the social guarantees, etc.) continued for a considerable while. So were his errors continued and exaggerated by his successors up to the point of discontinuing socialism. We refer to the denial of the existence and the resurgence of the exploiting classes and class struggle in Soviet society; and the unhindered propagation of the petty-bourgeois mode of thinking and the growth of the bureaucratism of the monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie in command of the great mass of petty-bourgeois bureaucrats.

From the Khrushchev period through the long Brezhnev period to the Gorbachev period, the dominant revisionist idea was that the working class had achieved its historic tasks, and that it was time for the Soviet leaders and experts in the state and ruling party to depart from the proletarian stand. The ghost of Stalin was blamed for bureaucratism and other ills. But in fact, the

modern revisionists promoted these on their own account and in the interest of a growing bureaucratic bourgeoisie. The general run of new intelligentsia and bureaucrats was petty bourgeois-minded and provided the social base for the monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie.

In the face of the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes, there is in fact cause for the Party to celebrate the vindication of its Marxist-Leninist, antirevisionist line. The correctness of this line is confirmed by the total bankruptcy and collapse of the revisionist ruling parties, especially the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the chief disseminator of modern revisionism on a world scale since 1956. It is clearly proven that the modern revisionist line means the disguised restoration of capitalism over a long period of time and ultimately leads to the undisguised restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship. The supra-class sloganeering of the petty bourgeoisie has been the sugarcoating for the anti-proletarian ideas of the big bourgeoisie in the Soviet state and party.

In the Philippines, the political group that is most embarrassed, discredited and orphaned by the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes is that of the Lavas and their successors. It is certainly not the Communist Party of the Philippines, reestablished in 1968. But the imperialists, the bourgeois mass media and certain other quarters wish to confuse the situation and try to mock and shame the Party for the disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes. They are barking at the wrong tree.

There are elements who have been hoodwinked by such catchphrases of Gorbachevite propaganda as “socialist renewal,” “perestroika,” “glasnost” and “new thinking” and who have refused to recognize the facts and the truth about the Gorbachevite swindle even after 1989, the year that modern revisionism started to give way to the open and blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship. There are a handful of elements within the Party who continue to follow the already proven anticommunist, antisocialist and pseudo-democratic example of Gorbachev and who question and attack the vanguard role of the working class through the Party, democratic centralism, the essentials of the revolutionary movement, and the socialist future of the Philippine revolutionary movement. Their line is aimed at nothing less than the negation of the basic principles of the Party and therefore the liquidation of the Party.

The proletarian revolutionary cadres of the Party who have continuously adhered to the Marxist-Leninist stand against modern revisionism and have

closely followed the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the early 1960s are not surprised by the flagrant antisocialist and anti-democratic outcome of modern revisionism.

The Party should never forget that its founding proletarian revolutionary cadres had been able to work with the remnants of the old merger Party of the Communist and Socialist parties since early 1963 only for so long as there was common agreement that the resumption of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal mass struggle meant the resumption of the new-democratic revolution through revolutionary armed struggle and that the old merger party would adhere to the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism and reject the Khrushchevite revisionist line of bourgeois populism and pacifism and the subsequent Khrushchevism without Khrushchev of the Brezhnev regime.

So, in April 1967 when the Lava revisionist renegades violated the common agreement and ignored the Executive Committee that had been formed in 1963, it became necessary to lay the ground for the reestablishment of the Party as a proletarian revolutionary party. Everyone can refer to the diametrically opposed proclamations of the proletarian revolutionaries and the Lava revisionist renegades which were disseminated in the Philippines and published respectively in Peking (Beijing) Review and the Prague Information Bulletin within the first week of May 1967.

The reestablishment of the Party on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism on December 26, 1968 necessarily meant the criticism and repudiation of all the subjectivist and opportunist errors of the Lava revisionist group and the modern revisionism practiced and propagated by this group domestically and by one Soviet ruling clique after another internationally.

The criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism are a fundamental component of the reestablishment and rebuilding of the Party and are inscribed in the basic document of rectification, “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party” and the *Program and Constitution of the Party*. These documents have remained valid and effective. No leading organ of the CPP has ever had the power and the reason to reverse or reject the criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism by the Congress of Reestablishment in 1968.

CHAPTER I

PARTY'S ML STAND AGAINST MODERN REVISIONISM

In the late 1970s, the Party decided to expand the international relations of the revolutionary movement in addition to the Party's relations with Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations abroad. The international representative of the National Democratic Front (NDF) began to explore possibilities for the NDF to act like the Palestinian Liberation Organization, African National Congress and other national liberation movements in expanding friendly and diplomatic relations with all forces abroad that are willing to extend moral and material support to the Philippine revolutionary struggle on any major issue and to whatever extent. This line in external relations was in consonance with the Marxist-Leninist stand of the Party and the international united front against imperialism.

In 1982, a definite proposal to the Central Committee came up that the NDF or any of its member organizations vigorously seek friendly relations with the ruling parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as with parties and movements closely associated with the CPSU. However, this proposal was laid aside in favor of the counterproposal made by the international liaison department (ILD) of the Party Central Committee that the Party rather than the NDF explore and seek "fraternal" relations with the ruling parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and other related parties.

This counterproposal disregarded the fact that the Lava revisionist group had already preempted our Party from the possibility of "fraternal" relations with the revisionist ruling parties. More significantly, the counterproposal did not take into serious consideration the Marxist-Leninist stand of the Party against modern revisionism.

Notwithstanding the ill-informed and unprincipled basis for seeking "fraternal" relations with the revisionist ruling parties and the absence of any congress withdrawing the correct antirevisionist line, the staff organ in charge of international relations proceeded in 1984 to draft and circulate a policy paper, "The Present World Situation and the CPP's General International Line and Policies," describing the CPSU as a Marxist-Leninist party, the Soviet Union as the most developed socialist country and as proletarian internationalist rather than social-imperialist, as having supported third world liberation movements and as having attained military parity with the

United States. This policy paper was presented to the 1985 Central Committee Plenum, and the latter decided to conduct further studies on it.

In 1986, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee commissioned a study of the Soviet Union and East European countries. The study was superficial. It was done to support the predetermined conclusion that these countries were socialist because their economies were still dominated by state-owned enterprises and these enterprises were still growing and because the state still provided social guarantees to the people. The study overlooked the fact that the ruling party in command of the economy was no longer genuinely proletarian and that state-owned enterprises since the time of Khrushchev had already become milking cows of corrupt bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs who colluded under various pretexts to redirect the products to the free market.

By this time, the attempt to deviate from the antirevisionist line of the Party was clearly linked to the erroneous idea that total victory in the Philippine revolution could be hastened by “regularizing” the few thousands of NPA fighters with importations of heavy weapons and other logistical requisites from abroad, by skipping stages in the development of people’s war and in building the people’s army and by arousing the forces for armed urban insurrection in anticipation of some sudden “turn in the situation” to mount a general uprising.

There was the notion that the further development of the people’s army and the people’s war depended on the importation of heavy weapons and getting logistical support from abroad and that the failure to import these would mean the stagnation or retrogression of the revolutionary forces because there is no other way by which the NPA could overcome the enemy’s “blockhouse” warfare and control of the highways except through the use of sophisticated heavy weapons (anti-tank and laser-guided missiles) which necessarily have to be imported from abroad.

In the second half of 1986, with the approval of the Party’s central leadership, a drive was started to seek the establishment of “fraternal” relations with the CPSU and other revisionist ruling parties as well as nonruling ones close to the CPSU. A considerable amount of resources was allotted to and expended on the project.

In late 1986, some Brezhnevites within the CPSU and some other quarters made the suggestion that the Communist Party of the Philippines merge with the Lava revisionist group in order to gain “fraternal” relations with the CPSU.

But such a suggestion was tactfully rejected with the counter suggestion that the CPSU and other revisionist ruling parties could keep their fraternal relations with the Lava group while the CPP could have friendly relations with them. We stood pat on the Leninist line of proletarian party-building.

Up to 1987 the failure to establish relations with the revisionist ruling parties was interpreted by some elements as the result of the refusal on the part of our Party to repudiate its antirevisionist line. These elements had to be reminded in easily understood practical terms that if the antirevisionist line of the Party had been withdrawn and the revisionist ruling parties would continue to rebuff our offer of “fraternal” or friendly relations with them, then the proposed opportunism would be utterly damaging to the Party.

By 1987, the Party became aware that the Gorbachev regime was already laying the ground for the emasculation of the revisionist ruling parties in favor of an openly bourgeois state machinery in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by allowing his advisors, officials of the Academy of Social Sciences and the official as well as independent Soviet mass media to promote pro-imperialist, anticommunist and antisocialist ideas under the guise of social democracy and “liberal” communism. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev himself delivered a speech abandoning the anti-imperialist struggle and describing imperialism as having shed off its violent character in an integral world in which the Soviet Union and the United States and other countries can cooperate in the common interest of humanity’s survival.

In 1987, the chairman of the Party’s Central Committee made an extensive interview on the question of establishing relations with the ruling parties of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and elsewhere. This was made in response to the demand from some quarters within the Party that the Party repudiate its line against revisionism and apologize to the CPSU for having criticized the Soviet Union on the question of Cambodia and Afghanistan. The interview clarified that the Party can establish friendly relations with the ruling parties even while the latter maintained their “fraternal” relations with the Lava group.

In June 1988, the “World Situation and Our Line” was issued to replace “The Present World Situation and the CPP’s General International Line and Policies.” The correct and positive side of the new document reiterated the principles of national integrity, independence, equality noninterference and mutual support and mutual benefit to guide the Party’s international relations;

and upheld the basic principles of socialism, anti-imperialism and proletarian internationalism and peaceful coexistence as a diplomatic policy. Furthermore, it noted and warned against the unhealthy trends of cynicism, anticommunism, nationalism, consumerism, superstition, criminality and the like already running rampant in the countries ruled by the revisionist parties.

The negative side included accepting at face value and endorsing the catchphrases of Gorbachev; describing the revisionist regimes as socialist under a “lowered” definition; and diplomatic avoidance of the antirevisionist terms of the Party.

In the course of trying to establish friendly relations with the revisionist ruling parties in 1987 and onward, Party representatives were able to discern that Gorbachev and his revisionist followers were reorganizing these parties towards their eventual weakening and dissolution. Despite Gorbachev’s avowed line of allowing the other East European ruling parties to decide matters for themselves, Soviet agents pushed these parties to reorganize themselves by replacing Brezhnevite holdovers at various levels with Gorbachevites and subsequently paralyzed the Party organizations. However, it would be in 1989 that it became clear without any doubt that all the revisionist ruling parties and regimes were on the path of self-disintegration, blatant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship under the slogans of “multi-party democracy” and “economic reforms.”

It is correct for the Party to seek friendly relations with any foreign party or movement on the basis of anti-imperialism. But it is wrong to go into any “fraternal” relations involving the repudiation of the Party’s Marxist-Leninist stand against modern revisionism.

In this regard, we must be self-critical for wavering or temporarily veering away from the Party’s antirevisionist line and engaging in a futile expedition. The motivation was to seek greater material and moral support for the Filipino people’s revolutionary struggle. Although such motivation is good, it can only mitigate but cannot completely excuse the departure from the correct line. The error is a major one but it can be rectified through education far more easily than other errors unless ideological confusion over the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is allowed to continue. Most comrades assigned to do international work were merely following the wrong line from above.

The worst damage caused by the unconsummated and belated flirtation with the revisionist ruling parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is

not so much the waste of effort and resources but the circulation of incorrect ideas, such as that these parties were still socialist and that the availability or non-availability of material assistance from them, especially heavy weapons, would spell the advance or stagnation and retrogression of the Philippine revolutionary movement. It should be pointed out that the Lava group had the best of relations with these parties since the sixties but this domestic revisionist group never amounted to anything more than being an inconsequential toady of Soviet foreign policy and the Marcos regime.

At this point, the central leadership and entirety of the Party must renew their resolve to adhere to Marxism-Leninism and to the antirevisionist line. We are in a period which requires profound and farsighted conviction in the new democratic revolution as well as the socialist revolution. This is a period comparable to that when the classical revisionist parties disintegrated and it seemed as if socialism had become a futile dream and the world seemed to be merely a helpless object of imperialist oppression and exploitation. But that period was exactly the eve of socialist revolution.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGACY OF LENIN AND STALIN

The red flag of the Soviet Union has been brought down. The czarist flag of Russia now flies over the Kremlin. It may only be a matter of time that the body of the great Lenin is removed from its mausoleum in the Red Square, unless Russia's new bourgeoisie continue to regard it as a lucrative tourist attraction for visitors with hard foreign currency.

The Soviet modern revisionists, from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, had invoked the name of Lenin to attack Stalin. But in fact, the total negation of Stalin was but the spearhead of the total negation of Lenin and Leninism, socialism, the Soviet Union and the entire course of Bolshevik and Soviet history. The bourgeoisie in the former Soviet Union was not satisfied with anything less than the open restoration of capitalism and the imposition of the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

It is necessary to refresh ourselves on the legacy of Lenin and Stalin in the face of concerted attempts by the imperialists, the modern revisionists, the barefaced restorationists of capitalism and the anticommunist bourgeois intelligentsia to slander and discredit it.

The greatness of Lenin lies in having further developed the three components of the theory of Marxism: philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism. Lenin is the great master of Marxism in the era of modern imperialism and proletarian revolution.

He delved further into dialectical materialism, pointed to the unity of opposites as the most fundamental law of material reality and transformation and contended most extensively and profoundly with the so-called "third force" subjectivist philosophy (empirio-criticism).

He analyzed modern imperialism and put forward the theory of uneven development, which elucidated the possibility of socialist revolution at the weakest point of the world capitalist system. He elaborated on the Marxist theory of state and revolution. He stood firmly for proletarian class struggle and proletarian dictatorship against the classical revisionists and actually led the first successful socialist revolution.

The ideas of Lenin were tested in debates within the Second International and within the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP). The proletarian revolutionary line that he and his Bolshevik comrades espoused

proved to be correct and victorious in contention with various bourgeois ideas and formations that competed for hegemony in the struggle against czarist autocracy.

We speak of the socialist revolution as beginning on November 7, 1917 because it was on that day that the people under the leadership of the proletariat through the Bolshevik party seized political power from the bourgeoisie. It was at that point that the proletarian dictatorship was established. For this, Lenin is considered the great founder of Soviet socialism. Proletarian dictatorship is the first requisite for building socialism. Without this power, socialist revolution cannot be undertaken. By this power, Lenin was able to decree the nationalization of the land and capital assets of the exploiting classes and take over the commanding heights of the economy.

Proletarian class dictatorship is but another expression for the state power necessary for smashing and replacing the state power or class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, for carrying out the all-rounded socialist revolution and for preventing the counterrevolutionaries from regaining control over society.

Proletarian dictatorship is at the same time proletarian democracy and democracy for the entire people, especially the toiling masses of workers and peasants. Without the exercise of proletarian dictatorship against their class enemies, the proletariat and the people cannot enjoy democracy among themselves. Proletarian dictatorship is the fruit of the highest form of democratic action, the revolutionary process that topples the bourgeois dictatorship. It is the guarantor of democracy among the people against domestic and external class enemies, the local exploiting classes and the imperialists.

The Bolsheviks were victorious because they resolutely established and defended the proletarian class dictatorship. They had learned their lessons well from the failure of the Paris Commune of 1871 and from the reformism and treason of the social democratic parties in the Second International.

Wielding proletarian dictatorship, the Bolsheviks disbanded in January 1918 the Constituent Assembly that had been elected after the October Revolution but was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, because that assembly refused to ratify the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People. The Bolsheviks subsequently banned the bourgeois parties because these parties engaged in counterrevolutionary violence and civil war and collaborated with the foreign interventionists.

In his lifetime, Lenin led the Soviet proletariat and people and the soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers to victory in the civil war and the war

against the interventionist powers from 1918 to 1921. He consolidated the Soviet Union as a federal union of socialist republics and built the congresses of soviets and the nationalities. As a proletarian internationalist, he established the Third International and set forth the anti-imperialist line for the world proletariat and all oppressed nations and peoples.

In 1922 he proclaimed the New Economic Policy as a transitory measure for reviving the economy from the devastation of war in the quickest possible way and remedying the problem of “war communism” which had involved requisitioning and rationing under conditions of war, devastation and scarcity. Under the new policy, the small entrepreneurs and rich peasants were allowed to engage freely in private production and to market their products.

THE RECORD OF STALIN

Lenin died in 1924. He did not live long enough to see the start of full-scale socialist economic construction. This was undertaken by his successor and faithful follower Stalin. He carried it out in accordance with the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin: proletarian dictatorship and mass mobilization, public ownership of the means of production, economic planning, industrialization, collectivization and mechanization of agriculture, full employment and social guarantees, free education at all levels, expanding social services and the rising standard of living.

But before the socialist economic construction could be started in 1929 with the first five-year economic plan, Stalin continued Lenin’s New Economic Policy and had to contend with and defeat the Left Opposition headed by Trotsky who espoused the wrong line that socialism in one country was impossible and that the workers in Western Europe (especially in Germany) had to succeed first in armed uprisings and that rapid industrialization had to be undertaken immediately at the expense of the peasantry.

Stalin won out with his line of socialism in one country and in defending the worker-peasant alliance. If Trotsky had had his way, he would have destroyed the chances for Soviet socialism by provoking the capitalist powers, by breaking up the worker-peasant alliance and by spreading pessimism in the absence of any victorious armed uprisings in Western Europe.

When it was time to put socialist economic construction in full swing, the Right opposition headed by Bukharin emerged to argue for the continuation of the New Economic Policy and oppose Soviet industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. If Bukharin had had his way, the Soviet Union

would not have been able to build a socialist society with a comprehensive industrial base and a mechanized and collectivized agriculture and provide its people with a higher standard of living; and would have enlarged the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois nationalists in the various republics and become an easier prey to Nazi Germany whose leader Hitler made no secret of his plans against the Soviet Union.

The first five-year economic plan was indeed characterized by severe difficulties due to the following: the limited industrial base to start with in a sea of agrarian conditions, the continuing effects of the war, the economic and political sanctions of the capitalist powers, the constant threat of foreign military intervention, the burdensome role of the pioneer and the violent reaction of the rich peasants who refused to put their farms, tools and work animals under collectivization, slaughtered their work animals and organized resistance.

But after the first five-year economic plan, there was popular jubilation over the establishment of heavy and basic industries. To the relief of the peasantry there was considerable mechanization of agriculture, especially in the form of tractor stations. There was marked improvement in the standard of living.

In 1936, a new constitution was promulgated. As a result of the successes of the economic construction and in the face of the actual confiscation of bourgeois and landlord property and the seeming disappearance of exploiting classes by economic definition, the constitution declared that there were no more exploiting classes and no more class struggle except that between the Soviet people and the external enemy. This declaration would constitute the biggest error of Stalin. It propelled the petty-bourgeois mode of thinking among the new intelligentsia and bureaucracy, even as the proletarian dictatorship was exceedingly alert to the old forces and elements of counterrevolution. The error had two ramifications.

One ramification abetted the failure to distinguish contradictions among the people from those between the people and the enemy and the propensity to apply administrative measures against those loosely construed as enemies of the people. There were indeed real British and German spies and bourgeois nationalists engaged in counterrevolutionary violence. They had to be ferreted out. But this was done by relying heavily on a mass reporting system (based on patriotism) that fed information to the security services. And the principle of due process was not assiduously and scrupulously followed in order to narrow the target in the campaign against counterrevolutionaries and punish only the few who were criminally culpable on the basis of incon-

trovertible evidence. Thus, in the 1936–38 period, arbitrariness victimized a great number of people. Revolutionary class education through mass movement under Party leadership was not adequately undertaken for the purpose of ensuring the high political consciousness and vigilance of the people.

The other ramification was the promotion of the idea that building socialism was a matter of increasing production, improving administration and technique, letting the cadres decide everything (although Stalin never ceased to speak against bureaucratism) and providing the cadres and experts and the toiling masses with ever-increasing material benefits. The new intelligentsia produced by the rapidly expanding Soviet educational system had a decreasing sense of the proletarian class stand and an increasing sense that it was sufficient to have the expertise and to become bureaucrats and technocrats in order to build socialism. The old and the new intelligentsia were presumed to be proletarian so long as they rendered bureaucratic and professional service. There was no recognition of the fact that bourgeois and other anti-proletarian ideas can persist and grow even after the confiscation of bourgeois and landlord property.

To undertake socialist revolution and construction in a country with a large population of more than 100 nationalities and a huge land mass, with a low economic and technological level as a starting point, ravaged by civil war and ever threatened by local counterrevolutionary forces and foreign capitalist powers, it was necessary to have the centralization of political will as well as centralized planning in the use of limited resources. But such a necessity can be overdone by a bourgeoisie that is reemergent through the petty bourgeoisie and can become the basis of bureaucratism, decreasing democracy in the process of decision-making. The petty bourgeoisie promotes the bureaucratism that gives rise to and solidifies the higher levels of the bureaucrat bourgeoisie and that alienates the Party and the state from the people. Democratic centralism can be made to degenerate into bureaucratic centralism by the forces and elements that run counter to the interests of the proletariat and all working people.

In world affairs, Stalin encouraged and supported the communist parties and anti-imperialist movements in capitalist countries and the colonies and semi-colonies through the Third International. And from 1935 onward, he promoted internationally the antifascist Popular Front policy. Only after Britain and France spurned his offer of an antifascist alliance and continued to induce Germany to attack the Soviet Union did Stalin decide to forge a

nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939. This was a diplomatic maneuver to forestall a probable earlier Nazi aggression and gain time for the Soviet Union to prepare against it.

Stalin made full use of the time before the German attack in 1941 to strengthen the Soviet Union economically and militarily as well as politically through patriotic calls to the entire Soviet people and through concessions to conservative institutions and organizations. For instance, the Russian Orthodox Church was given back its buildings and its privileges. There was marked relaxation in favor of a broad antifascist popular front.

In the preparations against fascist invasion and in the course of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, the line of Soviet patriotism further subdued the line of class struggle among the old and new intelligentsia and the entire people. The Soviet people united. Even as they suffered a tremendous death casualty of 20 million and devastation of their country, including the destruction of 85 percent of industrial capacity, they played the pivotal role in defeating Nazi Germany and world fascism and paved the way for the rise of several socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia and the national liberation movements on an unprecedented scale.

In the aftermath of World War II, Stalin led the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union. Just as he succeeded in massive industrialization from 1929 to 1941 (only 12 years) before the war, so he did again from 1945 to 1953 (only eight years) but this time with apparently no significant resistance from counterrevolutionaries. In all these years of socialist construction, socialism proved superior to capitalism in all respects.

In 1952, Stalin realized that he had made a mistake in prematurely declaring that there were no more exploiting classes and no more class struggle in the Soviet Union, except the struggle between the people and the enemy. But it was too late, the Soviet party and state were already swamped by a large number of bureaucrats with waning proletarian revolutionary consciousness. These bureaucrats and their bureaucratism would become the base of modern revisionism.

When Stalin died in 1953, he left a Soviet Union that was a politically, economically, militarily and culturally powerful socialist country. He had successfully united the Soviet people of the various republics and nationalities and had defended the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. He had rebuilt an industrial economy, with high annual growth rates, with enough

homegrown food for the people and the world's largest production of oil, coal, steel, gold, grain, cotton and so on.

Under his leadership, the Soviet Union had created the biggest number of research scientists, engineers, doctors, artists, writers and so on. In the literary and artistic field, social realism flourished, while at the same time the entire cultural heritage of the Soviet Union was cherished.

In foreign policy, Stalin held the US forces of aggression at bay in Europe and Asia, supported the peoples fighting for national liberation and socialism, neutralized what was otherwise the nuclear monopoly of the United States and ceaselessly called for world peace even as the US-led Western alliance waged the Cold War and engaged in provocations.

It is absolutely necessary to correctly evaluate Stalin as a leader in order to avoid the pitfall of modern revisionism and to counter the most strident anticommunists who attack Marxism-Leninism under the guise of anti-Stalinism. We must know what are his merits and demerits. We must respect the historical facts and judge his leadership within its own time, 1924 to 1953.

It is unscientific to make a complete negation of Stalin as a leader in his own time and to heap the blame on him even for the modern revisionist line, policies and actions which have been adopted and undertaken explicitly against the name of Stalin and have at first gradually and then rapidly brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of capitalism. Leaders must be judged mainly for the period of their responsibility, even as we seek to trace the continuities and discontinuities from one period to another.

Stalin's merits within his own period of leadership are principal and his demerits are secondary. He stood on the correct side and won all the great struggles to defend socialism such as those against the Left opposition headed by Trotsky; the Right opposition headed by Bukharin, the rebellious rich peasants, the bourgeois nationalists, and the forces of fascism headed by Hitler. He was able to unite, consolidate and develop the Soviet state. After World War II, Soviet power was next only to the United States. Stalin was able to hold his ground against the threats of US imperialism. As a leader, he represented and guided the Soviet proletariat and people from one great victory to another.

The regimes of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev mark the three stages in the process of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, a process of

undermining and destroying the great accomplishments of the Soviet proletariat and people under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. This process has also encompassed Eastern Europe.

The Khrushchev regime laid the foundation of Soviet modern revisionism and overthrew the proletarian dictatorship. The Brezhnev regime fully developed modern revisionism for a far longer period of time and completely converted socialism into monopoly bureaucrat capitalism. And the Gorbachev regime brought the work of modern revisionism to the final goal of wiping out the vestiges of socialism and entirely dismantling the socialist facade of the revisionist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He destroyed the Soviet Union that Lenin and Stalin had built and defended.

To restore capitalism, the Soviet revisionist regimes had to revise the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction and to go through stages of camouflaged counterrevolution in a period of 38 years, 1953 to 1991. It is a measure of the greatness of Lenin and Stalin that their accomplishments in 36 years of socialist revolution and construction took another long period of close to four decades to dismantle. Stalin spent a total of 20 years in socialist construction. The revisionist renegades took a much longer period of time to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union.

In the same period of time, the revisionist regimes cleverly took the pretext of attacking Stalin in order to attack the foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and eventually condemn Lenin himself and the entire course of Soviet history and finally destroy the Soviet Union. The revisionist renegades in their protracted “de-Stalinization” campaign blamed Stalin beyond his lifetime for their own culpabilities and failures. For instance, they aggravated bureaucratism in the service of capitalist restoration but they still blamed the long-dead Stalin for it.

Tito of Yugoslavia had the unique distinction of being the pioneer in modern revisionism. In opposing Stalin, he deviated from the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction in 1947 and received political and material support from the West. He refused to undertake land reform and collectivization. He preserved and promoted the bourgeoisie through the bureaucracy and private enterprise, especially in the form of private cooperatives.

He considered as key to socialism not the public ownership of the means of production, economic planning and further development of the productive forces but the immediate decentralization of enterprises; the so-called workers’ self-management that actually combined bureaucratism and anar-

chy of production; and the operation of the free market (including the goods imported from Western countries) upon the existent and stagnant level of production. In misrepresenting Lenin's New Economic Policy as the very model for socialist economic development, he was the first chief of state to use the name of Lenin against both Lenin and Stalin.

CHAPTER III

THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST RESTORATION

FIRST STAGE: THE KHRUSHCHEV REGIME, 1953–64

To Khrushchev belongs the distinction of being the pioneer in modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, the first socialist country in the history of mankind, and of being the most influential in promoting modern revisionism on a world scale.

Khrushchev's career as a revisionist in power started in 1953. He was a bureaucratic sycophant and an active player in repressive actions during the time of Stalin. To become the first secretary of the CPSU and accumulate power in his hands, he played off the followers of Stalin against each other and succeeded in having Beria executed after a summary trial. He depended on the new bourgeoisie that had arisen from the bureaucracy and the new intelligentsia.

In 1954, he had already reorganized the CPSU to serve his ideological and political position. In 1955, he upheld Tito against the memory of Stalin, especially on the issue of revisionism. In 1956, he delivered before the 20th Party Congress his "secret" speech against Stalin, completely negating him as no better than a bloodthirsty monster and denouncing the "personality cult." The congress marked the overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship. In 1957, he used the armed forces to defeat the vote for his ouster by the Politburo and thereby made the coup to further consolidate his position.

In 1956, the anti-Stalin diatribe inspired the anticommunist forces in Poland and Hungary to carry out uprisings. The Hungarian uprising was stronger and more violent. Khrushchev ordered the Soviet army to suppress it, chiefly because the Hungarian party leadership sought to rescind its political and military ties with the Soviet Union.

But subsequently, all throughout Eastern Europe under Soviet influence, it became clear that it was alright to the Soviet ruling clique for the satellite regimes to adopt capitalist-oriented reforms (private enterprise in agriculture, handicraft and services, dissolution of collective farms even where land reform had been carried out on a narrow scale and, of course, the free market) like Yugoslavia along an anti-Stalin line. The revisionist regimes were,

however, under strict orders to remain within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact.

The un-remolded social-democratic and petty-bourgeois sections of the revisionist ruling parties in Eastern Europe started to kick out genuine communists from positions of leadership in the state and party under the direction of Khrushchev and under the pressure of anticommunist forces in society. It must be recalled that the so-called proletarian ruling parties were actually mergers of communists and social-democrats put into power by the Soviet Red Army. At the most, there were only a few years of proletarian dictatorship and socialist economic construction before Khrushchev started in 1956 to enforce his revisionist line in the satellite parties and regimes.

The total negation of Stalin by Khrushchev was presented as a rectification of the personality cult, bureaucratism and terrorism; and as the prerequisite for the efflorescence of democracy and civility, rapid economic progress that builds the material and technological foundation of communism in twenty years, the peaceful form of social revolution from an exploitative system to a non-exploitative one, detente with the United States, nuclear disarmament step-by-step and world peace, a world without wars and arms.

Khrushchev paid lip service to proletarian dictatorship and the basic principles of socialist revolution and construction but at the same time introduced a set of ideas to undermine them. He used bourgeois populism, declaring that the CPSU was a party of the whole people and the Soviet state was a state of the whole people on the anti-Marxist premise that the tasks of proletarian dictatorship had been fulfilled. He used bourgeois pacifism, declaring that it was possible and preferable for mankind to opt for peaceful transition to socialism and peaceful economic competition with the capitalist powers in order to avert the nuclear annihilation of humanity; raising peaceful coexistence from the level of diplomatic policy to that of the general line governing all kinds of external relations of the Soviet Union and the CPSU; and denying the violent nature of imperialism.

In the economic field, he used the name of Lenin against Lenin and Stalin by misrepresenting Lenin's New Economic Policy as the way to socialism rather than as a transitory measure towards socialist construction. He carried out decentralization to some degree, he autonomized state enterprises and promoted private agriculture and the free market. The autonomized state enterprises became responsible for their own cost and profit accounting and for raising the wages and bonuses on the basis of the profits of the individual

enterprise. The private plots were enlarged and large areas of land (ranging from 50 to 100 hectares) were leased to groups, usually households. Many tractor stations for collective farms were dissolved and agricultural machines were turned over to private entrepreneurs. The free market in agricultural and industrial products and services was promoted. In the same way that the revisionist rhetoric of Khrushchev overlapped with Marxist-Leninist terminology, socialism overlapped with capitalist restoration. The socialist system of production and distribution was still dominant for a while. Thus, the Soviet economy under Khrushchev still registered high rates of growth. But the regime took most pride in the higher rate of growth in the private sector which benefited from cheap energy, transport, tools and other supplies from the public sector and which was credited with producing the goods stolen from the public sector.

In the autonomization of state enterprises, managers acquired the power to hire and fire workers, transact business within the Soviet Union and abroad; increase their own salaries, bonuses and other perks at the expense of the workers; lessen the funds available for the development of other parts of the economy; and engage in bureaucratic corruption in dealing with the free market.

With regard to private agriculture, propaganda was loudest on the claim that it was more productive than the state and collective farms. The reemergent rich peasants were lauded. But in fact, the corrupt bureaucrats and private farmers and merchants were colluding in underpricing and stealing products (through pilferage and wholesale misdeclaration of goods as defective) from the collective and state farms in order to re-channel these to the free market. In the end, the Soviet Union would suffer sharp reductions in agricultural production and would be importing huge amounts of grain.

The educational system continued to expand, reproducing in great numbers the new intelligentsia now influenced by the ideas of modern revisionism and looking to the West for models of efficient management and for quality consumer goods. In the arts and in literature, social realism was derided and universal humanism, pacifism and mysticism came into fashion.

The Khrushchev regime drew prestige from the advances of Soviet science and technology, from the achievements in space technology and from the continuing economic construction. All of these were not possible without the prior work and the accumulated social capital under the leadership of

Stalin. Khrushchev went into rapid housing and office construction which pleased the bureaucracy.

The CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party were the main protagonists in the great ideological debate. Despite Khrushchev's brief reconciliation with Tito, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960 maintained that modern revisionism was the main danger to the international communist movement as a result of the firm and vigorous stand of the Chinese and other communist parties.

Khrushchev extended the ideological debate into a disruption of state-to-state relations between the Soviet Union and China. In the Cuban missile crisis, he had a high-profile confrontation with Kennedy. He first took an adventurist and then swung to a capitulationist position. With regard to Vietnam, he was opposed to the revolutionary armed struggle of the Vietnamese people and grudgingly gave limited support to them.

The deterioration of Soviet industry and the breakdown of agriculture and bungling in foreign relations led to the removal of Khrushchev in a coup by the Brezhnev clique. Brezhnev became the general secretary of the CPSU and Kosygin became the premier. The former would eventually assume the position of president.

SECOND STAGE: THE BREZHNEV REGIME, 1964–82

While Khrushchev was stridently anti-Stalin, Brezhnev made a limited and partial “rehabilitation” of Stalin. If we link this to the recentralization of the bureaucracy and the state enterprises previously decentralized and the repressive measures taken against the pro-imperialist and anticommunist opposition previously encouraged by Khrushchev, it would appear that Brezhnev was reviving Stalin's policies.

In fact, the Brezhnev regime was on the whole anti-Stalin, with respect to the continuing line of promoting the Khrushchevite capitalist-oriented reforms in the economy and the line of developing an offensive capability “to defend the Soviet Union outside of its borders.” It is therefore false to say that the 18-year Brezhnev regime was an interruption of the anti-Stalin line started by Khrushchev.

There is, however, an ideological error that puts both Khrushchev and Brezhnev on board with Stalin. This is the premature declaration of the end of the exploiting classes and class struggle, except that between the enemy and the people. This line served to obfuscate and deny the existence of an

already considerable and growing bourgeoisie in Soviet society and to justify repressive measures against those considered as enemies of the Soviet people for being opposed to the ruling clique.

Under the Brezhnev leadership, the Khrushchevite capitalist-oriented reforms were pushed hard by the Brezhnev-Kosygin tandem. Socialism was converted fully into state monopoly capitalism, with the prevalent corrupt bureaucrats not only increasing their official incomes and perks but taking their loot by colluding with private entrepreneurs and even criminal syndicates in milking the state enterprises. On an ever-widening scale, tradable goods produced by the state enterprises were either underpriced, pilfered or declared defective only to be channeled to the private entrepreneurs for the free market.

Sales and purchase contracts with capitalist firms abroad became a big source of kickbacks for state officials who deposited these in secret bank accounts abroad. There was also a thriving black market in foreign exchange and goods smuggled from the West through Eastern Europe, the Baltic and southern republics.

The corruption of the bureaucrat and private capitalists discredited the revisionist ruling party and regime at various levels. At the end of the Brezhnev regime, there were already an estimated 30 million people engaged in private enterprise. Among them were members of the families of state and party officials. Members of the Brezhnev family themselves were closely collaborating with private firms and criminal syndicates in scandalous shady deals.

The state enterprises necessary for assuring funds for the ever-expanding central Soviet bureaucracy and for the arms race were re-centralized. A military-industrial complex grew rapidly and ate up yearly far more than the conservatively estimated 20 percent of the Soviet budget.

The Brezhnev regime was obsessed with attaining military parity with its superpower rival, the United States.

The huge Soviet state that could have generated the surplus income for reinvestment in more efficient and expanded civil production of basic and non-basic consumer goods, wasted the funds on the importation of the high grade consumer goods for the upper five percent of the population (the new bourgeoisie), on increasing amounts of imported grain, on the military-industrial complex and the arms race, on the maintenance and equipment of half a million troops in Eastern Europe and on other foreign commitments in the third world.

Among the commitments that arose due to superpower rivalry was the assistance to the Vietnamese people in the Vietnam war, Cuba, Angola and Nicaragua. Among the commitments that arose due to the sheer adventurism of Soviet social-imperialism was the dispatch of a huge number of Soviet troops and equipment to Afghanistan at the time that the Soviet Union was already clearly in dire economic and financial straits.

The hard currency for the importation of grain and high-grade consumer goods came from the sale of some 10 percent of Soviet oil production to Western countries and the income from military sales to the oil-producing countries in the Middle East.

The Brezhnev regime used “Marxist-Leninist” phrase mongering to disguise and legitimize the growth of capitalism within the Soviet Union. Repressive measures were used against opponents of the regime, including the pretext of psychiatric confinement. These measures served the growth of bureaucrat monopoly capitalism and constituted social fascism.

The Brezhnev regime introduced to the world a perverse reinterpretation of proletarian dictatorship and proletarian internationalism, with the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine of “limited sovereignty” and Soviet-centered “international proletarian dictatorship” on the occasion of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was also on this occasion that the Soviet Union came to be called social-imperialist, socialism in words and imperialism in deed. With the same arrogance, Brezhnev deployed hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border.

The Soviet Union under Brezhnev tried to keep a tight rein on its satellites in Eastern Europe within the Warsaw Pact. Thus, it had to expend a lot of resources of its own and those of its satellites in maintaining and equipping half a million Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. Clearly, the revisionist ruling parties and regimes were not developing the lively participation and loyalty of the proletariat and people through socialist progress but were keeping them in bondage through bureaucratic and military means in the name of socialism.

The Soviet Union under Brezhnev promoted the principle of “international division of labor” within the CMEA. This meant the enforcement of neocolonial specialization in certain lines of production by particular member-countries other than the Soviet Union. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the other CMEA member-countries was no different from that between imperialism and the semi-colonies. This stunted the compre-

hensive development of national economies of most of the member countries although some basic industries had been built and continued to be built.

Eventually, the Soviet Union started to feel aggrieved that it had to deliver oil at prices lower than those of the world market and receive off-quality goods in exchange. So, it continuously made upward adjustments on the price of oil supplies to the CMEA client states. At the same time, among the East European countries, there had been the long-running resentment over the shoddy equipment and other goods that they were actually getting from the Soviet Union at a real overprice.

Before the 1970s, the Soviet Union encouraged capitalist-oriented reforms in its East European satellites but definitely discouraged any attempt by these satellites from leaving the Warsaw Pact. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union itself wanted to have a detente with the United States, clinch the “most favored nation” (MFN) treatment, gain access to new technology and foreign loans from the United States and the other capitalist countries. However, in 1972, the Brezhnev regime was rebuffed by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which withheld MFN status from the Soviet Union for preventing Jewish emigration. The regime then further encouraged its East European satellites to enter into economic, financial and trade agreements with the capitalist countries.

During most of the 1970s, these revisionist-ruled countries got hooked on Western investments, loans and consumer goods. In the early 1980s, most of them fell into serious economic troubles as a result of the aggravation of domestic economic problems and the difficulties in handling their debt burden, which per capita in most cases was even worse than that of the Philippines. Being responsible for the economic policies and for their bureaucratic corruption, the revisionist ruling parties and regimes became discredited in the eyes of the broad masses of the people and the increasingly anti-Soviet and anticommunist intelligentsia.

The pro-Soviet ruling parties in Eastern Europe had always been vulnerable to charges of political puppetry, especially from the direction of the anticommunist advocates of nationalism and religion. In the 1970s and 1980s these parties conspicuously degenerated from the inside in an all-round way through bourgeoisification and became increasingly the object of public contempt.

The United States kept on dangling the prospect of MFN status and other economic concessions to the Soviet Union. Each time the United States did so, it was able to get something from the Soviet Union, like its commitment

to the Helsinki Accord (intended to provide legal protection to dissenters in the Soviet Union) and a draft strategic arms limitation treaty but it never gave the concessions that the Soviet Union wanted. The United States simply wanted the Cold War to go on in order to induce or compel the Soviet Union to waste its resources on the arms race. The only significant concession that the Soviet Union continued to get was the purchase of grain and the commercial credit related to it.

When the CPP leadership decided to explore and seek relations with the Soviet and East European ruling parties in the middle of the 1980s, there was the erroneous presumption that the successors of Brezhnev would follow his anti-imperialist line in the Cold War of the two superpowers. Thus, the policy paper on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe praised the Brezhnev line in hyperbolic terms.

Although the Gorbachev regime would pursue worse revisionist policies than those of its predecessor, it would become a good source of information regarding the principal and essential character of the Brezhnev regime on a comprehensive range of issues. By using this information from a critical Marxist-Leninist point of view, we can easily sum up the Brezhnev regime and at the same time know the antisocialist and anticommunist direction of the Gorbachev regime in 1985–88.

THE THIRD AND FINAL STAGE: THE GORBACHEV REGIME, 1985–91

The Gorbachev regime from 1985 to 1991 marked the third and final stage in the anti-Marxist and antisocialist revisionist counterrevolution to restore capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship.

It involved the prior dissolution of the ruling revisionist parties and regimes in Eastern Europe, the absorption of East Germany by West Germany and finally the banning and dispossession of the CPSU and the disintegration of the Soviet Union no less, after a dubious coup attempt by Gorbachev's appointees in the highest state and party positions next only to his.

The counterrevolution was carried out in a relatively peaceful manner. After all, the degeneration from socialism to capitalism proceeded for 38 years. Within the last six years, the corrupt bureaucrats masquerading as communists were ready to peel off their masks, declare themselves as ex-communists and even anticommunists overnight and cooperate with the longstanding anticommunists among the intelligentsia and the aggrieved broad masses of the people in setting up regimes that were openly bourgeois and antisocialist.

Because they were manipulated and directed by the big bourgeoisie and the anticommunist intelligentsia, the mass uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1989 cannot be simply and totally described as democratic although it is also undeniable that the broad masses of the people, including the working class and the intelligentsia, were truly aggrieved and did rise up. The far bigger mass actions that put Mussolini and Hitler into power or the lynch mobs unleashed by the Indonesian fascists to massacre the communists in 1965 do not make a fascist movement democratic. In determining the character of a mass movement, we take into account not only the magnitude of mass participation but also the kind of class leadership involved. Otherwise, the periodic electoral rallies of the bourgeois reactionary parties which exclude the workers and peasants from power or even the Edsa mass uprising cum military mutiny in 1986 would be considered totally democratic, without the necessary qualifications regarding the class leadership involved.

It is possible for nonviolent mass uprisings to arise and succeed when their objective is not to really effect a fundamental change of the exploitative social system, when one set of bureaucrats is simply replaced by another set and when the incumbent set of bureaucrats does not mind the change of administration. It was only in Romania where there was bloodshed because it was not completely within the reorganizing that had been done by the Gorbachevites in 1987 to 1989 in Eastern Europe. Ceaușescu resisted change as did Honecker to a lesser extent. In the dissolution of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, the anticommunist combination of Gorbachev and Yeltsin simply issued the decrees and did not even bother to conjure any semblance of popular demand in the form of huge mass uprisings.

As the last revisionist ruler of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev could accelerate the destruction of the CPSU and the Soviet Union because of the previous work of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. What he did in the main in his brief regime was to engage in a systematic campaign of deception. He described his regime as being engaged in socialist renewal and at the same time encouraged the forces of capitalist restoration to do their work under the slogans of democracy and economic reform.

From time to time, he paid lip service to Marxism-Leninism and socialism and made frequent protestations that he was a convinced communist. But in the end he came out openly as an anticommunist. In his final message as President of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, he used the language of the imperialists in the Cold War to describe his principal achieve-

ment, which is “giving freedom” to the people from “totalitarianism” and “civilizing” what he implied as the “uncivilized” Soviet state and people.

In laying the ideological premises of his regime, Gorbachev went back to the strident anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev and described the Brezhnev period as an interruption of the work initiated by Khrushchev. He rehabilitated Bukharin and put him up as a source of wisdom for “economic reforms.”

It became the fashion for Gorbachev and his colleagues at various levels of the CPSU and the state to describe themselves as “liberal communists” and to attack under the guise of being completely anti-Stalin and depicting Stalin as being worse than Hitler the entire course of Soviet history. They put forward propositions in abstract supra-class, universalistic, humanistic and ahistorical terms and drew from social democracy and bourgeois liberalism in order to denigrate, deviate from and attack Marxist-Leninist theory and the proletarian revolutionary standpoint.

Gorbachev and his colleagues systematically adopted barefaced anticommunist “advisers” and placed the anticommunists in the various branches of government, the Congress of People’s Deputies, the institutes and mass media in order to churn out a constant stream of anticommunist propaganda. Gorbachev himself took the lead in ridiculing the proletarian revolutionary stand as outdated and Marxism-Leninism as having no monopoly of the truth and won the adulation of the officials, ideologues and publicists of the United States and other capitalist countries as he used the language of social democracy and bourgeois liberalism and ultimately US Cold War terminology.

The main and essential feature of “glasnost” (openness) was the crescendo of anticommunist propaganda. The field of propaganda was monopolized by anticommunism. This was expressed in a variety of ways: modern revisionist, social-democratic, bourgeois-liberal, populist, nationalist, fascist, religious, racist and purely cynical terms. The pluralism of anticommunist ideas, including the most antidemocratic ones, was described as democracy.

But the key idea in the welter of anticommunist propaganda was the advocacy of capitalism and bourgeois liberalism. Gorbachev attacked Stalin to be able by implication to attack Lenin, Marxist-Leninist theory and the entire course of Soviet history. But his subalterns explicitly attacked all these in the entire course of the Gorbachev period.

After eliminating the Brezhnevite holdovers in the Politburo in the most undemocratic manner, replacing them when they were on foreign trips or knocking them down at lower levels of the Party and state bureaucracy, Gor-

bachev played the middle between the “conservative” Ligachev who accepted “perestroika” but not “glasnost” and the “radical progressive” Yeltsin who went gung ho for both “glasnost” and “perestroika.” Then, he used Ligachev in 1987 to push out Yeltsin from the Politburo only to let the latter continue as his cooperator in attacking the CPSU from the outside.

In the years leading up to 1989, the anticommunist followers of Gorbachev invented all kinds of lies against the socialist course of Soviet history and its great proletarian leaders and clamored for the rehabilitation of counterrevolutionaries and the freedom of all kinds of monsters. The people were fed with all kinds of illusions about a better life under capitalism.

In 1989, he had a new Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies dominated by an anticommunist intelligentsia most of whom were at first formally communists but would eventually declare themselves as ex-communists and even anticommunists. The congress included from the very start prominent anticommunists of longstanding.

In early 1990, Gorbachev used the congress to disempower the CPSU and to give him autocratic presidential powers. In the autumn of 1990 he took the posture of siding with the “conservatives” in the CPSU and the state against the “radical progressives” Yakovlev and Shevardnadze. But at the same time he agreed to putting the sovereignty of the Soviet Union under question through a referendum in early 1991.

The popular voting in the referendum was for the retention of the Soviet Union. But again he agreed with the nationalist forces in the various republics to make a new “union treaty” whose terms (like having separate armies and currencies, etc.) meant the breakup of the Soviet Union. In this period before the alleged coup to save the Soviet Union, Gorbachev announced that it was wrong to stress the role of the proletariat and that he was going to dissolve the CPSU and establish a social-democratic party.

Although the alleged coup of Gorbachev appointees from August 19 to 22, 1991 involved only a few plotters by its very nature, Gorbachev and Yeltsin collaborated in using it as a pretext for dissolving the entire CPSU and the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies. Although the Soviet Constitution and the Soviet Union were still existing and Gorbachev himself had a presidential term extending to 1995, he decreed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and resigned in favor of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) still on the planning board. Thus, mouthing the slogan of democracy, the anticommunist duo of Gorbachev and Yeltsin autocratically issued

decrees, committed the most antidemocratic acts and carried out their own coup against the Soviet state.

In the first place and in the final analysis, “glasnost” was devised by the monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie to pave the way for openly installing the bourgeois class dictatorship. The din of the petty-bourgeoisie about “democracy” is waning. After all, the drumbeating has been for the restoration of capitalism and the bourgeois class dictatorship. The monopoly bureaucrat bourgeoisie remains in control of the levers of political power and the economy while the petty bourgeoisie is being relegated to a worse life of massive unemployment, frustration and misery.

Perestroika in reality meant capitalist restructuring and the disorganization and breakdown of production, despite the avowals of renewing socialism and raising production through better management, a campaign against alcoholism and absenteeism, higher wages and availability of domestic and imported consumer goods, higher profits for the private entrepreneurs, the expansion and retooling of the means of production and the conversion of military enterprises to civilian uses.

The main line of perestroika is the privatization and marketization of the economy by domestic and foreign investors. One plan after another (the 500-day Shatalin Plan, the Grand Bargain, etc.) was considered and made dependent on foreign direct investments and loans as domestic savings disappeared and the real income of the people was cut down by inflation due to the wanton printing of money by Moscow and the price gouging in the free market. The free marketeers bought cheap or stole from the state enterprises and emptied the state stores. Thus, the people were compelled to buy from the free market.

The most favored among the private businesses were the joint ventures (joint stock companies) with foreign investors and the private cooperatives. Going into joint ventures with foreign investors mainly in the importation of consumer goods and in the repackaging or assembly of these, the high bureaucrats of the ruling party and the state and their family members appropriated for themselves state assets and drew from foreign loans in what may be considered as one of the biggest insider operation and management theft in the entire history of capitalism. These joint ventures were no different from the big comprador operations of high bureaucrats in the Philippines and many other countries in the third world.

However, the most widespread form of business was the private cooperatives of varying scales in industry, agriculture and services. Their operations included the re-channeling of goods and services from the state to the private sector, small and medium private manufacturing and the private export of whatever Soviet goods, including oil and weapons, and the importation of high-grade consumer goods like cars, computers, video recorders, etc. At least 50 million people out of a population of 290 million were registered as members of small, medium and big private cooperatives. Many people joined these private cooperatives if only to gain access to basic commodities which disappeared from the much cheaper state stores.

The capitalist restructuring or economic reforms did not stimulate production and improve the quality of goods but aggravated the breakdown of production and brought about scarcity of the most essential goods. Yet, it was the long-dead Stalin who got blamed by revisionist and imperialist propaganda for the economic chaos brought about by perestroika. The corrupt bureaucrats who continued to call themselves communists connived with private businessmen more scandalously than ever before in plundering the economy.

From 1988 to 1990, Gorbachev increased the money supply by more than 50 percent even as from year to year production had fallen by 10 to 20 percent or worse, and in 1991 alone he increased the money supply by more than 100 percent amidst a production fall of more than 20 percent. The Gorbachev regime had to keep on printing money to maintain the central bureaucracy and the military in view of inflation, corruption, the nationalist refusal of the republics to send up taxes and foreign exchange to the center, the ethnic conflicts and the justifiable workers' strikes.

At the beginning of the Gorbachev regime, the Soviet foreign debt was only US\$30 billion. The previous regimes had not been able to borrow more because of the US-Soviet rivalry in the Cold War. But in the period of only six years, the Gorbachev regime was able to raise the foreign debt level to US\$81 billion (according to the Soviet Central Bank report to the International Monetary Fund) or to US\$100 billion (according to the Soviet Central Bank report to the Group of Seven). In the final year of 1991, the Soviet Union borrowed US\$44 billion.

In view of the production breakdown, the foreign funds were used mainly to finance the importation of consumer goods and the sheer bureaucratic thievery under the cover of the joint ventures. The Soviet Union practically became a neo-colony of Germany, which had become its main creditor and

supplier. Germany accounted for the biggest bulk of foreign supplies and investments (at least 30 percent as of 1991) in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The ghost of Hitler can never be more happy with the success of the German big bourgeoisie.

There was a chain reaction of closures of state enterprises due to the lack of fuel, spare parts and raw materials; the diversion of funds to import foreign products; the lack of purchase orders; and the private appropriation of state assets and funds through real or fake joint ventures. Agriculture also suffered from the lack of inputs and transport. Conversion of military to civilian enterprises was negligible. The military-industrial complex continued to suck up large amounts of resources. As in Eastern Europe, the economy fell apart in the Soviet Union, with each part throwing away past advantages of cooperation and trying to strike disadvantageous deals with the bourgeoisie abroad.

Massive unemployment surfaced. Hyperinflation started to run at more than 200 percent before the breakup of the Soviet Union and was expected to run faster after the decontrol of prices scheduled by Yeltsin for January 2, 1992. Even then more than 100 million Soviet people were living below the poverty line. Most victimized were the pensioners, children, the youth, the women, the unemployed and the low-income people. The shortage or absence of basic necessities was widespread. As in 1990, the leaders of capitalist restoration shamelessly begged for food aid from abroad in 1991. On each occasion, the handling of food aid was attended by corruption as the food was diverted to the free market.

The key element in Gorbachev's "new thinking" in international relations was "de-ideologization," which actually meant doing away completely with the proletarian class stand and proletarian internationalism and capitulating to imperialism under the guise of cooperation. Gorbachev asserted that imperialism's violent nature had changed to peaceful and that humanity has integral interests and a supra-class concern about weapons of mass destruction, ecology and other issues. Gorbachev's "de-ideologization" actually meant the total rejection of the proletarian class stand and the adoption of the bourgeois class stand.

All Marxists recognize the common interests of mankind and the march of human civilization; and at the same time the fact that the world and particular societies are dominated by imperialist and local reactionary classes and that the historic class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is still going on. What Gorbachev did was to use abstract, universalistic

and supra-class terms in order to obscure that historic class struggle and find common cause with imperialism.

He considered “legitimate national interests” of states as the most important building material in international relations. After the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, he scaled down the international activities of the Soviet Union related to cooperating with third world countries and anti-imperialist organizations and movements. Prominent advisers of his also proposed that the international people’s organizations financed by Soviet organizations could unite with their counterparts financed by the forces of capitalism to form bigger “non-ideological” organizations. What they meant of course was outright capitulation to imperialist ideology.

Gorbachev touted the principle of peaceful coexistence among states, irrespective of ideology and social system. He repudiated the Brezhnev Doctrine and stressed that other countries as well as communist parties could decide for themselves. But he was being hypocritical because Gorbachevite agents busied themselves in reorganizing and then scuttling the ruling parties and regimes in Eastern Europe.

He called for an end to the Cold War, for accelerated nuclear disarmament and reduction of conventional forces and for the dissolution of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Arms reduction treaties were forged faster than at any previous period in the Cold War. The Gorbachev regime undertook all these in the vain hope of attracting foreign investments and new technology to shore up the Soviet economy. But the Group of Seven took the firm position that they would not throw good money after bad and shore up an increasingly decrepit and corrupt bureaucratic economy.

Under the Gorbachev leadership, the Soviet Union collaborated with the United States and other countries in the settlement of so-called regional armed conflicts such as those centered in Iran and Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union committed itself to unilateral withdrawal of military forces in Eastern Europe and to German reunification in exchange for economic assistance from the West in the form of direct investments, loans, technology transfer and trade accommodations. Among the capitalist powers, Germany gave the most assistance in the form of loans, consumer supplies and housing aid for Soviet troops returning from Eastern Europe. But even the funds advanced for housing these troops became the object of Soviet mismanagement and theft.

As early as 1987, the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in Eastern Europe were already being pushed to reorganize themselves and to put Gorbachevites on top of the Brezhnevites. The word also went around within and outside the ruling parties and regimes that the Soviet Union was decided on withdrawing its forces from Eastern Europe and not interfere in what would happen in the region. Thus, the anticommunist forces had advance notice of what they could do under the new circumstances. They could play on the real grievances of the people and bring down the already much-discredited ruling parties and regimes.

The socioeconomic and political crisis of the various revisionist regimes and the wide-open knowledge that the Soviet Union was no longer interested in the preservation of the Warsaw Pact and the ruble-controlled CMEA were sufficient grounds for the anticommunist forces to activate themselves and grow.

The increasingly clear message from 1987 to 1989 that the Soviet Union would not intervene in any popular action against the local regimes gave the anticommunist forces the confidence to aim for their toppling. Most important of all, the overwhelming majority of the revisionist bureaucrats in the ruling party and the state (with the exception of a few like Ceaușescu who was relatively independent of the CPSU and Honecker and Zhikhov who were longtime Brezhnevites) were just too willing to drop off their communist masks, retain their privileges, exploit the new opportunities and avoid the wrath of an already aggrieved people.

In the critical references of this discussion to the responsibilities of the Gorbachev regime and the East European satellite regimes in the collapse of the latter, there should be no misunderstanding that we wish a certain policy or a certain flow of events to have gone another way. We are merely describing at this point the final stage of the unmasking and self-destruction of the revisionist parties and regimes.

Next only to the destruction of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, the biggest service done by the Gorbachev regime to the capitalist powers was the rapid delivery of Eastern Europe to them and the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA.

Within the final year of its existence, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev supported the United States in carrying out a war of aggression in the Gulf region and in asserting itself as the unrivaled policeman of the world.

Gorbachev fully revealed himself in 1991. The destructive consequences to the Soviet Union of his kind of leadership became very clear. It is untenable for any revolutionary to make an apologia for him and to try to make him out as a hero. Those who had been deceived into believing that Gorbachev was engaged in socialist renewal should take a long hard look at the incontrovertible fact that he completed the process of capitalist restoration started by Khrushchev and presided over the destruction of the Soviet Union.

The officials, ideologues and propagandists of imperialism and reaction continue to hail Gorbachev as one of the greatest men of the 20th century for bringing about “democracy” in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed they have cause to rejoice. He has brought about the flagrant restoration of capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship. The peoples of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are now thrown open to further capitalist exploitation and oppression, suffer the pangs of hunger and greater loss of freedom and face increased political turmoil, widening civil war and military fascism.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that has replaced the Soviet Union is dominated by Russia, which is flaunting the old czarist flag of Great-Russian chauvinism, and is afflicted with serious contradictions between Russia and the other republics, among republics with common borders, between Russian enclaves and local nationalities in non-Russian republics and among different nationalities within each of the republics.

The contradictions involve political, economic, financial, security, ethnic and border issues. There is political chaos all over the so-called commonwealth. Serious differences between Russia and Ukraine have already arisen regarding economic and financial issues and on the question of dividing the Soviet army, navy and air force, the handling of nuclear weapons and border issues on land and sea. There are independence movements among minority nationalities in Russia and civil wars in Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The economic chaos has been aggravated by liberalizing prices on January 2. The prices of many basic commodities have multiplied up to more than twenty times. The state stores are being emptied by backdoor sales to the free market. Even food aid from abroad has flowed into the free market. More than half of the population have fallen below the poverty line and are in danger of starving. Ninety per cent of the population is expected to fall below the poverty line. Under these circumstances, street demonstrations and workers’

strikes are occurring against the openly capitalist regimes. The trade unions are agitated by the severely oppressive and exploitative conditions and have begun to conduct strikes on a wide scale. The Unity for Leninism and Communist Ideals, the United Front of the Working People, the Russian Workers' Communist Party and the Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Leningrad (St. Petersburg) have been among the most militant in staging mass actions against the Russian bourgeois regime of Yeltsin.

In the Soviet Union, more than 90 percent of the major industries are still owned by the state. This is also true in the case of the East European countries, with the exception of Poland whose privatization has gone fastest and whose state-owned enterprises are still about 65 percent, according to one report. This continuing predominance of state-owned enterprises does not mean socialism. Since a long time ago, many of these enterprises have acquired a capitalist character. They have long come under the control and have become instruments of the bureaucrat capitalists and the private entrepreneurs although these are state-owned. The ongoing privatization of these state enterprises is slowed down by the absence of genuine private venture capital, the disappearance of savings among the people and the lack of foreign interest in acquiring outmoded plants and investing in new ones.

The ex-communist bourgeoisie and the foreign investors are most interested in acquiring at scandalously low prices those state assets that yield quick and large profits. Inefficient and decrepit state enterprises are maintained only as they are still needed and continue being the milking cows of private entrepreneurs (e.g., steel and other metals, energy and other raw materials, transport, etc.) Closures and reduced production are continuing at an accelerated pace. In the process, millions of workers are laid off. There is a process of deindustrialization throwing back the former Soviet Union or the republics of the so-called CIS and Eastern Europe into the quagmire of third world capitalism.

A strong political and economic center is absent in the CIS. But in the meantime, there is a strong military center because the central command of the former Soviet armed forces is retained. Even the leaders of the capitalist countries who are worried about the nuclear and other strategic weapons insist that these be under a single military command. However, the political and economic chaos can induce the military officers to take matters into their hands as the military rank and file and the broad masses of the people are already gravely discontented.

It is still a matter of conjecture for outside observers whether there will be a social upheaval in the tradition of the Bolsheviks (the military rank and file linking up with the workers' organizations) or a coup to install military fascism over the entire scope of the so-called commonwealth or in a series of republics (like now in Georgia). The prevalent view is that the new bourgeoisie inside and outside the armed forces is so powerful that for the time being the likelihood of military fascism to rise is greater than the return to the socialist road if there is going to be any new drastic development.

CHAPTER IV

CERTAIN LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF MODERN REVISIONISM IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

It is of crucial importance to make a precise description of the ruling parties and regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the crisis that conspicuously beset them since the early 1980s and their collapse from 1989 to 1991. These ruling parties and regimes were revisionist. Their crisis and collapse are not those of socialism but of modern revisionism or capitalist restoration masquerading as socialism. The blatant restoration of capitalism and the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie are the indubitable proof. The unraveling of the revisionist systems and the unfolding of the truth in the few years before the collapse occurred right before our eyes.

There is ideological and political confusion if the crisis and collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes are described as those of socialism or Stalinism rather than of modern revisionism. Such a description would continue to pass off modern revisionism as socialism. All Marxist-Leninists must firmly recognize the fact that modern revisionism had undermined and prevailed over socialism long before the former itself plunged into a crisis and led to the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes from 1989 to 1991.

One may speak of a crisis of socialism only in the thinking of some of those who presume modern revisionism to be socialism and observe the crisis and collapse of the ruling revisionist parties and regimes. The imperialists, the revisionists themselves and the bourgeois intelligentsia simplistically call the crisis and collapse of these anti-Stalin parties and regimes as the “crisis of Stalinism” or the “Stalinist model of socialism.” Stalin has been dead for 38 years and a process of “de-Stalinization” has been going on for the last 35 years.

It is preposterous that long after his death Stalin is still being blamed for what his detractors have done or not done all these years in order to promote modern revisionism and restore capitalism. This is pure obscurantism and personality cult in reverse! The merits and demerits of any leader must be considered only within his period of responsibility, unless the objective is not to make a historical assessment but to demonize a leader and use psywar to attack Marxism-Leninism and socialism in a bourgeois personalistic manner.

The modern revisionists should not be allowed to cover up their responsibility within their own period of rule. As a matter of fact, Stalin's great achievements in socialist construction and defense of the Soviet Union are diametrically opposed to the restoration of capitalism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union by the modern revisionists.

We must draw the correct lessons from the betrayal and sabotage of socialism by the modern revisionists from Khrushchev through Brezhnev to Gorbachev. We must combat those forces and elements that wish to destroy the Party and the revolutionary movement from within by aping Gorbachev and the like and opposing the basic revolutionary principles of the Party.

THE ANTIREVISIONIST LINE

The reconsideration of the revisionist ruling parties as Marxist-Leninist and the revisionist regimes as socialist since 1982 by certain elements within the Party has generated misunderstanding of scientific socialism and a deviation from the antirevisionist line of the Party. This must be rectified in view of the undeniable fact of the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes and in connection with the correction of the exaggerated, incorrect and futile notion that these parties and regimes could extend assistance for accelerating the victory of the Philippine revolution.

As a result of the collapse of these parties and regimes, the CPP is ever more resolved to adhere to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and to pursue the antirevisionist line and persevere in armed revolution. The anticommunists who seek to use the collapse of modern revisionism as an invalidation and complete negation of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism deserve nothing but contempt.

The CPP upholds the fact that Marxist-Leninist theory has correctly guided the proletarian revolutionaries and more than a billion people to victory in new-democratic revolution and in socialist revolution and construction. As far as the Philippines is concerned, the working class is the leading class in the new-democratic and socialist stages of the revolution. The advanced detachment of this class is the CPP. Without this party, the revolutionary mass movement of the people would not have re-surfaced in Philippine history along the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal line, with a socialist perspective. The petty bourgeois groups that seek to confuse, discredit, weaken and destroy the CPP can only continue being servitors of the oppressors and

exploiters without the Party and the toiling masses of workers and peasants carrying out the revolution most determinedly.

What the CPP considers now as the greatest challenge in theoretical work among all proletarian revolutionaries, including Filipino communists, is learning lessons from the long-term and peaceful restoration of capitalism in socialist countries and understanding the way of continuing the revolution, combating modern revisionism and preventing the restoration of capitalism in socialist society as well as of fighting for socialism wherever it has been replaced by capitalism.

In countries where modern revisionism has had its way and restored capitalism, the challenge in theoretical and practical work among proletarian revolutionaries is to bring back socialism and bring it to a new and higher level. The forces of socialism can probably win again only after undergoing the violence of capitalist oppression and exploitation and defeating this through revolutionary violence. There is yet no historical example of a non-exploiting society replacing an exploiting class society without revolutionary violence although it has been demonstrated repeatedly in history that a higher form of society can degenerate into a lower form through peaceful evolution.

In the course of both the new-democratic and socialist stages of the Philippines, the basic factors of counterrevolution (big bourgeoisie and landlord class) are never obliterated completely (especially in the sphere of ideology and social psychology) by the main factors of revolution (working class and peasantry). And there are intermediate factors (urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie) that operate between the two poles of revolution and counterrevolution. The main factors of revolution can come on top of those of counterrevolution and in the process win over the intermediate factors, which in turn exert both positive and negative influences on the main factors of revolution.

In the complexity of waging the new-democratic and socialist stages of the revolution, the proletarian party must uphold its revolutionary integrity through adherence to Marxism-Leninist theory, from philosophy down to strategy and tactics, and must always conduct a concrete analysis of concrete conditions in order to lead the broad masses of the people from victory to victory.

Marxism-Leninism is on the high road of human civilization, cherishing the heritage from the past, availing of all current factors that make for progress; and always aiming for a better future. But it is wrong to use such terms

of idealism as universal humanism, classless populism, supra-class state, pacifism and such other abstract terms in order to obscure and negate the proletarian class stand and in fact give way to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie and other backward forces in the real world.

It is wrong to declare prematurely the end of exploiting classes and class struggle while in fact they continue to exist both domestically and internationally during the entire historical epoch of socialism. The seeming disappearance of the exploiting classes by socio-economic definition does not mean that the proletarian character of the ruling party and the state has become unnecessary and that the intelligentsia automatically becomes proletarian in socialist society. In fact, the bourgeoisie first reemerges through the bureaucracy and the intellectual sphere as petty bourgeois and then in the social economy as bureaucrat capitalists colluding with the private capitalists.

It is wrong to propagate, under the cover of idealist and metaphysical terms, mechanical materialism, specifically in the form of the theory of productive forces which posits that the development of the “productive forces” can one-sidedly and automatically bring about socialist progress. Revolution in the relations of production as well as in the superstructure must take the lead over production. Otherwise the idea gains ground that socialism with a low technological and economic level can advance only through domestic capitalist-oriented economic reforms and submission to the industrial capitalist countries.

THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

Upon the basic completion of the new-democratic revolution through the seizure of political power in the Philippines, the people’s democratic government is established. This is the form that the proletarian dictatorship takes in consonance with the basic worker-peasant alliance under proletarian leadership. Thus, the socialist revolution can begin in every aspect of society. The building of a socialist society and not a “national democratic society” begins, even if there are still transitory bourgeois democratic measures to undertake.

The people’s democratic government or socialist state must of course serve the entire people. But it cannot be really classless or supra-class. There is a definite class hegemony, either proletarian or bourgeois. For communists to waver about this is to concede to the initiative of the bourgeoisie and its intellectual and political agents. The socialist state is categorically a class dictatorship of the proletariat to preclude the counterrevolution of the exploit-

ing classes and make instantly possible the substance and process of democracy for the entire people. The party must never relinquish its leadership over the entire state and the people's army and must retain its Party organization therein until the time comes for the state to wither away, after a whole historical epoch of building socialism, defeating imperialism and neocolonialism and preparing the way for communism.

The modern revisionist bureaucrats systematically opposed the concept of proletarian dictatorship under the cover of populism and “no more exploiting classes and no more class struggle” or the “dying out of the class struggle” in order to resurrect the bourgeoisie within the bureaucracy as well as in society through capitalist-oriented reforms. Proletarian dictatorship should comprehensively guarantee national freedom of the people against imperialism; class freedom of the exploited against the exploiting classes; and individual freedom against the ever-potential alienation and abuse of state power.

The socialist constitution and the proletarian dictatorship must guarantee the civil rights of individuals and organizations that adhere to socialism, promote public participation in the affairs of the state and put restraints on the possible abuse of power by the state and its officials. These restraints include the basic freedoms, electoral process, popular power of recall, definite terms of office, age limits and restrictions on personal incomes and privileges and against any kind of privilege or favor which is not based on merit.

No elective national leader may be elected for a period longer than two five-year terms, and all officials may retire optionally at 65 and obligatorily at 70. Any individual or organization has the right to express anything in any legal way, be this criticism or constructive proposal without fear of reprisal. Due process is guaranteed. A person is presumed innocent, unless proven guilty in a court on the basis of evidence and through a fair trial. Thus, in the popular struggle against counterrevolution, the target is narrowed and the danger of abuse is averted.

But as already demonstrated in the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes, it is incorrect to promote individual freedom outside of the clear framework of anti-imperialism (national freedom) and socialism (freedom from the exploiting classes). Individual freedom should not become the license for the imperialists and the local bourgeoisie and other reactionaries to oppose socialism and regain control over society.

In the entire historical epoch of socialism, the proletariat must see to it that the leading role of the proletariat is upheld in the constitution. Subse-

quent to the democratic coalition government by consensus, there can be an upper house of congress as the house of the working people under proletarian leadership and a lower house of congress as the house of the district representatives of the people. Retired but still mentally able revolutionary leaders can be in advisory councils enjoying high moral authority, most useful in any moment of constitutional crisis that may threaten the revolution.

The proletarian revolutionary party should never be thought of as just any party, comparable to any party in the multiplicity of permitted parties in the bourgeois political system as in the current multi-party system of the Philippines which is actually monopolized by political factions of the exploiting classes. The Party is a revolutionary party that seeks and effects a radical rupture from private ownership of the means of production and all exploiting societies which have existed in various forms for millennia.

Notwithstanding the radical rupture sought and the mission of the working class to build socialism in a whole historical epoch, working-class parties which come to power have limited their memberships to a small part of society (typically five to ten percent of the population), with the Party expanding its influence in society through mass organizations and state agencies. It is understandable that the Party is a small part of society in the course of the fierce struggle to seize power because of the coercive power of the reactionary state and the dangers to life, limb and liberty to Party members and that there is a limit to the expansion of Party membership soon after the seizure of political power to avert the avalanche of overnight communists and opportunists coming into the Party. But after the consolidation of political power and proletarian control of all aspects of society, especially the educational and cultural system, there is no reason why the Party should not increase its membership up to the point of including the majority of the people.

The Party has a cadre and mass character now. It should continue to be so after the seizure of political power. The cadres can ensure the high quality of the Party and the mass membership, the strong democratic foundation formed by workers and peasants. The Party cannot automatically ensure its high revolutionary quality by simply remaining small. On the other hand, it is liable to be swamped by an excessively high proportion of intelligentsia, including fictitious communists. Worse, the party will be increasingly regarded as a small and privileged part of society. If the Party remains small, it can be challenged any time by any political group or movement which has a comparatively large or even larger membership; or by the traditional-

ly dominant church which registers most or much of the population as its member and claims the religious or moral allegiance of these people.

In accordance with the historic mission of the working class to build socialism, the representatives of the Party must be assured of at least one third of elective positions in the state alongside the representatives of the mass organizations of the working people and other sections of society. But within every slot allotted to the major components of society, the people inside and outside the Party must be able to choose candidates from a list in an electoral process.

With a large mass membership, the Party can confidently engage in multi-party cooperation along the united front line. The worst kind of model is a political system of only one party, which includes only a small fraction of society. The socialist society must be able to allow the existence and cooperation of several parties which offer lists of candidates subject to the consensus in the socialist united front, the electoral will of the people and the constitutional framework of socialist revolution and construction.

SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND CONSTRUCTION

Upon the basic completion of the new-democratic revolution through the seizure of political power, the proletariat and the people under the leadership of the Party can begin socialist revolution and construction. The means of production and distribution owned by the imperialists, big compradors and landlords are put under public ownership. The strategic enterprises and the main lines of production and distribution are nationalized. These comprise the initial base for socialist construction. Then the socialist state sector of the productive system can be expanded with further investments from the available domestic capital, export income and foreign borrowing.

But there are bourgeois-democratic economic reforms that still need to be undertaken as transitory measures, such as land reform and concessions to peasants of all strata and petty and middle bourgeois non-monopoly commodity producers. These reforms and concessions do not mean the building of a “national-democratic economy” in lieu of a socialist economy. The cooperativization of agriculture and nonagricultural enterprises as well as joint state-private ownership can be carried out from one stage to a higher one in conjunction with socialist construction and further industrialization.

In view of the fact that so far in history socialist economies have been established upon a low economic and technological level and worse after a

ruinous war, the proletarian revolutionary party is obliged to adopt transitory measures. How long these measures should run depends on the concrete conditions. In the Soviet Union, Lenin had to adopt the New Economic Policy. And Stalin subsequently pioneered in drawing up and implementing the series of five-year plans of socialist construction. He succeeded in building a socialist industrial economy.

But even after a socialist industrial economy had been established, the modern revisionists misrepresented Lenin's New Economic Policy as the way to socialism rather than as a mere transitory measure. Thus, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev made this misrepresentation by using the name of Lenin against Lenin. They justified the retrogression to capitalist-oriented reforms by counterposing Lenin's transitional policy to Stalin's program to build publicly owned heavy and basic industries and collectivize agriculture in a planned way.

After the New Economic Policy served its purpose, Stalin carried out full-scale socialist construction. It was prompt and absolutely necessary to do so in the face of the growth of capitalism threatening the socialist revolution. Anti-socialist critics decry overinvestment in heavy and basic industries, the suppression of the rebellious rich peasants and the exploitation of the peasantry. But they fail to mention that the hard work, the struggle against the counterrevolutionaries and the sacrifice resulted in the raising of production and standard of living, the mechanization of agriculture and the expansion of urban life in so short a period of time. If Bukharin had had his way and prolonged the NEP, the Soviet Union would have generated an uncontrollable bourgeoisie and a widespread rich peasantry to overpower the proletariat, would have had less economic well-being and less defense capability, would have been an easier prey to Hitler and would have been attacked earlier by Nazi Germany.

After World War II, China under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China was able to demonstrate that there could be a well-balanced growth of agriculture as the foundation of the economy, heavy industry as the leading factor and light industry as the bridging factor between the first two. The line of Mao was to provide as quickly as possible the producer and consumer goods for the people, especially the peasant masses. But even Mao was unfairly accused by modern revisionists of industrial overinvestment and premature cooperativization. At any rate, the Chinese example under the leadership of Mao bettered the Soviet example

under the leadership of Stalin in well-balanced development in a poor country engaged in socialist construction. The theory and practice of scientific socialism, therefore, is ever developing. All modern revisionists are carried away by the theory of “productive forces” and economism. They prate about the law of value but at the same time they obscure the critical Marxist theory of surplus value and the creative line of using what is otherwise private profit as social profit and of converting what is otherwise an anarchic yet monopolistic production for private profit into a system of planned production for use and for the benefit of the entire society.

Marxists have always agreed with Adam Smith and his followers that the value of a commodity is equivalent to the average socially necessary labor time and that the exchange value (price) is realized in the market. In the socialist system, there is a system of wage differentials paid according to quantity and quality of work done. Within the system of public ownership of the means of production and economic planning, the new value created is allocated for the wages fund for consumption, economic reinvestment not only to cover depreciation but also expansion of production, general welfare (education, health, infrastructure, etc.), administration and national defense.

Aside from the wage system with differentials which corresponds to the system of commodity values, the commodities produced incorporate inputs which are bought from other parts of the domestic or world market at certain prices and which are taken into account in the market price of the commodities. Price comparisons can also be made with similar commodities produced abroad.

The socialist system of production has proven to be effective in creating full employment, attaining high rates of economic growth, responding to the basic needs of the people and providing social services until a new bourgeoisie starts to appropriate an increasing part of the surplus product and develops a taste for high-grade consumer goods which it at first acquires through institutional buying from abroad.

In addition to the high consumption and excessive privileges of the new bourgeoisie, another big drain is the misallocation of resources towards military expenditures because of the imperialist threat. This in fact constituted the biggest drain on the resources of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under the long reign of Brezhnev. But this is obscured by imperialist propaganda whenever it asserts that socialism is inherently flawed or that the so-called Stalinist model pursued by the modern revisionists has failed. In

going for the arms race, the Brezhnev regime deviated from the concepts of people's defense and all-round consolidation adhered to by Stalin when the Soviet Union was militarily weaker and faced bigger threats from the capitalist powers.

The fact is that the socialist economies progressed for a certain number of decades and it would take another number of decades for the modern revisionists to make these economies retrogress into capitalism, under such bourgeois notions as stimulating production and improving the quality of production through private enterprise and the free market.

The adoption of capitalist-oriented reforms to "supplement" and "assist" socialist economic development is thereby wrongly rationalized. But the bourgeoisie, the corrupt bureaucrats and rich peasants are recreated and generated to undermine and destroy socialism from within. After a certain period of liberalization of the economy, the bourgeois forces can demand further privatization and marketization more vigorously and ultimately claim political power as in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union.

But usually at the beginning of their effort to subvert the socialist economy, when there are yet no significant number of private entrepreneurs within the country, they wage a campaign for learning "efficient management" from capitalist countries (unmindful of the wasteful business cycles and wars and the centuries of exploiting the proletariat, the colonies and the spheres of influence), for expanded trade with the capitalist countries, foreign investments, loans and technology transfer and therefore for an investment law attractive to the multinational firms and banks as well as to the domestic bourgeoisie which must be promoted if even the foreign bourgeoisie is allowed to enjoy the freedom of investing and owning assets in the country and hiring local people.

Without having to breach or abandon basic socialist principles and without having to enlarge domestic and foreign private ownership of the means of production, it is possible to use wage differentials and bonuses as incentives for raising the quantity and quality of goods according to reliable and accurate information on productive capacity and consumer demand and according to the resultant economic plan, to satisfy the basic needs of the people first and then to proceed to produce non-basic goods for improving the standard of living, to build one generation of better housing after another as a lifetime incentive and to decentralize economic activities with better results.

The production of both basic and non-basic consumer goods is complementary and interactive. When basic needs are satisfied and private savings mount, the people start looking for things to spend on in order to improve or make their lives more interesting. Some high-grade consumer goods can be locally produced. Others can be imported without prejudicing the priority given to the development of the entire economy and the importation of essential producer and consumer goods.

In the case of the Soviet Union, before there could be a Gorbachev, there was the prolonged period of Brezhnev in which the new bourgeoisie developed domestically and resources were wasted in the arms race and in the costly commitments abroad under the theory of defending the Soviet Union by developing the strategic offense capability and by being able to wage wars abroad.

We have seen that the concept of people's defense or people's war against an aggressor, within the people's self-reliant capabilities, within their own national borders and without undermining the growth of the socialist economy, still constitutes the correct policy.

The Soviet corps of research scientists, engineers and technologists was the largest in the world. They made great advances in basic research, experiments and prototyping. But only those advances suitable to the high technology requirements of the arms race were used in a big way. And because of disorientation and some false sense of economy in civil production, old and outmoded equipment tended to be kept and reproduced so that this exceedingly important area of the economy was deprived of the benefits of high technology.

In a socialist economy, the planners must adopt a reasonable measure for depreciation of productive equipment, durable consumer goods and infrastructures so that there is room for innovation and enlivening of production. It is not true that there has to be competition among capitalists in order to generate new and better products. The Soviet Union was able to keep on raising its military and space technology in a planned way.

In carrying out socialist construction, after the transitory period of reviving the economy from the ravages of war and completing the bourgeois-democratic reforms, we shall uphold the principle of instituting the socialist relations of production to liberate the productive forces and promote their growth; and after having advanced along the socialist line and gone beyond certain transitory measures, we shall never retrogress to the revisionist line of using capitalist-oriented reforms to push socialism forward.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

In continuing the revolution, combating revisionism and other counter-revolutionary forces and preventing the restoration of capitalism in socialist society, the cultural revolution must be carried out coextensively and interactively with the political and socioeconomic revolution.

If we are to avoid the errors which caused the failure of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China, we must grasp that the cultural revolution is a persuasive democratic process with Marxist-Leninist theory in the lead carried out along the general line of the people's revolutionary struggle, that the process is a protracted one and so many times more protracted than either the people's war or socialist economic construction and should not be rushed in order not to be persecutory; and that to preempt anarchy institutions like the Party, the state, the people's organizations, the educational system, the mass media and so on should take on responsibility for leadership over the cultural mass movement, with due process rigorously followed and the rights of individuals and groups respected.

The cultural revolution is an important process for keeping high the proletarian revolutionary consciousness and the spirit of selflessness and service to the people. As one generation after another draws away from the accomplished process of seizing political power from the reactionaries and the heroic efforts to establish a socialist society, those who are in the bureaucracy of the ruling party, the state and even in the mass organizations can degenerate into a new bourgeoisie and adopt modern revisionism and other retrograde ideas and policies. The youth and intelligentsia can adopt petty-bourgeois attitudes, grow cynical towards those in power, fall for anticommunist views and adulate the ideas and fashions of the domestic and international bourgeoisie.

Even while we are still engaged in the new-democratic revolution in the Philippines, we are already carrying out a cultural revolution among the people. We are promoting a cultural revolution with a national, democratic and scientific character. At the core of this revolutionary mass phenomenon are proletarian revolutionary cadres guided by the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

Our cultural revolution of a new-democratic type is distinct from and yet continuous with the socialist cultural revolution. Like now, we shall continue to combine Party leadership, the mass movement and a strong sense of the rights of the individual within the anti-imperialist and socialist framework. We shall take all the necessary time, no matter how long, to raise the peo-

ple's revolutionary consciousness from one level to another through formal and informal educational and cultural activities and to isolate and defeat the ideas that run counter to socialism.

In socialist society, we shall carry out the cultural revolution to promote the proletarian revolutionary stand and the spirit of service to the people. The cultural revolution shall ceaselessly put revolutionary politics (patriotic and proletarian) and moral incentive in command of production and other social activities. The revolutionization of the superstructure shall complement and interact with the revolutionization of the mode of production.

When the bourgeoisie is deprived of its economic and political power, it seeks to make a comeback at first in the ideological and cultural fields. When it succeeds at ideological revision and cultural pollution, then it can undertake the changes in political and economic policies which favor capitalist restoration. The bourgeoisie is most effective when it can work through un-remolded and degenerate elements within the state and the ruling party. The proletarian revolutionaries have therefore to be ever vigilant and resolute in maintaining the correct line and in militantly waging the socialist cultural revolution.

The main contradiction in socialist society is the one between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The old bourgeois class and the landlord class are easy to identify and the people are vigilant towards them. So the members of these defeated classes would rather encourage the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy to start adopting the petty-bourgeois mode of thinking and behavior. On the basis of this, the bourgeoisie can regain lost ground, especially in the ideological and cultural fields. When the proletariat loses the fight in these fields, the already pronounced bourgeois revisionists can push the anti-proletarian change of political and economic policies under the guise of transcending classes and class struggle.

By that time, the bourgeoisie shall have been well on the way to re-imposing itself on the proletariat and the people and restoring capitalism. The restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe proves that the victory of socialism is not irreversible in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution. All proletarian revolutionaries can learn important lessons from the way the bourgeoisie has come on top of the proletariat in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through peaceful evolution from within the state and the party and by using the state against the party, particularly the dwindling proletarian revolutionaries in the party.

In building socialism as the long-term preparation for communism, we shall strive to reduce the gap and solve the contradictions between the proletariat and peasantry, between mental and physical labor and between urban and rural life. We shall do so by mustering the capabilities of the proletariat and the rest of the people, utilizing science and technology and fostering a socialist civilization.

We owe to Mao the theory of continuing revolution, combating modern revisionism and preventing capitalist restoration in socialist society; and the application of this theory in the great proletarian cultural revolution, which succeeded for a number of years until the errors accumulated and resulted in a Rightist backlash. If the positive aspects are upheld and the negative aspects are corrected, then Mao's theory and practice of the cultural revolution can be the treasury of knowledge on the basic principles and methods for continuing the revolution in socialist society. The theoretical work on the cultural revolution is a wide and open field for study.

The failure of a revolution is never the permanent end of it. The Paris Commune of 1871 succeeded briefly and failed. But the theory of class struggle and proletarian dictatorship was never invalidated. After 46 years, the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed.

Then, the forces of fascism wiped out the working-class parties in many European countries and eventually invaded the Soviet Union. But soon after World War II, several socialist countries arose in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Modern revisionism would emerge to afflict a number of socialist countries. And finally from 1989 to 1991, we witnessed the collapse of revisionist parties and regimes. This confirms the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism and eliminates a certain number of revisionist parties and regimes which have caused theoretical and political confusion in the socialist and anti-imperialist movement.

Unfortunately, the capitalist powers have become more arrogant and cruel upon the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower rival of the United States. But they are beset by the crisis of overproduction and contradictions are growing between them and their client states in the imperialist and neocolonial framework. In fact, the continuing crisis of the countries in which capitalism and bourgeois dictatorship have been restored in a blatant manner, has all along been part of the global capitalist crisis. The former Soviet republics and the East European countries have become hotbeds of

nationalism, ethnic conflicts, militarism and civil war and lay bare the rottenness of the capitalist system.

Upon the aggravation of capitalist oppression and exploitation, the anti-imperialist and socialist cause is bound to surge to a new and higher level. The high technology in the hands of the capitalist powers has already deepened and aggravated the crisis of overproduction. The trade war among the capitalist powers is developing in the wake of the end of the bipolar Cold War. The United States is disturbing the balance among the capitalist powers as it seeks to revive its productive capacity, expand its trade and solve its huge deficit and debt problems in an environment where the other capitalist powers are holding tightly on to their productive and trade advantages and all neocolonial client states (except a few earners of export surplus due to US market accommodations) in the South and East are long depressed and find no relief from deficits, debt problems and austerity measures.

For some time, notwithstanding the disappearance of the two-superpower rivalry, the social turbulence and political violence will increase throughout the world.

From these will reemerge the anti-imperialist and socialist movement at a new and higher level. The increased oppression and exploitation of the peoples of the world can only serve to generate the revolutionary movement. What has come about as a hostile environment for this movement is a precondition and a challenge for its resurgence.

PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

The ever-worsening crisis of the Philippine ruling system provides the fertile ground for the continuance and growth in strength of the revolutionary mass movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines. But to gain total victory in the new-democratic revolution and proceed to the socialist revolution, the Party must take fully into account the international situation and draw further strength from the world proletariat and other positive forces abroad.

In international relations, we must be guided above all by the principle of proletarian internationalism. Especially in the current situation, we must unite and close ranks with the working-class parties and organizations that adhere to Marxism-Leninism and are waging revolutionary struggles in their respective countries.

The ever-worsening crisis of the world capitalist system and the ever-escalating oppression and exploitation are prodding the proletarian revolutionaries and peoples in various countries to reaffirm the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. Even now, it is clear that the current decade is one of social turmoil in the world capitalist system and popular resistance to neo-colonialism. It is not going to be a decade of Pax Americana and capitulation by the forces of revolutionary change.

More than a billion people (a quarter of humanity) continue to live and work in societies that consider themselves socialist and are led by parties that consider themselves communist. The crisis of the world capitalist system shall have become far worse than now before the degree or semblance of socialism that exists in the world can be erased.

The disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and their counterparts abroad is part of the crisis of the world capitalist system and is in fact a positive development in the sense that it provides alerting lessons to all proletarian revolutionaries, demonstrate the folly of straying from Marxism-Leninism and from the road of socialism and argues against the illusions that the modern revisionists have conjured for a long time on a world scale.

In accordance with the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Communist Party of the Philippines is more than ever determined to engage in all possible ways to develop mutual understanding, fraternal relations, and mutual support and cooperation with all working-class parties and proletarian revolutionaries the world over.

The Party is grateful to all fraternal proletarian parties for the moral and concrete support that they extend to the resolute revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people and for recognizing the Party as one of the advanced detachments of the world proletariat which can contribute to the re-strengthening of the world socialist and anti-imperialist movement in theory and practice.

Like today when it sincerely follows the slogan, "Workers of all countries, unite!" and gives uppermost importance to the world unity of workers through party-to-party relations, the Party shall uphold proletarian internationalism as the highest principle and general line of international relations when it is in power and shall give the uppermost importance to the world unity of workers through party-to-party relations as well as through the relations of the socialist state with other socialist states.

Fidelity to proletarian internationalism is a necessary measure of whether a party is Marxist-Leninist or not and whether a state is socialist or not. It is aimed at creating the world conditions for socialism to prevail over capitalism, for the working class to defeat the bourgeoisie and all reaction, and paving the way for communism; and therefore at realizing the mutual support and cooperation of all proletarian revolutionary forces, without any party or state infringing on the independence and equality of others.

We have seen parties and states that start out as proletarian revolutionary but later degenerate and become revisionist and relate with other parties and states only as these become subservient and become their foreign policy tools. They subordinate the principle of proletarian internationalism to diplomatic and economic relations with bourgeois states. They stop mentioning proletarian internationalism as if it were a dirty phrase, as cosmopolitan relations with transnational corporations and banks gain the uppermost importance.

Learning lessons from recent history, the Communist Party of the Philippines is resolved that in the future the foreign policy of the new Philippines shall encompass relations with other socialist states, with working-class parties, with peoples and revolutionary movements and with states (irrespective of ideology or social system) in that order of importance, under the guidance of proletarian internationalism in basic correspondence to the socialist character of the state and the proletarian revolutionary character of the ruling party.

The Party is confident that the ever-worsening crisis of the world capitalist system and the resurgence of the socialist and anti-imperialist movement will create the global conditions favorable for their winning total victory in the new-democratic revolution and for establishing a socialist society that requires the proletarian party and state to practice proletarian internationalism at a new and higher level.

**Reaffirm Our Basic
Principles and Rectify Errors^I**

Central Committee of the CPP

July 1992

Let us reaffirm the basic revolutionary principles of the Party on the 23rd anniversary of its reestablishment. These are our guiding light in taking stock of and celebrating the accomplishments of the Party as well as in confronting certain long-running problems and unprecedented setbacks.

Our basic principles are set forth in the documents of reestablishment such as “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party,” the Party Constitution and Program. As proletarian revolutionaries, we must always measure ourselves according to these principles.

These principles run through the following: adherence to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, repudiation of modern revisionism, the class analysis of Philippine society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the general line of new democratic revolution, the leading role of the working class through the Party, the theory of people’s war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, the united front along the revolutionary class line, democratic centralism, the socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism.

Through the years, the overwhelming majority of Party cadres and members have adhered to these basic principles and have won great victories in carrying the Philippine revolution forward. The Party played an outstanding role in the long struggle against the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship up to the end and comprehensively and profoundly advanced the Philippine revolution to a level higher than at any time in the past.

Under the guidance of the Party’s general line, correct tactics against the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship, policy on the step-by-step, all-sided and consistent pursuit of the armed revolution and through the courageous struggles and sacrifices by Party cadres and members and by the revolutionary masses,

¹ Editorial Note: This is the final document as amended and approved by the Central Committee of the Party. This supersedes the draft presented by CC Chairman Armando Liwanag and the version amended and approved by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee.

This is an internal Party document. Party cadres can make copies of this document only upon authorization by higher organs. New and unpublished data presented in this document can be published only upon the permission and authorization of higher organs of the Party.

Because this is a summing up of major errors and shortcomings and also a rectification document, there is a preponderance of criticism rather than of celebration of the achievements of the Party.

This is the principal document of the ongoing rectification movement. It is supplemented by the General Review of Important Events and Decisions From 1980 to 1991.

the Party, the people's army, the mass movement and the revolutionary united front reached in the mid-1980s a level unprecedented in scope and strength since the Party's reestablishment, far beyond the highest level ever achieved by the armed revolution under the leadership of the old merger party.

At the same time, there have been gross deviations and errors which have caused grievous damage to the Party and the revolutionary mass movement. There have also been other errors and shortcomings, which although not as serious, have nonetheless caused damage or served as a drag on the advance of the revolution. Impelled by petty bourgeois impetuosity and subjectivism in the face of the vigorous advance of the revolution and the rapid decline of the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship, there emerged inside the Party certain concepts of "advancing" the revolution that deviated from the basic principles and the theory and line of people's war, flew away from concrete conditions and the actual strength of the revolutionary forces and overreached for a quick victory by skipping the necessary stages for advancing the revolution.

The worst among these is the line combining the desire for urban armed insurrection and army "regularization," that in the countryside encouraged military adventurist actions and the purely military viewpoint and, in the cities, actions and ideas of putschism and worship of the spontaneous masses. The obsession with urban insurrection and the premature buildup of higher but as yet unsustainable military formations (companies and battalions) and top-heavy staff structures, deprived the countryside of cadres urgently needed for mass work. These are misrepresented as adjustments or refinements on the theory and practice of people's or otherwise as a superior theory or strategy. Thus, we are plagued by a reduction of mass base and other concomitant problems that in gravity are also unprecedented in the experience of the reestablished Party.

The serious deviations and errors were not identified, criticized and repudiated for a long time. These were allowed to spread and influence a portion of the Party organization and created a great amount of disorientation and damage, and then to harden to the point of rejecting criticism and rectification, and now to a degree these threaten the very life of the Party and the revolutionary movement. However, the correct line and those who adhere to it still prevail and can further prevail over the wrong line. It should be made clear, however, that we are still far stronger in several respects than in 1968, 1977 or 1980. The entire strength of the Party, the people's army and the mass movement in the countryside and the cities is more or less at the level we reached in 1983

or 1984. If we rectify the deviations and errors and take firm steps towards the correct course, the strength that we have achieved and maintained until today is sufficient for us to continue advancing towards the last phase of the strategic defensive. There is firm ground for further leading the masses (arousing, organizing and mobilizing them) and launching the offensives (mass actions and armed tactical offensives) that we are capable of.

The enemy is daydreaming when he boasts of being able to defeat the Party and the people in 1992 and 1993. The ruling system is wracked by an ever worsening political and economic crisis. There is increasing violence among the political factions of the exploiting classes. The preindustrial semi-colonial and semi-feudal economy continues to be plundered by the local exploiting classes and the multinational firms and banks. The crisis drives the broad masses of the people to resistance and provides the fertile ground for the armed revolution and the legal democratic movement.

We must stand firmly as proletarian revolutionaries like the Bolsheviks did when capitalism expanded rapidly to become modern imperialism in the period before World War I and the classical revisionists dominated the Second International and also like the Communists did when they fought fascism during another period before, during and after World War II. We must stand firm and fight now in another dark period when capitalism seems to be unchallenged and unbeatable as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the revisionist ruling parties and regimes and their replacement by undisguised bourgeois class dictatorship and capitalist regimes.

The chronic crisis of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal social system is ever worsening and provides the conditions for the development of our protracted armed revolution. We see the ever-growing contradictions among the capitalist powers, between them and the increased number of debt-ridden neo-colonies, between the local ruling classes and their foreign masters on the one hand and the oppressed and exploited peoples and nations on the other and between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

All the counterrevolutionary campaigns of violence and deception will fail if the Party sums up its experience well, criticizes, repudiates and rectifies the major errors and deviations that have seriously damaged the Party and the revolutionary mass movement and now threaten their very life. The Party can further strengthen itself by basing itself on previous and continuing achievements, conducting criticism and self-criticism in an all-round rectification movement and correctly setting forth the new tasks.

In the face of enemy assaults and of deviations and errors that have caused serious damage to the revolutionary forces and the people, we call on all Party cadres and members to reaffirm our basic principles, identify and rectify the major deviations, errors and shortcomings and strengthen our Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

Despite the adverse results leading to the drastic decline in our strength in certain areas, there are still some elements who persist in their impetuosity and there are others who swing from an ultra-Left position to a Rightist position. It is of crucial importance that we trace the ideological, political and organizational roots of our major errors and shortcomings, understand the circumstances in which these arose and recognize their harmful effects, so that we can correctly take our bearings and strengthen the Party and the revolutionary mass movement.

There can be countless specific achievements and specific problems to cite. But our main objective in this document is to identify, criticize and rectify those major deviations, errors and shortcomings that have had the most considerable impact on the current status and further development of the Party and the revolutionary movement. While we conduct a wide-ranging review and study of our past practice and current circumstances, this is not intended to replace the summings-up and assessments of varying scope that must still be undertaken. In general, the Party still has considerable strength and vitality needed to solve the long running problems and overcome the unprecedented setbacks. We can further strengthen ourselves and carry the revolution forward.

I

IN THE FIELD OF IDEOLOGY

In the field of ideology as proletarian revolutionaries, we have availed ourselves of the great treasury of Marxist-Leninist theory and have drawn from it the basic principles that guide our revolutionary cause in the stages of new democratic revolution, socialist revolution and communism. We must continue to do so, or else suffer the fate of the revisionist ruling parties (including their camp followers) that started to revise and depart from basic revolutionary principles more than three decades ago and would eventually disintegrate during these last few years. Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement. We can persevere in revolutionary struggle, promote the rights and interests of the people, stay on the correct line and win further victories only if we have firm ideological moorings. We must therefore undertake theoretical studies seriously.

Political studies and activism are absolutely necessary in order to arouse, organize and mobilize the masses. But these are not enough. We must not limit ourselves to the study of the national situation from time to time. We also must not swing and sway with the current hype in the bourgeois mass media nor with pressures of unstable and unreliable allies. We must constantly be clear about our theory and our ideas. We must constantly be clear about the interests of the proletariat and the oppressed people in our own country and throughout the world.

We must maintain and further develop our Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method. We must constantly improve our knowledge of materialist philosophy, historical materialism, political economy, scientific socialism, the new-democratic revolution, party building, people's war and the building of the united front. Since the reestablishment of the Party, theoretical study has had three levels: the basic level focusing on Philippine history, society and revolution and our own basic documents; the intermediate level, on the comparative study of the Philippine revolution with the Chinese and other revolutionary movements, using our seven-volume selections from Mao's works; and the advanced level, on the basic principles of Marxist-Leninist theory, using the most important works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao for reading and study by individual Party members and by Party branches.

But since the late 1970s, we have increasingly departed from the foregoing structure of theoretical education and given less attention to the works of Mao. Writings of lesser importance and lesser relevance to our revolutionary struggle have gained more attention from Party members although in a superficial manner. Also since the late 1970s, except for the basic Party course and other sporadic educational drives of limited coverage, there has been a gross lack of study courses and study materials for theoretical education at the intermediate and advanced levels. New translations into Filipino of the basic documents of our Party's reestablishment and other important basic writings were made and distributed in 1981–82 but only in limited number. The works of the great communist thinkers and leaders have also become scarce and unavailable to the Party rank and file.

LOW LEVEL OF THEORETICAL EDUCATION

The undeniable consequence of this neglect of theoretical education is the widespread low level of theoretical knowledge among Party cadres and members, especially among those recruited since the late 1970s. There is a growing failure to evaluate the revolutionary experience of our own Party and people as well as foreign revolutionary experiences, past and current. There is also a growing failure to identify, criticize and combat the petty bourgeois ideas and influences that emerge inside and outside the Party and are allowed to mislead our Party members and the revolutionary masses. Cadres with a low level of theoretical knowledge have been organizationally promoted and are prone to serious deviations and errors not only in ideology but also consequently in political and organizational work.

There is wide ground for subjectivism, including the dogmatist and revisionist trends, to arise within the Party. Instead of having a comprehensive, complete and all-sided view of things and theoretical development from a proletarian revolutionary stand, there is a narrow, one-sided and fragmentary view of these, depending on which deviation certain elements wish to promote.

For instance, there are elements who exaggerate the current role of their urban area of work and eclectically take out of historical context certain dramatic events, like the Petrograd and Moscow uprisings, the Vietnamese uprising of 1945, the Tet offensive of 1968 and the Nicaraguan final offensive of 1979 in order to insist on the “autonomous/specific dynamism of urban struggle” (apart from the entire strategy) and devise a “new strategy”

of armed urban insurrection and dogmatically superimpose it on or counterpose it to the entire theory and practice of people's war.

People's war does not exclude armed insurrection at the appropriate time, like the widespread revolutionary uprisings in many Philippine provinces in 1896–98 and 1898–99 against Spanish colonial rule and then against the US war of aggression and those in Central Luzon in late 1944 and early 1945 against the collapsing Japanese forces. In their respective times, the Philippine revolutionary army and the Hukbalahap were the rallying points of the organized and spontaneous masses.

A successful popular insurrection is premised on the disintegration of the counterrevolutionary army and on the existence of a new armed revolutionary force among other factors. To deny the necessity of developing people's war and building the people's army in stages, while the enemy force is still intact and not yet disintegrating, is not only to demagogically take advantage of a natural desire for quick victory but to lead the revolutionary forces to self-destruction. Even when the wholeness of a certain thing or process is well perceived and even when the two contradictory aspects are recognized, errors have been committed either in identifying which are the principal and the secondary aspects under certain conditions at a given time; or after identifying the principal aspect, in completely or virtually denying the secondary one.

Take for instance the current of thought leading to the boycott error of 1986. The central leadership was correct in declaring that the 1986 snap presidential election was farcical and that Marcos would cheat and win the Comelec count. So up to a given set of circumstances and within a certain period of time, the principal aspect was obviously for Marcos to remain in power. Indeed, Marcos would "win" by Comelec count and Batasang Pambansa (the legislative) proclamation. But the secondary aspect could rise to the principal position upon a change of circumstances, like the US-engineered military mutiny and the popular uprising that arose due to the convergence of both the organized reactionary forces (including the Catholic Church) and the progressive forces. As early as November 1985, the high potential of the secondary aspect rising to the principal position was already discernible.

In the handling of contradictory aspects, error can also arise from trying to combine or reconcile the principal aspect with the secondary aspect. According to dialectical materialism, an entire thing or process can be understood by knowing both the principal aspect and the secondary aspects or in a complex thing or process, both the principal and the secondary contradictions.

For example, one line is correct, like the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside in accordance with the theory of people's war. Another line is wrong, like aiming for total victory or a share of power with the bourgeoisie soon, without necessarily building the people's army in stages until it is strong enough to smash the bureaucratic-military machinery of the reactionary state in the cities. Thus, Party cadres, including those on the enemy manhunt list, concentrate in urban-based staff organs for the purpose of "preparing" for armed insurrection; and the people's army is pushed to build prematurely and unsustainably large combat formations and top-heavy military staff.

The wrong line is not at all identified as such because it pays lip service to the theory of people's war and the leadership of the Party and also because it uses Party cadres and rides on even while it undermines the existing urban and rural mass base and contains certain elements of short-term validity like more effective offensives by bigger military formations before the mass base is greatly reduced or lost.

Proposals for shifting to an "insurrectionary" strategy or the diminution of importance of base building and the antifeudal struggle have been rejected, but these have not been thoroughly criticized. Worse, they have been allowed to persist in other guises such as aiming for the decisive victory of the revolution by means of the "strategic counteroffensive" within the strategic defensive and "seizing opportunities" by means of an urban insurrection combined with "regularization" for the strategic counteroffensive.

There is in effect a blending of the correct and wrong lines which allows the latter to make a big headway until the Party wakes up to the ultimate losses. In the absence of a clear and consistent criticism and rejection of what is wrong, the compromise allows the error to work like a parasite on the correct body of principles, the Party, the people's army and the revolutionary mass movement.

The grossest example of failing to recognize the principal and secondary aspects of a certain thing or process pertains to Apos Campaign (the anti-informer hysteria in Mindanao). The grave violations of civil rights, the unjust taking of the lives of comrades and other individuals and the attendant devastation of the revolutionary forces by this campaign are so strikingly clear and revolting. Yet for some time the campaign was deemed correct on the premise that it probably succeeded in eliminating real deep penetration

agents even if hundreds upon hundreds of good comrades and innocent people were victimized and killed.

Various reasons which are extraneous or of indirect relevance to the flow of events under the responsibility of the Mindanao Commission from the early 1980s to late 1986 are cited as the basic causes of Ahos Campaign. These cut off the real connection among the wrong ideological, political and organizational line; the resultant setbacks; and the anti-infiltrate hysteria. The worst proposition put forward by some elements is that Ahos Campaign was a revolutionary success.

THE PEOPLE'S WAR AND THE TWO-STAGE REVOLUTION

It is not a matter of arbitrary choice that in the structure of theoretical education a large part should be allotted to the study of the works of Mao and the Chinese revolution. Mao represents a stage of theory and practice which is a major development of Marxism-Leninism. His works bring Marxism-Leninism deeper into the East. And these arose from semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions basically similar to those of the Philippines.

The Chinese and the Vietnamese examples of people's war bear closer relevance to the current people's war in the Philippines than any other armed revolution abroad. These examples demonstrate that the chronic crisis of the semi-feudal conditions is the ground for a protracted people's war and, to this day, they remain the best available and most relevant to our struggle.

We have learned basic principles from the Chinese revolution and Mao's works as the Vietnamese revolutionaries have. We have applied them according to our own conditions, never copying dogmatically or mechanically any pattern of experience. Let us cite some important differences from the Chinese experience in people's war.

- (1) In addition to using the countryside to divide and weaken the forces of the enemy, we have used the archipelagic character of the country to further divide and weaken them.
- (2) The Chinese people's army used regular mobile warfare and established extensive base areas during the strategic defensive. Like the Vietnamese, we have done so with guerrilla warfare and guerrilla bases and zones.
- (3) A whole period of agrarian revolution involving peasant uprisings and confiscation of land preceded the more successful campaign of rent

reduction and elimination of usury during the anti-Japanese struggle. We have pursued what we call the minimum program of the agrarian revolution before the maximum program.

The objective conditions and the subjective forces of the current Philippine revolution are such that it can fulfill the two-stage revolution (new democratic and socialist) first defined by Lenin and elaborated on by Mao. The Philippine revolution is therefore similar to the Chinese, Vietnamese, Korean, Cuban and other revolutions which could proceed from the new-democratic to the socialist stage. In this sense, our revolution belongs to a level higher than that of revolutions that have had to emerge from more backward colonial and even racist political and economic domination (like much of Africa) or those in which the revolutionary leadership is not determined to make a socialist revolution (like in Nicaragua).

The worst kind of dogmatism resulting in the worst damage to the Party is the superimposition of the Sandinista paradigm or some aspects of or events in the Vietnamese revolution outside of their historical context on our successful practice of people's war in order to push for insurrectionism and the unacknowledged revival of the Jose Lava idea of quick military victory to push the purely military viewpoint and military adventurism. The seed ideas for these started to sprout and grow in influence at first within the central leadership in the early years of the 1980s, emerged as a clear insurrectionist line in Mindanao in 1983, and was subsequently propagated on a nationwide scale from the mid-1980s onward within the frame of the program for the "strategic counteroffensive."

In its documents of reestablishment, the Party took into full account the most important and essential facts of Philippine history and circumstances, in the class struggle and revolutionary movement in our country. In the ideological field, the most outstanding achievement of the Party is the integration of Marxist-Leninist theory and concrete Philippine conditions. This involves the identification of the basic conditions and current character of the Philippine revolution, its motive forces and enemies, its strategy and tactics, its tasks and its socialist perspective. The Party made a criticism of the various subjectivist errors dogmatist, empiricist or revisionist, and "Left" or Right opportunist of the previous leaderships of the first Communist Party (1930–38) and the merger party of the Socialist and Communist parties (1938 onward).

Among the major subjectivist and opportunist errors criticized and repudiated was the Jose Lava adventurist line of quick military victory, building battalions and companies without building (through painstaking mass work) an extensive and deep going mass base as their foundation. When we forget lessons from our own history, we are bound to repeat the errors.

The line of spontaneous mass uprising and urban armed insurrection looks new and trendy because it flaunts the Sandinista paradigm or some paragraphs taken from some Vietnamese writings. But in fact, this line is also an unacknowledged recycling of the Sakdalista Uprising, which had been correctly criticized and repudiated since the time of Comrade Crisanto Evangelista. As proletarian revolutionaries, we must learn from various revolutionary experiences abroad but we must know how to evaluate them according to their world significance, national context and relevance or applicability to our own people's struggle. It is a manifestation of low theoretical understanding, subjectivism and opportunism to rate any Sandinista leader as more significant or more relevant than Mao in terms of seizing political power and making social revolution. We must read the self-criticism of the FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front] after it lost power in ten years' time.

We must grasp the fact fully that US imperialism and the reactionary classes in the Philippines are not easy pushovers. Making revolution is not simply a matter of choosing from foreign models the easiest way to seize power. Otherwise, the coup d'état made by progressive army officers in the Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) would be the best model. Since 1969, it has been necessary to wage a protracted people's war in order to accumulate strength and build the organs of political power in the countryside. To rush the process of ultimately seizing the cities with notions of spontaneous mass uprising and quick military victory is to feed the small fish to the shark, to plunge into setbacks and defeats.

From the mid-1970s onward, there seems to be a penchant among certain cadres for studying Bolshevik history and the works of Lenin. By itself, this is a good thing. It is even better if this is done within the context of our comprehensive theoretical education. But the effort by certain elements to apply the Bolshevik model on the Philippine revolution and at the same time diminish the importance of the works of Mao Zedong which are the more relevant to the conditions of the Philippines has encouraged a trend to deviate from the comprehensive structure of the basic, intermediate and advanced levels of theoretical education.

The apparently avid students of Bolshevik history and Lenin eventually over-focused on the issue of the 1978 and 1986 elections and neatly divided themselves into the boycott and participation sides of the debate. Because the Party was banned by the enemy from participation, the boycott side always came out the winner in the internal debates. Despite objections of Party cadres to the formulation of the issue as well as practical suggestions from them, the Party center did not fully take into account how our Party conducted itself in the 1969 and 1971 elections and, of course, in reactionary institutions and organizations and how the Vietnamese comrades during the Vietnam war overrode the electoral exercises staged by the Saigon regime.

In late 1986 and 1987, there was the promotion of a tactical course on “political leadership” concentrating on Bolshevik history and strategy and tactics and on Lenin’s work. The intention was to correct the erroneous application of the strategic and tactical principles of the Bolshevik revolution in the EDSA uprising and the post-EDSA political situation. At the same time, a Leninist course was promoted by the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee among their leading cadres. Because there were practically no other courses undertaken, these courses had the effect of squeezing out the further study of the theory and practice of people’s war, encouraging an urban orientation which was used by some elements for pushing the notion of insurrectionism.

Priorly in 1981, a view emerged within the central leadership itself and spread among some parts of the Party that neither the Bolshevik model nor the Chinese model is applicable to the Philippines. This further pushed the tendency to lessen the reading and study of the works of Mao and to deviate from the appropriate structure of our theoretical education.

It was further encouraged by attacks on Mao Zedong in China with regard to the great leap forward and the great proletarian cultural revolution as well as by the lessened militance of the Chinese party in the world anti-imperialist movement. Albeit, the Chinese Communist Party did not attack Mao for his teachings on the new democratic revolution and the socialist transformation of Chinese society. These teachings continue to be valid and enlightening to the Philippine revolutionary movement.

The dogmatic ambush was not only on the appropriate structure of our theoretical education but also on what should be our efforts to sum up our own rich experience of people’s war and raise it to the level of theory. Instead, there is the preference to go back to a single foreign example or to a part of it

in an attempt to validate an erroneous line of urban insurrectionism and to superimpose it on our living practice of people's war.

Even while total victory has not yet been achieved in the new democratic stage of the Philippine revolution, the Party has acquired a lot of experience which can be studied and raised to the level of theory. It has created various forms of revolutionary forces. It has built Red political power in a considerable portion of Philippine territory. It has yielded writings that are significant. But petty-bourgeois faddists get bored with the line of the Party and see no great achievement unless the cities are seized.

Even at the present stage, the development of the Philippine revolutionary movement is of a level higher than that of other revolutionary movements which are better known in the international press mainly because of the more backward forms of oppression (like outright colonialism and racism) that they contend with or because their national status has gained recognition in United Nations resolutions. But those who do not seriously study theory underrate the achievements of the Philippine revolution and overrate foreign models on the basis of mere coverage in the world mass media and not on the basis of the potential and actual advances on the path of the two-stage revolution.

WORST KIND OF DISORIENTATION

The worst kind of disorientation started to emerge in 1981 in the form of the concept of the "strategic counteroffensive" (SCO) and "three strategic coordinations," which originated from the central leadership itself. The concept of the "strategic counteroffensive" before it became the principal vehicle for the nationwide propagation of the combination of urban insurrectionism and "regularization" after the 9th Central Committee Plenum in 1985 already carried the notion of a rapid shortcut to regular mobile warfare which was set as the principal form of warfare during the strategic defensive; encouraged the desire for insurrection, which was regarded as a means of rapidly strengthening the army and of advancing towards a higher strategic stage or a decisive victory; propagated the concept of coordinated political and military offensives nationwide; and factored in the possibility that such offensives would lead to the achievement of a decisive victory in the revolution. The concept of "three strategic coordination" stresses the strategic significance of the coordination of the struggles in the countryside and the cities, political struggle and armed struggle, and domestic work and international work, but in a way that deviated from the strategic line of encircling

the cities from the countryside. It upheld the view that the main force of the revolution is the worker-peasant combination, instead of the peasant masses in order to reduce the emphasis on the party's work in the countryside and shift to the urban centers instead of strengthening the basic worker-peasant alliance in pursuit of the line of encircling the cities from the countryside in the protracted people's war. It emphasizes the importance of widespread political mobilizations to directly build the mass base for the armed revolution but with the tendency of substituting this for or putting this above painstaking work of organizing the peasant masses. It set a 60-40 balance between work in the countryside and work in the cities, consonant with the view that the principal stress on the countryside could shift to the cities because of some supposed changes in the situation whose levels and limits were unclear. Furthermore there were the ideas that encouraged the tendency to expect support from outside the country.

This concept (three strategic coordinations) was formulated in the attempt to clarify the tasks and the course for advancing under conditions that the guerrilla fronts and the guerrilla units were rapidly growing in strength and the fascist dictatorship was rapidly declining. But impelled by petty-bourgeois impatience and subjectivism, the issues were prematurely focused on the leap towards the strategic stalemate and strategic victory in a situation where the necessity was to take advantage of favorable conditions for consolidating initial victories, further fortifying the nationwide spread of our mass base and spreading out our guerrilla forces, transforming our initial guerrilla bases and consolidated zones into wider and stronger bastions of the revolution, and hasten the weakening not only of the fascist dictatorship but of the entire reactionary ruling system.

There was open impatience even among some leading cadres over the protraction of the people's war. There were those who spoke out as if the protraction of people's war were the subjective desire or else borne of a lack of determination or imagination rather than the demand of objective conditions and the objective process necessary for building revolutionary strength and weakening the forces of reaction. Thus was the door opened for the emergence and growth of such illusions as taking short routes leading to a strategic leap, rushing to advance towards strategically decisive engagements through regular mobile warfare or urban insurrection and belittling or skipping painstaking work of building an expanding and deepening mass base; and thus also developed the penchant for eclectically picking and sewing up

disparate fragments of foreign experiences from such revolutions as those of Nicaragua, Vietnam and Zimbabwe to build a “strategy” for hastening our advance and our victory in the revolution.

In Mindanao, the concept of the three strategic coordinations was implemented by the commission of the Party in the island as policy despite the decision of the central leadership to subject this to further study and discussion.² This was quickly approved by some cadres, particularly those who had expressed doubts over the practicability and appropriateness of building revolutionary bases and conducting antifeudal struggles in the countryside of the island. In their concept of comprehensively advancing the struggle in the island, the frame of the strategic coordination or combination of the countryside and the cities was superimposed on the strategic emphasis given to work in the countryside. Another conspicuous result was the concept and practice of intensifying “politico-military struggles” in Davao City and other urban centers in the form of all-out partisan warfare, sweeping propaganda, confrontational street actions and combinations of these.

Further driven by the initial impact of partisan warfare in Davao City from 1982 and later on by the upsurge of antifascist protest in the urban areas after the Aquino assassination in 1983, the Mindanao Commission took hold of some phrases (especially that of “seizing opportunities” used in August 1945 uprising and “strategy of war and uprising” in south Vietnam in the 1960s) from the writings of Vietnamese revolutionary leaders on their own people’s war but gave them an urban insurrectionary twist, incorporated ideas of spontaneous mass uprisings and armed urban insurrection from Central America into the theory and practice of people’s war and devised the “Red area (military struggle) White area (political struggle)” schema that systematically deviated from the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside and favored uprisings and insurrections as the “highest form of political struggle to be achieved.”³

Manifesting a lack of understanding of basic theory, the Mindanao Commission in several major documents redefined the term “political” and counterposed it to or put it on the same plane as “armed” or “military.” Political struggles are defined by these documents as “those that are based principally

² Cf., “Mga Tala sa Estratehiya at Taktika ng ating Digmang Bayan,” 1982.

³ Cf., “Batayan sa Pagpapaunlad at Papel ng Kilusan sa Puling Purok sa Buong Estratehiya ng Digmang Bayan sa Mindanao,” 1984.

on popular forces and armed strength of the masses or political forces waged principally in urban areas” while “armed struggle” is defined as “principally launched in the countryside and principally relying on the armed forces or the army focused on the objective of defeating the military force of the regime” (Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 6.). Our armed struggle, which is a people’s war, is denied its character as a revolutionary political mass movement. The mere wish for an armed urban insurrection virtually relegates our people’s army into being merely a “regularized” military force not unlike that of the enemy’s.

Let us remind ourselves without end that the people’s war has a revolutionary political nature and that the people’s army itself is an armed mass organization. Our people’s war is within the framework of the national democratic revolution. And within the antifeudal framework, there is the necessary political integration of armed struggle, genuine land reform and mass base building. Our people’s war is a revolutionary political mass movement encompassing all forms of struggle, legal and illegal, armed and nonarmed. And a people’s army is able to grow and prevail over a vastly superior enemy military force essentially because of popular participation and support.

While gambling on the possibility of total victory through armed urban insurrection, irrespective of the strength of the people’s army, and actually dismantling on the basis of such a possibility the whole disposition (*latag*), direction of the work, priorities, and correlation of forces in the countryside and the cities, there was continued lip service to the theory of people’s war. There are those who do not understand the relation between revolutionary strategy and tactics and consider such actual dismantling as being merely on the level of flexibility in tactics, in the service of “seizing opportunities” and every time such a supposed “opportunity” arises, we can lay aside the strategic line and the principles of our people’s war and wallow in insurrectionism, without necessarily harming the revolution. There are also those who allow the promoters of urban insurrection to denigrate the theory of people’s war because they are also interested in quick military victory, without painstaking and solid mass work. Thus, it was possible for the proponents of urban insurrection and those of “regularization” (i.e., building bigger military units and staff at the expense of mass base building) to agree on the same documents.

The worst form of deviation which has also proven to be the most resistant to rectification has been the propensity to adopt a successful but flaky foreign model taken out of the context of its history and exceptional conditions and then superimposed on the Party’s and the Filipino people’s own revolutionary

practice. It is correct to say that the Party should learn from all revolutionary experiences abroad. But we should know how to evaluate and rate them according to their significance and relevance to the Philippine revolution.

The clear insurrectionist frame of the “Red area-White area” schema was presented by the Mindanao Commission to the 9th CC Plenum in 1985. Although it was rejected, one of its principal ingredients was endorsed, adopted and incorporated into the program for the “strategic counteroffensive” or else the latter already had similar ingredients. A general insurrection or uprising was set as a target within the first year of the strategic counteroffensive, aside from “rehearsal” uprisings before it. After the experience of the EDSA uprising, “seizing opportunities” also became a byword, meaning to say, preparing to rush into an uprising every time there is a developing violent confrontation among the reactionaries while pursuing “regularization” for the “strategic counteroffensive.” Thus, during the second half of the 1980s the program for the “strategic counteroffensive” took the form of combining the wrong and the correct lines and became the vehicle for the nationwide propagation of the combination of insurrection and “regularization.” From 1985 the program for the “strategic counteroffensive” played a big and direct role in propagating and pushing the “regularization” of the people’s army. Instead of “regularization” serving urban insurrection of the “Red area-White area” Mindanao schema, “regularization” itself leading to regular mobile warfare was made the focus to be served also by the uprisings. Additional impulses for “regularization” were the views and analyses that the people’s war since 1983 had reached the stage of “intensification through raising the level,” “having a sufficient mass base for continuous intensification of the war” and that the company formation had become the principal or typical formation of the people’s army and had become the principal vehicle/factor of the entire war since 1985. Thus was the overall stress of the armed struggle and army building firmed up as consisting of the building of larger formations, “regularization” of the command and staff structures at different levels and fighting as the main/principal task of the entire army.

In 1987–88, there was another push for “regularization” towards the building of even bigger formations (battalions), coordinated campaigns and “regularization” of commands at various levels, on the basis of the analysis that the “strategic reserves of the enemy had been deployed,” conditions for local “strategic counteroffensives” were obtaining and the key to the sustained advance of the war and the army was to “further raise quality.”

But it did not take long before the impact of the AFP “general offensive” exposed the gaping vulnerabilities of the guerrilla fronts, especially the mass base, as well as the destructive effect of “regularization” and the program for the “strategic counteroffensive.” Despite the initial objections to the criticisms and rectification of “regularization” begun by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee towards the end of 1988, the adjustments to overcome shortcomings in mass work, the stress on guerrilla units in the localities and the gradual correction of imbalances in the disposition of cadres began to gain momentum in the countryside. The program for the “strategic counteroffensive” was withdrawn by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in 1990 and was replaced by the program of stressing extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare.

The purveyors of armed urban insurrections in the main were satisfied with the space given to insurrectionism in the program for the “strategic counteroffensive” since 1985. However, in 1990, due to the views regarding the insurrectionary “rare opportunity” after the 1989 coup attempt and in face of the crisis in the Gulf and the intensification of the socioeconomic crisis, they became more aggressive in pushing their own line and peddling various insurrectionist notions and the “strategy of war and uprising with the object of having the best possible combination of politico-military struggles” (none other than the “Red area White area” schema in new disguise).

Grandiose politico-military plans in the national capital region with the objective of igniting an armed urban insurrection were kept from the knowledge of the central leadership through the maneuvers of one leading cadre. In all-out abandon under the theory of the spontaneous masses and in a spate of military adventurism, “politico-military” actions were undertaken using agent-provocateur tactics for effecting general paralyzations and confrontational mass actions combined with ambitious projects for projecting the NDF in the bourgeois mass media and the building of a broad coalition to serve as a political center for insurrection. The result, aside from a serious and immediate political and security problem, was the grave disorientation and deviation from the strategic line of people’s war as well as from the class line of the people’s democratic revolution.

The gross neglect of observing and clarifying the issues regarding theory and line and the long running absence of any comprehensive summing up of our experience at the national level gave way to the continuous spread and repeated complications and disasters caused by grave errors and deviations.

There has been a pileup and interweaving of so many problems that have long remained unsolved, of large phenomena and experiences with widely differing interpretations and assessments and of correct and wrong concepts. It has thus become so easy for such wrong lines as the “Red area White area” schema that had wrought so much devastation in Mindanao in 1984 and 1985 to continue to be presented as something superior even as it directly contravened the general and strategic line of the Party.

OUR LINE AGAINST REVISIONISM

Since the early 1980s, the deviation from the antirevisionist line of the Party has been prompted by a desire for rapid military advances, be these the loose Lava-type of quick military victory or the “strategic counteroffensive” within the strategic defensive. The National Democratic Front, like the Palestinian Liberation Organization and other liberation movements, could try to establish friendly relations with the revisionist ruling parties and regimes in the early 1980s. However, some elements wished to override the preemptive relations between the Lava group and the revisionist ruling parties and even wanted to repudiate the antirevisionist line of the Party in order to establish “fraternal” relations with these revisionist ruling parties and secure material assistance.

In 1984, there was already the draft of a policy paper on the international situation and line on international relations, which toadied up to the Brezhnev ruling clique and unnecessarily attacked China even if the Soviet Union and its flunkies in the Lava group were collaborating even more closely with the Marcos fascist regime. In 1985, this paper was read to the Central Committee plenum, which decided to subject it to further study.

At any rate, it was circulated and promoted by the International Liaison Department until it was counteracted in 1987 and replaced in 1988 by a new policy paper which upheld the correct principles of party-to-party relations and the basic principles of socialism but accepted at face value the avowals of Gorbachev, with some amount of tactful critical observations.

Thus, even beyond 1989 (collapse of revisionist regimes in Eastern Europe), the 28th CPSU Congress in 1990 and August 1991 (the coup and the banning of the CPSU), there are elements within the Party who continue to adulate Gorbachev on a simplistic notion of anti-Stalinism (which holds Stalin responsible even for the revisionist ruling parties and regimes since 1956) and do not believe that the revisionist ruling parties and regimes

have collapsed and their “fallen” leaders (misleaders) and their relatives have characteristically become ex-communists and anticommunists, business entrepreneurs, openly milking the state enterprises and privatizing the social wealth of the proletariat and the people in collaboration with the flagrant anticommunist regimes which oppress and exploit the proletariat and people and persecute the genuine communists.

The criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism are a basic component of the theoretical foundation and reestablishment of our Party. No leading organ can do away with the basic documents of the Congress of Reestablishment, short of a new congress. And why should anyone at this point consider doing away with the critique of modern revisionism or capitalist restoration when in fact it has been vindicated and proven by the blatant restoration of the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and capitalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? The shame that properly belongs to the Lava revisionist group should not be shifted to or shared by the Party.

Inside and outside the Party, there are a few but articulate elements espousing ideas of insurrectionism, populism, liberalism, social democracy and the like who have been influenced by the swindling and wrecking operations of the Gorbachevite crew in the Soviet Union and who have derided, denigrated and attacked the basic principles of the Party. Just as it is important to take the most responsible among them to account for celebrating Aquino in the past as the champion of democracy and economic recovery, let us take them to account for continuing to celebrate Gorbachev as the ideologist of “socialist renewal and democracy” (in fact the restoration of capitalism, bourgeois class dictatorship and disintegration of the Soviet Union).

The glib advertising job of Gorbachev drummed up the total negation of Marxism-Leninism and the entire course of Bolshevik history; the accelerated capitalist restructuring and the breakdown of production; the rise of the bourgeois class dictatorship; the unleashing of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and civil war, and the emergence of all kinds of monsters, including racism, fascism and rampant criminality.

The imperialists and those who echo them wish the proletarian revolutionaries in the Philippines to become shamed and demoralized by the collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes and to give up Marxism-Leninism and the Philippine revolution. Let it be stated forthrightly that the theory of Marxism-Leninism has proven to be the correct guide in

the making of the new democratic revolution and in laying the political and economic foundation of the socialist system.

THE NEW GREAT CHALLENGE

At the same time, the Party recognizes that the truly new great challenge for Marxist-Leninist theoretical and practical work is the problem of combating modern revisionism, preventing the restoration of capitalism and continuing the socialist revolution. The greatest contribution of Mao to Marxist-Leninist theory is the recognition of this problem and his attempt to solve it. That attempt met with temporary success for a number of years but eventually failed. The Paris Commune of 1871 succeeded briefly and failed. But the theory of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship was not invalidated by the failure of the Paris Commune. After 46 years, the first proletarian state would arise.

It took thirty to forty years to build socialism (proletarian dictatorship and socialist economic construction) among more than a billion people and it took another thirty to forty years for modern revisionism to peacefully evolve into blatant capitalism and the full restoration of bourgeois class dictatorship in several countries.

It is an advantage for the Philippine revolution that while it is still at the new democratic stage, it has seen how socialism was built elsewhere only to be subverted and destroyed. We, as proletarian revolutionaries, have the advantage of availing ourselves of proven Marxist-Leninist theory in the new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution and construction as well as of learning lessons from the peaceful evolution of socialism to capitalism and prospectively from an inevitable resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. By learning positive and negative lessons in revolutionary history, the Philippine revolution will have the opportunity to contribute to the effort of building socialism and preventing the restoration of capitalism in more effective ways.

In the meantime, especially after the bourgeois euphoria over the downfall and disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes, we witness today the aggravated problems of the world capitalist system. The most developed capitalist countries are increasingly in contradiction with each other over economic, financial, trade and security matters. High technology is accelerating the insoluble capitalist crisis of overproduction. High productivity is in contradiction with the shrinking of the world market. The

monopoly capitalist sale of goods and services to the client states can be maintained only by loans that cannot be paid back. The client states are debt ridden and are squeezing each other out in the export trade, yielding no surplus to save them from further indebtedness but incurring more budgetary and trade deficits.

In fact social turmoil and violent upheavals are occurring with increasing frequency throughout the world, despite the peace rhetoric of the “new world order.” Food riots, coups and countercoups, ethnic strife, civil wars, and various types of violence are bursting out in the third world and in the new client states of imperialism in the East. Even in the capitalist countries, the economic recession is causing unemployment, cutting down social welfare measures, generating social tensions and breeding racism and racist violence against workers from the third world.

In due time, from the new world disorder, the anti-imperialist and socialist movements will resurge. By force of circumstances, the Marxist-Leninist parties that retain their proletarian revolutionary integrity and continue to wage revolutionary struggles and some parties that will reemerge in countries where revisionist parties have disintegrated or degenerated will spring up once more to wage revolutionary struggles at a new and higher level under the theoretical guidance of Marxism-Leninism and under the banner of proletarian internationalism.

II

IN THE FIELD OF POLITICS

The most outstanding achievement of the Party and the Filipino people has been the resumption and advance of the Philippine revolution at a new and higher historical level since 1968. The new democratic revolution surpasses the old democratic revolution of 1896. It is led by the proletariat through the Party and it has a socialist perspective. The Party is at the center of the stage in the struggle between revolution and counterrevolution.

The Marxist-Leninist analysis of Philippine history and current circumstances by the Party has raised the level of theoretical and political knowledge as well as revolutionary activity far above that established during the 1930–38 period of the old Communist Party of the Philippines and the subsequent period of the old merger party of the Communist and Socialist parties, including the series of Lava opportunists and their pseudo-communist successors.

By virtue of its clear definition of the character and current stage of the Philippine revolution, its motive forces and its enemies, its tasks and socialist perspective, the Party has been able to build itself and wield effectively the revolutionary armed struggle and the united front against US imperialism and the local exploiting classes and push forward the national democratic revolution of the Filipino people.

Due to the leadership provided by the Party, the level of revolutionary consciousness and struggle of the Filipino people has risen as never before. The organizations of the basic toiling masses of workers and peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie have risen as never before along the national democratic line. Red political power has emerged in extensive areas of the countryside, defended by the New People's Army and the masses even while the cities are still under the control of the reactionary forces.

As a result of the adoption and implementation of the correct political line by the Party, the masses under organs of political power and in mass organizations number in millions in both urban and rural areas. The Party, the New People's Army, the National Democratic Front and other revolutionary forces are in substantial portions of 65 out of 73 provinces in hundreds of towns and thousands of villages, and exercise influence throughout the archipelago.

The revolutionary political nature of the armed struggle (taking the form of a people's war) is determined by the general line of national democratic revolution. Our armed struggle is pointless if it is off this line. The people's army is itself a mass organization and a mass movement. Its armed struggle in the countryside is integral with genuine land reform and the building of the mass base (organs of political power and mass organizations).

But there have been deviations from our analysis of Philippine society, the general line of new democratic revolution and the strategic line of people's war under the guise of questioning "antiquated" ideas, "innovating on," "refining" and "adjusting" them.

In the long period of the Marcos regime and subsequently during the Aquino regime, the semi-colonial and semi-feudal status of Philippine society has remained unchanged. In fact, it has been deepened and aggravated. The Philippine social economy has become even more backward, agrarian, preindustrial and semi-feudal and more wracked by an insoluble crisis than at the time of the Party's reestablishment. The Philippines remains without basic industries. Even import-dependent manufacturing has deteriorated. The bureaucratic big comprador operations of the Marcos regime sank the economy into indebtedness and deeper underdevelopment.

The political system has been increasingly characterized by violence among political and military formations of the exploiting classes. The economic ground for mutual accommodation among the various political factions of the exploiting classes has shrunk. Thus, the reactionary military establishment itself as well as factions of it are moving into the forefront of political affairs.

But there are elements who are wittingly or unwittingly influenced by the imperialist propaganda that the Philippines has been industrializing, developing and urbanizing, especially during the Marcos period of expanded big comprador operations financed by huge amounts of foreign loans. Among the reasons given by the Lavaite group for collaborating with the Marcos regime was that the latter was industrializing the country and that it only needed to be swayed from the neocolonialist to a nationalist path of industrialization.

Somehow, a few elements in the Party seem to have been contaminated by this kind of ideas and question the proposition that Philippine society is semi-colonial and semi-feudal, especially before a thoroughgoing explanation of the Philippine mode of production was made in 1983. In 1981, in combination with the concept of the "three strategic coordinations," a pro-

posal was submitted to the Politburo to characterize the Philippine economy as semi-colonial, semi-feudal and “semi-capitalist,” with the last adjective intended to suggest that the Philippines was becoming industrial-capitalist. The proposal was rejected by the Politburo but some of its proponents continued to propagate the characterization even after its formal rejection by the central leadership.

The proposal asserted that the “urbanization” of Philippine society had reached a level far higher than what was previously maintained in Party analysis and writings. It echoed the statisticians who arrive at the figure on urban population by adding to the population of Metro Manila (including the great number of transients who are seasonal odd-jobbers, students and the like from the rural areas of Luzon) that of the provincial cities and capitals (which have small commercial cores) and the *poblaciones* (centers) of municipalities.

The statistical manipulation of the term “urban” would be used by some elements to deviate from the Party’s class analysis of Philippine society, the general line of new democratic revolution and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside. They claim that the Philippines is 40 percent urban and is far more urban than China or Vietnam ever was.

They also claim that the Philippine society and economy is no longer predominantly agrarian by adding up the manpower distribution or output share of the industry and service sectors against the agriculture sector of the economy. They fail to take into account the import dependence of the industry and service sectors, their dependence on agriculture and the share of agriculture that does not formally appear in the market.

They further claim that the rural population consists of more than 55 percent farm workers. In this regard, they fail to distinguish the modern machine-operating farm workers from the overwhelming majority of traditional farm workers (more than 95 percent) who are still poor peasants or who are their direct outgrowth. On the basis of misleading statistics, a straw figure is set up that the Party has overemphasized rural work to the neglect of urban work. The erroneous line of combining armed urban insurrection and the premature building of unsustainable military formations is pushed to replace the theory of people’s war and building the people’s army in stages. This involved “regularization,” drawing Party cadres away from mass work, especially rural mass work, for urban-based as well as military staff assignment. Party cadres were also drawn away from the countryside under the guise of making a 40-60 urban-rural redeployment.

From 1980 onward, various proposals were made to enlarge the scope of the urban movement and redirect large portions of population concentrations in the countryside to an urban orientation. The changes sought were not an issue involving the temporary advantages or the necessity of having to divide the work but an issue involving strategic orientation, in consonance directly or indirectly and intended or unintended with the pushing of various ideas of increasing the strategic weight of urban work and urban insurrections.

There were the proposals to incorporate large portions of Central and Southern Luzon into the Manila-Rizal region; to shift the overall stress in Central Luzon from armed struggle to the open mass movement and insurrection or to the “Red area-White area” schema of the plains, Mindanao assigning to the latter (White area) the small cities and provincial capitals and putting this within the scope of the urban-based movement; to adopt a “mountain-plain” division with an orientation of mass-building for mountainous areas and of insurrection or uprisings for the plains; and with regard to the peasant movement, if not the entire revolutionary struggle to put the main stress on the open mass movement in the plains with an orientation towards mass uprisings.

In 1987 a small group of splittists in Negros Philippine society had become “capitalist” and with this as one reason among others, would promote a line of capitulation to the Aquino regime, abandonment of armed struggle and a shift to parliamentary struggle. This group failed to recognize that in sugar plantations workers are a small minority, compared to the operating regular farm wage relations are not the huge mass of traditional farm workers and that wage relations are not a determining factor in industrial capitalism and can exist in slave and feudal societies.

URBAN INSURRECTIONIST AND MILITARY ADVENTURISM

There is A gross lack of understanding of the theory of people’s war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside. This strategic line is not an arbitrary edict for a permanent condition. It simply means that when the people’s army cannot as yet seize the cities, the revolutionary forces have to accumulate armed strength first in the countryside where reactionary power and control is relatively weaker and where there is a wide area of maneuver for the people’s army tactical offensives, accumulate armed strength and engage in mass work. Conditions in the future will arise to allow the people’s army and the people in mass uprisings led by the Party to

finally seize the centers, municipalities, provincial capitals, minor cities and major cities, in that probable order. But it would be foolhardy to believe that Metro Manila could fall in an uprising led by the Party earlier than the time that the backbone of the enemy forces is broken in the countryside or before they go into a process of final disintegration.

The EDSA uprising in 1986 involved both a military mutiny and anti-Marcos or antifascist uprising but the United States, and the Catholic Church were still in a position to determine the outcome of the uprising. They understood the balance of forces in their favor. They were out only to change one reactionary ruling clique with another, notwithstanding the popular uprising.

Building the people's army in stages is ridiculed by certain elements who have not really studied the theory of people's war and who obviously do not believe that it is necessary for the NPA to smash the reactionary armed forces and replace it in the end. We have seen how the NPA started from scratch in 1969 and grew. The people's war will certainly have to go through a middle stage of development before it can totally and finally defeat the enemy forces and replace them.

The initial, middle and final stages of the people's war cannot be dismissed as useless concepts by those who hold the opportunist notion that urban armed insurrection and imported heavy weapons can replace the full development of people's war. When the term probability (closer to realization than the term possibility) instead of certainty is used to refer to the stages of people's war, it is to give allowance for nonrealization or defeat due to deviations and errors like those committed by the Mindanao Commission against the line of people's war or due to a forced retreat in the face of foreign aggression.

The expression Left opportunism is apt when it refers to demagogically taking advantage of the natural desire for quick and easy victory but leading the revolutionary forces to defeat and self-destruction. Urban insurrectionism and military adventurism have so far been the gravest form of Left opportunism in the history of the Party since 1968. These are retrogressions to the line of urban guerrilla warfare (Carlos Marighela) and the foco theory (promoted by Regis Debray), which some elements tried to promote within the Party in the early 1970s but which were effectively combated by the Party.

Before the Party could be reestablished in 1968, there had been almost a full decade of mainly urban work among the workers and the youth under-

taken by the new proletarian cadres together with a few veterans in the revolutionary movement. Upon the reestablishment of the Party, there were more proletarian cadres in the cities than in the countryside. They emerged from the resurgent anti-imperialist and antifeudal mass movement that was based in Metro Manila. The claim that the Party neglected revolutionary work in urban areas and overemphasized work in the rural areas is untrue.

Soon after the Party reestablishment, with hardly 200 Party members concentrated in Metro Manila, the Party was able to carry out the First Quarter Storm of 1970 and other mass actions in the 1970–72 period. From these mass actions would emerge a few thousands of mass activists who would become Party members. Among the regions, the highest concentration of Party members would be in Metro Manila for a considerable period of time.

It is to the credit of the Party that it has pushed the general line of new democratic revolution through people's war since its reestablishment. Thus, the proletarian cadres from Metro Manila were aroused and motivated to join up with the good remnants of the old people's army to form the New People's Army in 1969 and to build the armed revolutionary movement in the countryside on a nationwide scale. And when martial rule and the fascist dictatorship were imposed, Party members and activists in the cities had been ideologically prepared, so that in droves they went to the countryside in 1972 onward and there subsequently participated in the painstaking work of laying and building the revolutionary armed strength and the revolutionary mass movement that served as the firm basis and backbone of rapid advance of the revolutionary movement in the 1980s.

The pattern has been for the cadres produced by the urban-based mass movement to go from the cities to the countryside. Without such a pattern inspired and directed by the Party, there would be no or so few cadres to build the people's army, the mass organizations and the organs of political power in the countryside. This pattern has promoted the people's war. Without the theory and strategic line of people's war, Party members would have preferred to stay in the urban areas. It is so much easier to stick to the relative comfort and convenience of the city than to break new ground in the countryside.

But since the early 1980s, there had been an increasing movement away from such a pattern. This was initiated by the central leadership under the concept of 70/30 balance between countryside work and urban work and of giving stress on a comprehensive political movement and broad alliance work

based in the cities, on the basis of the tactical priority set on making urban work and broad alliance work catch up with the more advanced work in the countryside and on the basic alliance, as well as on some views that such is the appropriate balance at the given level of urbanization in the country. From 1981 onward, there had been a stop to the deployment of significant numbers of cadres and activists from the cities to the countryside. The trend towards city-basing involving the central leadership and national organs and, subsequently, even many regional leading committees and staff organs, also started and worsened.

The concept of the “strategic counteroffensive” within the strategic defensive that was adopted by the central leadership (PB) in 1981, affirmed by the 9th CC Plenum in 1985 and formally withdrawn in 1990 promoted the “three strategic coordinations,” the nationally coordinated political and military offensives, regular mobile warfare as the main form of warfare to advance the people’s war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate, and the possibility of such offensives leading directly to the realization of the decisive victory of the revolution. As such, it tended to encourage urban insurrectionism and had an even bigger and more direct role in fostering “regularization” and military adventurism.

Leading Party committees and cadres became drawn increasingly to urban-centered questions and tasks and farther and farther away from urgent questions and tasks in the all-rounded development of the people’s army, mass base and Party organization in the countryside, which to begin with were no longer being adequately taken care of. The cadres were encouraged to stay in leading and staff organs of the urban-based Party organization, legal mass organizations and institutions or join the armed city partisans rather than go to the countryside. They failed to recognize that the peasant masses do not by themselves produce the kind of cadres and other personnel that the urban areas produce and which the rural areas need.

Under the guidance of the so-called “three strategic coordinations” (which had been convened into the “three strategic combination”) and the mechanical 60-40 balance between countryside and urban work, key cadres of the Mindanao Commission, positioned themselves in the small cities of Mindanao (urban centers and adjacent rural areas), pursued a line of intensifying “political-military” struggle in the white areas and developed this into a full-blown line of armed urban insurrection under the influence of the Sandinista victory. They combined this line with the adventurist line of building

many company formations and intensifying company-size operations in the countryside, reminiscent of the adventurist line of the Jose Lava leadership in forming companies and battalions in 1949 and 1950, without giving due attention to Party and mass base building; i.e., the organs of political power and the mass organizations, when the overall task was shifted from expanding the guerrilla warfare to “intensifying” it and later to “raising” its level. The erroneous line would eventually result in the exact opposite of what it sought to accomplish.

Inherent to the line of seeking to seize power through urban uprisings, with the aid of a few prematurely enlarged NPA units that lacked extensive and deep going mass base, was the undermining and lessening of the interest of Party members and mass activists in going to the countryside to do revolutionary work. In the long run, especially from 1983 to the fall of Marcos, the deployment of cadres to the countryside did not only stop but was reversed when large numbers of cadres deployed in the countryside were drawn towards the cities.

In conjunction with the line of urban insurrection, the line of intensifying and raising the level of warfare virtually became a line of quick military victory. Layers of army commands and staff were increased and companies built without minding the necessary balance and interaction of military formation and the mass base and vice versa. The larger military formations and increased layers of staff were formed and took cadres and material resources away from the already thinly-spread, undermanned, ill-trained and ill-armed units in charge of the various forms of mass work, military work and Party work in the localities.

In 1984 and 1985, when the full-scale building of company formations and the intensification of company-size operations were being undertaken, only then were there efforts to catch up in building the Party section committees from among the fresh recruits of Party cadres and members who were extremely lacking in political and military knowledge and capability. On top of this was the insistence of some leading cadres in the Mindanao Commission to reduce attention on antifeudal education, propaganda and struggles in favor of the expansion of the mass movement in the countryside along an almost purely antifascist line. The quality of the mass base, Party work and military work in many localities either stagnated at a very low level or even deteriorated.

For a very short period, from 1983 to 1984, the military offensives of companies, oversized companies and coordinated companies were effective in Mindanao. Fighters were recruited rapidly and hundreds of high-powered rifles were confiscated from the enemy. But when the enemy military forces increased and paramilitary forces and anticommunist fanatic sects were formed in ever widening areas, the mass work units and local guerrilla units could no longer sustain mass work and military work in increasing numbers of barrios. The mass base dwindled and deteriorated. Also in that period, the mass bases, which were either still new, had stopped to develop or had started to decline as a result of the shortcomings, were further forced into a more intense military situation and thus declined and deteriorated at an even faster rate. From 1985 to 1987 large chunks of the mass base and the guerrilla fronts were entirely lost in the face of the repeated onslaughts of the large-scale enemy military offensives, the damage and demoralization as a result of Ahos Campaign, the disorientation in the immediate post-Marcos situation, and the lack of guidance and support from higher Party committees. The enemy objective was clear: to destroy the revolutionary mass base, force the companies and oversized companies of the people's army into a purely military situation where the enemy forces could use to their advantage their militarily superior forces. A people's army can use most effectively the principle of concentration in offensives if it has an extensive and deep-going mass base. But in a purely military situation, it is, of course, the truly larger military force that gains the upper hand and wins.

Because of the extensive loss of mass base resulting from the wrong line and the destruction wrought by Ahos Campaign, as well as from the impact of the enemy offensives, many of the small and weak units deployed to do mass work and guerrilla units in the localities became extremely vulnerable and were destroyed by the enemy. Eventually, the companies in Mindanao were pushed into passive and vulnerable positions and could no longer launch nor win tactical offensives. There was a buildup of problems in recruitment, morale, maneuver, coordination, intelligence-gathering and supply. As a result of these problems and in response to the glaring need to attend first to the mass base in many areas, the regional Party committees either took the initiative to reduce the companies or simply allowed these to dwindle into platoon or over-sized platoon formations. By 1987, the number of companies on the island stood at five.

In the small and easily surveilled cities of Mindanao (Davao City for one is not really the biggest city in the world; beyond its commercial core of a square kilometer, it is rural), cadres who were on the manhunt list of the enemy were carried away by their “insurrectionary” mentality and displayed themselves in public places during mass actions and became preoccupied with contact work among allies and coordination of mass actions rather than attending to and guiding solid organizational work. “Broadness,” fast confrontational actions and rapid intensification became the rule and norm above all else.

The *welgang bayans*⁴ were regarded as “a process of building up towards popular uprisings” serving to hasten political polarization, to expose government ineffectuality, to train the masses and to make the entire situation explode. In practice, these were more of transport paralysis rather than mammoth rallies of the people. On such occasions, armed units set up “checkpoints” to block the highway and at assembly points a few hundreds to a few thousands of people converged. At the same time, the armed city partisans heated up these small cities beyond the capacity of the “wanted” cadres to conceal themselves. In 1984, the principal leaders of the Mindanao Commission obviously had extreme difficulties staying in Mindanao and were forced to shift to Cebu City, which was beyond the commission’s jurisdiction. As the enemy saturated the identified partisan bases and fronts, intensified intelligence operations against the urban underground, tightened the checkpoints, carried out frequent zoning raids and militarized the target communities and cities, the casualties among the white area forces began to mount and work could no longer be pursued in an increasing number of these areas.

Under conditions of gross setbacks in the urban areas and growing difficulties in the guerrilla fronts due to intensifying enemy attacks, and the alert from the central leadership against enemy infiltrators, leading cadres at the regional, front and Mindanao levels were prone to over-suspiciousness and panic about the possibility that there were enemy agents in their midst who were tipping them off. Believing that their line was correct and victorious and not realizing the error and its effects, they were inclined to look for external forces and reasons behind the setbacks and problems.

⁴ *Welgang bayans*: public strikes—*Ed.*

Based on the report of a former political detainee and some unverified confessions extracted through torture of some suspected infiltrators who had been initially arrested in one guerrilla front during the early part of 1985, these leading cadres easily believed that there were enemy deep penetration agents (DPAs) who had infiltrated the Party, the people's army, the mass organizations and the legal institutions. They began arresting suspected saboteurs and infiltrators and subjected them to torture to extract self-incriminating confessions about their alleged crimes and co-conspirators. They became convinced that large numbers of enemy deep penetration agents had infiltrated the Party over a long period of time through the white area organizations and were already being mobilized to bring down and destroy the revolutionary movement in late 1985 or early 1986. The Party organizations which had overexpanded and neglected ideological, political and organizational consolidation proved to be extremely susceptible to mutual suspicion among its cadres and members. Thus, from mid-1985 onward, the anti-infiltrator hysteria started and raged in Mindanao.

The resultant devastation was unprecedented in the entire history of the Philippine revolution. Never has the enemy inflicted as much damage as this to the revolutionary forces in so short a period of time. The wrong political line resulted in setbacks and problems that started to be felt in 1984. Under such a situation, the anti-infiltration hysteria easily took effect and resulted in self-destruction from 1985 onward. On the basis of mere suspicion, close to a thousand people (including Party cadres and members and mass activists) became victims of civil rights violations and severe punishment. Due process was completely disregarded as panic and hysteria took over. The Party membership fell abruptly from 9000 to 3000. The mass base which was shallow shrank by 50 percent. The 15 companies and 30 platoons were reduced to 2 companies and 17 platoons.

The leading cadres of the Mindanao Commission refer to a "fast draft of Bicol" ("unang borador ng Bicol") as their guide and for some time declared a revolutionary success in eliminating enemy agents at the expense of so many times more innocent comrades and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary movement. In terms of rate and absolute numbers, the destruction wrought had never before been achieved by the enemy frontally in so short a time. Basic civil rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Guide for Establishing the People's Democratic Government issued in 1972 and by the Party Constitution and the Rules of the New People's Army were grossly violated.

Many of those responsible for the devastation and the victimization of comrades and the people in Mindanao have expressed remorse for the hysteria and tried to account for their part. But at the most the accounting had been merely partial. Some of those who have not accounted for nor been taken to account for their political and criminal responsibility have even been promoted to national positions in the Party and allowed to spread their wrong line at the further and bigger expense of the Party and the revolutionary movement.

THE PROPAGATION OF THE ERRONEOUS LINE ON A NATIONWIDE SCALE

Uncriticized, unrepudiated and unrectified, the combined lines of armed urban insurrection and quick military victory have spread on a nationwide scale and have resulted in unprecedented nationwide damage and setbacks to the revolutionary movement.

The 9th CC plenum in 1985 rejected the Red area (military struggle) White area (political struggle) scheme but did not call it insurrectionist, thoroughly criticize it, nor direct the Mindanao Party organization to make a rectification. In fact the plenum got carried away or impressed by the seemingly resounding but, now proven, very temporary victories in Mindanao despite what had been reported regarding the disturbing size of the casualties and the problem of ammunition even as the enemy had not yet undertaken a full-scale counterattack.

The entirety and parts of such impression of success were held and drummed up by many Mindanao cadres or by cadres whom they influenced, as “advanced experience” or as a “superior” way of conducting the struggle. Moreover, key elements of the erroneous line and its practice, like the magnified partisan warfare in the urban areas and “regularization” of the people’s army, were endorsed and integrated into the program for the “strategic counteroffensive” (SCO). The tactical program aiming for the decisive victory against the US-Marcos dictatorship through the SCO also induced further infatuation and toying with the notion of armed urban insurrection.

Since 1986, the proponents of the line of armed urban insurrection have capitalized on the rejection by the Party of the boycott error in 1986 by overstating this error even after rectification while obscuring the incomparably far bigger error and earlier devastation of revolutionary forces in Mindanao and by interpreting the rejection of the boycott error as a vindication of the line of armed urban insurrection. At the beginning of the Aquino regime,

various views emerged overestimating the “democratic space,” the patriotic and democratic possibilities of Aquino, the depth of the destruction inflicted by the EDSA uprising on reactionary rule and the state machinery and spurred on the attitude of “seriously considering the possibility of and preparations for insurrection.”

Various insurrectionist proposals were put forward, like the plan for a “fast track” victory of the revolution and using the race for the Constitutional Commission, the peace talks, etc. in order to hasten a repolarization and a giant confrontation on the basis of national and democratic issues. Considering the intensified violence and factional strife among the reactionaries, “seizing opportunities” has become the favorite posture and catchphrase of those who yearn for urban insurrection. Thus, there was the phenomenon of heightened insurrectionary fever among certain urban-based Party cadres and units after every coup attempt.

By itself, the line of armed urban insurrection is isolated and impotent. However, it can be damaging to the Party and the revolutionary movement because it encourages Party cadres and members who are needed in the countryside to stick to the cities, it promotes overreaching in the urban revolutionary movement and the duplication of the Davao City “political-military” debacle in Manila-Rizal no less. It is most damaging when it combines with the line of military “regularization” because it gives rise to bureaucratization, isolation from the masses, setbacks and eventually self-destruction.

The line of rapidly organizing armed city partisan units, building companies and battalions, top-heavy military staffing and drawing cadres away from expansion and consolidation work among the people was first pushed by the National Military Conference in late 1984 and, afterwards, by the central leadership’s program of fulfilling the requisites for the SCO, and eventually by the military conferences of the national military staff (later made the general command in 1987) of the NPA. These put forward such puerile premises as the following: we have covered all the strategic points in the country, we have a sufficient number of guerrilla fronts, we have a sufficiently wide mass base, etc. Ergo, the time has come to build the NPA vertically, regularize it, build the army organization separately from the Party, specialize in military work and in fighting. Since the military conference in 1984, the view had arisen and spread that the strategic reserves of the enemy were already deployed; he could no longer increase the number of troops and

his growth in strength would have to be achieved more in terms of quality than of quantity.

In the latter half of 1986 and in 1987, the conscious effort in Mindanao to control and overcome the disastrous results of Aho Campaign, to rectify the errors and rebuild the revolutionary forces was underway. But it was also in 1987 that the NPA general command was able to push most vigorously the line of “regularization” on a nationwide scale.

The NPA general command vigorously pushed the building of larger formations and the formation of military staff. They continued to carry the view that “the enemy’s strategic reserves were already deployed” and conditions obtained for “local strategic counteroffensives.” The general command ordered a “nationally coordinated offensive,” which was heavily subsidized from above, overstrained the units and the logistics, wasted the ammunition stocks, created contradictions and frictions between the army command and the territorial Party organs, launched politically counterproductive military actions and exposed to the enemy the GC staff personnel and radio equipment based in Metro Manila in exchange for a sizeable number of casualty inflicted on the enemy and a number of arms confiscated from the enemy.

In the regions of Luzon and the Visayas, the building of companies and the intensification of company-size operations were accelerated, the concept of igniting peasant uprisings presented as if of the same category as ordinary forms of mass struggles was pushed, and there were those who prepared the “flash points” for uprisings should the “opportunity” arise. One guerrilla front in Luzon was almost totally demolished after undertaking a series of “insurrectionary mass actions,” a campaign to confiscate landlord property and a declaration of the implementation of the maximum program of land reform and such other actions supposedly similar to the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan based on the mistaken notion that conditions were ripe for “local strategic stalemate.” At the same time, armed city partisan warfare was escalated in Metro Manila and other cities at a rate that tended to prejudice the legal and defensive character of the struggle in these urban areas.

The central leadership of the Party shares the responsibility for the imbalances and the program of “regularization” that primarily caused them. Apart from responsibility for the entire program of the SCO, the central leadership affirmed and approved many of the initiatives and views from lower units pushing for “regularization.” However, from year to year, it stressed the need to rely on an expanding and deepening mass base. And since the Party

anniversary statement in 1988, there has been the call for waging extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare founded on a wide and deep-going mass base without prejudice to building sustainable guerrilla companies that are dispersed for mass work when not fighting or not on training exercise.

In addition, many regional Party committees raised questions, expressed doubts and asked for reconsideration in connection with the extremely strong pressure and unrealistic targets for “regularization.” Thus, at certain points, downward adjustments have been made in the number of companies to be formed or else existing companies were redeployed in accordance with the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. And in early 1989, a new emphasis and new priorities on mass work and local guerrilla forces and a clear shift away from the program of increasing the number of companies was decided upon. And in 1990 the program for the SCO was dropped. However, the NPA general command, despite lip service to the absolute leadership of the Party, continued to argue for and push its own line of “regularization” in contravention of the Party leadership’s criticism of it.

The consequences have been destructive to the revolutionary movement. From 1987 to 1990, the membership of the mass base was reduced by almost 60 percent from the base year of 1986, the number of barrios covered by guerrilla fronts, by 16 percent, and the Party membership, by 15 per cent. While the number of rifles of the people’s army continued to grow every year, the rate of increase fell to the level of 1976–78. Furthermore, the number of officers and fighters of the people’s army fell by 28 percent or below the level of 1985. Large numbers of cadres at the provincial, front and district levels have been lost and many of them have not yet been replaced.

For twenty years since its reestablishment, it had been a matter of pride for the reestablished Party to declare annually that there was an all-round increase of strength of the revolutionary movement. The enemy could concentrate against certain areas or regions and inflict damage but the movement would increase in strength elsewhere and on a nationwide scale.

In 1971, the revolutionary forces were in the main suppressed in the second district of Tarlac, with the enemy using from 1969 to 1971 a full division (Task Force Lawin), paramilitary forces (BSDUs) and “civic action” to try to run down an NPA force of merely 200 fighters. But revolutionary work in Isabela, started in early 1969, had already created a mass base several times larger than the one in Tarlac. Then came the time that the forces in Isabela were contained in the forest region by the enemy from 1972 to

1976 due to the stubborn and wrong maintenance of three companies and one platoon within the enemy encirclement. But the guerrilla forces and the mass base in the other regions of the country were significantly growing from 1974 onward. Eventually, not only was the territory temporarily lost in Tarlac recovered but several more provinces were gained in Central Luzon from 1972 onward.

Only in 1988 would the Party start to register a nationwide reduction of the rural mass base. We comforted ourselves by saying that that was not much in view of the escalation of enemy onslaughts and that in fact we grew in strength because we became even more tempered in the struggle. Although some internal weaknesses and shortcomings were pointed out, we failed to take into full account the errors within our own ranks and instead tended to adduce the reduction entirely to the assaults of the enemy.

Many among us express mystification over the enemy's "war of quick decision" and "gradual constriction" and are dumbfounded because of the telling effect these seem to have had on our mass base and armed struggle. But these are in fact old terms and old enemy strategy and tactics as anyone who has studied Mao's teachings on people's war should know. Indeed, the "war of quick decision" and "gradual constriction" we have been confronting since 1987 have certain peculiarities like the simultaneous deployment of enemy divisions and brigades in the main guerrilla fronts all over the country, the heightened determination of the enemy to pursue the level of concentration of enemy troops and offensives on areas targeted for relatively long periods, the widespread and systematic building of vigilantes and CAFGUs, and the advantage of Aquino's popularity during the early years. But we have overcome the same enemy strategy and tactics in so many places in the past. And even now, we have learned to cope with, adjusted to and gradually overcome it generally and in many places.

It suits the enemy forces to go on a war of quick decision or strategic offensive in view of their military superiority in the number of troops, weapons, logistics and training. But at the tactical level, where they wish to win battles, they fail because they lack popular support. So, they resort to what they call "gradual constriction" or "blockhouse" warfare (lines of camps and fortifications to encircle and control an area) combined with "special operations teams," organizing paramilitary forces and undertaking a sham kind of mass work.

On the side of the NPA, the correct response is the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive of the enemy forces. Concretely, we render them deaf and blind on a wide scale by gaining the people's participation and support. At the tactical level, we launch guerrilla warfare by assembling a superior force to carry out tactical offensives on enemy units that we are capable of wiping out by surprise. The enemy forces can also concentrate on any point and take away particular areas from us but they would be giving up far more space elsewhere. We can and must always cover territory much wider than the ring of large enemy forces and offensives while we combine annihilative and tactical guerrilla actions and mass mobilizations to resist and punish him in the areas of his concentration.

What the proponents of quick military victory have done is to build prematurely large and unsustainable units that siphon off cadres from mass work and that leave large portions of the guerrilla fronts without effective people's army units and cadres for extended periods of time. The result is that in less than two years of the enemy's "general offensive" he was able to chop off large portions of our guerrilla fronts and extensively build paramilitary units, in many places, with only the minimum of resistance from the unconsolidated mass base and weak local guerrilla and mass work units. We made ourselves vulnerable to enemy attacks in 1988 because for some years already we had weakened our local forces and neglected mass and consolidation work in many places when the enemy also intensified the sweep on our areas and the pressure on the barrios and localities; not to mention the delay in understanding and giving guidance on a national scale. If we do not rectify this error, the enemy can force us to fight in a purely military situation in more and more areas and graver damage would befall the revolutionary forces.

From 1990, in answer to the call of the central leadership, the Party committees and army commands in the regions have been putting the stress on mass work, putting a stop to the reduction of the mass base and strengthening the forces in the localities. Many of the companies have been deployed to mass work, expansion, recovery and consolidation of the mass base and positive results have been rapidly felt in the gradual reversal of the trend towards reduction in earlier years. However, we have just started and a great deal has yet to be done to overcome the adverse effects of the wrong line and recovery towards a steady, continuous and comprehensive advance. First of all, we must thoroughly criticize, repudiate and rectify the erroneous line and persevere in extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare while expanding and

consolidating the mass base through the proper deployment of our cadres and guerrilla forces.

Among many cadres, especially those in the regions and organs familiar with the day-to-day work among the masses and the activities of the army units, there is a strong recognition of the fact that the premature formation of unsustainable companies and battalions does not result in quick military victory but in preoccupation with logistical needs, isolation from the masses and passivity, defeats and other forms of disaster.

The premature formation of unsustainable companies and battalions has also spawned other military adventurist tendencies and acts such as the inclination to hit enemy hard points; ill-planned tactical offensives that last long, consume too much ammunition and result in many casualties; and military actions that do not take into full account the probable and possible negative effects on mass base building, the welfare of the masses and other political implications.

Various departments and layers of staff take away cadres and resources from mass work. Although some, such as those for training, ordnance, medical at various levels, are necessary and contribute a great deal to the development of the army and military technique, some unnecessary staff layers and units have been formed prematurely or are assigned to tasks that are already being attended to or can be more conveniently attended to by other units of the Party or the mass organizations. Prior to this, in most of the regions, there had been a dwindling and drop in the quality of cadres and armed units deployed in the localities. First came the redeployment of cadres and personnel for expansion and for assisting relatively backward guerrilla fronts and regions. Then, came the promotion of cadres for building and strengthening of the Party committees at the district level and upward. And then, came the building of the full-time guerrilla units devoted to military work, thus reducing their participation in mass work and local work. And at the same time there is gross neglect of theoretical education and training of cadres.

As a case in point, the enemy poured nine battalions into Samar in the early 1980s. The NPA had no battalion to speak of but the NPA and the revolutionary forces grew in the course of guerrilla warfare. Now, with the enemy having only three or four battalions on the island and with the NPA having its own battalion unit, there have been certain unprecedented losses in all of the Party, the people's army and the mass base. The "battalion" is bogged down by sheer logistical problems and its troops and staff have been reduced in 1990 by 50

percent from its peak strength of 500 fighters. The battalion staff constitute a large percentage of the total number of Red fighters. The mass base in the entire island has been weakened and sharply reduced.

The overall result is reduction of the mass base. Consequently, the tendency emerged to look upward and outward for logistical support when the food supplies and the contributions from the masses and the tax collections from the local businessmen and landlords could no longer suffice to meet the needs of the companies and battalions. There also developed a strong tendency to use the weapons in getting finances through gangster activities, which are politically counterproductive and give rise to serious ideological and political disorientation among the officers and fighters.

As they should, some companies and battalions do mass work and production work when possible. However, the Red fighters complain why they should be in large concentrated formations even when they are not fighting the enemy. Their constant bigness is precisely the obstacle to taking more offensives as they are bogged down by logistical problems. If they were to fight more often without the mass base and the source of material support, they would fare worse in warfare. There are also those in company formations who use their very size as an argument for not dispersing and engaging in mass work and production or helping the people.

They say that they have to act like a standing army ever alert and specialized in fighting because the enemy might catch them unawares in a dispersed mode. Because of the problems in recruitment resulting from the dwindling mass base, many companies have resorted to recruiting lumpen and other elements who have not gone through revolutionary education and tempering in mass organizations. In many areas there has even been a deliberate lowering of criteria for recruitment into the companies to compensate for the high rate of turnover among fighters.

This, plus the neglect of internal political education and isolation from mass work and production have led to the deterioration of the overall political quality and discipline of the people's army. Among the ranks of the officers and men, the skill and knowledge in conducting mass work, the desirable attitudes developed and necessitated by integrating with the masses have weakened. Problems of coarseness, lack of discipline, lumpen tendencies, arrogance and commandism have developed and spread. Oftentimes, the people speak of the first generation NPAs in squads and platoons as real NPAs and those in companies as fake because they do not engage in mass

work, production and helping the people. “Regularization” has meant alienation from the masses.

At one time, we boasted of dozens of companies and some battalions. But the ratio of the number of company-size offensives to the number of these units is very low. We must squarely face the question why bigger but fewer military units have resulted in fewer tactical offensives, increased number of failed tactical offensives, and a drop in our armed strength, particularly in the number of fighters.

REASSERTING THE ABSOLUTE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY OVER THE ARMY

The party must exercise its absolute leadership over the people’s army by deploying Party cadres properly. The Party leadership in the army command must not be allowed to pay lip service to the comprehensive Party leadership and yet proceed to take all initiative in building a “separate” structure by grabbing all Party cadres within its reach for staffing. The Party should not thus be “left behind” only to be told to catch up in building and consolidating the mass base when its limbs have been cut off precisely because the army has preempted the personnel and resources. The Party has to take the initiative in deploying cadres and resources properly and take full command of the people’s army.

The premature concentration of army command and coordination at higher levels (national and interregional) must be corrected and relative to this, the direct leadership of the Party territorial committee over the organization and units of the army within their respective scopes must be strengthened. The premature centralization of army command, which is one of the factors of “regularization” and verticalization deprived the guerrilla units of flexibility, encouraged disregard for political considerations and local conditions and resulted more often in incorrect judgments not only politically but also militarily. The practice of some higher army commands to bypass the regional Party committee and directly order the deployment and mission of the main “regular” formations must be stopped. The policy of declaring as war zones all the areas within the guerrilla fronts, thus giving the army command and the main army units the license to bypass the local Party committees and disregard political conditions, considerations and plans for launching military actions must also be stopped.

Within army units, the role and leadership of both the military commander and the political officer should be strengthened; their cooperation

must be continuously strengthened for the all-round development of the army unit. What is appropriately the authority of the military commander, especially in military situations, must be ensured while the collective leadership of the Party over the army unit must be developed and strengthened. The tendency to overstress the authority of the commander at the expense of the role of the Party committee, branch or group over the army unit must be avoided.

There have been cases of overstressing the army's line of authority and command almost to the point of liquidating collective life and depriving the Party members in the army of their right to participate in collective discussions about policies and ideological, political, organizational and military matters. There have also been cases at upper command levels of important decisions taken and implemented and operations launched without being referred to or, worse, hidden from the knowledge of the concerned Party committee and reported only after the fact.

Such violations of the absolute leadership of the Party over the army should be corrected. We must ensure that at all times the army operates according to the line of the Party and to the comprehensive policies, plans and priorities and the correct balance between military and political work set by the leading Party committees at different levels. Ideological, political and organizational work to ensure and strengthen Party leadership over the army must be constantly attended to.

It is wrong to maintain big formations in absolute concentration when these are not on tactical offensives or training exercises. The people's army should be like a net which is drawn in when it is to engage an enemy force that it is capable of defeating; and is cast out widely to attend to mass work and other noncombat tasks when not on a fighting mode.

Considering the amount of weapons that the NPA has, it is wiser to have the regional command lead a company as a rallying point for the entire region. When not fighting, such a company should be in relative concentration with the headquarters platoon within the radius of a few barrios and the squads in the other platoons can be deployed within a wider radius of more barrios per squad. Such a company can do fighting and other tasks, move from one guerrilla front to another to launch an offensive or to perform other tasks, with the augmentation or coordination of the more numerous and widespread front and local guerrilla units.

It is wiser to multiply the number of guerrilla fronts, with platoons as the rallying point and squads and half-squads spread out within a wider radius for mass work. The objective should be to attain extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare throughout the country. We should be able to make the monster bleed from thousands upon thousands of wounds.

It is wrong to say that the number of guerrilla fronts is already enough and that the point is to verticalize the armed strength into a few big formations. This is the self-constriction which falls into line with the kind of war that the enemy wants us to fight because it allows him to beat us in his war of quick decision and gradual constriction, which is based on his superior military forces. Painstaking mass work and guerrilla warfare are still our winning line at this stage of our people's war. These lay the horizontal foundation for the vertical growth of the people's army in due course.

Confronted by the brigades and battalions deployed by the enemy, let us apply the law of contradiction in our warfare. The enemy is not always in solid large formation. The rough countryside and the archipelago objectively divide the enemy forces. There is no large enemy formation that does not divide itself according to several functions and that does not make its parts vulnerable to our attack. Instead of going into the path of certain defeat by trying to match the enemy's large formations, we must use guerrilla tactics to induce the enemy force to divide itself and unwittingly provide us with part after part that we can wipe out.

Where we cannot as yet raid a camp successfully, we must find success in ambushing the part of the enemy that we can wipe out on the road. Where we cannot as yet wipe out regular enemy troops, we can find success in repeatedly seizing arms from police and paramilitary units through appropriate operations. It is wrong to say that luring the enemy in deep, letting him move around blind and deaf, and letting him punch the air when we cannot fight to win are outmoded tactics just because our people's war has grown increasingly more intensive as we advance. These are useful at any stage of the people's war. The winning line is to fight only the battles that we can win. The losing line is to stick out big heads or to overreach. Another losing line is not to fight even the battles that we can win. All the way we assume that we expand and consolidate the mass base.

We cannot induce our advance to the stage of regular mobile warfare because it would mean feeding our army and our mass base to senseless attrition or to self-destruction by prematurely rushing into strategically deci-

sive battles or campaigns. Advancing to regular mobile warfare is a strategic advance that necessitates fulfilling the requirements in stages, building up the strength and capability of the Party, the mass base, the reserves and logistics at a higher level and also a greater degree of the enemy's weakening and disintegration, with due consideration of other important factors inside and outside the country. Even the guerrilla warfare for developing the requisites and laying the conditions for regular mobile warfare in the future will have to go through stages, progressively from simple and lower levels to more complex and higher.

The rectification of the line of "regularization" and premature vertical buildup of the people's army should result in the reinvigoration and improvement of the quality of mass work and mass base building in the countryside. It is urgent that we attend to the work of expanding the guerrilla fronts and recovering lost areas as well as of solving the problems of consolidation that have been relegated to secondary position since we started to undertake "regularization" and "to raise the level of our warfare." It is necessary for us to understand and implement the line of solid organizing, correct balancing of expansion and consolidation, antifeudal struggle, consistent education and propaganda, and developing various types of mass campaigns.

We must take advantage of the enemy's loosening hold over wider parts of the countryside as he concentrates the majority of his forces and resources for offensives on the few priority targets of Lambat-Bitag II. But we must also learn to adjust to and persevere in developing our mass work even under conditions and within areas of more intense contention with the enemy. We cannot just leave and abandon the areas that are more populated, along lines of transportation, communications and supply, and important in linking up with the movement in the cities simply because these areas are more easily accessible to or more closely watched by the enemy.

We must therefore be good at combining according to the changing military conditions and particularities of the areas (remote and mountainous, foothills and plains, adjacent to urban centers and along highways) forms of organizations and struggles that are open and secret, legal, semi-legal and illegal, traditional and nontraditional, as well as forms of struggles that are armed and nonarmed in order to maintain as far as possible our link with, guidance over and development of the movement and the mass base.

One long running problem in our mass work is the smallness of the membership of our mass organizations; in many localities, the only existing peo-

ple's organizations are the organs of political power or a semblance of it. We must solve this problem by organizing as fully as possible the workers, peasants, youth, women, children and cultural activists. And we must develop the organs of political power, supported by working committees for mass organization, education, defense, land reform, production, finance, health, arbitration, cultural affairs and so on. These can be drawn from mass organizations.

In organizing the masses, we must also avoid premature verticalization and give priority to horizontal spread and consolidation at the barrio and municipal levels. In the last several years, there has been a tendency to push the building of the structure of the organs of political power and the mass organizations upward to the level of the district and higher even as the scope and strength of the mass organizations at the basic levels have diminished, thus absorbing the already limited number of cadres at the lower levels in order to preoccupy them with the tasks of administration, coordination and formal processes of organization at upper levels. It is of urgent necessity to organize the masses. But getting organized is not enough. Mass campaigns must be launched. Through these, the masses can develop their own power, effect changes for their social and economic wellbeing and resist and frustrate enemy attacks by unarmed and armed, open and secret means. The key campaign to benefit the peasant masses is the campaign for the realization of the minimum program of our land reform and increased production. There are some elements who without having much in carrying out the minimum program of rent reduction already wish to carry out the maximum program of land confiscation. We have had more than enough negative experiences of this kind of overreaching of trying to achieve what we cannot as yet achieve.

Elements of the maximum program may be carried out only against despotic landlords (those who harm the peasant masses and farm workers and refuse to negotiate with them) and landgrabbers so that we can still take advantage of the split between the despotic and enlightened landlords, prevent the landlords (big, medium and small) from uniting against us and allow us to further develop our strength among the peasant masses not only in the current guerrilla fronts but also in the more extensive areas to which we must expand.

THE BOYCOTT DECISIONS OF 1978 AND 1986

The boycott error of 1986 has been rectified but it deserves some attention in this discussion for the purpose of comparing or relating it to other

errors. It has been so overstated and drummed up that it has overshadowed the incomparably far bigger and more destructive line of armed urban insurrectionism and military adventurism. Here is a clear case of subjectivism, a gross failure to see all the major errors and evaluate them properly.

Before and after the reestablishment of the Party, the proletarian revolutionary cadres have had an extensive experience in working within the reactionary institutions, organizations and processes. It is permissible and necessary for cadres and Party groups to be assigned to work within the reactionary trade unions, churches, the army of the enemy and so on.

And, of course, certain legal mass organizations even if patriotic and progressive can operate viably and conduct legal political struggle by complying with the requirements of legality. For instance, they cannot declare in their documents that they are for the armed revolution. But neither is it correct for them to gratuitously declare themselves against armed revolution. As a matter of fact they can always assert the sovereign right of the people to decide on what it takes to defend their freedom.

It is not unprincipled for a Party member to have a legal occupation and carry legal documents. Neither is it unprincipled for a Party member or a Red fighter under arrest to retain the services of a lawyer and wage a legal struggle in order to defend his rights and prevent the enemy from doing worse to him.

But the question about Party cadres and Party groups operating in legal political parties and alliances and in the reactionary electoral process aroused bitter debates in the past. Such debates were over the 1978 and 1986 elections called by the Marcos fascist regime. Each time one side was for boycott and another side for participation.

The term boycott was used by the broadest spectrum of antifascist opposition, including the Party and the anti-Marcos reactionaries, to isolate the Marcos regime in the 1981 elections. In the 1984 elections, the Party leadership again referred to its position as boycott and this went along well with the boycott position of the broad antifascist popular movement and most of the anti-Marcos reactionaries. In both 1981 and 1984 elections, the 1978 boycott decision of the Party appeared vindicated. But the 1986 boycott position became problematic because this time, the middle and backward sections of the antifascist movement opted for critical participation. Even among the advanced section of the masses, there was great opposition to the boycott line.

We are most concerned about the bitter internal debates over the 1978 and 1986 elections. An understanding of these leads to a general understanding of the reactionary electoral processes and the correct stand and approach of the Party. Whenever the issue in the debate is formulated as a choice between boycott and participation, those on the boycott side have the advantage of winning the debate on the simple ground that in the first place, the Party is banned and cannot participate and anyway the electoral process is reactionary on the whole, if not exclusively.

But should the issue always be formulated as a choice between boycott and participation? Cannot the issue be formulated within the Party as one of whether or not the Party deploys Party cadres and groups that are not known as such outside of the Party in order to operate in the reactionary electoral process, promote the national democratic line, attack the enemy and support the progressive side be it party, alliance or set of candidates? The Party itself is not participating because it cannot as a matter of revolutionary principle and even if it wants to, it cannot due to the enemy ban on the Party. The Party's own line of armed revolution regards the reactionary elections as farcical. But the Party certainly can do something by way of revolutionary dual tactics through Party cadres and groups that are not publicly known as such.

Revolutionary dual tactics are employed by the Party to reach a greater number of the people and to counteract the enemy's counterrevolutionary dual tactics of misrepresenting the electoral exercise as a democratic one, even if it is actually monopolized either by the reactionary ruling clique or by all the exploiting classes through a multiplicity of bourgeois reactionary parties and is intended to deceive the people into believing that they participate in a democratic process.

In the elections of 1969 and 1971, the Party kept to its antirevisionist line of not considering these reactionary elections as the sole or principal way of achieving revolutionary change or basic reforms and described these as farces on the whole and in essence. But the Party could issue statements on what constitutes the substance of democracy and what makes a truly democratic exercise, promote the national democratic line and encourage the legal progressive forces and candidates to take the patriotic and progressive line.

The central leadership took a decision to boycott the 1978 elections. In the process of making the decision, the leadership of the Manila-Rizal party organization argued for participation but was outvoted and was therefore bound to abide by the decision. But it did not carry out instructions for

implementing the boycott. And in the ensuing full-blown struggle with the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, it resorted to secret meetings where committee members who did not agree with it were excluded, continuously refused to follow instructions about organizational arrangements, spread irresponsible talk to undermine the central leadership's credibility and which violated the secrecy of the identities of the Central Committee members, and threatened violence against certain Central Committee members. Hence, disciplinary measures were meted out to the regional leadership. The central leadership decided to reorganize the Macula-Rizal Party organization. But only a provisional executive committee was formed to replace the Manila-Rizal Party Committee, many of whose members had either been suspended or reassigned. Increasingly, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee tried to run the Party organization and the mass movement in Metro Manila through central staff organs until the regional leadership was completely abolished in 1982.

In the absence of an effective regional leadership, the district Party committees, local Party branches and the community-based mass organizations became neglected and fell into disarray. The disarray in the Party organization in Metro Manila disabled the Party from bringing about the upsurge in the mass movement, participated in by a broad range of political forces. This upsurge had been well signaled by the "noise barrage," which was called on the eve of the 1978 farcical elections for the IBP (interim legislature) and which aside from the noisemaking was accompanied by various forms of street mass actions.

The Party had anticipated this upsurge in 1974 on the basis of advances made among the workers and the youth in that year. There were expectations that the workers and the urban communities would rise up in an unprecedented manner in the last years of the 1970s at the latest, notwithstanding the tendency of some leading cadres in Manila-Rizal to overstress the antifascist struggle and to artificially heat up the street actions. These expectations could not be realized as a consequence of the boycott decision of 1978, the disciplinary actions in 1979 and the inability of the central leadership to build an effective regional Party leadership.

The central staff organs, especially the National Commission on Mass Movements, would promote Metro Manila-based national mass organizations which were then weak but they did not pay sufficient attention to the growth of community organizations and basic Party life at the grassroots lev-

el. Their attention and efforts were increasingly devoted to sweeping propaganda, building administrative structures related to the urban-based national mass organizations and coordinating these for mass mobilizations. Thus was laid the ground for bureaucratism. This kind of bureaucratism involved central staff organs dividing among themselves aspects of work over the mass organizations, acquiring excessive political discretion and developing a unilateral top-down command system. These staff organs became in practice sources of political authority and tended to herd Party cadres and members into the administrative structure of mass organizations. By 1986, Party members were already critical of the existence of “two or three Party centers” in addition to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. Basic Party life in communities, factories and other workplaces would be neglected for a long time. Party cadres and members are piled up in administrative positions and in Party groups at various levels of mass organizations and are lacking in basic Party life at the grassroots level. So, to this day all-round Party life ideological, political and organizational remains weak at the basic level.

It was in the 1983–86 period that the Party and progressive urban mass organizations were able to recover significantly due to the powerful antifascist popular current that was let loose by the Aquino assassination. The mass movement in the cities developed in street actions, coordinated campaigns, sweeping propaganda and broad coalition and alliance building. On the other hand, it had weaknesses in solid organizing, solid work at basic levels, sustained and solid efforts at political education, propaganda and agitation among the masses, and in building up strength in factories, schools and communities. Even at the height of the open movement and struggle in the 1983–86 period, Party activists and members reached only a few thousands among the workers and students and these were thinly spread in small secret Party groups and cells and branches within legal political mass organizations.

The boycott decision of 1978 had resulted in as much damage as, if not even more damage than, the 1986 boycott error. But the latter has been played up by honest elements who seek redress from what they perceive as unjust punishment for circumventing the 1978 boycott decision as well as by other elements who have seized upon the 1986 boycott error to obscure the far more devastating errors in Mindanao and who continue to promote the wrong line that caused the far bigger error the ultimate weakening of the revolutionary forces there as early as 1984 and the anti-informer hysteria in 1985-86.

The 1986 boycott was a major tactical error, as correctly described by the central leadership. During the short electoral campaign period, it separated and isolated the advanced section of the masses from the other sections which took the antifascist and anti-Marcos line. There was a failure to recognize that Marcos' cheating in the elections would incite the people to an unprecedented uprising as well as a grave split in the reactionary armed forces. The Party went into a vigorous effort and expense in order to impose its sectarian will on organizations and alliances with a mass and united front character for the duration of the snap presidential elections campaign period.

However, the Party leadership regained its composure and initiative when it called for the nationwide popular resistance in alliance with all the antifascist and anti-Marcos forces immediately after the farcical election exercise. Nevertheless, there are outside the Party critics of the boycott error of 1986 who to this day overstate it in order to push their own erroneous lines and agendas but are not being significantly rebuffed by the Party. There are those who claim against the incontrovertible facts that because of the 1986 boycott error the Party and the progressive mass organizations and alliances were out of the EDSA mass uprising that caused the downfall of Marcos and go so far as to negate the role of the Party and the revolutionary movement in the 1983–86 mass actions and the longer process of undermining and isolating the fascist regime.

In overemphasizing the role of the spontaneous masses and the supposed lack of participation by the revolutionary and legal progressive forces, there are those who stress the role of their own small petty bourgeois organizations and obscure the role of the US and the Catholic officialdom and the reactionary classes in the making of the mass uprising cum relatively bloodless military mutiny. The fact was that there was a convergence of organized contradictory forces and the spontaneous masses on the widely detested fascist regime.

However, the most fantastic claim is that made by some proponents of urban insurrectionism. They claim that were it not for the boycott error, the revolutionary forces could have brought down the ruling system together with Marcos by leading the spontaneous masses to victory as in Nicaragua in 1979 or at the least there could have been a sharing of power with the Aquino clique, the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM) and the like. They therefore consider the boycott error of 1986 as the biggest error of the Party.

In fact the bigger ideological, political and organizational error had been the erroneous line and the anti-infiltrator hysteria that caused the devasta-

tion on the Party and the mass movement in Mindanao in 1985 and afterwards. How could the Party be expected to seize power when the year before the EDSA uprising the revolutionary forces and people in Mindanao were already being ravaged by the logical and real consequences of the erroneous line of urban insurrectionism and military adventurism? Whether intentional or not, some who have been responsible for the disaster in Mindanao have promoted the wrong line and themselves within the Party by overstating the boycott error of 1986 and obscuring their own far bigger errors.

BUILDING THE UNITED FRONT

The party has a revolutionary class line in building the united front for the national democratic revolution and for armed struggle. This revolutionary class line is the building of the basic alliance of workers and peasants, winning over such middle forces as the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, taking advantage of splits among the reactionaries and isolating and defeating the reactionary diehards. There is a structure of requirements for the revolutionary united front to exist and develop along the revolutionary class line of the Party.

First, there must be the leadership of the working class through the Party, which initially recruited its members from the trade union, youth and urban-based mass movements and from the remnants of the previous revolutionary movement. Second, there must be the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry through the Party arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasant masses and building the New People's Army and the peasant associations led by the Party. Third, there must be a broader alliance of the toiling masses of workers and peasants with the third basic force of the revolution, the urban petty bourgeoisie, through the underground National Democratic Front and other alliances aboveground.

Fourth, there must be a still broader alliance of the positive forces of the revolution, linking the basic forces of the revolution with the national bourgeoisie. There is yet no significant organizational expression of the united front of the positive forces, although members and groups of the national bourgeoisie cooperate with the revolutionary movement in areas where the armed revolutionary movement and the trade union movement are strong.

Fifth, there can be an alliance with certain sections of the reactionary classes against the most reactionary clique. This was well manifested on a

nationwide scale in the antifascist struggle. Enlightened landlords and businessmen have shown cooperation by paying their taxes to the people's government and have cooperated with the Party, the NPA, NDF and mass organizations on such matters as land reform, wage relations, elections, etc.

Sixth, the broadest alliance can be ranged against the narrowest target, the reactionary clique that is ruling or the one most favored by US imperialism. We fight and defeat one most reactionary clique after another and in the process we accumulate revolutionary strength.

The Party must play the vanguard role in representation of the immediate and long-term rights and interests of the working class and must be able to distinguish in class terms the stable and reliable allies from the unstable and unreliable ones. But as early as in 1975, there was a motion to do away with the Marxist-Leninist language in Ang Bayan and specifically the politically precise term, anti-Marcos reactionaries, to refer to such allies as Benigno Aquino, Diosdado Macapagal and Joaquin Roces. There was the misunderstanding that such allies as Lorenzo Tariada and Jose W. Diokno, who in fact took a clear-cut patriotic and progressive line (of the national bourgeois kind) on major issues, would feel referred to and be turned off by the term.

Thus, the term faded towards the end of the 1970s. What replaced it was the ideologically strict term "bourgeois reformists," used in the debates between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. This term was applied so widely by the central leadership up to 1986 as to lump together with reactionary elements and forces some of the basic as well as positive elements and forces of the revolution. The result was a certain amount of confusion within the Party.

One side used the term to support a sectarian position. This position adhered to the tactics of aiming for decisive victory in the revolution in the struggle against the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship and the policy of neutralizing, dismantling and removing the influence of the "bourgeois reformist" bloc. Thus, it had a tendency to impose the advanced position and will of the Party on the legal organizations of a mass and alliance character to the point of creating splits within these organizations and separating the advanced elements from the broad antifascist front.

Another side also used the term in a reverse way from a liberal position. One extreme begot another. Thus, certain elements of the Party in the National Urban Commission (NUC), the United Front Commission, the National Military Staff (later called the General Command) and Ang Bayan would go so far as to describe the Aquino's political stand as national bour-

geois and her regime as liberal democratic rather than as a US-supported big comprador-landlord regime. Echoing the American bourgeois mass media, they propagandized the line that the new reactionary regime was liberal democratic and thus they created confusion even among the Party members and the revolutionary mass organizations.

Errors keep on arising in united front work. There are those who, in their wish to hasten the ripening of the insurrectionary situation in the urban areas, advocate the development of direct and open alliance between the NDF and legal organizations and alliances progressive and otherwise within the framework of a common minimum program (the so-called people's agenda). The supposed objective is to position the NDF at the center of the people's struggles that will be developed towards armed mass uprisings. But what they are actually proposing is confusing the demarcation line between legal and illegal organizations and struggles and pulling the NDF down to the level of legal allied organizations and personalities, many of whom are still confined within the bounds of reformism although they maintain a progressive stand on certain questions.

There are also those who equate the united front with the entire people and then accuse the Party of instrumentalizing the people when the Party speaks of the armed struggle and the united front as weapons of the Party. They do not understand that the working class leadership through the Party, the armed struggle through the NPA and the united front through the NDF and other formations or informal cooperative relations are all functional aspects of the revolutionary movement and are all weapons or instruments of the Filipino people in the national democratic revolution.

There are also those who wish to equate the NDF with the entire united front and make the NDF a catchall federation which assumes the leadership over the Philippine revolution and in which the Party is politically and organizationally subordinated not only to a "federal center" but to one with a preponderance of petty bourgeois formations.

There are those who erase from the history of the NDF the role and initiative of the Party in the formation of the NDF and who eliminate the leading role of the working class in the united front. Upon the elimination of the proletarian leadership, the democratic revolution then envisioned is nothing but a recycling of the old liberal revolution and the passing hegemony of petty bourgeois formations and ideas on behalf of today's exploiting classes. In fact, the program of the NDF has been overwritten and diluted several

times under the wrong notion that even after the seizure of political power (the basic completion of the new democratic revolution) the goal is still to build the “national democratic society” and not the socialist society as well as under the influence of the (now failed) Sandinista program of “multiparty democracy” (no socialist revolution) and “mixed economy” (no socialist construction) and the policies of revisionist regimes, whose cornerstone is the elimination of the leading role of the working class.

Despite all the efforts aimed at expansion, the NDF remains an underground united front of the organizations of basic forces of the revolution (working class, peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie). Should there be a retreat from or should there be a reaffirmation of what the NDF is as a formal united front of the organizations of the basic revolutionary forces which accept the leadership of the working class, the new democratic line and the armed struggle?

Even as the NDF remains as it was originally envisioned in 1973, of course, with appropriate scaling down of the unrealized expectation in 1973 that it is the entire united front of all patriotic and progressive classes, it is possible to strengthen it internally and then proceed to seek out allies who do not wish to be within the NDF fold but within varied frames of bilateral and multilateral relations.

Strengthening it internally means reaffirming the NDF as the most advanced united front organization of the basic revolutionary forces along the new-democratic line; developing those underground allied organizations (even if led or influenced by the Party) other than the Party and the NPA; and creating the councils and commissions to assist and pave the way for the people’s government at various levels.

Rather than have the concept of federation, it is more flexible to adopt the principle of confederal, consensual and consultative relations of allied organizations within the NDF. This is the way to uphold the independence and initiative of the Party and override such questions as to whether the NDF is under the democratic centralism of the Party or the other way around, and also keep the door indefinitely open to entities that wish to join, depending on the circumstances and strength of the revolutionary movement.

Seeking out groups as allies does not mean only dealing with those willing to join the NDF. It also means establishing bilateral or multilateral relations with them on a consultative and consensual basis. Such allies might prefer to

deal with the NDF from the outside and possibly on an equal footing within a wider frame.

Since 1986, the much expanded legal alliances have shown the way how to build them on the consultative and consensual basis, without having to choose between federal and unitary forms of organization or without getting mixed up about these forms of organization.

ON THE ISSUE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Proposals for peace talks and national unity between the revolutionary forces and a new government to replace the Marcos regime were publicly aired by the prominent leaders and forces in alliance against the fascist regime in the 1983–86 period. These proposals served to expand and firm up the united front, both formal and informal.

Upon coming to power, Aquino released the political prisoners as she had pledged to do in an attempt to court the support of the national democratic movement; and called for a ceasefire as she had expressed interest in it before becoming president.

It was correct for the Party to declare its willingness to engage in peace talks or, as the Aquino regime preferred to call them, ceasefire talks. To have done otherwise would have been to appear as being opposed to peace in the face of Aquino's offer of ceasefire talks. In the first place, the Party's national democratic line is the line for a just and lasting peace. Thus, it was decided that a negotiating panel of the National Democratic Front would represent all the revolutionary forces.

But before agreeing to engage in formal bilateral negotiations or sign a ceasefire agreement, the NPA should have taken all the time to engage in talks about peace talks until such time that a substantive agenda and other terms could be agreed upon to the mutual satisfaction of the two sides. Even before the 60-day ceasefire agreement, the NDF could take initiatives in launching propaganda. It could also expose the other side as the intransigent one, especially on the substantive issues. The NDF could rebuff the other side every time this threatened to end the pre-ceasefire talks.

It was erroneous though to allow the pre-ceasefire talks to be held exclusively in the Metro Manila area. The sickness (terminal cancer) of one of the negotiators of the reactionary government, Senator Jose W. Diokno who was deeply respected by the NDF, dictated the constant Metro Manila venue of the pre-ceasefire talks. It was also erroneous to agree to a 60-day ceasefire

agreement without any agreement on a substantive agenda for serious peace negotiations. The declared purpose of the ceasefire agreement was merely for creating the atmosphere for an undefined substantive dialogue during the ceasefire period.

One reason given for the ceasefire agreement was that it would pave the way for a substantive agenda and for the formal peace talks. Another reason given by some elements in the Party for the ceasefire agreement was that it would allow the revolutionary forces to show their “human face” and to make propaganda on a nationwide scale through the dominant bourgeois mass media.

Still another reason given by other elements in the Party was that the people’s army in Mindanao needed the ceasefire as a relief from the pressures by overwhelming enemy military forces and as a device for allowing supplies to isolated and besieged NPA units. Actually, the enemy forces in Mindanao were then in disarray due to the big split between the Marcos-Ver and the Enrile-Ramos camps. At any rate, some Mindanao cadres had gone into localized ceasefire independent of the central leadership of the Party. They were in a difficult situation not simply because of enemy pressures but more essentially because of the ravages of a wrong line and the anti-informer hysteria.

Some elements in Mindanao Commission had the localist notion that they could run far ahead of the rest of the country in liberating Mindanao through a combination of offensives by enlarged “regularized” NPA formations and armed urban uprisings. Under conditions of self-destruction as a result of the anti-informer hysteria and the effectiveness of the enemy in a purely military situation, they wished to find a way out through localized ceasefires, without realizing that these could induce a fragmentation of the national revolutionary movement and that these would not really solve the problems wrought by the erroneous line that they had pushed in Mindanao. At any rate, there was a case of swinging from an ultra-Left to a Rightist position.

Certain leading cadres of the Party held the view that our armed struggle was put in a politically defensive position after the EDSA uprising. They asserted that we needed the ceasefire to “reposition” our armed struggle in the new situation. For them, the ceasefire was the main thing and it was a good thing that served our purpose despite the serious flaws in the ceasefire agreement and the aggravation of our security problems in the cities and the countryside.

There were even a few who held the view that the ceasefire and peace talks would possibly lead to another polarization of forces where Aquino and

other “middle forces” (including pro-Aquino comprador big bourgeois and landlords) could be won over to the side of the also issued comprehensive guidelines and detailed instructions on security since 1989.

As a result of some efforts to push a new round of peace talks between the NDF and the reactionary government from 1989 onward, the Party and the NDF have further worked out a comprehensive framework of peace negotiations in order to frustrate the attempt of the enemy to misrepresent itself as the champion of peace and the revolutionary forces as the source of violence and to split the revolutionary forces and the people. The main points in the framework are the following.

- (1) The strategic line is one of pursuing the national democratic line to attain a just and lasting peace.
- (2) The NDF is a belligerent force in the civil war and not a mere insurgent force. It cannot negotiate with the reactionary government if not on an equal footing under international law.
- (3) The legal and political frame is the set of mutually acceptable principles, the international norms and the agreements that may be made.
- (4) The substantive agenda includes the following: respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; social and economic reforms; constitutional, political and electoral reforms; and the armed forces.
- (5) There must be a reasonable timetable.
- (6) The venue must be abroad for the mutual convenience and safety of the two sides.
- (7) There must be a foreign state or interstate third party acting in a certain capacity (intermediary, good offices or witness) agreed upon by the two sides.
- (8) The domestic and foreign third party of nongovernmental peace advocates can be consulted and be of help to the peace process.

The framework of the reactionary government is diametrically opposed to that of the NDF and is not at all a framework for peace negotiations but for killing the peace process *ab initio*. It includes the following points:

- (1) 1. NDF must submit to the GRP constitution.
- (2) The NPA must surrender its arms and be liquidated.

- (3) In exchange for the foregoing two points, the GRP will offer amnesty and rehabilitation measures to the amnesty grantees.
- (4) Negotiations must be held in the Philippines.
- (5) If the NDF leadership refuses to agree to the foregoing points, then the GRP and AFP will not enter into any formal bilateral talks with the NDF but will seek localized dialogues and ceasefire for the surrender of local leaders and forces of the CPP, NPA and NDF.

The opposing frameworks are absolutely clear. Those who blame the Party and other revolutionary forces for the absence of formal bilateral talks between the NDF and GRP cause harm to the interests of the revolutionary movement. Those who take the posture of being above the NDF and the GRP, avowing to be simply interested in doing away with the human costs of the civil war, and who simplistically consider both sides of the civil war as equally violent, actually obscure the just and reasonable cause of the armed revolution and in effect rationalize the retention of the violent system of oppression and exploitation.

We must rebuff those elements who, without understanding the costs of prolonged ceasefire to the revolutionary will and forces of the people, exaggerate the importance of ceasefire and peace talks as means to broaden the united front and strengthen the mass movement for the purpose of an armed urban insurrection. We must frustrate the reactionary effort to put the NDF at par with mutinous factions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and with a multiplicity of nongovernmental organizations of all political sorts (including the most reactionary ones) in a supposed peace process to attain a broad anti-imperialist front for an “armed insurrection in the medium term.” This is a puerile ploy.

We must also frustrate the attempt of some reactionary clerical elements to make the revolutionary movement accept the strategic hamlet by a simple change of name, like “zone of peace” or “zone of life.” Our revolutionary mass base is peaceful and full of productive life, unless the reactionary forces intrude and unleash death and destruction on it.

We must put a stop to the practice of NDF cadres on the enemy manhunt list going to Manila to meet with personalities under probable or certain surveillance and to talk about peace prospects with them there. The repeatedly proven cost of such meetings should convince everyone that talks about peace talks are best delegated to those who are most secure or least vulnerable.

On the question of peace negotiations, we must reject any ultra-Left and yet Rightist notion that if armed urban insurrection is not possible, then we must seek peaceful settlement with the enemy and depart from the armed revolution and put our hopes on parliamentarism. We must also reject as a major premise of peace negotiations the notion that the NDF must seek peaceful settlement because it is supposed to be the trend in the world. A just peace in the Philippines is essentially something that the Filipino people have to fight for.

If there can be no peace negotiations yet, it is because the reactionary government is intransigent. The lack of peace negotiations only means that the revolutionary forces and the people under the leadership of the Party must work and fight more resolutely than ever to change the balance of forces in the Philippines.

III

IN THE FIELD OF ORGANIZATION

It is the outstanding achievement of the Communist Party of the Philippines that it has become a nationwide organization with deep roots among the broad masses of the people, especially among the toiling masses of workers and peasants. The Party and the masses it leads are in the urban areas and in the wide expanses of the countryside, in the plains, hills, mountain valleys and seacoasts. In the entire history of the Philippines, never has there been a revolutionary organization of such national scope and depth among the broad masses of people as the Party. The Party membership is in the tens of thousands, consisting of cadres and members. Augmented by the revolutionary mass activists, the Party has surpassed the Katipunan of 1898 and far more the old Communist Party of the Philippines in national spread and in other significant respects.

The Party is present wherever there exists the people's army, the underground and legal mass organizations and the organs of political power it has created. It is at the head and at the core of the revolutionary mass movement. It exists in new areas of growth as well as in traditional institutions and organizations.

The Party owes its strength to the cadres and members and to all martyrs who have adhered to and implemented the correct line of the Party; and to the broad masses of the people who follow the leadership of the Party along the general line of the new democratic revolution against the imperialists and the local exploiting classes.

The Party is the advanced detachment of the working class and the Philippine revolution. Without this vanguard, the revolutionary mass movement along the new democratic line cannot arise and develop. Even the byproducts of this movement, such as petty bourgeois groups and trends of thought which are patriotic and progressive in varying degrees, cannot thrive without the growth and advance of the Party and the revolutionary mass movement. To attack the vanguard role and development of the Party is to try to defeat the revolution and bring back the worst forms of reaction.

The main organizational principle of the Party is democratic centralism. This is centralism based on democracy and democracy under centralized leadership. For further explanation, let us quote extensively from the Party Constitution. The basic conditions of democratic centralism are the following:

- (1) Leading organs of the Party at all levels shall be elected and shall be responsible to the Party organization or conference that elected them.
- (2) After free and thorough discussion, decisions taken by the Party are implemented.
 - (a) The individual is subordinate to the organization;
 - (b) The minority is subordinate to the majority;
 - (c) The lower level is subordinate to the higher level;
 - (d) The entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee and the National Congress.
- (3) Leading organs always pay attention to the reports and views of lower Party organizations and of the masses of Party members and constantly study concrete experiences and render prompt assistance in solving problems.
- (4) Lower Party organizations give regular and special reports about their work to the organization above them and request instructions promptly concerning problems which require the decision of a higher Party organization.
- (5) Party organizations follow the principle of collective leadership and all important questions are decided collectively.

However, democratic centralism is not just the democratic and collective process of decision-making. The decisions must adhere to the basic principles for which the Party exists. These points are declared in the Party Constitution and Program; and these are the guide to the definition of achievements, problems and tasks; to inner Party democracy and discipline and to the conduct of criticism and self-criticism. Democratic centralism does not allow the violation of the Party constitution, diminution and destruction of basic Party life, the practice of bureaucratism as well as ultra-democracy or liberalism and disregard of one's own security and the security of others and the entire Party.

There must be a good account of the reasons for the failure of the Party to increase its membership and to further develop a comprehensive Party life, especially at the basic level. There are certain elements and certain trends of thought and action that prevent these.

THE CENTRAL LEADING AND STAFF ORGANS

For a long time, there has been no Party Congress. However, this has been made up for by the holding of plenary conferences of the Central Committee. In the history of other parties engaged in bitter armed struggle, wide time gaps between Party congresses occur due to extreme difficulties posed by the enemy. The ongoing time gap in our case is, at any rate, extraordinary and must be dealt with. Even the plenary meetings of the Central Committee could have been held more frequently under particular circumstances when the Party was confronted by serious problems regarding the conduct of the struggle or important shifts in the situation of general and long-term significance.

But far more disturbing than this time gap is the tendency of certain elements since the early 1980s to disregard and deviate from the basic principles and organizational rules set down by the Party Constitution and Program. The delay in the holding of a Congress may be regarded as a blessing in disguise insofar as the basic principles remain intact and can be reaffirmed by proletarian revolutionary cadres.

It would be utterly disastrous now if, in a Party Congress at any time in the 1980s, certain elements had succeeded in withdrawing the analysis of Philippine society, the antirevisionist critique and the theory of people's war from the Party Constitution and Program. As a matter of fact, these basic documents were invoked by the central leadership in 1985 to defend the Party's line against the attempts to push the line of hastening military victory through the combination of prematurely enlarged armed formations and armed urban uprisings. Ironically at that time, this erroneous line was already resulting in disaster but the reputation of those who pushed this line was high on the basis of the temporary success in their military offensives in a major island in 1981–83.

At any rate, there is another obvious departure from the Party Constitution that has run for so long. The office of the General Secretary, required by the Constitution, has been practically abolished. No leading organ can abolish this office, which is meant by the Constitution to take charge of daily administrative and routine matters on behalf of the central leadership.

Instead, structures revolving around commissions focused on principal lines of work have been created. One result has been the increasingly loosened supervision over and weakening of the basic tasks of organization and education in the Party, something that has become even more widespread in

the entire Party when the decision to replicate these structures in the regions was implemented.

Another result has been a proliferation of central staff organs directly under the Central Committee through the Executive Committee. These are meant to assist the central leadership (the Central Committee, Political Bureau and the Executive Committee) and not to hamper, exhaust or ignore it.

But insofar as these central staff organs have increasingly acquired discretion and power, they have become so autonomous that they can either decide on policies on their own without the prior approval of the central leadership; circulate so-called orientation, strategy, program and policy papers under the guise of drafts; and generate long meetings, long papers and issues of controversy with other staff organs (e.g., NOC versus NUFC over slogans and procedural issues) and lower leading organs (NOC versus MR on the issue of national democratic or socialist “orientation” of the workers’ movement). The controversial issues and papers are dumped from time to time onto the central leadership, or the latter must run after them.

The central leadership assumes responsibility for this bureaucratic state of affairs which victimizes itself. As the daily core of the central leadership, the Executive Committee must issue the timely statements on major public issues, national and international; solve the problems promptly and decisively; run the central staff organs with concise notes of instruction or directives; restore the General Secretariat to take care of daily administrative and routine matters; and streamline the other central staff organs, define the limits of the functions of the staff organs, correct their style of work, transfer to the countryside those staff organs that properly belong there and send to the regions and countryside the excess of urban-based staffers, especially those on the enemy manhunt list.

Whenever a major difference of view or controversy arises between staff organs or between a staff organ and a lower leading organ, the issue should be immediately reported to the Executive Committee and should not be prolonged nor generate long meetings, long papers and disruption of work. Just as the Executive Committee and its executive officers are expected to issue timely guidelines, statements and directives, the central staff organs and lower leading organs must make timely reports and recommendations.

The territorial (interregional) commissions were originally conceived as CC administrative organs, each covering several regions. The 9th plenum of the Central Committee in 1985 converted them into the highest policy-

making body within their scope but also pointed out that the commissions must facilitate the flow of reports from the regional committees to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. In practice, reports from the regions became fewer and farther between and in many ways, the Executive Committee was sealed off from the regions. The territorial commissions are appointive and should function as staff organs. They must effect the timely exchange of communications between the Executive Committee and the regional committees. They can give the appropriate cover letter, including recommendations, to the EC but they cannot *a priori* assume that they can make decisions on behalf of any higher leading organ on major issues that involve the question of compliance with the Party's line or not.

The central leading organs, the Military Commission and the Party organization within the New People's Army must see to it that no army command disregards the strategic line of people's war and the comprehensive requirements of people's war. Not even the general command of the New People's Army can generate strategy papers and conferences and make decisions that run counter to or deviate from the strategic line of people's war. The absolute leadership of the Party means that the Party decides the line and well-balanced deployment of Party cadres and resources and ensures the growing participation and support of the people.

At no time should the Party and the masses be "left behind" chasing after the supposedly "independent and separate" initiative of any army command at any level. It is not the case that the Party leadership is the deliberate sluggard, when initiatives that deviate from the strategic line gobble up the cadres and resources for premature and unsustainable bigger military formations and staff. At no time can the Party and the masses catch up with a line that gobbles up cadres and resources in a narrow way and eventually leads to the drastic reduction of mass base and all-round disaster. It is the constant duty of Party cadres and members to assert the basic principles and implement the correct line rather than tail after an erroneous line. The concept of a separate military structure should not also be allowed to lead to the abolition of Party collectives and Party life at any level of the people's army.

Certain elements in staff organs as well as leading organs based in Metro Manila and other cities exaggerate the importance of their urban work by touting the insurrectionist line as the principal way to seize political power irrespective of the development of the people's war and the people's army. The practical consequence has been the dwindling of Party cadres with a

good level of education, professional and technical competence who are willing to serve the people in the countryside and join the people's army.

The peasant masses and the countryside do not by themselves produce these cadres. If these cadres are not provided by the urban areas, then the people's war and the people's army will decline and collapse; and the legal progressive mass organizations and the armed city partisans become easy prey for the enemy. Violations of the specific line that the principal character of the urban struggle is legal and defensive can provoke a crackdown by the enemy on the highly vulnerable legal democratic mass organizations and even on the underground staff organs. Without the guerrilla fronts and the rural mass base, where will our city-bred comrades go to pursue revolutionary work if they can no longer work effectively in the urban areas?

The concept of armed urban insurrection should cease to be the rationale for withholding cadres from the countryside in favor of armed city partisan units and urban-based staff organs or the lopsided attention given to recruiting "brave" or "exposed" elements of dubious political commitment into the armed city partisan units.

While central staff organs enjoy a high degree of autonomy, some to the point of independent kingdoms, and lower leading organs have unquestioned political authority over their jurisdiction, there is the wrong notion held by certain elements to deprive the Executive Committee of political authority and to reduce it to being a mere convenor of PB meetings.

The view spread by a certain element that there is no more EC or that the EC lacks political authority can only result in the weakening of the Party and in whipping up centrifugal tendencies like the independent actions by individual leading cadres and certain central staff organs beyond their authority and against central policies and decisions.

The daily core of the central leadership of the Party is the Executive Committee. It can make decisions in accordance with the basic principles in the Constitution and Program and the policies and standing decisions of the higher leading organs. It assumes responsibilities and risks within this frame. If there is no daily core of the central leadership, if the Executive Committee and its officers have no political authority and discretion between meetings of any higher leading organ, then the Party becomes headless and brainless on a daily basis.

Without the daily political authority of the Executive Committee, then it becomes possible for certain elements (including the enemy) to take advan-

tage of the time gaps between meetings of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. Any disrupter can claim to represent the PB or the CC, to relay PB or CC decisions according to his own peculiar view and to do any mischief against the Party's line because the PB, the CC or the Congress is not yet in session.

It must be understood that there is a series of delegations of powers from the general Party membership to the Congress to the Central Committee, to the Political Bureau and to the Executive Committee; and a series of collective responsibilities from the lower to the higher organs and organizations. The Party Constitution even describes the Executive Committee as a direct organ of the Central Committee. It is superior to any individual member of whatever rank, although it is subordinate to the PB, CC and the Congress.

ON URBAN-BASING AND BUREAUCRATISM

The party organization and mass organizations in Metro Manila and other urban areas have been the initial and continuing source of proletarian revolutionary cadres, well-educated and with some professional and technical competence, for the countryside since the beginning of the armed revolution.

When martial law was declared in 1972, a large number of Party members and mass activists wanted to go to the few guerrilla zones. However, only a few could be absorbed by these zones. Thus, there was a big number of Party cadres and mass activists who had to be completely in the urban underground under several central staff organs and regional leading organs, especially in Metro Manila.

When guerrilla fronts and zones increased significantly in 1974, the Party members and mass activists who had bided their time in Metro Manila were dispatched in hundreds to the various regions. This line of deployment helped to strengthen the armed revolutionary movement and laid the basis for the resurgence of the legal democratic movement on a nationwide scale.

As a result of the veritable dissolution of the Manila-Rizal leading organs and Party organization in 1979, the central leadership assumed responsibility for the party and the mass movement in the national capital region; and started to build and base central staff organs there, using Party cadres on the enemy manhunt list and former political detainees. Basing in urban areas had for its rationale the concept of the three strategic coordinations that overemphasized urban work. In a short while, these vulnerable personnel would come under effective enemy surveillance and arrest operations in the

early 1980s. But still the lesson has not been subsequently learned that such types of cadres should not be based in Metro Manila to run urban-based central staff organs; and that certain organs are not to be based in Metro Manila but in the countryside.

The organizational line pursued is a reversal of the line of the 1970s that cadres who are produced by the urban areas are dispatched to the countryside systematically in order to strengthen the armed revolution as well as to secure those Party cadres already exposed to and hunted by the enemy.

Leading organs of the Party have allowed staff organs or administrative structures based in urban areas to absorb the bulk of Party cadres. Even the NPA general command (earlier called national military staff) based itself since the 1980s in Metro Manila. And since 1986, there has been the yearning to accelerate the explosion of an urban insurrection and to issue commands from the big city by modern communications equipment to the people's army in the countryside. There was no end to special projects rationalizing the stay of the NPA general command in Metro Manila. These projects were not delegated to offices or personnel that could stay in cities more safely and more effectively.

Despite all the lip service paid to people's war, the line opposed to it gained influence to the detriment of the Party and the revolutionary movement. And such erroneous line has never been thoroughly criticized, especially with reference to the fact that the principal leaders of the urban-based commission and other organs in charge of Mindanao where that line was first implemented were either pushed out of the island or disabled by the enemy as early as 1984.

The NPA general command, together with the central staff organs of the Party, entrenched itself in Metro Manila along the erroneous line of "positioning" itself for an over-anticipated "sudden turn" in the situation that could give rise to an urban insurrection. Lured by the urban convenience of high-tech electronic means that enabled it to issue commands for one "nationally coordinated offensive" to the people's army in the countryside, the NPA general command tended in practice to disregard the principle of centralized leadership and decentralized operations. Related to this line of the NPA general command is the preoccupation with special projects, which are considered essential for acquiring the logistics from above and from outside the country for prematurely enlarged military formations that cannot be supported by a declining mass base.

Some regional commands have also based themselves in urban areas. At the same time, the staffing at various levels of command regional, guerrilla front, battalion and company has absorbed much of an already stagnant and decreasing number of Party cadres.

When certain elements speak of “regularization,” they actually mean generating more staff levels and bureaucratization. Their designs of regularization on paper have gone too far ahead of the available personnel. At any rate, the predilection for building administrative structures and making top-heavy staff has resulted in the phenomenon of gross bureaucratization within the Party.

Running the top-heavy military staff and administrative structures has eaten up the time and energy of leading cadres and committees which should have paid more attention to policy questions, ideology-building and in-depth study of our revolutionary practice for guiding the comprehensive development of Party life and Party work. It has taken such a long time and such unprecedented losses for the central leadership to fully identify and take firm and decisive steps to correct the erroneous lines afflicting the Party and the repeated grave errors in the anti-infiltration campaign (which threatened the very life of the Party in 1988).

There is no crescendo of Party cadres doing mass work and developing basic party life at grassroots level in both urban and rural areas. The more Party cadres are promoted to leading and staff organs, the more are they taken away and alienated from basic Party life and the less party members there are at the basic level. This has resulted in the neglect of Party recruitment.

From the mid-1980s, the overall growth of the Party membership stopped and even gradually started to decrease from 1988. The number of Party recruits decreased year by year in consonance with the overall lag in the expansion if not contraction of the mass organizations in the countryside and cities. On the other hand, there was increased loss of Party members as a result of death, captivity, demoralization or loss of connection due to enemy operations. Particular note should also be made of the big drop in the recruitment of Party members from the ranks of students and young intellectuals, an important source of Party cadres.

For a long period, limited recruitment of Party members was done more by Party staff, Party organs and by Party groups in mass organizations who were compelled to do so because of staff requirements. Out of desperation, they often gave priority to reviving long-time drop outs from the Party or recruiting raw elements from the youth movement or wherever possible without prompt-

ly checking and raising their ideological consciousness and political level. Or they recruit non-Party staffers and give them tasks and responsibilities (including those reserved for Party members) but without even bothering to give them Party education and recruit them into the Party.

There has been a proliferation of legal offices and institutions in conjunction with the increase in staff organs and a continuous build up in them of dropouts or near dropouts from the Party and the mass movement. An increasing number of political prisoners have also been lured into these offices instead of returning to direct work among the masses and the countryside where they are badly needed. Party work and Party life in them are often buried in office routine and office work away from the masses and the mass movement and where petty bourgeois views, habits, loose discipline and craving for comfort are strong and often go unchallenged.

Such a tendency within the Party has extended also to international work, where cadres are concentrated in legal offices and institutions, practically without giving consistent attention to conducting direct propaganda and organizing among our overseas compatriots, and where there is gross neglect of comprehensive Party work and Party life. In the last several years, many cadres based in the cities prefer deployment abroad (particularly in Western capitalist countries) rather than to underground work, especially if this is in the countryside.

Staff organs have been a good training ground for Party cadres. However, there are elements without sufficient experience and competence in Party and mass work and with low ideological, political and organizational level who get promoted to higher staff organs and even get appointed to leading organs simply because they come from the staff organs. They learn to rule by being appointed first as “political officers” or “secretaries.”

There is a reproduction of staffers rather than the development of basic Party life and the systematic recruitment of Party members from the advanced elements of the revolutionary mass movement within the period of candidature set by the Constitution. There is a big delay in taking in candidate members and then there is another big delay in providing the basic education and trial work for someone to become a full Party member.

What is often passed off as organizational work is the frequent reorganizing and multiple organizing of the same limited number of Party members into committees, commissions, task forces, secretariats and so on. Issues and functions, although already well-covered or can be covered by an exist-

ing body, become excuses for new bodies to be created. There are constant reshuffling of cadres and reorganizations of Party cores and Party organs, thus further drawing attention away from more important tasks. There are those who are satisfied or preoccupied with mere administrative, contact and coordinative work. They think or act as if these are all there is to organizational work and Party life.

In ideological, political and technical terms, personnel of staff organs are not always necessarily superior to the cadres leading the lower Party organizations and the mass organizations. But using the authority of the Party and the leading organ to which they are attached, they impose themselves on the Party cadres leading the lower Party organizations, mass organizations and legal institutions.

The staff organs have been the sources of “political officers” and “appointive” secretaries who have comprised one-person layers of authority between higher and lower organs or units on the basis of the arrogant proposition that no one in the lower organ or unit qualifies to be a member of the higher organ or unit. The system of “political officers,” which is a bad copy of a good system in the people’s army (good because the political officer is integrated into the army unit) was abolished in 1986. But the promoters of bureaucratism have merely shifted to another name, the “secretary,” who is appointed by a higher organ and is not integrated into the organ or unit of which he is the “secretary.”

The “PO” system, especially in a situation where important policies and decisions were often transmitted orally, fostered overreliance on the “political officer” by the lower leading committees, weakened the Party committee system and impaired the interaction between lower and higher Party collectives.

Integral to the buildup of urban-based central staff organs and the stifling of basic Party life and mass organizations at the grassroots level in the course of growing bureaucratism, was the generation of the fear of taking initiative and expressing views at lower levels within the Party.

Insofar as there are still Party cadres and members who are attending to basic Party and mass work; and insofar as there are mass organizations which continue to grow or which can grow, there is a basis for combating bureaucratism and fostering comprehensive ideological, political and organizational life at the basic level rather than the compartmentalized kind of life in the administrative structure or bureaucracy.

The Party branches and groups in the trade unions, peasant associations, student and youth organizations, the people's army, women's associations, cultural activists and so on should see to it that there is comprehensive Party life and growth and should urge their current Party and mass members to create more local mass organizations on the basis of which more local Party branches can be built.

THE PROBLEM OF ULTRA-DEMOCRACY

Bureaucratism begets ultra-democracy. When there are no venues for free discussion within the Party outside of administrative bounds, then Party members tend to speak out outside of those bounds and also outside the Party. Without comprehensive ideological, political and organizational life, Party members at one level of the organization can easily get the sense that their lives are compartmentalized and are run by command from above. And thus, they tend to resist by becoming ultra-democratic or liberal.

When the boycott error of 1986 was under fire and was not resolved for several months, the floodgates of ultra-democracy were opened at various levels of the Party and among Party members in general. The Executive Committee, as it was then composed, was beleaguered. Liberalism and indiscipline grew strong, taking the form of irresponsible dissemination (extending beyond the Party) of internal information and questions, irresponsible criticism and talk beyond proper Party forums and meetings, looseness in the implementation of Party policies, “barkada”-style (unprincipled camaraderie) in the relations between cadres, and so on. Certain central staff organs were acting like centers of comprehensive political authority. Some elements issued publications and promoted their own lines, like “critical support for the ‘liberal-democratic’ Aquino regime” and the line of armed urban insurrection cum premature buildup of unsustainable higher military formations. There was ideological and political osmosis between ultra-democratic elements in the Party and populists, liberals, “social democrats” and other petty bourgeois elements outside the party who collaborated in denouncing the boycott error of 1986.

Under conditions of ultra-democracy, some elements responsible for the incomparably far bigger error and disaster in Mindanao were able to ride on the campaign against the boycott error of 1986. They kept their silence on or obscured and minimized the problems and disaster whose impact was already fully being felt in Mindanao. Some of them even had the gumption

to claim that had it not been for the boycott error of 1986 the people would have been able to seize political power or share it with other forces. What the Politburo saw and took into account was only the boycott error of the Executive Committee.

There are certainly plenty of free discussions and debates prior to consensus or voting in leading as well as staff organs in the Party. In the leading organs, the range of subject matter is naturally wider than in staff organs. In the staff organs, there is an element of specialization but it is always related to the general framework of the revolutionary struggle.

There has been the prevalent notion that the Party leader presiding over the meeting is no more than a mere moderator whose main role is nothing more than to let everyone have a more or less equal share of the discussion. In fact, participants in meetings repeat the same point several times and sometimes talk their heads off. Even patently wrong ideas get more time than correct ones. Thus, the phenomenon of overly long meetings has arisen, costing those attending and the Party much time, energy and resources.

Another reason for the overly long meetings is the failure to distinguish between work and study meetings, to evaluate the items put into the agenda and set the direction of the meeting. A discussion on the national situation or certain national issues is often the best kind of discussion available in these meetings. Too much time is spent on the discussion of administrative and procedural matters. And when personal relations like marital problems and allegations of sexual offense are taken up, there are not only a few overly long meetings but a protracted series of such. There should be a more efficient way of handling these and avoiding disruption of the normal flow of work.

Another factor for overly long meetings is the deterioration of the Party's system of reports which to a large extent is also due to neglect on the part of leading Party organs. In the absence of a system of regular and special reports, plenary meetings at different levels are used to deliver, gather and synthesize the reports by lower units. The result, besides the excessive length of meetings, is widespread haphazardness in the study and verification of reports, susceptibility to one-sidedness in assessing and programming the work of the Party and a tendency to gloss over or conceal problems before they pile up and worsen.

So much time is taken away from political and organizational work. Party cadres are aware of this kind of loss and complain about it. But even far worse is the lack of time for attending to theoretical and political education.

The most active Party members are absorbed by political and administrative meetings and paperwork and the level of theoretical and political knowledge has gone down. In the relationship between higher leading organs or organizations and lower organs or organizations, there is a one-way vertical from-top-to-bottom kind of bureaucratism. In major instances, as in the promulgation and implementation of the EC decision for a boycott of the 1986 elections, there is such a type of bureaucratism. For a long period already, the representatives of central staff organs appear like big bosses and moneybags when they show up in meetings of the representatives of mass organizations to push mass actions.

But there are more cases of ultra-democracy in which mere staff organs and lower leading organs take major decisions even against the Party's line, without bothering to consult the higher leading organ. The Mindanao Commission drew up and implemented the "Red area-White area" scheme and some lower Party committees and cadres under it went into local ceasefires without seeking consultations and getting the approval from the central leadership. The UFC could proceed with a "peace process framework" that degrades the NDF and is detrimental to the interests of the revolutionary movement. It also proceeded with the NDF Congress without the EC or the PB being able to go over the draft documents and plans. Upon the initiative of a single individual leading cadre, grandiose plans anchored on the line of armed urban insurrection could be drawn up and implemented for the mass movement, for military actions and for the united front in 1990 without the knowledge of the central leadership. *Ang Bayan* could publish articles against the decisions of the central leadership and against the antirevisionist line of the Party. There are certain elements who keep on writing "strategy," "orientation" and "policy" papers which deviate from and attack the Party's line. They even manage to use some central staff organs to promote the wrong line on a national and international scale. Notwithstanding the disastrous results of their line, they continue to tout it.

For refusing to implement the boycott decision of the central leadership with regard to the 1978 elections and for distributing their position paper to other regions, the members of the Manila-Rizal Party committee were meted out disciplinary measures. For failing to convene the Political Bureau on the subject of the 1986 elections boycott, the Party chairman then found it necessary to resign from his position in 1986.

But there are privileged elements who consider themselves as Party members and yet write and publish articles preponderantly against the Party's line in certain publications (from *Praktika* to *Debate*). They use the personnel, the relations and facilities of the Party to attack the Party's line and they have not yet been called to account for their anti-Party actions.

Under the guise of reacting to bureaucratism, there are certain elements who whip up ultra-democracy in order to question and oppose the basic principles, line and policies of the Party; to disinform the Party membership; to misrepresent, provoke and turn the Party inside out. Ultra-democracy or liberalism is as bad as bureaucratism. It can confuse, degrade, endanger and even disintegrate a revolutionary party that allows it.

There is a seepage of the influences of liberalism, populism, social democracy and other petty bourgeois trends and even of imperialist and modern revisionist (especially Gorbachevite) propaganda into the Party. There are ultra-democratic elements who attack the leading role of the working class, the socialist perspective of the Philippine revolution, democratic centralism and other basic principles of the Party. Some of them go to the extreme of demanding that the Party adopt an "alternative framework and program," abandon the framework of Marxism-Leninism or discard its basic Marxist-Leninist principles (because these are supposed to constitute fundamentalism) and that the leading organs of the Party give up their responsibilities.

Just as they simplistically hold Stalin responsible for everything that has gone wrong under the anti-Stalinist revisionist regimes long after the death of Stalin, they wish to put the stigma of their specious definition of Stalinism on the Party. The Party will not allow itself to be wrecked from within by those stereotyping it by any epithet and by those trying to damn it by some false analogies. We know exactly how Gorbachev pushed the line of negating the entire course of Soviet history, Leninism and socialism by totally negating Stalin.

Among those who are whipping up ultra-democracy are elements who are responsible for the gross violation of the civil rights and brutal victimization of a large number of Party members and non-Party people. The Party is determined to hold such elements to account for their deeds no matter how many issues they drum up to sidetrack their responsibility and no matter how much anti-Party "conjuncture" they find with other promoters of ultra-democracy.

Among the worst of those who misuse the slogan of democracy are those who reject the very principle of democratic centralism and denounce it as “authoritarian” and who call for and undertake actions violative of this principle.

SECURITY PROBLEMS IN URBAN AREAS

Learning lessons from long experience in the urban underground work since the beginning of the ongoing armed revolution and giving due attention to precision raids and arrests by the enemy in 1988 onwards, the central leadership has issued a comprehensive set of guidelines and instructions on security for all Party cadres and members since 1989.

Among the problems recognized by the guidelines and instructions are the following:

- (1) Party cadres and members are far more vulnerable in the cities than in the countryside.
- (2) There have been several years of laxity in security, rising in the 1983 to 1986 period, further rising in the 1986–87 ceasefire period and onward and still further rising.
- (3) Party cadres on the manhunt list of the enemy have accumulated in urban areas and are endangering themselves and others by being in contact with former political detainees, as well as personalities, organizations and institutions under probable and certain enemy surveillance.
- (4) Party cadres on the manhunt list themselves and persons they have been in contact with, places and facilities which they have used are already under surveillance and are practically in boxes of the enemy’s intelligence agencies.
- (5) The precise capture of important Party cadres, documents, equipment and other things prejudices the safety and security of the people and resources and paves the way to further enemy surveillance and action.
- (6) Modern equipment and facilities (telephones, computers, radio and so on) facilitate our work but if improperly used help the enemy more as they surveil or capture these.
- (7) The enemy accumulation of information from captured documents in computer discs and on paper as well as from tactical surveillance of fixed points (persons, houses, buildings and public places) used by

Party and related personnel give the enemy the basis for its confidence in long-term surveillance.

- (8) That the enemy has not yet captured all cadres and things already within his knowledge means that he captures some and leaves others as tracers to more cadres and things.

Amidst the practical instructions given to secure the safety of Party and related personnel, the most important instruction is for Party cadres and members on the manhunt list to leave Metro Manila and other urban areas for the countryside in order to cut off the enemy. Other Party cadres and non-Party persons who can work legally in the urban areas can meet them in the countryside whenever necessary.

The biggest number of losses of upper level cadres has been the result of their being captured in urban areas, especially in Metro Manila. Since 1988, more than 100 regional and national level cadres have been captured by the enemy in raids and arrests in urban areas. In spite of this, many Party cadres in the enemy manhunt list have insisted on staying in Metro Manila, except for brief periods of seeming or token compliance with the security guidelines and instructions.

The comprehensive guidelines and instructions have been ignored and violated. The best proof is the continuing capture of such Party cadres and volumes of computer diskettes and documents under their care.

What is needed is a more fundamental criticism of this phenomenon of central staff organs and Party cadres on the enemy manhunt list who stick to Metro Manila and other urban areas. The ideological and political roots of the concentration of central staff organs (including the NPA general command) and Party personnel on the enemy manhunt list must be pulled out. For their own good and for the good of the revolutionary movement and the people, all those unsuitable for Party work in urban areas must be ordered to go to the countryside to help expand and consolidate the mass base. The urban-based staff organs which are more appropriately based in the countryside must be based there.

It is true that since the start of the armed revolution it has been recognized that there must be Party cadres posted in urban areas in order to facilitate communications of the regions with the central leadership and within regions because of the specific archipelagic character of the Philippines. But why is it that, even after the rebuilding of the legal mass organizations and

the further development of the united front since the 1980s, Party cadres on the enemy manhunt list are still in charge of work and communications in the urban areas instead of cadres who can work there legally and viably? Why is it that leading and staff organs that should be best positioned in the countryside are based in and elaborated on in the urban areas?

Why should the NPA general command and its central staff organs, which should properly and correctly be in the countryside, be based in Metro Manila? Why is it that exactly at the time that the general command was claiming that all the strategic points of the country had been covered by the people's army, that the number of guerrilla fronts were already enough and that the main point was to build companies and battalions, the NPA general command chose to base itself in Metro Manila?

There is now a dangerous situation which arises from the fact that Party cadres and members are concentrated in urban-based administrative structures, such as the central staff organs and the Party groups in the multilayered national mass organizations. These administrative structures in the urban areas are extremely vulnerable to one fatal blow by the enemy in a general crackdown or to ceaseless piecemeal arrests.

For the long-term positive development of the armed revolution, the Party must now withdraw immediately all Party cadres on the enemy manhunt list from the urban areas, streamline the central staff organs in favor of work at the grassroots level, and transfer to the countryside those cadres and organs that properly belong there.

However, it is not enough to transfer cadres on the enemy manhunt list to the countryside. A rectification and reeducation campaign must be carried out among them. They must reaffirm the basic revolutionary principles, line and the strategy and tactics of the Party. They must be disabused of whatever conveniences, habits, thoughts and illusions that have kept them in the urban areas. They must accept that they have to stay in the countryside on a long-term basis in order to contribute to the recovery of lost ground and to expand and consolidate the revolutionary movement.

If they go to the countryside without sufficient rectification and reeducation, they will be dissatisfied with being assigned there, they will contaminate others with the wrong ideas and dissatisfactions that they have and they will soon be back in the urban areas after one more short stint of token compliance with the order to go to the countryside. What the countryside now

needs are more cadres who are determined to serve the people and advance the revolutionary cause.

THE RECTIFICATION MOVEMENT

It is a matter of life and death for the entire Party now to reaffirm its basic principles, assert its correct line and criticize, repudiate and rectify those major deviations and errors which have run for so long (overlapping with half of the existence of the Party and the armed revolution) and have brought about unprecedented setbacks to the Party, the New People's Army and the entire revolutionary mass movement. These major deviations and errors could have been more destructive were it not for the perseverance of the overwhelming majority of Party cadres and members who uphold the basic principles of the Party and are determined to carry the revolutionary cause forward. Thus, we think that the Party has the principles, the revolutionary personnel, the mass support and the all-rounded strength to check and overcome the dangerous trend brought about by the major deviations and errors.

In the light of our basic principles, we have identified and evaluated the major deviations and errors and the serious damage to the Party and the revolutionary movement. We must criticize, repudiate and rectify these. The rectification movement should raise the Party's level of theoretical knowledge, political consciousness and practical activity. The Party membership should be mobilized to join and support this movement. Only those who oppose this movement and who are incorrigible should come under disciplinary action. up to removal from the Party. There is a big and essential difference between the incorrigible and those who are willing to rectify their errors.

It is important for the appropriate organ to formulate the most pointed questions on facts and issues to be posed to those responsible for the most serious deviations, errors and adverse consequences and to be answered by them individually (if collectively, there will be difficulties that can delay the process either because it is objectively difficult to convene the pertinent collective responsible for some error or there is no desire on the part of certain individuals to make any collective assessment). Only after the inquiry from individuals concerned may their collectives be convened if necessary and possible.

We anticipate that there will be elements who will oppose or deflect the rectification movement by using the following tactics:

- (1) Continuing to question and attack the Party's basic principles no less in order to dogmatically insist on the erroneous line;
- (2) Detaching the erroneous line from the serious adverse consequences;
- (3) Confusing the evaluation of the deviations and errors by playing down bigger errors and playing up lesser ones;
- (4) Confusing the evaluation of collective and individual responsibilities;
- (5) Generating new and old issues of lesser importance and relevance to the major problems and unprecedented setbacks that we now face;
- (6) Retaliating against well-founded criticism by making unfounded attacks; And
- (7) Attacking the many in order to conceal a few in error.

At every level of the Party, in any organ, the central leadership must not hesitate to remove from the Party any element who is responsible for any major deviation or error but who instead of accepting responsibility continues to systematically attack the Party's line or is incorrigible and resorts to any of the aforesaid tactics to deflect or defeat the purpose of the rectification process. We must also serve serious warning to those elements who resort to ultra-democracy by campaigning outside of the appropriate Party channels or going beyond the bounds of the Party.

It is a fair estimate to make that only a few will be removed from the Party due to the gravity of the error for which they are responsible or due to a loss of conviction in the revolutionary cause and in the basic principles of the Party. In this regard, the slogan of the Party is "A bit fewer but a lot better," to paraphrase Lenin and Mao.

There may be those who are no longer fit to remain in the Party for ideological reasons, such as the loss of conviction in all or any of the basic principles of the Party. They can be considered allies if they can still cooperate with us on political issues, provided they do not become special agents of the enemy by attacking the Party and capitalizing on their previous association with or inside knowledge of the Party.

The rectification movement is mainly and essentially an educational effort to recognize, criticize and repudiate the deviations, errors and weaknesses and thereby further strengthen the Party and the revolutionary movement. The objective is to bring about a higher level of revolutionary consciousness and militance and therefore a higher level of unity within the party.

The overwhelming majority of Party members are definitely good and desire to do their best in advancing the revolutionary cause. There can only be a handful of elements who oppose the rectification movement and who refuse to rectify their errors. If these elements persist in the Party, they can continue to inflict damage on the Party and the revolutionary movement. It is the duty of all Party members to reaffirm the basic principles of the Party and rectify the errors.

**General Review of Important
Events and Decisions From
1980 to 1991⁵**

During the 1980s, the Party and the revolutionary movement made unprecedented advances and victories. But these were not sustained. Eventually, there was a loss of momentum and an increasing loss of initiative, which finally led to unprecedented setbacks.

The analysis of the roots and circumstances of the entire course of the revolution during the past more than one decade in order to draw lessons and clarify the path for the restrengthening and continuous, all-sided advance is the main objective of any comprehensive summing up of experiences during this period.

This paper is a chronology of the most important events and decisions in the practice of the Party during the past more than one decade. This has been made on the basis of the discussions of the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee. It aims to provide cadres and members of the Party with a comprehensive understanding of the general flow of revolutionary practice during the previous decade and to unify the view of the entire Party on this.

This chronology supplements the main summing-up and rectification document, “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the Errors” and, as such, is still raw material relative to the higher level of synthesis and elevation of our practice to theory as has been achieved by the main rectification document. Nevertheless, this chronology also contains an evaluation of important events and decisions from the point of view of principles and of the practical movement.

Because of the long period that the Party failed to make a comprehensive summing-up of its experiences and the pileup of errors, shortcomings and weaknesses, which have not yet been thoroughly and correctly summed up, a short summing-up document and a short chronology of crucial events and decisions will not suffice.

Some events and issues in the past which might have had a direct bearing on an incident, a line of work or an area may be discovered as not having been considered here. It is expected that these will be taken up in the summings-up of particular lines of work or areas, or else in a new edition of the main document of summing-up and chronology if necessary.

⁵ “General Review of Important Events and Decisions From 1980 to 1991 (Supplement to ‘Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors’),” in *Theoretical and Political Journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines*, Section: “Decision on the Rectification Movement,” Special Issue 2, April 1993.

I

GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PAST

The crisis of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system deepened during the past decade. The socioeconomic crisis and the factional strife of the reactionaries reached a new level of intensity and gravity. The masses in the countryside and cities became very receptive to revolutionary propaganda and organizing, participated in large numbers in economic and political struggles, and enthusiastically supported the armed revolution.

In the first three years of the decade the revolutionary movement rapidly expanded and became stronger. The momentum in 1980–1983 was achieved within the general framework of expanding the guerrilla fronts throughout the entire archipelago; intensifying the war through more widespread and more frequent tactical offensives; rigorous balancing of the armed struggle, mass base building, agrarian revolution, and Party building; relying mainly on the squads and the platoons, which took charge of both military work and mass work and which were ordinarily dispersed but were concentrated when the need arose; the movement in the city wholeheartedly supporting the expansion efforts in the countryside; and comprehensively developing the movement in the various areas of the struggle.

By 1983, we had gone beyond the early substage of national expansion in the guerrilla warfare which had started from almost nothing. The guerrilla fronts and the open and underground movements in the cities, which had surged forward in various parts of the archipelago, had been established in almost all the regions. We had moved towards the more advanced substage of the strategic defensive. In addition, after the Aquino assassination, the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship had become extremely isolated and the masses had been aroused to an extraordinary degree of participation in political struggles.

But under such a situation, we got excessively carried away by the initial successes and opportunities opened up by the extraordinarily favorable objective conditions. The people's war had just moved beyond the early substage of the strategic defensive but we immediately preoccupied ourselves with issues concerning the leap to the higher strategic stage and to the strategic victory. Our obsession with these issues grew to the extent that we neglected

the fact that the forces of reaction, despite their serious crisis, were still on the strategic offensive.

In fact, the real concern should have been on efforts at accumulating more strength through more widespread and more intensive guerrilla warfare; and further expansion of the guerrilla fronts and simultaneously creating within these fronts wider bastions of the revolution from the existing small guerrilla bases and consolidated areas; the painstaking work of transforming our broad influence and linkages with the masses into solid, intensive and all-round organized strength; and the continuous strengthening of leadership over the broad masses—while steadily weakening the forces of reaction and resolutely taking advantage of splits among the reactionaries.

Instead, what evolved were concepts of advancing characterized by undue haste, deviations from the line and strategy of the people's democratic revolution and setting targets well beyond our actual capacity and level of development. There was a loosening of our grasp of the concept of all-round advance and painstaking mass work. Our understanding and measure of achievement were extremely narrowed (one-sided) and drawn towards heightening the struggles; influencing the entire population; and speculating on the factional strife of the reactionaries.

The central leadership of the Party conceived of the program of the strategic counteroffensive (SCO) strongly influenced by a desire to quickly achieve a leap to the higher strategic stage and gave impetus to the hasty and premature "regularization" and to ideas of toying with insurrection, even if there was continued adherence to the strategic stages of development and to the essential balancing of the armed struggle, agrarian revolution and mass base building.

In Mindanao, from the desire for an insurrection to achieve a big leap or victory, the insurrectionist "Red area-White area" (RA-WA) schema was developed and this promoted the line of all-out intensification of the struggle through a combination of army "regularization" in the countryside and "politico-military struggles" in the cities for the purpose of rapidly bringing about an explosion into an insurrection.

After the 9th Central Committee Plenum, the SCO program emerged influence and linkages with the masses in the form of an intertwining of the correct and the wrong lines. Under this program, premature "regularization," all-out armed partisan warfare, the obsession with "general paralyzing

actions,” a reckless concept of peasant uprisings and a shifty insurrectionist concept of “seizing opportunities” gained ground.

In the main, the movement continued to expand and the struggles intensified up to 1987. In fact—while the enemy was caught still unprepared and preoccupied with adjusting to the new situation—harder and more resounding blows could be inflicted on the enemy forces. However, as quickly as the struggle intensified, so did the imbalances in the deployment of the forces and tasks, the erosion of our forces and mass support, and the increasing vulnerability of the revolutionary forces, especially the mass base. Our bitter experience has demonstrated that such a course for advancing could not be sustained, that the successes had been merely temporary and had eventually led to loss of initiative and finally to grave setbacks.

From 1988, there has been a drastic decline of the revolutionary forces throughout the country. In the face of massive, widespread and continuous enemy offensives in the countryside and the cities, the deficiency and weaknesses of our forces and our mass base, which had been concealed for a number of years by dramatic military actions, “general paralyzing actions,” broad propaganda and the clashes among the reactionaries, became exposed.

Nevertheless, we are still far from the danger of being totally defeated by the enemy. Although the losses have been serious, the errors and deviations have not continued to do damage; the premature strategically decisive battle did not occur. Despite the disorientation, the overreaching and the reckless offensives, firm adherence to basic principles has prevailed among the majority of cadres and members.

Even in Mindanao, the insurrectionist line had not been fully consolidated. Only a few leading cadres carried the full insurrectionist line. Its worst effect on others has been the insurrectionist disorientation arising from the desire for quick victory and from the wrong concept of “seizing opportunities.” Moreover, the majority of cadres, especially in the regions, continue to adhere firmly to the principle of protracted people’s war and to the lessons drawn during the period of building the guerrilla fronts and the guerrilla forces. The insurrectionist line had been rendered ineffective by the impact of the damage caused by the hysteria of the anti-infiltration campaign (the Ahos Campaign) and the change in the political situation.

Throughout the country, the Party’s leading committees and cadres in the regions, who could closely monitor the forces and the work among the masses, stood as the biggest obstacle to the implementation of the line of premature

regularization and to insurrectionist illusions even when the tendency to rush and overreach was at its height in 1987 and 1988. They were the first and the strongest to object to the excessive targets and to lead in making adjustments to save the forces and the mass base. When the Politburo reversed the entire plan and the priorities in 1989 and started to undertake the rectification, the Party committees in the majority of the regions quickly responded.

The existence and propagation of big errors and deviations in about one decade is traceable to and reflects the main weaknesses and shortcomings in building the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. Within the Party, the comprehension and distinction of what is right and wrong on many issues regarding the theory, principles, history and practice of the movement have loosened, blurred and dimmed for more than a decade.

The mixing of right and wrong did not only lead to setbacks in the practical movement; it also wrought damage to the Party's ideological and political integrity and, recently, even to its organizational integrity. The liberalism, muddle and confusion with regard to the basic principles should be thoroughly overcome in order for the Party to strengthen itself and to undertake its tasks of leading the revolution firmly and correctly.

Because of the duration and extent of the confusion and deviations, the task of rectifying and repudiating them will not be easy. The rust that has eroded the mind and body of the Party has thickened and an intense internal ideological struggle and a thoroughgoing rectification movement are necessary in order to strip off the rust and revitalize the Party.

At present the overall strength of the Party, the people's army and the mass movement in the countryside and city is more or less at the level of 1983 and 1984. Our armed forces and our mass base are sizable; the movement is extensive and possesses a certain level of consolidation and strength all over the country.

The accurate summing-up of experiences especially during the decade of the 80s and the repudiation of the errors and deviations are a big leap in the Party's knowledge, in its understanding of Marxism-Leninism and correct application of theory on concrete practice. If we put ourselves on the correct course again, the strength we have built and continue to wield until now is sufficient for us to proceed from the level of development that had been interrupted and derailed by 1983, and we now have the opportunity to do so in an all-sided, solid and sustained manner.

In the following sections we pursue the most significant events and decisions from 1980. The discussion is divided into four sections: 1980–1983; the Aquino Assassination in 1983—EDSA Uprising in 1986; 1986–1987; and 1988–1991.

II

1980–1983

At the beginning of the 1980s, the economy declined and further intensified the people's deprivations. Protests and mass struggles in the countryside and the cities became widespread. The weaknesses of the fascist camp became exposed and the support it enjoyed from the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class weakened. The US-Marcos fascist dictatorship became more vulnerable to challenges and attacks from various flanks.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement had been well positioned for a big advance. Under the guidance of "Our Urgent Tasks" (OUT), there was a clear understanding of the correct antifascist, antifeudal and anti-imperialist line against the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship as well as of the tasks of building guerrilla fronts and guerrilla units, and of the policy of advancing step-by-step, comprehensively and continuously. By relying on the masses and on itself, the Party had succeeded in setting up the organizations of the Party, the people's army and the mass movement in the various regions and these had been vigorously growing in strength. Tactical offensives of the people's army had increased and become widespread all over the archipelago.

During the 8th CC plenum in 1980, the experiences in building the first guerrilla fronts were summed up and the stress was laid on continuing to expand boldly while preparing the requisites for intensifying guerrilla warfare. The Party was able to grasp the exceedingly favorable conditions and the importance of seizing the political initiative. It focused the hardest blows on the US-Marcos dictatorship in order to hit US imperialism and its principal puppet directly.

The guerrilla fronts vigorously expanded and grew in strength and many more were built rapidly. The advanced guerrilla fronts served to mother many more by becoming the source of advanced experiences and of seed elements and arms and by assisting in the setting up and strengthening of other fronts. Up to 1981, significant numbers of cadres and mass activists went to the countryside from the cities. In addition, there was direct legal organizing in the countryside undertaken by selected city-based units.

From 1980 to 1982, the number of barrios covered had yearly increases of more than 1,200 and the mass organizations' membership, of more than 50,000. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were mobilized and benefited

from the open and underground implementation of the minimum program of the agrarian revolution whose level of implementation reached up to district or inter-district levels. The open peasant mass actions against fascist abuse and in connection with agricultural issues such as the coconut monopoly and the land disputes in Sta. Isabel and San Antonio increased.

In 1982 and 1983, guerrilla fronts effectively covered almost entire provinces and big chunks of regions in all parts of the country. The guerrilla fronts in Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol covered from two-thirds to three-fourths of the total land area and number of barrios. The guerrilla fronts extended to well-populated areas, including environs of town centers, along highways, seashore and plains. These provided the guerrilla forces with wide areas in which to swim, with numerous lines of communications and supply, and more importantly, strengthened our direct political work and influence in entire municipalities and provinces.

The guerrilla fronts achieved a certain level of consolidation and strength through step-by-step organizing, implementation of the minimum program of land reform, political education, the building of basic Party units, the building of the people's militia units, mass mobilizations to support the army and the launching of various types of mass campaigns.

Organs of democratic power and popular control could cover three to five contiguous barrios and, in some places, the area covered by entire sections. Party organizations and structures were built at the front, district and section levels.

In 1981, we correctly made the call for an intensification of the guerrilla warfare through more widespread and more frequent tactical offensives. It was appropriate to the general political situation and to the extent and strength of the guerrilla fronts. Tactical offensives were launched in more guerrilla fronts and at a more frequent rate in each guerrilla front.

Guerrilla units increasingly focused on military work were formed. From 1982 guerrilla platoons were formed in the most advanced fronts and soon reached the number of 34 for the entire country. The squads, which numbered more than 200, were definitely more numerous and widespread. The training of guerrilla units was systematized and improved.

Mass work had been the main emphasis of the army, but some 800 to 900 high-powered rifles were confiscated from the enemy every year by the squads and the platoons which simultaneously attended to both mass work and military work. Small ambushes and arms confiscations were conducted

extensively and from time to time big ambushes and raids were also conducted by bringing together separate units.

In the cities, the democratic mass movement further expanded, the protest movement grew and became more militant. Spurred by the upsurge of the mass movement in Manila-Rizal and the formation or strengthening of Party units in the cities, open and underground mass organizations, sectoral and multisectoral alliances were organized and grew almost from scratch in the major cities of the different regions. We had overcome our earlier satisfaction with having only narrow secret cells and contacts in many major cities and we boldly expanded the open mass movement.

The Party-led trade unions were determinedly expanded, a progressive union center was formed and the strike movement gained momentum until the fall of the dictatorship and even after. By persevering in revolutionary propaganda and organizing and in resolute struggle, we broke through the cloud of fascist terror and the long-standing dominance of the yellow trade union movement.

The students repeatedly launched boycotts and protest actions against tuition fee increases and for democratic reforms. In 1981, these peaked in the form of nationally coordinated campaigns. Increasing numbers from the urban petty-bourgeois sectors were aroused and mobilized in sectoral organizations and struggles, in political protests, and in supporting the struggle of the working classes and the political prisoners.

Up to 1982, what stood out in the urban mass movement were the sectoral and economic struggles of the workers and the students. Nevertheless, a few coordinated multisectoral campaigns had already started such as the campaign during the Pope's visit and the 1981 presidential election boycott. The revolutionary forces led the massive open political mobilizations with the participation of a broad range of antifascist forces, including peasants from the countryside.

From 1981, alliance and relations work with different progressive and antifascist political forces was further expanded. The main priority was given to the setting up of the National Democratic Front, the broad legal alliances, the sectoral alliances, and the issue-based alliances and tactical cooperation with the broadest range of antifascist forces.

By attending to the different levels of alliances and contacts, the basic revolutionary forces (Party, army, revolutionary mass organizations) continuously expanded and grew in strength, together with the rapid expansion of our political leadership and influence over the people in general and our active exploitation of the factional strife among the reactionaries. The Party's links with all the sectors at various levels—municipal, provincial, regional and national—expanded.

There were efforts to build the NDF provisional standing committee, with the participation of some allies. The NDF secretariat was formed. It strengthened propaganda work and broadened direct and secret contacts and discussions with various political forces and personalities.

Work among the national minorities expanded and developed. The struggle of the minorities against the Chico Dam became stronger and this accelerated the growth and consolidation of the revolutionary movement in the Cordilleras. The Cordillera People's Democratic Front (CPDF) was built as the revolutionary united front organization of the people in the Cordilleras. In Mindanao, the orientation of independent political work in combination with alliance work was expounded.

Overseas, the role of the NDF spokesperson, who was designated in 1976, and the Party units were strengthened in order to expand the work of propaganda, relating with potential friends and organizing overseas Filipinos.

With the rapid advance in the different fields and areas of work, the Party organization developed and expanded throughout the country. The Party went beyond being a cadre party and assumed a broad mass character. From 1980 to 1983, Party membership expanded at an annual average of almost 4,000. The basic Party units in many barrios, factories, schools and communities were set up.

The Party machinery was able to cover the whole country more effectively. The regional Party organizations acquired substance: committees of the Party were set up at different territorial levels—front, district and section—as well as within the army. The national Party organs were strengthened through the promotion of cadres from the regions and the setting up of staff organs.

Within the general framework of advancing the people's war, leading Party committees strove to deepen and enrich their understanding of the particular direction of advancing the revolutionary struggle. Various summings-up were conducted at different levels under the guidance of the policies enun-

ciated in “Our Urgent Tasks” and researches into the conditions and social investigations at the level of the regions were undertaken.

A campaign to study the basic Party course was undertaken. This provided a comprehensive and systematic, albeit initial, comprehension of the basic principles of the Party and the history of Philippine society and revolution.

On the other hand, in the face of the exceedingly favorable conditions and the rapid advance of the revolution, the tendency towards haphazardness and haste grew strong. Ideas that promoted overreaching and concepts giving way to sharp deviations from the line of protracted people’s war and to grievous tactical errors in later years at the height of the antifascist struggle arose.

The problems of remedying gaps and weaknesses, as well as of gaining the skills to handle new and more complicated tasks in building the Party, the army and the mass base that had been identified in 1980 were not given sufficient and consistent attention. In succeeding years, these were increasingly neglected and the problems worsened. In Party work, there were deficiencies in education and training, building and consolidating the basic units, consistent expansion and all-round consolidation ideologically, politically and organizationally. In mass work, there were the longstanding problems of the extremely small number of the masses being organized relative to the extent of our influence, the tendency to stagnate at a low level of mass organizing, the haphazard education and propaganda work, and the deficiencies in sustaining mass campaigns. In army building, there were the problems of ideological, political and organizational consolidation in addition to those of logistics, finance, medical work and technique.

The 1981 meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (Politburo) asserted that there had been a turn in the anti-dictatorship struggle during the year. The Politburo asserted that what stood out to characterize such a turn was the extreme isolation of the fascist dictatorship, when the armed struggle entered the advanced substage of the strategic defensive and the revolutionary movement attained general leadership of the anti-dictatorship struggle although a sizable block of the anti-Marcos reactionaries still existed, in line with such an assertion, the three-year program drawn up by the 8th CC Plenum was revised.

The general task set for the advanced substage was the intensification of guerrilla warfare and the preparation of the requisites for advancing into the strategic counteroffensive (SCO), which was identified as the third substage

of the strategic defensive. The following essential tasks for the advanced sub-stage were set:

- (a) Uniting the revolutionary forces; drawing in one section of the reformist bloc;
- (b) Sufficient preparation for the people to directly participate in the war, the full development of the revolutionary mass organizations and the broad legal organizations; mass actions and growing support for guerrilla warfare;
- (c) Demoralization of a large part of the enemy troops; neutralization of the police forces; infliction of effective blows on the enemy and active defeat of his military operations;
- (d) Extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare; formation of many full-time guerilla units and militia units; expansion of partisan warfare, building of the commands and necessary units; building the mass base and the guerrilla zones; and
- (e) Development of relations with foreign friends and allies for international recognition and support

The SCO concept revolved around the coordination of regular warfare, guerrilla warfare, mass uprisings and mass actions, with the objective of achieving a leap in the war from the strategic defensive towards the strategic stalemate, and probably even up to a decisive victory, should US imperialism and the local reactionaries be forced to yield to a political compromise. The essential tasks for the SCO were set as follows;

- (a) General polarization of the political forces; extreme isolation of the diehards; decisive elimination of the bourgeois reformists as a political force;
- (b) Actual and active participation of the people in the war (“The proletarian leadership, through the Party, over the people and the war in the countryside and the cities will become more apparent.”);
- (c) Regular warfare in combination with guerrilla warfare. Insurrections and mass actions (“Regular warfare at its height will play the leading role in the decisive battles. The military requirements for building the base areas will be achieved and the enemy will be forced to radically

change the disposition of its forces and concentrate these in strategic locations”);

- (d) Crushing, dismantling or paralyzing the bureaucracy; and
- (e) Frustrating direct US aggression.

The proposal to categorize Philippine society as semi-colonial, semi-feudal and semicapitalist on the basis of a supposed change in the class structure according to the census of the reactionary government was presented to, but was rejected by, the Political Bureau. The proposition that the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside implied having base areas and big regular formations from the start of the people’s war and was thus particular only to China and not applicable to the Philippines was similarly rejected. Nevertheless, the impression was created that we had opened the strategic line of protracted people’s war to a fundamental review.

Another proposal was also presented regarding the three strategic coordinations as a guiding concept in strategy. According to this concept, the coordination of the cities and the countryside, of the political and the armed struggles and of the domestic and international struggles was central to the strategy. Within the concept of rural-urban coordination were the formula of a 60/40 rural/urban work balance, the concept of the working class-peasantry combination as the main force of the revolution, and the concept of political struggle with emphasis on a broad urban-centered political movement.

The proposed idea went against the correct policy of all-round advance and use of various forms of organization and struggle legal and illegal, open and secret, armed and nonarmed. In it was a tendency to exaggerate the weight of, if not altogether focus on, the urban struggle in undertaking the broad political preparation of the people for a higher stage of the war. It encouraged the drift away from the line that it is in the countryside where the main strength of the revolution is accumulated, not only militarily but also politically. Thus was the door opened to overemphasizing the role of urban struggle as well as to views that pushed for the separation of military work from political work in the countryside.

The Politburo set the proposal aside for further study. But in the clarification of the tasks under the advanced substage and the SCO and even of the revisions on the program, the emphasis on a broad urban-centered political movement and struggle was already incorporated.

Contrary to the decision and without the knowledge of the Politburo, the concept was propagated as a policy in Mindanao. One glaring result, particularly of the concept of urban armed and political struggles, was the development of armed partisan warfare in Davao City. Arms confiscation operations were accelerated and, in 1981, armed partisans began to be formed. Armed partisan operations increased and “politico-military organizing” in the communities gained momentum. A large number of rifles were confiscated and many people were recruited into the revolutionary organizations. However, the partisan operations frequently committed the mistake of targeting those who were not supposed to be targeted; there was an overemphasis of military actions in the city and the “partisan bases” thus became open targets for enemy military attacks.

The 1981 politburo meeting nurtured the illusion of an anticipated decisive victory of the revolution in the immediate future and drew up the corresponding tactics. The anti-Marcos reactionaries were renamed “bourgeois reformists” which were to be dismantled as a political block by drawing to our side the “Left wing” and isolating the Right wing. Thus, we hoped to stop the emergence of the Third Force and to create the general political polarization between the revolution, including the democratic forces, on one side, and the US-Marcos fascist dictatorship, including the diehard reactionaries, on the other.

With the belief that the basic alliance was already strong while work among the middle forces and on the broad united front was lagging very much behind, city-centered alliance work and political movement were made the priority. The central leadership based itself in the city, focused on the city centered political movement and alliance work, and built and strengthened the city-based staff organs.

The building of the NDF was programmed within the frame of the struggle for the decisive victory of the revolution against the US-Marcos dictatorship and carried a program for a broad revolutionary coalition designed to attract even the legal progressive forces and the “Left wing” of the anti-Marcos reactionaries and to neutralize, in the event, the threat of US imperialist aggression and attack.

A new draft was made of the program of the NDF, with the intention of renaming it Katipunan. upon the suggestion of an ally. The draft was withdrawn due to widespread objections of Party units and cadres to the

proposed compromises on the maximum program. Nonetheless, the door was opened to the view that there was a need to restrict or conceal the leadership of the Party if the intention were to build and strengthen the NDF as a broad coalition.

The multiplication of draft documents on strategy, policies and orientations, whose contents though not finalized were broadcast through various means, started to emerge as a problem during those years. It also became widespread for leading territorial and regional Party committees—on their own and without central guidance—to “particularize” the revolutionary strategy and tactics for their own areas of responsibility.

Outside of the Party, parallel to the surge of different political forces and groups, various theories and lines opposed to Marxism-Leninism and the line of protracted people’s war—such as dependent capitalism, Eurocommunism, social democracy, and various types of the line of insurrection or urban terrorism—also proliferated. These theories and lines were not promptly examined and criticized, but were instead allowed to gain influence and cause confusion even inside the Party

The Education and Propaganda Commission and the National Instruction Bureau were dismantled in 1982. Education work at the basic and intermediate levels was passed on to the territorial commissions and the regional committees while the Executive Committee of the Central Committee assumed that of the advanced course and the publication of a theoretical journal.

However, due to the weakening of what was then only a rudimentary machinery for Party education, the task of drawing up additional regular and special courses as well as that of translating and publishing the numerous materials needed by Party cadres and members were neglected. Worse, the impetus to study the basic course waned and attention on the finished translations was interrupted.

The machinery for education was weakened at a time that more active ideological work became highly necessary. Outside of the Party, the theoretical challenges to the Party’s principles and line became stronger. Inside the Party, the need for more education and training became greater. There was the large-scale promotion of cadres necessitated by the extensive building or strengthening of the Party committees at the regional, front and district levels as well as of the staff organs at various levels. Thus, from then on, the gap increased between the need for and the attention given to education and training.

At the 1983 Politburo meeting, the discovery and destruction of a wide network of infiltrators in one part of the guerrilla front at the Bicol-Quezon border area was reported. After the short report and without further examination of important details and data of the event, the conclusions of the report were approved, and other regions were alerted to the danger of a massive enemy infiltration.

By 1983 the tasks for the nationwide expansion of guerrilla warfare had in the main been accomplished. In all the regions, with the exception of Manila-Rizal, the regional Party and army organizations were already in place. The majority of the regions had two or three big and relatively stable guerrilla fronts. Tactical offensives in various parts of the archipelago echoed each other and the mass campaigns and struggles in the countryside and the cities were vigorously advancing.

The rapid expansion and advance of the people's army pushed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 1981 and 1982 to start the massive redeployment of their forces from areas of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to our own areas. Units of the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) and anticommunist vigilantes were extensively organized. Population-control operations in the countryside as well as kidnapping and extrajudicial killing ("salvaging") operations in the cities were intensified.

Furthermore, the AFP started to review and discard the pattern of its counterrevolutionary war centering on "search and destroy" operations. More comprehensive counter-guerrilla operations such as "Cadena de Amor" in Northern Luzon were tested. At the same time, the CIA increased intelligence operations all over the country. And the AFP started its large-scale and long-term intelligence operations focusing on strategic analysis of the revolutionary movement and the identification of leaders, cadres and mass activists at various levels and areas.

III

1983–1986: AQUINO ASSASSINATION—EDSA UPRISING

The peak in the antifascist struggle was reached in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination up to the fall of the dictatorship. The Marcos ruling clique lost the political initiative to the anti-dictatorship forces. The entire country was rocked by gigantic mass protests. The support for the Marcos fascist clique dwindled even among the comprador big bourgeoisie and the big landlord class. US imperialism made preparations to boot Marcos out in order to avoid bigger damage. A political polarization occurred and a situation developed towards a decisive confrontation between the fascist dictatorship and the antifascist forces.

The Party and revolutionary movement put itself at the center of the huge antifascist struggles, touching and mobilizing millions and millions of people. Many progressive mass organizations were set up; various types of antifascist organizations from various sectors in society proliferated. The multi-sectoral alliances became centers of political struggles of the broad masses at different levels and scope.

All-out effort was exerted to heighten the struggles in the countryside and the cities. Urban-centered and nationally coordinated mass campaigns were repeatedly launched. From 1984, coordinated workers' strikes were launched, and in Mindanao and in other regions, people's strikes were launched in coordination with big rallies and marches in the streets of Manila-Rizal and other cities. The workers' role in the open political actions was outstanding and so were their strikes in heightening the struggle.

The armed revolution in the countryside continued to expand and strengthen itself rapidly. More or less 1000 rifles were confiscated from the enemy every year. Big and concentrated guerrilla operations in various parts of the country accelerated. And as a result, the people's army seized high-powered weapons such as machine guns and mortars, annihilated bigger numbers of enemy troops, killed or captured high-ranking officers and inflicted powerful blows on the fascist dictatorship. The use of radio communications and explosives in tactical offensives began and was developed.

The rapid and huge advances of the movement in Mindanao became renowned during those years. From 1981 Mindanao led in boldly expand-

ing and intensifying guerrilla warfare. Also notable were its contributions to advancing the urban mass movement and the protest movement. The movement in the island advanced even more after the Aquino assassination. Up to the early part of 1985, a big bulk of the total number of high-powered rifles, Party members and members of the rural and urban secret and open mass organizations were to be found in Mindanao.

These advances and victories in the island were based on the broad spread of the revolutionary forces in the countryside and in the cities. In Mindanao, island-wide and interregional planning, coordination and cooperation; bold tasking and promotion of cadres; the experiences summed up in the implementation of “Our Urgent Tasks” and support from cadres from other regions were effectively used in order to rapidly expand and achieve the majority of the targets in terms of provinces and towns. The exceedingly favorable conditions in the country and in the island, such as the relative weakness of the local reactionary groups, the concentration of the AFP on the Moro areas, the intense socioeconomic crisis and the favorable terrain, were effectively exploited.

In 1983, on the basis of the analysis that in the main the task of expanding and positioning our forces on the strategic parts of the island had been accomplished and in accord with the Politburo decision, the companies were formed and increased rapidly (five companies were immediately formed in 1983, increased to 13 by 1984 and to 15 by 1985). The intensification of the armed struggle by raising the level of the war was started. The companies repeatedly launched tactical offensives, inflicting hard blows on the surprised enemy.

In November 1983 the Mindanao Commission reached the conclusion that a “revolutionary high tide” existed in the island and in the country and they decided to redirect their work towards preparations for an anticipated antifascist uprising. The overall relation and direction of the main lines of the struggle were radically changed according to the wish of seizing upon a rare opportunity. The supposition—and the impression given to the forces—was that these were merely improvements or refinements on the line of people’s war, although these were in fact deviations from it.

The disposition and coordination of the tasks and struggles in the island, based on the new orientation, were set and systematized according to the Red area-White area schema focusing on creating the conditions for an explosion into a general insurrection. In this connection, the cadres were encouraged to earnestly study and adopt insurrection as a form of struggle.

The “three strategic coordinations” was made into “three strategic combinations” and central to this line is the “politico-military combination or struggle” concept. From the original view of its being a method of organizing, the “politico military combination” came to be regarded as a form of struggle (the people’s strikes-armed partisan combination) to be applied not only in the urban areas, but also in the entire conduct of the war (Red area/military struggle-White area/political struggle/insurrection) in the island.

Such was the form taken by the systematization of the idea of hastening victory, betting on an exaggerated expectation of a great upsurge arising from the urban mass struggles and the intense political costs of the reactionaries.

In the “politico-military struggle” scheme, the importance of people’s strikes was emphasized. These were regarded as “a process leading to popular uprisings” and were supposed to hasten political polarization, to expose the impotence of the government, to train the masses and to bring about an explosion of the whole situation. All-out partisan warfare was combined directly with “general paralyzing actions” and the combination was viewed as a way of quickly bringing about the ripening of the insurrectionary situation.

The line of rapid regularization of the people’s army and intensification of the war by raising its level was also incorporated into the Red area-White area framework. The Commission in the island decided to concentrate at the regional level all the guerrilla strike units, which then held half of all the high-powered rifles. The intention was to maximize the strike forces in the intensification of the war, commit them full time to fighting, separate them from work in the localities and ensure their maximum flexibility in military work. The guerilla units in the districts and fronts were concentrated and integrated into the main regional guerilla units (MRGU) and the subregional guerilla units (SRGU), although some SRGUs were put under the command of the guerilla front committees because they could not be handled at the region level.

Initially, the fascist dictatorship and the AFP were caught by surprise and suffered the full impact of our blows. The military successes, the intensification of the mass struggle and expansion of the revolutionary movement’s influence throughout the island were unprecedented.

But it did not take long (1984) before the AFP poured the main bulk of their combat troops into the guerilla fronts and the urban areas of Mindanao. Brigade-size military operations were intensified, and fascist paramilitary

units and fanatic sects were set up in great numbers. In urban areas, the armed partisan bases in the communities were militarized, known leaders and allies were killed one after the other, and the legal mass organizations and alliances were suppressed.

Immediately, the problems with regard to the overextension and depletion of our forces and the limitations and difficulties of sustaining the new level of the war became felt and worsened. The guerilla fronts became extremely vulnerable because the political and military capabilities of the local units were extremely limited. It was only in 1984 and 1985 that efforts were made to catch up in organizing the section committees and that there was a recognition of the need to improve the arms and military capability of our local forces. While the line of intensifying the struggle and advancing towards the decisive battle was being pushed, the problems of stabilizing the Party leadership at island and regional levels, of the depletion of cadres in the countryside, and of the worsening security situation in the urban underground also continued to intensify. The movement in the urban and the rural areas suffered increasing setbacks, which eventually led to widespread destruction and paralyzation upon the impact of the anti-infiltration hysteria (the Ahos Campaign) in 1985-1986.

The Ahos campaign was a widespread anti-infiltration campaign, launched in July 1985, formalized in the enlarged meeting of the caretaker committee of the Mindanao Commission in September 1985, and stopped by the Mindanao Commission in December 1985 but continued and even ran wild in one region up to March 1986. Hundreds and hundreds of cadres, fighters, activists and ordinary peasants were arrested, interrogated and punished without sufficient and strong basis.

The Ahos Campaign perpetrated grievous violations of the individual rights of the suspects, the standards of due process and the rules of scientific examination and weighing of evidence. The cases were formulated, investigated, judged and concluded through methods and processes that were extremely subjectivist, haphazard, arbitrary and defective. Torture was extensively used on the fallacious ground that the victims were enemy spies, in a situation that the suspects were presumed guilty even if the suspicions usually stood on the flimsiest ground.

The Ahos Campaign was spurred by panic from unproven apprehensions regarding an extensive and long running infiltration by the enemy. Such

apprehensions were buttressed when worries mounted over growing security problems and losses in the countryside and cities, and at the same time, there had been the previous warning from the central leadership against a wide network of infiltration, there was an enemy campaign of intrigue regarding enemy operatives within the movement and there were reports about so much internal information known to the enemy. The belief hardened that there was an extensive infiltration network and the leadership in the island was seized by panic when the report and the doubt of one former political detainee reinforced the doubts of the leading cadres themselves in the white area of one region, leading to arrests, self-confessions and accusations drawn through torture. The belief finally turned into hysteria when the arrests, torture, confessions and subjectivist judgment led to an ever widening scale and ever-rising level, fueled each other, eroded mutual trust, ran over the integrity and the organizational processes of the Party and shook entire organizations of the Party.

The Ahos Campaign occurred under conditions of intense life and death struggle with the reactionary enemy. It was conducted under the mistaken belief of defending the Party and the revolution against enemy infiltrators.

We have principles and rules that should guide us in ferreting out and eliminating informers and infiltrators and there have been efforts to remind Party units not to violate these. However, these were not sufficiently studied, disseminated and impressed in thought and practice, there had been a history of carelessness and immaturity in the handling of such matters within the Party.

The damage created by the Ahos Campaign is extensive and sizeable. Many Party and army cadres up to the regional and front levels were arrested and punished. Many more left or fled because they came under suspicion, became confused or demoralized. Demoralization, confusion and mutual suspicion spread among the forces at all levels. Organs assigned to white area work, united front and the NDF were paralyzed or fell apart; NPA units collapsed or contracted; NPA personnel were sent home. Mass actions and tactical offensives almost disappeared or stopped. The enemy took advantage of the confusion to sow intrigues, encourage splits and attack wide areas of the guerrilla fronts that had fallen into disarray or had been left unattended by Party or army units.

Meanwhile within the central leadership, the view emerged that the political crisis was rapidly ripening into a revolutionary crisis. Moreover, the crisis was imagined as most probably leading to the decisive victory of the revolution within a few years through the leap to the strategic counteroffensive, regular mobile warfare combined with guerrilla warfare and extensive people's uprisings.

In the 1984 National Military Conference and the 9th CC Plenum in 1985, the central leadership rejected the Red area-White area schema of the Mindanao Commission. But the SCO framework upheld by the central leadership also advocated the rush to shift to regular mobile warfare and the notion of toying with insurrection. There was a strong tendency to set tasks and objectives beyond the actual capacity and level of development of the revolution.

The Mindanao insurrectionist framework was criticized but its key elements, such as the rapid increase of the companies, raising the level of the war, all-out urban partisan warfare, and wishing for widespread and general uprisings, were approved and endorsed. These factors were incorporated into the program and the struggle towards the SCO which prevailed until 1990.

Before the 1984 Military Conference and according to the 1983 Politburo decision, the formation of companies in the Visayas proceeded. After the conference, the formation of companies in Luzon followed.

The 9th CC Plenum recognized the gravity of the problem of the reactionaries in connection with the socioeconomic crisis, the extreme isolation of the fascist dictatorship, the serious splits and rifts among the reactionaries, and the rapid advance of the revolution. But there was an underestimation of the capacity of reactionary armed strength to increase and of the US and local reactionaries to maneuver politically.

There was a strong tendency to overestimate the capacity of the Party and the revolution. There was the view that we had gone beyond the stage of deploying our forces all over the country, that we had built a strong force, and that the most important issue was the maximization of the forces in the extraordinary situation in order to achieve an advance equivalent to a decisive victory or something close to it. Because of the unusual extent of spontaneous mass participation in the urban political mobilizations, there was also a strong tendency to overestimate the level of the people's consciousness.

The problems and limitations of the revolutionary movement, the gaps and deficiencies in the spread, solidity and capability of the Party, the army

and the mass base for accelerated and more intense battles in the countryside, and especially for leaping to a higher stage of the war, were underestimated. The attention of the Plenum was focused on the issue of more intense struggles, wider sweep of revolutionary influence, the wish to immediately achieve general leadership over the people, and the polarization of the situation between the revolutionary forces and the US-Marcos dictatorship.

The view prevailed that the line of protracted people's war should be upheld and that the building of the people's army and the mass base in the countryside should be pursued. This played a significant role in preventing the insurrectionist influence from growing much stronger in the following years. But in the view upheld by the Plenum, there was a strong desire to hasten the leap to a higher stage of the war: extremely high targets were set for different areas of work, with the assumption that these could be accomplished simultaneously.

The Plenum firmed up the decision that the company would be the principal formation of the people's army and military work would already be its principal task. The company was identified as the principal vehicle for the tactical offensives and would have to absorb a big bulk of the army personnel.

The three year program that focused on fulfilling the requirements for advancing to the SCO was drawn up. The principal content of the program for "regularization" was the formation of many more companies (regular and guerrilla) and even battalions; the building of the command structure at various levels and areas; and the development of military training and discipline.

The following general conclusions were reached: first, the level achieved in the expansion and consolidation was sufficient for a sustained intensification of the war and, second, guerrilla warfare should be intensified by raising its level. Thus, the solution of outstanding problems with regard to further consolidation and accumulation of strength and mass base was relegated to a secondary position and the erroneous estimate with regard to the fulfillment of the political requisites for accelerated verticalization and "regularization" was reinforced. While intensifying and raising the level of the war was set as a target, attention to work at the basic level and the localities slackened.

The preparation for and launching of town uprisings including principal towns—except in the national capital region—was set as a component of the program for the SCO. A wild concept of uprisings and insurrections that was loose on the strategic requirements, muddled in its understanding of the dangers and probable costs, and extremely expansive in lining up the

objectives—from simple trial, training the masses, strengthening the army, weakening the reactionary state or its local branches, up to the actual seizure of power. For the first year of the SCO, the creation of the conditions for an explosion into a general uprising simultaneous with a general offensive of the army was also set as a target.

The extensive development of partisan warfare all over the country was programmed. The orientation for it was determined as an all-out and special form of warfare, complementary to the guerrilla warfare in the countryside, supportive of the urban mass movement, and a principal requisite in preparing for urban uprisings.

Another general objective of the three-year program was the achievement of a decisive revolutionary victory over the US-Marcos dictatorship. The polarization between the revolution and the US-Marcos dictatorship, the seizure of the overall leadership of the anti-dictatorship front and the transformation of the entire anti-dictatorship struggle into a full revolutionary struggle were set as targets.

It was assumed that the revolution had accumulated enough strength for it to be able to grow continuously, draw the so-called liberal democrats and destroy the anti-Marcos reactionaries as a bloc. There was an excessive overestimation of the revolutionary potential of the so-called liberal democrats and “Left wing” of the anti-Marcos reactionaries. On the other hand, there was a strong tendency to belittle the capacity of the entire bloc of the anti-Marcos reactionaries to assert their leadership over the anti-dictatorship struggle.

It was estimated that the grave crisis would lead to a polarization and massive confrontation of the political forces. But, given the strategic balance of the forces and the level of development, the targets desired—the general polarization between the revolution and the US-Marcos dictatorship and the decisive confrontation with the fascist dictatorship, with one block of the anti-Marcos reactionaries not playing any role—were unattainable.

By muddling the class character of the anti-Marcos reactionaries, with the use of the term “bourgeois reformists” for them, and their division into blocs of the right and left wings, one reactionary bloc was erroneously regarded as belonging to the middle forces between revolution and reaction. The confusion led, on the one hand, to the “Left” tendency to exaggerate the issue of combating reformism within the open antifascist alliance and to the boycott error in the snap elections; and, on the other hand, the Rightist tendency in

the building of the NDF to make anticipatory compromises on the maximum program and seek the inclusion of those assumed to be liberal democrats but who are still steeped in reformism and parliamentarism and also the so-called “Left bourgeois reformists.”

Simultaneous with the attempt at “neutralizing” the anti-Marcos reactionaries, more emphasis was put on the importance of building the NDF and of drawing into it the other revolutionary and progressive forces, on raising the political content of the mass actions and on strengthening the revolutionary leadership over the antifascist front.

The formal establishment of the NDF was pursued, with the Party and Party-led forces to start with but eventually to expand with the entry of other forces. The NDF was designed according to the framework of the broad national revolutionary united front against the fascist dictatorship and carried the program for the decisive (incomplete) victory of the revolution over the US-Marcos dictatorship. Its political program is a coalition program seeking to encompass the liberal democrats and the left wing of the anti-Marcos reactionaries and, in the event, neutralize US imperialist counteraction and aggression.

Proceeding from the target of destroying the bloc of the anti-Marcos reactionaries, there emerged the tendency to counterpose the task of building the national revolutionary united front to that of building the broad anti-dictatorship front. Within the broad legal anti-dictatorship front, there was a tendency to exaggerate some issues with regard to slogans and form of struggle (in connection with the struggle against reformism and to prevent the consolidation of the anti-Marcos reactionaries) in a way that limited our relations, influence and maneuvers (Oust/Resign, Boycott/Participation in election).

The same tendency was reflected by the view that from 1981, the level of consciousness of the broad masses had been antifascist and the revolutionary task was to raise that level by raising the political content of their struggles.

In 1984, the boycott campaign launched during the elections for the national legislature had a positive effect. The masses in large numbers were mobilized in militant street actions such as the “Lakbayan” (long march) and many legal progressive forces and a sizeable part of the anti-Marcos reactionaries were drawn to our side. However, there was an exaggeration of the contradiction between boycott and participation and also an overemphasis on the election issue. In handling the issue, the task emphasized was that of

fighting the elections as an attempt, on the one hand, by the fascist dictatorship to overcome a politically defensive position and, on the other, by the anti-Marcos reactionaries to draw the masses to reformism.

The desire to immediately gain revolutionary leadership over the majority of the people, the middle forces and the legal progressive forces the so-called liberal democrats overestimated the level of the development of these forces. The desire to draw the “Left wing” of the anti-Marcos reactionaries to the side of the revolution did not only overestimate the level of development, but also deviated from the correct analysis of the class character of the anti-Marcos reactionaries.

The call for snap elections in the latter part of 1985 ran counter to the Party’s expectations. The central leadership, in line with the tactics of decisive victory, insisted on an active boycott of the snap elections despite the widespread objections of cadres and members and the demand of some Politburo members to convene and decide the issue.

During the electoral campaign period, millions of people were drawn to and mobilized in the antifascist struggle, the conditions were ripe for a decisive confrontation and for ousting the fascist dictatorship. Because of the boycott tactics, the legal progressive forces was divided, their links with the broad antifascist struggle of the masses weakened, and the Party’s political maneuver limited.

After the elections, the Party rapidly regained initiative by calling for and launching protest actions. Party units and Party-led mass organizations actively participated in the EDSA uprising. But US imperialism, the anti-Marcos reactionaries and the petty bourgeois reformist groups took advantage of the Party’s boycott error by making it appear that the Party and the revolutionary movement were not at the scene when Marcos was toppled.

The need to hold a new party congress was recognized during the 8th and the 9th CC Plenums. But such important preparations for the congress as conducting theoretical studies, reviewing reports and documents, correctly presenting important issues in our just and current practice, developing the framework for a correct and comprehensive understanding of the major theoretical and practical issues, and reaching a unified understanding by the Party of such issues were neglected.

The larger part of the time and efforts of the central leadership, including the majority of the leading cadres at the national and regional levels, was devoted to day-to-day administration, leadership over the political struggles or tactical leadership over the people's army.

The Party membership expanded by almost four times from 1980 to 1985. A great number of tried and tested advanced elements rose from the intense struggles in the countryside and the urban centers and the most earnest and dedicated among them were recruited into the Party. But a large percentage of the old and new recruits were not given adequate ideological and political training and education. Such neglect worsened even more at the height of the antifascist struggle. The studies and tasks undertaken by Party cadres and members revolved around the day-to-day demands of the struggle. They were not sufficiently armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism nor even with the knowledge of the history of the Party and the Philippine revolution. The continuous ideological remolding of many recruits, particularly from the intelligentsia and the peasantry, was neglected.

The central leadership and many other leading committees were excessively drawn to base themselves and attend to tasks in the city. As the central leadership got immersed in details, including those regarding mass actions in Manila-Rizal, supervision over and prompt attention to such larger and much more complicated matters as army building, the general course of the war, mass base building and Party building in the countryside were neglected. An already weak system of reporting was further weakened and written reports came to be substituted by consultations in the city and reports made during meetings.

In the desire to expand the leadership role of the Political Bureau, the 9th CC Plenum decided to reduce the power of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. The Executive Committee was stripped of the power to make policy decisions in between meetings of the Politburo, except in emergency situations. Meanwhile, the territorial and national commissions were given more powers. While the continuous authority of central leadership was weakened, the authority of the staff organs for assisting the central leadership was strengthened. This issue would keep on recurring and would become more controversial in the following years as bureaucratism worsened and the internal struggle on line and tactics heightened.

City-based staff organs multiplied and grew; legal institutions and programs proliferated. The deployment of cadres and activists in the countryside

almost stopped. The number of cadres concentrated in the cities multiplied, particularly because it was there that the political actions were most impressive, and also there that the means and facilities for communications, administration and coordination could be found. The deployment of cadres and activists to the countryside stopped and a reverse current started: the flow to the cities of cadres previously deployed in the countryside.

While attending the 9th CC Plenum, the leading cadres of the Mindanao Commission received status reports on the Ahos Campaign and on the unusual extent of the problem. They did not in their turn report it to the Plenum. It was only after the Plenum that they made a report to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee formed an investigating body. It was easy enough to investigate and decide on abolishing the “joint command” set up by the Manila-Rizal-based organs to arrest “infiltrators” in Manila-Rizal on the basis of “findings” of the Ahos Campaign. But gathering the data on the events and the situation in Mindanao proved to be difficult for the Executive Committee and it could not proceed. So this task was passed on to the Mindanao Commission in December. The Mindanao Commission was given the task of continuing the investigation and formulating the necessary guidelines and measures. The examination and analysis of what transpired got overtaken by the tasks and the issues related to the snap elections and the EDSA uprising. However, central authority should have been exercised to immediately order a stop to the Ahos Campaign and to exert all necessary efforts to promptly get at the facts and analyze them. The central leadership should have given the highest priority to the matter; this would have been the sharper and wiser handling of the issue at the national level.

The party’s leadership, relations with and influence over the workers, peasants, youth and students, women and the other sections of the intelligentsia broadened. The Party continued to take active positions on issues and to lead the mass actions on tactical issues. Support for the national democratic program also continued.

However, the neglect of internal ideological work was reflected in the overall weakening and decline in the quality of propaganda work. Propaganda work weakened on issues involving the theory, strategy and the basic principles of the Party. No active theoretical struggle was undertaken against the various growing petty bourgeois currents. It reached a point that other political groups surpassed us and took the initiative in presenting and explaining

the basic issues from their own point of view, and were able to sow confusion even within the Party.

Although there was a surge in the expansion of mass organizations after the Aquino assassination, the task of following up, maintaining relations with, raising the political consciousness and organizing a large part of the masses aroused and mobilized in the protest actions was not pursued. One reason was that in the Manila-Rizal region, the Party territorial organization had been dismantled. But the bigger reason was the weak and low quality of the educational and organizational work at the basic level. The attention of the majority of the cadres was excessively drawn to tasks related to day-to-day administration, sweeping propaganda and mobilization in the mass campaigns.

From 1984 the Party-led organized forces among the student masses began to dwindle and weaken although the broad influence of the revolutionary movement continued through positions held by activists in student councils, campus publications and inter-school organizations.

Overseas, after a period of being limited to relatively minor non-ruling parties and organizations, our relations expanded at the party-to-party level, and so did those of the NDF with other liberation movements and governments and those of other Party-led organizations at the people-to-people level. The initiatives of the national military staff helped to accomplish this although in the beginning their entry into this arena had been done without the knowledge of the Executive Committee. Not much progress was made in organizing overseas Filipinos; instead, there were some setbacks.

At the 9th CC Plenum, the importance of our efforts to expand and strengthen international support was stressed. The major objectives for targeting such support were to neutralize the threat of US aggression and to acquire heavy weaponry needed for advancing to the SCO. A diplomatic campaign was programmed. A related proposal to regard the Soviet Union as socialist was presented. The Plenum, however, decided to subject the proposal to further study.

IV

1986–1987

When Marcos fell, the broad antifascist front fell into disarray and the alignment of political forces changed. The vacillations of the middle forces increased; they were easily swayed by reformist promises and potentials of the Aquino regime. And as it should have been anticipated, there was a relative cooling off of political struggles and a relative ebb in mass participation in protest actions.

The euphoria over the downfall of the Marcos fascist dictatorship quickly turned into anxiety over the unresolved basic national and social problems and the continued worsening of the socioeconomic crisis. There was a short-lived surge in trade and commerce due to the injection of new foreign loans and a big amount of dollars earned by overseas workers, and also due to the loosening of IMF-WB controls on imports and government spending. But only a small number of the comprador big bourgeoisie, big landlords and big bureaucrats who took power profited from these; only a small number among the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie received fleeting trickles of relief from the intense lashes of the crisis.

While still consolidating its hold on power, the newly installed Aquino regime implemented a few meaningful democratic reforms and measures, used Aquino's personal popularity to its advantage, encouraged reformist illusions and pushed for a ceasefire. At the same time, the fascist military and bureaucratic machinery were maintained and proposals for essential changes in the economic, military, political and foreign policy, which continued to be in effect even after the fall of the dictatorship, were blocked. Behind the bourgeois constitutional processes, militarization was intensified and the fascist repression of the basic masses and the progressive forces continued to be widespread.

The reactionary ruling system was able to overcome its lack of initiative and the other problems brought about by the extreme isolation of the former ruling dictatorial regime. However, the divisions and the rifts among the reactionary political and military factions further deepened and heightened.

Although preoccupied with internal reorganization, the AFP General Command continued to prepare for renewed big offensives against the revolutionary movement. More combat battalions were formed and deployed in NPA guerrillas fronts, apart from those redeployed from the Moro Nation-

al Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) areas and from Metro Manila Territorial commands were reorganized and divisions and brigades were redeployed. US military support was increased. Additional units of the CHDF, anticommunist vigilantes and religious fanatics were formed.

In Northeast and Western Mindanao, brigade size operations which started as early as 1984 continued. Brigade-size operations also started in Negros and Cagayan-Apayao and in many other regions in 1987. In urban areas, militarization was intensified in Davao and Cebu. From the second half of 1986, assassinations of progressive leaders and the “salvaging” (extrajudicial execution), abduction and threats to progressive forces started and would become more widespread and heighten in 1987.

Under the new situation, the Party held on to the national democratic line. The emphasis was put on advancing the struggle for basic national and social interests, pursuing the armed revolution, continuing to strengthen the basic revolutionary forces while striving to maintain the broadest link and cooperation with other progressive and democratic forces.

The legal progressive movement in the cities remained as a powerful force for promoting the national democratic struggle. The progressive workers’ movement further expanded; its leadership and initiatives in the trade union movement grew stronger. The open peasant movement became the main partner of the workers’ movement in the legal struggle on issues affecting the basic masses and fundamental changes in the country and society. The progressive movement of indigenous peoples, women, teachers and, from almost nothing, the government employees advanced vigorously.

From the second half of 1985, the revolutionary movement in Mindanao declined suddenly when the setbacks caused by enemy attacks were aggravated several times over by the ravages of the Aho hysteria. In 1986 only two of the 15 companies in 1985 could be maintained at company strength; the number would rise to five in 1987. The others either dwindled as a result of attrition or were dismantled and redeployed by decision of the responsible regional committees to give priority to the work in the localities. Tactical offensives and weapons seized from the enemy dwindled; incidents of units hit by enemy operations increased, and the total number of high-powered rifles decreased. Worse, big chunks of the guerrilla fronts and mass base were lost.

Nevertheless, the intensity of the tactical offensives in Luzon and the Visayas continued; in these areas, this was still the period of impetus for company formations and operations. The use of radio for communications, the use of explosives and advanced military training became widespread. After the ceasefire in 1987, there was the coordinated intensification of big and small, annihilative and attritive, military actions throughout the country. Despite a slight decrease, a sizeable number of high-powered rifles continued to be seized from the enemy.

The expansion of guerrilla fronts in the regions of Luzon continued. In the Visayas, the total number of barrios reached was more or less maintained; there were losses in some parts and slight expansion or recovery in others. More importantly, some tens of thousands were added to the membership of the mass organizations in the Visayas.

During the 1986 meeting of the politburo, the boycott of the snap election was criticized as a major tactical error. But the review made of past practice was sketchy and fragmented. Other errors and bigger deviations from the line of protracted people's war since 1983 were not examined. The Apos Campaign was put on the agenda but was neither reported nor discussed. The conspicuous growth inside the Party of the current of populism and compromise and, outside the Party, of the aggressive parliamentarist and reformist currents among legal progressive groups were not identified, criticized nor combated.

The drastic changes in the political situation demanded correct firm and decisive adjustment in the tasks and priorities of the movement. But internally, the previous weaknesses and shortcomings, the disorientation and the deviation from the line and the strong tendency to overreach continued to plague the vanguard Party and even worsened.

The overall result—despite the continued impressive military actions, the overall expansion in the countryside, the growth in the total membership of the open and underground mass organizations and the active positioning on national issues—was an increasing loss of momentum and initiative, the more frequent miscalculations in the tactical offensives, and the worsening imbalances and vulnerability in the disposition of forces and tasks. Under conditions of a relative slowdown of the pace in the advance of the revolution, the obsession with intensifying military actions and bringing about an explosion of the situation caused further complications, difficulties and

delays in efforts to recover and increase our initiative for an all-sided and solid advance.

A significant number of Party cadres and units in the urban areas and even in some parts of the countryside were confused and misled by illusions regarding the new regime. There were those who held the view that the Aquino regime was a centrist, if not a progressive, government because of the erroneous assumption that those who were regarded as liberal democrats and “Left bourgeois reformists” constituted a strong block and could prevail within the government. Initially, even the Politburo had vacillated on this so much so that in determining the principal target, it identified the US and the ultra-Right, i.e., the “Enrile-Ramos faction” and the remnants of the Marcos fascist faction.

The Politburo recognized the essentially reactionary character of the Aquino regime. It clarified that the regime neither had the will nor the capability to solve the fundamental national and social problems. But in the analysis some conjuncturalist influence and views were also accepted. Among them was the speculation that as a result of the EDSA uprising, the people got a share of state power so that the reactionary state itself had also become an arena of struggle for power between reaction and the people.

Among the tasks set by the Politburo were: “Expand people’s power inside and outside the government; combine political and armed struggles in order to develop the organs of political power (from armed to non-armed prototypes).”

The confusion over distinguishing real friends from enemies under the new situation was exploited by a few factionalist and defeatist elements in Negros in order to peddle class collaboration, parliamentarism and splitism inside the Party. In the Cordillera, the same was used as an additional ammunition for the Conrado Balweg faction in its splittist campaign after the Party rejected the faction’s narrow localist line and vigorously asserted the national democratic line and the correct application of the line of national self-determination.

At the 1987 meeting of the Politburo, the internal debate regarding the reactionary, puppet and antipeople character of the Aquino regime was firmly resolved. The conjuncturalist approach with regard to the question of the state, the one-sided and excessive emphasis on the particularities of Aquino’s personality as projected by the bourgeois mass media, and the notion that

the puppet state had become fragmented as a result of the EDSA uprising were all criticized.

In utter disregard of actual conditions, the rhetorics of big political struggles, of rapidly reaching the majority of the people, and of anticipating and preparing for a new gigantic explosion were raised and prevailed within the Party. Thus, the rhetorics continued to encourage previous overestimations and insurrectionist speculations and illusions. The insurrectionism carried by the SCO program, which the central leadership maintained, combined with the confusion over the charter of the new regime, the insurrectionist misinterpretation of the EDSA uprising and the constantly changing concept of “seizing opportunities.”

With regard to the tasks approved by the Politburo, the direct adoption of an insurrectionary line was again rejected, but other insurrectionist views were allowed. There was the formulation that it is necessary “to recognize the probability that the urban political struggle would bring about an insurrection,” which clearly indicates something more than an EDSA-type upheaval. Thus, it was stressed that while people’s war was being advanced in the countryside, we should also “take cognizance of the possibility of urban insurrection.” Another formulation stated that it is necessary “to consider insurrection as a practical possibility and consciously to develop the requisites for it.”

The Southern Luzon Commission formally presented a proposal to the central leadership (which was immediately rejected and criticized) regarding a “fast track/slow track” plan to achieve victory in a few years through insurrection. In the Southern Tagalog region, the Party organization in the urban areas was dismantled and reorganized according to the three machineries (legal, partisan and territory) as in Mindanao. Armed organizing teams were formed to establish partisan bases and fronts, using the “politico-military method” of organizing in the plains and alongside highways in the provinces near Metro Manila. As a result, the mass movement was neglected and weakened and the links between the Party and the masses further narrowed. The armed organizing teams became highly vulnerable to exposure and destruction and most of their time was spent in making arrangements for their security, basing and maneuver.

In Metro Manila and other cities, the wish for a “second round” of uprising spread. Thus, the possibility of a new and higher form of uprising and the sociopolitical and historic significance of the EDSA uprising were exag-

gerated. The illusion prevailed that a new polarization and the conditions for an uprising could be rapidly induced.

In 1986 the more conspicuous result of such illusion was the gross overestimation of the potentials of the democratic space and of work within the government and its processes for bringing about a renewed intensification of mass protests on the basic national and social issues, rapidly drawing entire sections of the middle forces towards the revolution, and splitting the new regime between the progressives (possibly including Aquino) and the reactionaries.

In the following years, however, what predominated was the rush to heat up the situation, bring about an explosion of general paralyzations and intensify partisan warfare. In 1987, the Politburo set the task of developing the capacity for general paralyzations and of expanding partisan warfare in the cities.

The decision to enter into a ceasefire was finalized towards the end of 1986 despite the absence of an agreement or of any meaningful advance or hope for talks on the major issues, the arrest of a member of the Executive Committee, the Olalia assassination and the big enemy military operations in different regions. And finally, the assertion of NDF status of belligerency, revolutionary power in the guerrilla bases and zones, and the right of the NPA to bear arms, was dropped altogether.

What prevailed was the desire for a grand demonstration of goodwill giving in to what was merely a perceived strong sentiment for peace among the people, specifically of some sections of the middle forces, even if it meant having to undermine the political framework of the armed struggle and having to present the reactionaries with a big advantage and allowance.

As soon as the Aquino regime got the ceasefire, it lost interest in continuing the talks on the major issues. Making public announcements became the major activity of the panel and spokesperson of the NDF, something that the government propagandists took head on by getting a far greater space and time in the bourgeois mass media.

The AFP took advantage of the ceasefire to prepare their general offensives against the revolutionary forces. During the period, the AFP boosted their intelligence stock of information on the revolutionary movement, formed anticommunist vigilante groups and fanatic sects and intensified operations in the plains and the vicinity of major transportation lines and population centers. Some NPA units were disarmed by the AFP. Had the ceasefire period

been prolonged, the Aquino regime and the AFP would have wrought greater damage and confusion by taking advantage of the fundamental defects of the ceasefire agreement and the monitoring system which they controlled. After the ceasefire, during the graduation of the PMA in February 1987, Aquino drew the “sword of war” and declared her total war to finish off the armed revolution within her term.

Based on the lessons derived from the boycott error, the Party agreed to the creation of an electoral party of legal progressive forces and their participation in the 1987 elections. While continuously clarifying to the masses the line of armed struggle in order to resolve the fundamental problems of the country, we also demonstrate to them the correctness of legal progressive forces participating in elections in order to develop further links with a broader number of the people and use the electoral arena to strengthen ourselves and allow us to maneuver against attacks by the reactionaries.

Nonetheless, because of widespread terrorism and cheating by the reactionaries, shortcomings in coalition tactics, weaknesses in maintaining maximum flexibility in handling local issues and in projecting the progressive platform, and lack of knowledge and experience in mobilizing the masses to cast their votes, the benefits gained from participating in the elections were limited. The original target was beyond our capacity and fell far short of the potential.

During the first plebiscite on the Aquino constitution in 1987, an intense struggle again developed in some parts of the Party organization and in some legal alliances primarily as a sequel to the struggle on the 1986 boycott and the strong illusions about the Aquino regime. The issue was not boycott or participation but support or rejection of the 1987 constitution and therefore, of the Aquino regime.

To avoid divisions and focus attention on more important struggles then, such as the ceasefire, formal peace talks and the mass campaigns on basic issues, the Party correctly launched political activities beyond the plebiscite issue on which progressive forces could cooperate despite their differences with regard to the plebiscite. On the plebiscite issue itself, the most important was the propaganda and education campaign to clarify the real character of the constitution and the Aquino regime.

In 1987 partisan warfare was intensified in Manila-Rizal Normal and special partisan operations in Manila-Rizal were accelerated and drummed up.

Because the targets had been arbitrary and the operations heightened at a time that there were strong reformist illusions about the Aquino regime, the partisan operations generated a strong backlash of criticism from the middle forces, further added to the difficulties of the legal progressive forces in political positioning and maneuvering, and provoked intense police retaliation on the communities. It was only in 1988 that there would be an order to stop the so-called normal operations and to impose strict controls even on special operations.

For the first time, a general transport strike was launched in Manila-Rizal in August 1987 and afterwards, a general workers' strike in October. The Aquino regime was surprised by these two broad coordinated strikes. It was caught unprepared to stop and sabotage them and was forced to respond to the demands of the workers. The workers also gained the broad support of other sectors.

However, as a result of these experiences, the obsession for "general paralyzing actions" grew stronger. There was a tendency to make a threat of a general paralyzation or a call for it on every big issue even when the masses were not sufficiently prepared. In the succeeding people's strikes and general strikes, the Aquino regime would no longer be surprised and would be able to use carrot and stick measures and diversionary and dividing tactics. Because the organized strength of the workers and the people was not yet sufficient, such reactionary tactics became relatively successful.

There was also a big failure in gathering and mobilizing the workers in street demonstrations, which should have been regarded as important for mobilizing the worker masses in activities beyond work stoppages in factories and more effectively impressing upon the public consciousness the breadth and strength of the workers' organized struggle. But the struggle had been excessively focused on "paralyzations" and in the end, the Aquino regime would use doctored statistics, mass media manipulation and the image of normalcy in well-known places to show that "paralyzations" did not occur.

The program for "regularization" and intensification of the war inwards the SCO formulated by the 9th CC Plenum was continued. The 1987 Politburo meeting emphasized the formation of more companies and the development of the annihilative capability of the people's army. Simultaneous with this was the identification of peasant uprisings as a goal for advancing the peasant movement within a two-year program.

After the ceasefire in 1987, tactical offensives were intensified throughout the archipelago. It was followed by a coordinated campaign against the “low intensity conflict” scheme in July-September 1987 as part of a special project. In July and August, more than 600 big and small guerrilla operations were launched by the NPA nationwide.

But with the intensification of guerrilla warfare through coordinated campaigns, the regional forces with limited logistics became overextended at a time that the enemy was gearing itself for a general offensive. The national military staff was compelled to provide huge amounts for subsidizing the military operations in the regions. Frictions arose in the relations between the army commands and the territorial Party committees because of the direct top-to-bottom flow of the army command.

We discovered that the capability of our guerilla army and its system of communication and command were still extremely inadequate for supervising, coordinating and commanding a national military campaign. We did not yet have the capability at the national level to quickly know, concentrate, process, make decisions and act on the information about drastic changes in the situation below, and neither to quickly dispatch tactical decisions and orders to the appropriate territories, levels and units.

Even when there had been a decision to stop the campaign, a member of the Executive Committee and the national military staff issued an order—beyond his authority—for a continuation of the military campaign when a coup attempt materialized in August 1987 supposedly in order to “seize the opportunity.” Some succeeding military actions in response to the order were unnecessary, inappropriate to the prevailing situation in their area of occurrence, extremely overdue and further caused big political problems. Because of the primitive condition of our communication system, succeeding actions could not be stopped, despite the loud public outcry on previous actions. Worse, no formal directive was ever issued to stop the campaign.

However, in the assessment of the anti-LIC campaign made by the Military Commission towards the end of 1987 and of the Politburo in 1988, there was a one-sided emphasis on intensification of the tactical offensives and the supposed achievement of a higher level of coordination. The assessment claims that coordinated military campaigns at the national, territorial and regional levels were an important factor for raising the level and sustaining the advance of the war. Greater coordination and campaigns at a higher

level became a rationale for the transformation of the national military staff into the General Command of the NPA.

In Southern Luzon, the guerrilla units were almost totally concentrated under the command of the territorial commission during the anti-LIC campaign. For months and months, guerrilla fronts in the Southern Tagalog area were deprived of armed forces at a time that the enemy forces in the region had been beefed up. The detachments and CAFGU units were being rapidly set up and the enemy forces were combing the guerrilla fronts. Big and entire chunks of the guerrilla fronts were lost almost without any fight.

In Bicol, the excessive concentration of guerrilla units at the regional command continued for some more years. It resulted in the loss of military capability over wide areas, the preoccupation of the regional command with the problems of administration and logistics, the almost total stop of tactical offensives over a long time, the deterioration of discipline, and the big decline in the political quality and integrity of guerrilla units.

In Northern Luzon, the program for the rapid preparation of the requisites for the SCO was drawn up in mid-1987 in connection with the analysis that reactionary infighting would intensify and that emergency rule or a civilian military rule was imminent. The rapid increase of companies and battalions, the preparation of areas for uprisings and the spread of partisan warfare were programmed. The territorial battalion had been formed as early as the end of 1986.

Within the framework of the overall plan of the Northern Luzon Commission and further additions to it, the Nueva Vizcaya Party Committee prepared a plan for achieving strategic stalemate in the area, under the illusion that the enemy was no longer capable of large redeployment of its forces. Peasant organizations were rapidly established and expanded through mass meetings, the implementation in the province of the maximum program for revolutionary agrarian reform was declared, platoon-sized armed units in the guerrilla front were made to participate in the "insurrectionary actions" of the peasants, raids and confiscation of the properties of landlords were initiated and other "Left" policies in dealing with identified and suspected counterrevolutionaries and bad elements were implemented.

An AFP battalion was dispatched to the area as a result of a few dramatic actions. It targeted the open mass organizations in the barrios and relentlessly pursued the small armed units of the people's army. The haphazardly established mass organizations were immediately destroyed. Eventually,

a meeting of the guerilla front's leading cadres was discovered and cornered and all those present were captured. After a series of setbacks, the leadership of the front veered towards a Rightist policy of retreat, limited links with the masses and individual recruitment.

The Visayas is a standout in terms of the level of verticalization achieved by the people's army. The guerrilla units were concentrated in 15 companies, which had started to be regularized and commanded at the levels of the region and the large guerrilla front. In Samar, the battalion formation was set up after the Military Commission and the Politburo approved the formation of battalions in Northern Luzon. Meanwhile, the local armed forces were very weak; it would only be in 1988 that district guerrilla units and armed propaganda units would again be formed. The Visayas also pioneered in establishing command structures and support staff at the regional level and in stressing the importance of developing the capacity for regional and interregional coordination and for battalion and multi-company operations. Concomitantly, the logistical and financial problems confronted by the people's army there were also much more serious than elsewhere.

In Central Luzon the guerilla zones expanded several times over and in that situation platoon-size guerrilla units were formed and the company started to be built.

In the main, the fighting capability and technique of the people's army advanced. The national military staff created in September 1984 made a big contribution by planning, supervising and leading the work. The training of officers and men was systematized, developed and expanded; and so was the use of explosives and radio. Such basic tasks as intelligence work at various levels and medical work started to be attended to and organized.

On the other hand the surge in the building of bigger combat formations concentrating on military work and alienated from mass work brought down the political quality, integrity and capability of the people's army and abetted wrong ideas and practices within the army. Among live ranks of the officers and Red fighters, previous skills and knowledge in mass work gradually deteriorated, and so did the desirable attitudes that were developed in and needed for integrating with the masses. Problems of coarseness, lack of discipline and lumpen habits spread and worsened. Arrogance based on military strength and disregard for political considerations in planning and undertaking military actions grew strong.

In some areas and in some instances, there emerged the tendency to depend on the sheer size of the formations and to be haphazard in the work of investigation and planning as well as the preoccupation with hitting hard enemy positions and waging prolonged battles which exhausted the forces and the extremely limited logistics.

In 1987, the problem of discipline within the army had already become noticeable and particular attention started to be focused again on the development of political work within the army and its participation in mass work and production. The campaign to rectify coarseness in manners and looseness in discipline was initiated in a few regions.

Guerrilla zones continued to expand and membership in mass organizations in the countryside increased. But behind these were the weakening and decline in the quality of the forces deployed in the localities; the prolonged failure to consolidate the mass organizations, sustain antifeudal struggles and other mass campaigns and maintain lively political education and propaganda work; and the growing problem of ensuring the continued presence of the local guerrilla units in the localities given the extremely low level of their military capability in the midst of expanding and intensifying enemy operations.

At the peak of the antifascist struggles, thousands of cadres and peasant activists were recruited in the countryside. They were the main forces attending to the organizations and tasks in the localities and the backbone of the mass base. But in more areas, sweeping recruitment of Party members and full-time fighters was not followed up by the necessary education, ideological remolding, training in political leadership and close attention and guidance. There were serious shortcomings in the ideological, political and organizational consolidation of the local Party committees and branches in the barrios. On top of all these was the gross neglect or inability on the part of the higher Party committees, especially those based in the cities, to provide supervision, guidance and support.

In the countryside, there was a rapid depletion of cadres with high educational level, knowledge of theory and capacity to study theory. The expansion of our areas by several times over, the creation of committees in more territories and levels, and the redeployment of cadres to staff organs at higher levels totally exhausted the limited and constant number of these types of cadres in the countryside. Many leading committees at the guerrilla zone level and a few at the regional level, not to mention the districts and sections, did not

have or had only a handful of these types of cadres. Under such a situation of a diminishing number of cadres with the capacity to study theory, the redeployment of even only one quality cadre from the work in the localities became a difficult problem and had telling negative effects.

The countryside did not benefit from cadres produced by the powerful surge of the political movement in the cities since 1983. Despite the further expansion and growth of the progressive workers' movement, worker cadres and activists deployed to the countryside were sporadic and far between. Very few cadres and activists from the intelligentsia went to the countryside. As a matter of fact, the reverse happened: cadres in the countryside were redeployed to staff organs based in cities or asked to be redeployed for various reasons to the cities. On top of this, the leading committees whose attention and efforts had been drawn by the issues and work in the cities had less and less time for giving timely attention and guidance to the work in the countryside.

The results, aside from the low level and the unconsolidated state of the organizations and the sporadic activation and growth of the mass base, were the emergence and spread of the problems of bureaucratism, commandism, neglect, lack of discipline, abuses, and—in a few instances—corruption, which caused the erosion of the masses' confidence, their lack of interest and alienation from us. It was not only in the army combat units that the problems of discipline worsened in 1986–1987 and even afterwards, but also in the local Party organizations and units for mass work. In order to create a broad, strong and continuing mass base in the countryside, particularly those with a capacity to confront and overcome the systematic and ceaseless attacks of the enemy, there is the need for untiring, unceasing and painstaking mass work, continuous strengthening of cadre forces in the localities and unremitting guidance and care by the central leadership and other higher committees and cadres of the Party.

It was during those years that the growing problems in maintaining our position and continuing our work in the plains, alongside highways, seashores and small islands which came under frequent enemy concentrated operations were already being felt. The enemy started to attack these areas using massive anticommunist propaganda, special operations teams, vigilantes and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) and took advantage of the political and military errors of the revolutionary forces.

At the end of 1987, the Executive Committee came out with the concept of the terminal crisis of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal system. Although the term was used in its broad historical meaning, it confused some units and areas which interpreted and applied it tactically.

At the meeting of the Military Commission, the analysis was reached that the AFP had used up their strategic reserves and were already overstretched. Carried away by such an analysis, by an over-anticipation of a violent confrontation among the reactionaries after the coup attempt in 1987, and by a one-sided overemphasis on what had been assumed as advanced experience in high-level coordination achieved by the anti-LIC campaign, the conclusion was drawn that conditions existed for “local strategic counteroffensives” that could be undertaken at the district, front, provincial or regional levels.

The central leadership went along with these wrong analyses and views. In the meeting of the Politburo during the early part of 1988, the decline in the mass base was already noticed, but it was still regarded to be within the normal limit; the spread of the guerrilla zones and the mass base was also regarded as sufficient for the continued intensification of the war. It was clarified that we were still at the stage of guerrilla warfare but it was stressed that the further development of its quality was decisive for a sustained general advance. It was also declared that the strategic stalemate was within sight.

The implementation of the SCO program was pursued and the line of further verticalization of the army, the coordinated military campaigns, the initiation of the maximum program for land reform in the most advanced guerrilla bases, and peasant uprisings were further pushed. Overall stress was on developing the offensive capability of the people’s army, while intending to catch up in strengthening the local guerilla units.

The formation of the General Command of the army, the commands at the different levels, and their staff, was approved. The General Command, besides being in command of the units of the national military staff, was tasked to act as the command of the campaigns directed by the central leadership, during emergency situations (like coups), and upon assignment to directly handle units and military work in an area.

The outcome of the Ahos Campaign was reported to the Politburo. The excesses were strongly criticized and the policy on the absolute ban on torture was reiterated. But the facts and bases for what had then been the Mindanao Commission’s assessment of having identified and punished a big number

of deep penetration agents up to the level of the regional leadership were accepted without any investigation.

In keeping with the program of the 9th CC Plenum, the diplomatic offensive was undertaken to solicit the financial, military and political support from overseas. This offensive was based on the view that support from overseas is crucial in preventing the threat of US aggression and acquiring military weapons necessary for raising the level of the war.

The Party attempted to establish fraternal relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties in Eastern Europe. The earlier stand and criticism against the revisionist character of the Soviet government and party were disregarded and their total reversal, such as the proposal to regard the Soviet Union as socialist and the CPSU as Marxist-Leninist, was considered. But during those years, the Gorbachev leadership had already gone all-out on its line of “new thinking” and on a campaign to dismantle the ruling governments and panic in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Within the Party, the manifestations of ultra-democracy and liberalism worsened. After the boycott error, the tendency to question, to belittle and to disregard the central leadership and its decisions became strong.

Among the cadres of the national and territorial commissions, the tendency to take positions on their own—and beyond their own scope—on national and strategic as well as tactical issues became very strong. A few cadres and units developed the habit of disseminating their own views and papers without going through the processes and the committee system of the Party.

There was a proposal to make *Ang Bayan* a forum for debates. Ideas similar to the “freedom of criticism” (freedom not to follow and to openly oppose the analysis, standpoint and decision of the Party) emerged.

Some classified documents and information were spread around and reached even those who should not, including the newspapers and the enemy. Talks about the leadership that could only come from its members were also spread around.

All these were not promptly criticized and rectified until it seemed to have become a part of normal processes.

The urban basing of leading committees, staff organs and cadres on the enemy manhunt list continued and even worsened. Legal offices and institutions maintained for various tasks and needs further proliferated. Cadres

drawn from the countryside to the cities further multiplied. The central leadership was rocked by security problems and internal disputes.

In 1986, as a result of a big change in the situation, a comprehensive summing-up of the work of the Party and a deeper review of the content and bases of the current program of action should have been regarded as important. A new plenum of the Central Committee was needed at the very least.

The special course on political leadership which revolves around the writings of Lenin and the issues on boycott and insurrection was drawn up and popularized to correct the wrong interpretations and the application of these on the analysis of the EDSA uprising and the situation after. Plans for the course originally included a few writings and the revolutionary experiences in China and Vietnam, but the sections were never finished.

The special course helped in unifying cadres on the correct interpretation and application of Lenin's ideas on theoretical and political issues that emerged after the EDSA uprising. But those studies were overstretched and exceeded the original intention: more a familiarization with the writings for most of those who undertook the study; and it continued to be given long after the intensity of the particular issues focused on by the course had passed. In a few regions, there were attempts to combine the course with the study of the people's war in China and Vietnam within the framework of the concept and program of the SCO.

In the study sessions held, the big inadequacy in theoretical education for cadres, including the predominance of questions and differences in the understanding of many issues on line, strategy and experiences, became even more obvious.

V

1988–1991

By early 1988 the magic of Aquino's popularity had vanished. The surge in commercial activity had been short-lived and had receded into a rapidly worsening crisis. Aquino's economic, military and foreign policies, which were no different or were even worse than those of the Marcos regime, spawned widespread discontent among the masses. The unresolved factional strife among the reactionaries grew deeper and more intense.

However, by 1988, the AFP had completed the reorientation, redeployment and other preparations of their forces and launched a general offensive against the revolutionary movement. As a result of increases in the military budget and in US military assistance, a number of new Philippine Army divisions and the CAFGUs, with a membership of several tens of thousands, could be formed; and brigade- and division-size operations and urban surveillance operations could be increased.

The US and the local reactionaries intended to finish the war quickly. In the countryside, big regular military and paramilitary forces were deployed in guerrilla zones identified as primary targets; campaigns of "gradual constriction" or "clear, hold and consolidate" operations, were simultaneously and relentlessly intensified in various parts of the country, while smaller and medium-size operations were also continued in other guerrilla fronts. Enemy combing, surveillance and holding operations were intensified and accelerated in as many localities as could be covered for the purpose of identifying, taking by terror or by force the leaders and activists of the organs of political power and mass organizations, intimidating them to turn traitor or else killing them and, thus, destroy the mass base of the armed revolution, allow the AFP with its exceedingly far superior military strength to dictate the type and the pace of the battles, and finally corner and crush the units of the people's army.

In the cities, there was an intensification of counter-partisan operations, campaigns to suppress and intimidate legal progressive forces and, worst of all, the widespread and long-term surveillance against the leading organs and cadres of the Party. Long-term surveillance was undertaken to identify, track down and box in entire Party leading committees and their links and communication lines in the cities. The objective was to cut off the head of the Party.

Simultaneously, a campaign of psychological warfare was undertaken. It consisted of campaigns in the mass media and various forms of counterrevolutionary propaganda for deceiving the people, confusing and dividing the revolutionary forces, destroying the morale and determination of the Party, and encouraging defeatist, pacifist, reformist and parliamentary tendencies.

In the main, the enemy did not achieve his original target of destroying the armed revolution within three years nor even his repeatedly adjusted target of attaining “strategic control,” the latest version of which had been to cut the movement’s strength by half in 1988. Nevertheless, these campaigns wrought great damage and there was a heavily felt decrease not only in scope and quantity, but also in depth, firmness and quality, especially of the mass base and cadre corps of the Party.

From 1987 to 1990, there was a decline of 15 percent in Party membership, 16 percent in the total number of barrios covered, 28 percent in the total number of Red fighters, and 60 percent in the total organized masses registered in the countryside. The NPA rifle strength continued to increase, but there was a drop in the annual rate of increase to the 1976–1978 level. Large numbers of cadres at the levels of the province, front and district were lost due to arrest, death or loss of interest.

A large percentage of what had been our consolidated barrios was lost. There was a general slackening of the organized strength of the masses and mass activists even in the remaining barrios as a result also of a weakening of the leadership. Many among the total number of those barrios were either being recovered by us or sharply being contested by us and by the enemy forces stationed there.

We either lost hold or experienced a drastic narrowing of our mass bases in the plains, alongside highways and seashores, and around town centers (*poblaciones*). These parts of our mass base were of relatively denser population, important sources of cadres and activists with relatively higher education, important for maintaining supply and communication lines, and staging areas for reaching and influencing the people in the town centers.

Within many of our guerrilla fronts. The enemy forces built a network of regular troop and CAFGU detachments either to drive away our units devoted to mass work or to put them under constant pressure and limit the areas for the NPA’s big formations to maneuver.

Oplan Lambat-Bitag succeeded to a certain extent. But even before the enemy could mount a big offensive, our own internal weaknesses such as our failure to sustain the work of consolidating and deepening our mass base, our negligence of ideological work as well as in developing Party cadres and committees in the localities, our own reduction of our political and military capability in the localities, our growing negligence of expansion work and our own error of forcing our mass base into a war situation whose intensity and level were beyond their capability—had already preceded the enemy's efforts to destroy us.

At the national level, there was a repeat of the basic pattern of the Mindanao experience: the formation of many companies and the premature raising of the level of war. Initially, the enemy was surprised, the tactical offensives were accelerated, and military gains were bigger than before. In the main, our areas and mass organizations continued to expand despite the increasingly serious overextension of our forces, the growing imbalances in the deployment of forces and tasks, and diminishing capability for military and mass work in the localities.

However, after two or three years, the enemy forces were able to adjust: at first, by further strengthening their defenses and, eventually, by concentrating bigger forces and launching massive counterattacks. It did not take long before the weakness of the foundation and the serious vulnerability of our mass base became thoroughly exposed. Our mass base and our local forces in big chunks of the guerilla fronts collapsed.

And the huge losses in our mass base areas aggravated the problems of our units in maneuvering, maintaining links and coordinating their efforts; and also in knowing and monitoring the movements of the enemy. Full-time armed units, especially the much smaller and weaker teams for mass work in the localities, became even more vulnerable to enemy attacks. The number of casualties in defensive battles and all the weapons recovered by the enemy rose, while the number of tactical offensives, especially victorious ones, fell. Other problems involving logistics and finance, accelerated loss of forces, declining number of new recruits, in supplies, in maintaining troop morale, etc., were also more intensely felt.

The rush to achieve an acceleration of the offensives and the growth of our forces through premature “regularization” and verticalization finally led to an increasingly serious loss of initiative, weakening of tactical offensives, and general decline.

The massive enemy attacks were not seriously and promptly confronted by the city-based central leadership which had preoccupied itself with issues in the urban movement. The regions and the guerrilla fronts where the enemy forces concentrated their attacks were overwhelmed by the size, intensity and duration of the enemy campaigns. In many guerrilla fronts, huge chunks of territory and mass base were lost without any serious fight and resistance because, first, the forces in the localities were extremely weak; second, guidance and support from the higher Party committees were lacking; and third, political support from the people in town centers and cities was not mobilized. However, in some places the Party and army organizations put up serious resistance but were nevertheless forced to leave because of the overwhelmingly large concentration of enemy forces and attacks.

At the height of the enemy's general offensive in 1988 and 1989, the formation of additional companies and one more battalion of the people's army continued, a bigger number of cadres, personnel and rifles were further concentrated in a few big formations, and more localities were deprived of arms and forces. The view emerged that it was necessary to continue the enlargement of the formations not only to sustain the intensification of the offensives but also to fight the bigger enemy military formation attacking our territories. So did the idea of proceeding with efforts to "upgrade" the army and only eventually "catch up" with efforts to build and strengthen the mass base and the Party.

Since the end of 1988, the central leadership has seen more clearly and comprehensively the extent and depth of problems confronting the movement in the countryside and the armed struggle. These problems were identified as the narrowing and weakening of the mass base and the work in the localities and the imbalances in the overall deployment of our forces and efforts proceeding from the premature verticalization of the army and raising of the level of the war.

The 1989 Politburo meeting indicated that to solve the problems, it was necessary to totally change the priorities, the entire balance and deployment of forces and efforts, and the system of planning and leadership of leading Party committees. A decision was taken to stop the verticalization of the army and emphasize attention on and strengthen the horizontal forces. While maintaining the appropriate number of companies at the level of region and big fronts, higher priority was given to strengthening the forces

engaged in mass work and deploying the forces for extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare. It was clarified that all guerrilla units, including the companies, must actively participate in mass work—in expansion, recovery and consolidation aside from fighting and production work.

In the 20th anniversary statement of the Party in 1988, the basic principles of the revolution were again clarified, and the following were given emphasis:

- (a) Comprehensive establishment of the political, military, economic and cultural requirements for advancing towards a more developed level of warfare and total victory.
- (b) Guerilla warfare that persistently expands and consolidates the organized participation and support of the people.
- (c) Limitations on the building of bigger formations by strictly basing these on the extent and depth of the guerilla forces, strength of the mass base, capability of Party cadres and leadership, and adequacy of reserves and logistics.

The statement emphasized the requirements for advancing the people's war, but at the same time pointed to the possibility of victory within 10 years premised on the “militant all-sided participation and support of the broad masses of the people” and the fulfillment of all political, economic and cultural requirements for victory. That projection was based on the data of 1987 and early 1988, which failed to make an accounting of the gravity of the weaknesses and the imbalances in the deployment of forces and efforts, which were further revealed in the succeeding months.

The 1989 and 1990 Party anniversary statements more clearly identified and criticized the errors of premature “regularization” and verticalization, and even more clearly emphasized the need for extensive and intensive guerilla warfare and building the mass base in the countryside. But internal contradictions over this issue intensified. The NPA General Command and a handful of its leading cadres went against the criticism and peddled their own views through communication with the regions.

In 1990 the Politburo formally took a decision to put a stop to the implementation of the SCO program and clarified that at the advanced substage of the strategic defensive, the overall stress would be on extensive and intensive guerilla warfare and on the mass movement while at the same time maintaining and developing some elements of regular mobile warfare.

However, the Politburo also approved the results, without discussing the particular contents, of the Command Conference in 1989, which contrary to the Politburo decisions pushed for continued and further verticalization and “regularization.” Such contradictory signals from the central leadership indicated a lack of firm unity on and understanding of the issue. This hindered a more vigorous and more widespread impulse for rectification in the regions.

Since 1989 adjustments and the practice of putting more emphasis on mass work, the mass base and the legalities have become widespread in the regions. Conferences on mass work at the regional and interregional levels were held and a bigger part of our forces, including the companies, were redeployed to attend to mass work, expansion and recovery.

In 1990 and 1991 the accelerated narrowing of many guerrilla fronts was stopped and we started to be able to recover in these areas because the leading committees gave emphasis to local work, strengthened the forces deployed there, and mobilized the companies for mass work. These positive currents were further encouraged by the national conference on the political work of the army.

In areas where the enemy continued to concentrate, the combination of widespread small-scale attritive and annihilative actions, a few concentrated and large-scale thrusts, mass protests and actions, and various forms of legal and illegal organizations were used in resisting the enemy and in making him pay a high price.

However, there was widespread and insistent demand among leading committees and cadres in the regions for a comprehensive summing up of our experiences and a clarification of the direction and the principles for advancing the war in accordance with revolutionary theory and principles, lessons from history and, above all, lessons from their own rich experience. Although there was extensive unity on the changes made by the Politburo in 1990, the struggle with regard to the analysis and judgment of past practice continued, especially with regard to the program of “regularization.” There were still differences over the understanding of the lessons to be learned, and this meant that a lot of effort still had to be exerted in uniting not only on the level of practice, but also on the level of theory and principles of the strategy and tactics.

The insurrectionist wind abated relatively in 1988 and 1989 when rumors about coup attempts diminished, the anti-infiltration hysteria

directly affected the Manila-Rizal-based Party organs and open mass campaigns could not advance.

But in 1990, following the attempted coup of December 1989, there was a renewed gust of insurrectionist illusions and attempts on the part of some organs and leading cadres, when apprehensions among the ranks of reactionaries were further fueled by the crisis in the balance of payments, the devastation caused by the earthquake and greater disorder threatened by the impending Gulf war. There was a flood of insurrectionist speculations, but much worse than this were the organizational maneuvers led by one member of the Politburo to force through the implementation of an insurrectionist plan.

The “national conference on mass campaigns” held in April 1990, without consultations with the Executive Committee or the Politburo, united on the view that the situation was “leading to a renewed big confrontation.” Three crisis points were identified the issue of the military bases (“society is being polarized on a national issue”), the issue of land and agrarian revolution (“the battle line has been drawn” on this issue) and the intense economic crisis (“an explosion will also be created by the intense economic crisis”). It was assumed that each of these points would be a ground for “major tactical battles that must be won by the revolutionary forces” and that the interaction or conjuncture of all three points would produce a big explosion.

Plans based on dreams of an uprising surpassing the EDSA-type—“a people’s uprising, far more extensive and of deeper strategic significance for the revolution”—were formulated and implemented. It was supposed that in the anticipated uprising, the people could benefit in accordance with “the strength wielded by the revolutionary forces,” or even more if we could correctly “ally ourselves with other progressive forces and even with some conservative or reactionary factions that would subscribe to some major interests of the people.”

Thus, we were supposed to “prepare and lead the possible explosion of an insurrection in the cities and the wide plains.” The call was made to use “the entire strength and the maximum combination of the mass movement, the united front, military action and solidarity work abroad. To make the situation explode, the following tasks were set:

- (a) Expansion and intensification of the anti-US bases struggle and, once the treaty had been brought to the Senate, intensification of the struggles up to political strikes and people’s strikes. During the negotia-

tions, “confrontational and assertive actions like barricades” were to be pushed. Also to be pushed were “sabotage actions inside parliament until a parliamentary crisis is reached.”

- (b) “Widespread, continuous and aggressive launching of direct revolutionary actions by the peasant masses,” whose “principal line and direction... are the direct revolutionary assertion by the peasants of their right to own and control the land and other instruments of production.”
- (c) Building the “broadest anti-imperialist and democratic front (AIDF) and proper positioning of the NDF and the revolutionary alternative at its center.”
- (d) “Widespread campaign to win the hearts and minds of the soldiers and low-ranking officials of the reactionary army.”
- (e) “More active efforts to hasten the disintegration of the reactionary camp.”

[Such an opposing line was drafted and implemented without the knowledge of the Executive Committee and the majority of the Politburo members. The document resulting from the “conference on mass campaigns” which covered even other principal lines of work and attempted to sabotage the general flow of the struggle in the countryside and the cities was distributed to different organs and areas. But this reached the Executive Committee only in February 1991 after many months of persistent demand for a report from the instigator of the “conference” and, even then, the copy that reached the Executive Committee did not come from him.]

The “conference” contradicted the 1990 analysis of the Politburo that the eruption of an uprising was a mere possibility and if ever it would occur, the highest form that it could take, based on the existing strategic balance of forces, would be that of the EDSA uprising. In other words, it would be an uprising brought about by the conjuncture of the violent attacks among the reactionaries and the widespread struggle of the people and would bring about a government still controlled by the reactionaries with but minor participation of some elements of the legal revolutionary movement.

The “politico-military struggle advanced by the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee came within the general framework of that 1990 plan. Essentially, it meant the direct combination of partisan operations with mass struggles, especially with general “paralyzing actions.” Partisan warfare was

assumed to hasten “revolutionary organizing” of the people in the cities, “fill in” the deficiencies of the political factors for bunching people’s strikes, and “directly prepare” the broad masses for insurrection.

With regard to the peasant movement, the Peasant Movement Secretariat promoted the shift of general emphasis to preparing for insurrection and, accordingly, to open and legal struggle in the plains, intensification of open peasant struggles highlighted by “direct revolutionary actions” (like land occupation and confiscation of grains, fertilizers, etc.), “combining military factors with open mass struggles” and “making the armed struggle serve the mass movement and the preparation for insurrection.” The target was peasant uprisings to spark or to occur simultaneously with the eruption of the people’s general uprising.

In Central Luzon, the regional leadership subordinated all other efforts to the wish for an insurrection. In Bulacan, instead of organizing groups or committees and peasant associations, insurrectionary forces were formed as forces for anticipating the “opportune moment.” The Regional Committee plenum in early 1991 approved the “play to win, victory in one year” program through insurrection.

In accordance with the insurrectionist plan, preparations for the building of an anti-imperialist and democratic front (AIDF) were undertaken. Its intention was to develop the AIDF as a broad coalition to serve as the political center and unified command for the anticipated uprising. This was supposed to be of extreme importance not only for positioning at the center of the political struggle, but also for maximizing the gains to be derived by the people from the uprising. This explains why so much emphasis was given to coalition tactics, why the tendency to kowtow to the middle forces’ position and consciousness is very strong, why there is so much predisposition to encourage the spontaneous pacifism of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and why the tendency to be overwhelmed by the schemes of the bourgeois mass media is also very strong.

The AIDF was not only intended to be an alliance of a wide array of legal democratic forces and oppositionists united by a minimum common program. The NDF was to directly link, join and put itself within the framework of the program and activities of that front. That was why in 1990, a number of leading cadres used their positions in the NDF to draw up and finalize the “Proposal for a People’s Agenda” laid down by a legal meeting of a wide array of legal progressive, democratic and opposition forces. The proposal

was supposed to constitute the NDF's medium-term program. It downgraded the stand and status of the NDF to that of a legal opposition, attempted to subordinate the NDF to the processes and rules of the reactionary government and, worst of all, made a public promise binding the Party, the people's army and the entire movement to whatever common program—no matter how much more—would be approved by the legal progressive, democratic and opposition forces. There is nothing wrong for legal progressive forces to enter a broad alliance on the basis of a common minimum program or medium term program. But to attempt or to seek to confine or subordinate the NDF to such a front is to distort the NDF's status and stand and to derail the revolutionary forces.

In the rush to form the AIDF and position the NDF at its center, the holding of the first NDF congress was also rushed and in the process even the Party's central leadership and its role in the process of finalizing the documents and making arrangements for the congress were disregarded.

Subsequently, the NDF was pushed to embark on a campaign for multilateral peace negotiations among the NDF, GRP, MNLF-BMA, RAM-YOU, various legal opposition groups, businessmen, etc. The newly formed NDF units were maneuvered into a scheme of confining the peace process within the tactical plans of building the AIDF, contrary to the line of a just, lasting and liberating peace, and contrary to the policy of bilateral negotiations between the NDF and the GRP abroad.

The "politico-military struggle" was put to a test in the failed "people's strike" in October 1990. Because of the obsession with achieving a "general paralyzation," there was the attempt to force such a "paralyzation" through armed city partisan operations. As a result, a struggle on a very popular issue which initially enjoyed very wide support from the people became a target of condemnation and put the legal progressive forces into the danger of violent enemy repression. Because of overreaching, a very favorable opportunity to propel the mass actions towards a powerful current of protests and to advance considerably and firmly was wasted.

The obsession with "people's strikes" and "general paralyzations" that strain the mass movement is dangerous for the urban struggle. The danger is even greater if armed city partisan operations are combined with it because there is the increased temptation to force the struggle, rush to confrontations beyond the capacity of the masses, and recklessly disregard the level of con-

sciousness and practice of the masses and the allies. Worse, the struggle in the cities prematurely assumes a military character and the legal organizations are made vulnerable to violent counteractions by the police and military.

But even if partisan operations were not combined with general strikes and people's strikes, such strikes, if not carefully handled, have the potential of exhausting our forces and drawing them towards premature offensives. These are higher forms of struggles with distinct political characteristics. Every general strike should be carefully planned based on the existing general political situation, relations of forces and general status and aims of the movement. Otherwise, the movement would be drawn prematurely into large encounters, our forces and the mass movement exhausted, and we would be isolated from the masses.

By itself and unattended by premature partisan actions, the revolutionary movement, based on its organized strength among the workers and other segments of the populations, does not yet have the capacity to launch general paralyzing actions in Manila-Rizal. In some victorious people's strikes and general workers' strikes that were staged in Manila-Rizal, the strength of the progressive forces had been further augmented by the participation of a wide range of organized forces on issues that were especially hot and attracted wide spontaneous participation or sympathy from the people. Nonetheless, the longest ever achieved had been two or three days.

However, because of insurrectionist illusions and the tendency to excessively bet on the spontaneous participation of the masses, there was the strong tendency to frequently and suddenly raise calls for general paralyzations and to recklessly launch these actions. These calls were made despite the almost complete cessation of expansion among the ranks of the workers since 1988, the inability of the youth and student movement to recover from its decline since 1984, and the narrow work in the urban poor communities that had been adversely affected by sweeps of anti-partisan operations conducted by the police in 1987 and 1988.

In July 1991 a broad front was again achieved against the oil price hike. Even the *Iglesia ni Kristo* took a posture of joining the struggle and rumors were rife about a new coup d'état. Again, there was an overflowing urge to rush into a gigantic confrontation with the enemy and a people's strike was pushed. Contrary to what was wished for, the broad front became divided, the support gained for the people's strike was narrow. This allowed the

US-Aquino regime to gain the advantage and to easily maneuver to force its wishes on the people.

Paralyzation was set as the target and was given the highest priority instead of the more important task of further cementing the links among various forces that were mobilized by the issue, strengthening their commitment to fight, gradually raising the level of their consciousness and action, and taking advantage of the opportunity to further expand and accelerate solid and comprehensive organizing among the masses. By overreaching, another excellent opportunity for achieving significant and solid political and organizational gains was once again lost.

Despite the failure and the problems spawned by the 1990 plans, the same Politburo member responsible for them continued to spread his insurrectionist line and illusions. After the Senate's rejection of the military bases treaty in 1991, he peddled the view that a trend to be "more autonomous" had developed within the ranks of the local reactionaries and, supposedly as a result of it, "the strategy of encircling the cities had further been rendered ineffective." Supposedly, "the strategy of war and uprisings aiming for the best combination of political and military struggles" and with the option of shifting to an insurrectionary strategy was more appropriate.

Towards the end of 1990 and in 1991, the Manila-Rizal Party organization undertook extra efforts to increase the number of mass activists and expand the Party membership. There were also efforts to expand mass work at the basic level.

But as a result of putting too much weight on "stretching the limits of legality" and over-anticipating an explosion that would lead to an insurrectionary situation, the Manila-Rizal Party Executive Committee (MREC) pushed a proposal for an upsurge in the first quarter of 1992. They pushed their plans even as these were clearly contrary to the decisions and directives of the Executive Committee and despite the objections of other Party organs that had to do with the campaigns and mass struggles at the national level.

The targets to be achieved from accelerated and prolonged street actions were overblown, given the still limited organized forces. Worse, there was the insistence on an upsurge characterized by "open revolutionary actions." In the attempt to achieve these, the MREC usurped authority for themselves and bypassed other concerned Party organs and even the legal structures,

changed the orientation of one legal alliance within their area and geared it for “open revolutionary action.”

The MREC’s insistence on their own type of upsurge did not only limit mass participation in the mobilizations and gain a broad range of condemnation from various sectors. It also created a lot of confusion and disruption within the organization, especially because the existing relations and processes of the Party were abused to the point of causing disruptions not only within the Party but also within the legal movement.

In 1991 the Executive Committee came up with the analysis that there was a revolutionary flow in the political situation and called for offensives in the form of big demonstrations in the cities and intensified tactical offensives in the countryside. The use of the term revolutionary flow became controversial because of the differing interpretations of its context and the correctness of its application to the people’s war in the Philippines. Moreover, there were those who twisted it according to their own insurrectionist point of view. What the Executive Committee had emphasized was the exceedingly favorable situation for broadly arousing, mobilizing and organizing the people and for further advancing the people’s war.

Nevertheless, the Politburo meeting of 1991 approved the call to launch offensives in the form of big demonstrations in the cities and tactical offensives within our capability in the countryside. It affirmed the analysis that there were conditions for the creation of a new upsurge of mass struggles. It also approved the tactical slogan calling for the overthrow of the US-Aquino regime.

The document on the world situation and our international line issued by the Executive Committee in 1988 was reviewed and adopted by the Politburo in 1989. The document upholds the Leninist line of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. At the same time, it accepts at face value Gorbachev’s claim that perestroika and glasnost were being undertaken to revitalize socialism.

In 1990, following the collapse of parties and governments in Eastern Europe, there was a debate during the Politburo meeting whether the events constitute a “revitalization” or a failure of socialism. The draft for the Party’s 21st anniversary statement with an analysis of the event was discussed and a decision was taken to deepen the study of the theoretical issues involved and to know the history and circumstances of the Eastern European countries.

Nonetheless, it was emphasized in the meeting that the Leninist line should be used in analyzing the events and in formulating the stand of the Party.

But due to the longstanding neglect of theoretical study and the earlier loosening of the grip on the line against modern revisionism, some elements in the Party had become very vulnerable to the flood of anticommunist and anti-Leninist propaganda and gloating of the bourgeoisie. There were profuse praises for Gorbachev, ahistorical and relentless attacks against Stalin, and strong currents of populism, liberalism, reformism and social-democracy.

In 1990 *Ang Bayan* praised the 28th CPSU Congress, despite its decision and stand to openly call for the dismantling of socialism, the conversion of the CPSU into a social democratic party, and the rejection of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. The pages of *Ang Bayan* echoed the Gorbachevite line that the collapse of revisionist parties in Eastern Europe meant the revitalization of socialism.

Due to the depth of the disorientation over the line against modern revisionism and the seriousness of the skepticism about Marxism Leninism, *Ang Bayan* continued to praise Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika even after the attempted coup d'état on August 1991, the victory of Yeltsin's countercoup, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the existence, beyond any doubt, of a bourgeois dictatorship in Eastern Europe and in countries formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. The AB editor's outpourings of ecstasy over these events, which according to him was the "strong march of democracy and civil society in the world," continued.

Since 1988 there had been repeated serious damage inflicted on city-based leading organs and cadres of the Parts and army, especially in Manila-Rizal. More than a hundred national and regional level cadres, including a big bulk of CC members, were arrested by the enemy, mostly in the cities. The Visayas Commission, the NPA General Command, the Central Luzon Committee, the National United Front Commission, the National Organization Commission, the Mindanao Commission and the Executive Committee itself, including the units attached to them, were repeatedly and seriously hit in Metro Manila and other cities by raids conducted by enemy intelligence units. These raids resulted in repeated seizures of diskettes and documents containing sensitive information about the Parts and its work.

The existence of a grave security problem besetting the urban-based central and other organs was clear. But the analysis of the circumstances and

causes of every arrest was utterly particularistic. Lessons drawn remained at the level of individual mistakes, while serious basic violations of the rules of underground movement and security, such as the urban basing of the central organs and of leading cadres identified or hunted by the enemy; and wanted cadres meeting with their relatives, allies and legal forces in the cities were ignored or dismissed.

At the 1990 Politburo meeting, the widespread and persistent enemy surveillance operations and our security problems were extensively studied from the viewpoint of comprehensively reorganizing and strengthening the underground movement and of ensuring long-term security for the basing and operation of the central and other leading organs. The meeting adopted, among others, the policy of countryside basing for the central leadership, the meeting organs and the territorial commissions that had based in Manila-Rizal. A decision was taken to redeploy cadres identified and hunted by the enemy. The system of guiding and coordinating mass campaigns was also changed.

But despite the policies that were firmed up and implemented by the Politburo, the repeated arrests of leading Party cadres in the cities continued. Many leading units and cadres persisted in basing themselves in the urban centers until they were captured by the enemy. Many highly wanted cadres persisted in basing themselves and moving around in the cities in pursuit of special projects, in anticipation of “extraordinary opportunities,” in their one-sided emphasis on the speed and facility of communication in the cities, in their reluctance to change old habits, in avoidance of the difficulties of life in the countryside, etc. Even members of the Politburo and the Central Committee violated security rules. The decision to change the system of guidance and coordination in the mass campaigns was disregarded in the pursuit in 1990 of an explosion in the situation.

The loss of cadres increased not only because of enemy arrests. Scores of cadres at the national and regional levels lost interest or were killed. Hundreds of cadres at the district and section levels were arrested, killed or lost interest. The disorientation over the line, the repeated errors, the repeated arrests of leading cadres, and the long-standing neglect of ideological work are some of the principal reasons for the loss of courage and interest among the rank and file.

In 1988 the impact of intense enemy attacks was aggravated by the destruction wrought by the anti-infiltration hysteria—especially among cadres at the

district and section levels—in Southern Tagalog, Manila-Rizal, some national organs and some other regions. The Politburo meeting's acceptance in 1988 of what were then the Mindanao Commission's conclusion that there had indeed been a widespread enemy infiltration network frustrated by the Ahos Campaign fueled renewed fears of infiltration in other areas and organs.

In Southern Tagalog, the anti-infiltration campaign was propelled by the wish to discover the cause of the capture and "salvaging" of many members of the Southern Tagalog Regional Committee in 1977; the arrests of suspected infiltrators had started even before the Politburo warning was received.

In Manila-Rizal, the arrests of suspected infiltrators began after an investigation of the enemy's arrest and "salvaging" of an ABB (urban partisan) cadre. The National Organization Commission implemented a 1987 decision to arrest a cadre who had been implicated as a result of investigations made during Ahos Campaign and proceeded to investigate other suspects. The United Front Commission and General Command were adversely affected by the results of the arrests and interrogations undertaken by the Manila-Rizal Party Committee.

After some months and the first wave of arrests, the Executive Committee directly involved itself in assessing the "whole design of the enemy infiltration" by putting together patches of information drawn from the interrogations, which had not been carefully analyzed and examined. To prevent the campaign from getting out of hand, a lot of rules on deciding and undertaking the arrest, interrogation and investigation were drawn up. The system of communication and coordination among concerned Party organs was also firmed up. All these were made within the framework of what was believed to have been a wide enemy infiltration network and a gradually creeping sense of panic. Selected territorial cadres were alerted about what had been "discovered" as an infiltration network

The Executive Committee came to its senses when it entered Southern Tagalog in November 1988 and directly witnessed the gross errors in the judgment, interrogation and treatment of those arrested. It immediately ordered a stop to the entire campaign and led the review of the cases, the summing up of the event and the formulation of clear guidelines on the basis of the bitter experience.

Along with its self-criticism, the Executive Committee also immediately ordered a stop to the campaign in Manila-Rizal, directly reviewed the key cases and set the steps for a continuation of the review and for rectification.

However, before these campaigns could be halted, these had already created serious damage and disorder in the organization and in our relations with the masses and allies in some areas and sectors.

In the Politburo meeting of 1989, the two anti-infiltration campaigns were reviewed. The serious error was traced to panic, a siege mentality, grave subjectivism and unbridled suspicion, violation of the rights of the suspects, wrong views and methods of investigation and prosecution, and carelessness in the investigation and weighing of facts and circumstances. A clearer and stricter set of rules on investigation and prosecution of suspected infiltrators was adopted.

In the rectification, the task to review all anti-infiltration campaigns and the correction of past wrong judgments and excesses was agreed upon. Also agreed upon were the need to review the general conduct of investigation, prosecution and judgment of informers and criminals and the continued refinement of the guide and rules for the revolutionary system of justice. The importance of widespread education among the ranks of cadres and members regarding the principles of humane treatment of captives, respect for the rights of individuals and the revolutionary system of justice was emphasized.

Since 1989, the extent of the disorientation and the deviation from the basic principles, line and strategy; the weakening of the central leadership and the unity of the Party; and the decline in the ideological, political and organizational level of the vanguard Party came to be more clearly discerned.

For a long time many basic tasks and rules in establishing the Party have been neglected, the problems have accumulated and worsened, and the determination and vigilance of Party cadres and members have slackened.

The wanton disregard for theory and the basic principles had been allowed to spread and worsen. Among the leading cadres themselves, there are those who do not have a clear understanding of the Party's basic principles. In 1991 the AB editor presented to the Politburo meeting a view that totally rejects Marxism-Leninism. Even before this, the Party's central publication had published the same view on its pages although with some flimsy camouflage.

The peddling of all sorts of denunciations of the Party's line and strategy and of propositions to dismantle these, without any solid footing from an earnest study of the theory, history, revolutionary practice and the concrete conditions, became commonplace. The line and strategy of the Party was allowed to become the target of all kinds of irresponsible speculation.

Worst of all, views deviating from the line of protracted people's war exercised a strong influence on the very policies and program of the Party, a matter that spawned worsening problems such as the loss of initiative, repeated miscalculations, overreaching, exhaustion of the forces and political support for the revolution, and serious setbacks.

The weaknesses and shortcomings in Party building were clearly manifested even organizationally. The central leadership has been weakened by the repeated arrests of leading cadres based in the cities. When the central organs were hit by grave security problems, transferred to the countryside and passed through a difficult process of readjusting their entire system of basing and linking with the different parts of the organization, a handful of elements took advantage of this to undertake various ultra-democratic actions; to insist on putting into practice their views and line opposed to the official line, policies and decisions of Party; and to maneuver and spread intrigues against the central leadership in a bid to reject and block criticisms and the rectification started by it.

In 1990, the Politburo decided to concentrate itself continuously so as to be able to directly attend to the task of deciding on important issues. The continued existence of the Executive Committee did not become an issue; there were plans and structures that were created and directly assigned to the Executive Committee.

But a Politburo member misrepresented that Politburo decision as a decision to dissolve the Executive Committee and at the same time he usurped the authority to make decisions regarding big projects and strategic and tactical issues, including the 1990 insurrectionist plan and the change of AB's orientation. While strongly attacking the supposed over-centralism of the Executive Committee, he made himself the center of the leadership and proceeded all by himself to initiate and implement major policy changes and big political projects by keeping the central leadership ignorant of them and through sheer lies and maneuvers.

The ultra-democratic acts that had worsened in 1986 and 1987 went on, became even more widespread and since 1990 have become even more aggressive. When sharper and more direct criticisms of the gross errors and deviations were made, the reaction of some of those who were responsible for these became even more vehement: they refused to accept criticism, their gossips and intrigues became more malicious, and their maneuvers to insist upon their deviations and oppose the rectification became more adamant.

The longstanding and serious neglect and shortcomings in Party building has reached the point of undermining even the integrity of the Party's organization, leadership and processes.

Nevertheless, even with the serious damage and internal problems, the Party firmly has upheld the national democratic struggle. It has relentlessly struggled to expose, denounce, isolate and weaken US imperialism and the local reactionaries.

The revolutionary movement remains outstandingly the strongest and firmest force fighting for the rights of the working masses and for national liberation. On major issues and political battles, like the struggle against the military bases, Party-ed forces were the principal force upholding the progressive position and the people's interest.

The identification and criticism of our major errors and deviations had already started in 1989. In most of the regions, the clarifications and changes in the policies and program were readily accepted. Actually, rectification had begun by then.

But there is still the need to thoroughly identify, criticize and repudiate the errors and deviations. Their ideological, political and organizational roots should be identified so that we can more firmly and strongly return to the correct line of advance. The outstanding issues and problems should be resolved at the level of theory and principles so that there can be a strong ideological, political and organizational consolidation of the Party.

As long as we persevere in upholding the Party's basic principles and in applying these on our concrete practice, we shall definitely overcome our weaknesses and problems and the Party and revolution can be brought back on the path of correct, firm and steady advance.

Written by:

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Finalized by:

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

November 1992

Decision on the Rectification Movement⁶

1. In summing up more than a decade of experience, the 10th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines recognized the unprecedented expansion and consolidation of the revolutionary movement and the historic victories of the national democratic revolution. However, it also recognized major ideological, political and organizational deviations and errors with regard to the basic principles of the Party. And as a result of these, the advance of the revolution could not be sustained; problems such as imbalances in development, weaknesses in deployment, and shortcomings of our revolutionary forces and work arose, became aggravated and inflicted grave losses to the revolutionary movement in terms of mass base and cadres, especially during the last three years of the last decade. [Refer to the summing up document.]

Generally, the efforts of the central leadership to identify, criticize and correct the deviations and errors since 1989 have been energetically welcomed and supported by the regional Party organizations. In spite of this, however, and despite the scale, enormity and gravity of the deviations, errors and disorientation that have adversely affected the main spheres of work and the entire strategic and tactical leadership of the revolution, there are those who persist in their deviations and errors as well as those who obstruct criticism and rectification. The struggle between two lines within the Party has become clear and has intensified.

Under this prevailing situation, the plenum of the Central Committee has decided to undertake a comprehensive and thoroughgoing rectification movement in order to fully identify and repudiate the deviations and errors, firmly hold on to and even surpass past achievements, and put the revolution on the firm and correct path in order to advance. The principal objectives of this rectification movement are to firm up the stand of all the cadres, members and units of the Party on the basic principles and the entire strategic and tactical line of the Communist Party of the Philippines (ML); identify, evaluate and rectify the errors and weaknesses; and further heighten the level of unity of the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

The rectification movement is a matter of life and death for the Party and the revolution, every honest Communist and Party member should resolutely pursue it. If the deviations and errors within the Party are not thoroughly

⁶ Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee Communist Party of the Philippines. Translated from original in Tagalog.

readied and repudiated but are instead allowed to wreak further havoc, confusion and disorientation, it would not take long before the Party and the revolutionary movement would collapse.

Up to the present, the Party still has a large armed and mass strength. The movement is extensive and has a certain degree of strength and spread all over the archipelago. The overall strength of the Party, the people's army and the mass movement in the countryside and in the cities now is more or less at the same level as that of 1983 or 1984. With the correction of the deviations and errors, we will gain the capability to unleash powerful offensives under the excellent objective conditions obtaining and to advance the revolution more comprehensively, more resolutely and more consistently.

2. The methods for carrying out the rectification movement are the following:

- (a) Criticism and self-criticism within the general framework of the summing up conducted by the Central Committee and the rectification documents drawn up by the central organs and within the more specific framework of summing-up and rectification conducted by particular organs or units.
- (b) Assessment and summing up of work for the purpose of clearly identifying the ideological, political and organizational achievements of the Party as well as the problems that the Party as a whole and the particular organs and units must solve; and
- (c) Study of the basic, intermediate and advanced courses, giving priority to study materials decided by the central leadership and according to the given level of consciousness of the particular Party unit or member at the time.

3. As far as the general membership of the Party is concerned, the aforesaid methods would suffice in the conduct of the rectification movement. The basic assumption of the Party and the rectification movement is that, except for a handful, all Party members are good. The handful who are excluded are those who no longer agree or have never agreed with the basic principles of the Party, who refuse to correct their errors and weaknesses and who oppose the rectification movement.

4. In undertaking the process of criticism and self-criticism. It is our assumption that the patient can be cured of the illness. This method has

long been our practice and is familiar to all Party organs, units and members. What is distinct now is the particular attention to the major errors and weaknesses within the Party and the determination to identify, evaluate and rectify them.

Errors and weaknesses must be weighed according to their seriousness and scope. Collective and personal responsibility must be analyzed and determined. The central leadership has taken the lead in undertaking criticism and self-criticism as may be seen in the summing up and other rectification documents.

In practically all cases, criticism and self-criticism can be accomplished and confined within particular organs and units. It suffices for an organ, unit or individual to accept responsibility for errors and weaknesses and to resolutely take concrete steps in order to rectify them. The naming of any organ, unit or individual for criticism beyond a certain jurisdiction is subject to the approval of a higher organ. Meetings of criticism that go beyond the proper jurisdiction of any unit or organ are prohibited.

The rectification movement is an inner-party criticism/self-criticism and study movement guided by the spirit of drawing lessons from our practical experience and with the objective of further strengthening unity through the rectification and repudiation of deviations and errors. It is against the spirit of the rectification movement to relentlessly cast criticisms and accusations that are baseless and beyond the actual gravity of the error, and likewise to foment unnecessary debates and controversies.

5. For the ease of mind of all Party members who are of good standing and are desirous of strengthening themselves and the entire Party, the rectification movement makes a strict distinction between criticism/self-criticism and disciplinary action.

These differentiations have to be made in order to stress the correct methods of rectification and to frustrate the attempts of certain malicious elements who wish to misrepresent, discredit and sabotage the rectification movement.

A disciplinary action is imposed only when a serious violation of an ideological, political and/or organizational nature has been committed or continues to be committed against the Party's rules of discipline. The Party Constitution stipulates the basic principles of the Party and the rights and duties of Party members which must not be violated as well as the penalties that correspond to violations. The rectification movement does not offer any new procedure with regard to the process of disciplinary action within the Party.

The enforcement of a disciplinary action is well within the jurisdiction of any organ or unit; however, suspension and expulsion are automatically subject to approval by a higher organ.

6. The rectification movement should be firmly under the control of the Party leading organs and within the existing structures of the Party. Otherwise, factionalism and anarchy would occur to destroy both Party discipline and inner-Party democracy.

Democratic centralism is the basic organizational principle of the Party and there must be strict adherence to this principle in the rectification movement. Whoever misrepresents and attacks this principle as authoritarianism is in need of further education or, if not, is no longer desirous of remaining in the Party.

No Party member is permitted to do any of the following things:

- (a) Write articles in order to attack the basic principles of the Party, the rectification movement and the central leading organs of the Party and distribute these articles outside of the proper Party structure as well as outside the Party;
- (b) Without proper authorization, distribute internal Party documents or articles about internal Party matters to Party units or members that are not concerned and, worse, to elements outside the Party;
- (c) Hold meetings without proper authorization and outside of the appropriate organs and units of those in attendance, and arbitrarily include or exclude Party members and entire organs from these meetings in order to attack the line of the Party, the central leadership of the Party or anyone of its members.
- (d) Propagate in any form or manner the idea that the Party's basic organizational principle of democratic centralism should be replaced by liberalism or ultra-democracy and the view that individuals can remain in the Party even while they reject or negate the Party's basic principles (and even while they campaign inside and outside the Party for the rejection of these principles);
- (e) Incite others through intrigues, factional meetings and unauthorized publications to make any organ of the Party the target of contempt or hostility;

- (f) Call on members of the Party to act outside and in contravention of the established structures and processes of the Party and to form new committees or meetings outside of these structures in order to discuss internal Party matters or to campaign against the line and the leadership of the Party; and
- (g) Propagate or use as authority articles, statements or opinions that have been clearly criticized and repudiated by the Party.

The Party prohibits the foregoing violations of discipline. It cannot allow persons or groups to have their way in viciously violating the most elementary requirements of inner-Party democracy even as they keep on harping on democracy.

7. All the foregoing points (1-6) in this decision are in accordance with the CPP Constitution and with the correct conduct of the rectification movement.

On the International Relations of the Communist Party of the Philippines

*An Interview with Comrade Armando Liwanag,
Chairman of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Philippines*

Last June 30, 1987, the editor-in-chief of *Ang Bayan* interviewed Comrade Armando Liwanag, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, on the international relations of the Party.

Hereunder is the full text of the interview.

Ang Bayan: The readers of *Ang Bayan* and the people in general would like to be updated in a comprehensive way on the position of the Communist Party of the Philippines regarding international relations. Are you willing to answer a long list of questions?

AL: Yes, certainly.

Ang Bayan: The growth in strength of the CPP and the Philippine revolutionary movement has been substantial since 1968. How do you account for this? What is the impact of universal theory and international relations?

AL: The principal and most decisive thing is that, under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, the CPP has independently made a correct critique of the history and circumstances of the Filipino people as well as of the old merger party of the Communist and Socialist Parties; repudiated the long line of Lavaite errors; and formulated the program of national democratic revolution for the self-reliant struggle of the Filipino people against US imperialism and the local exploiting classes.

By and large, the CPP has provided the correct leadership. And the broad masses of the people, especially the workers and peasants, have become aroused, organized and mobilized to fight for their own national and social liberation. The people rally to the leadership of the Party, wage revolutionary armed struggle and blend their national and democratic interests through the national united front.

The victories of the Philippine revolution under CPP leadership have been achieved through hard struggle and sacrifices, including the martyrdom, torture, incarceration and disappearances of so many revolutionaries and ordinary people.

Universal theory becomes a lifeless dogma if not applied correctly on the concrete conditions of the Philippines. Basic principles and lessons learned from experiences abroad are useless without a concrete analysis of concrete conditions in the country. The objective and subjective factors in the Philippines are principal to whatever impact international relations have in the

making of the Filipino people's revolution. This is not to say, however, that major developments in the world situation and the international communist movement are not important and have no significant implications and effects on the revolutionary process in the Philippines.

The CPP was reestablished in 1968 mainly and essentially because of the oppressive and exploitative conditions and revolutionary needs of the Filipino people even as we took positions in the ideological debates of the sixties. The Party has garnered victories because it has made the correct critique of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal Philippine society and the correct program of national democratic revolution, and has struck deep roots among the people and relied on them in fighting for their own rights and interests.

Ang Bayan: What is the significance of the Philippine revolutionary struggle in the world context? How do you relate the Philippine revolutionary struggle with the revolutionary and progressive struggles of other peoples?

AL: The Philippine struggle is of major world significance because it has become one of the strongest national liberation movements and because it strikes at US imperialism where it hurts not only in regional but also in global terms.

The Philippines has been for a long time the principal base of US imperialist hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The US has its largest economic interests and military bases in the country. It has used the Philippines to launch aggression, as in the Korean, Vietnam and other wars; and to cast its influence in the entire region.

The US stakes in the Philippines are a vital part of the US global network. US transnational firms here are geared to exploit the largest region in the world. And the US military bases, including communications centers, are a major link in the encirclement of socialist countries and in the US nuclear strategy.

The victory of the Filipino people in the national democratic revolution will mean a major defeat for US imperialism in the Asia-Pacific region and in the whole world. It will cause a major shift in the balance of strength between the forces of imperialism and socialism in favor of the latter.

The Philippine revolutionary struggle is part of the world revolutionary process. It is joined with the revolutionary struggle of liberation movements of oppressed peoples; socialist countries; other independent anti-imperialist countries and the progressive people's movements in capitalist countries.

In its life-and-death struggle against US imperialism and the local reactionaries, the Philippine revolutionary movement benefits from the advances and victories of all other revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces abroad. At the same time, it helps to strengthen them.

No revolutionary movement including that in the Philippines can become victorious in isolation. In the era of imperialism, it is only through the vigorous and mutually supportive interaction of the world's revolutionary forces that they can advance and win greater victories.

Ang Bayan: What have been the advantages and disadvantages derived by the CPP from the open and bitter debates and divisions in the international communist movement since the 1960s? How do you propose to enhance the advantages and overcome the disadvantages?

AL: Among the major advantages is the emphasis on the correctness and justness of revolutionary armed struggle in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, including the Philippines. Since 1960, the people in more than a dozen countries have won national liberation through revolutionary armed struggle, without having to take direct advantage of an inter-imperialist world war. The Filipino people have been encouraged to wage revolutionary armed struggle against US imperialism and the local exploiting classes and for national liberation and democracy.

But I would not go so far as to say that armed struggle is immediately possible and necessary at all times for all countries. Due attention must be given to concrete conditions in every country which determine the appropriate forms of struggle. Furthermore, no single party or revolution in one country can be regarded as the exclusive model or center for the proletariat and people all over the world.

Among the major disadvantages is that the international communist movement and socialist countries have been unable to take full advantage of the ever-worsening crisis of capitalism and maximize support for the national liberation movements. Consequently, the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people has not been able to get as much international support as it should, especially from other communist and workers' parties which are either in power or out of power. Also, the CPP has not been able to extend direct support to and coordinate with more progressive forces for concerted international actions against imperialist aggression, intervention and war preparations.

It is a sad thing that the open and bitter debates and divisions have also resulted in violent confrontations beneficial to the US and the reactionaries. It is high time for all communist and workers' parties to restrengthen the unity of the international communist movement.

To keep and enhance the advantages and overcome the disadvantages, the CPP takes the independent position of consolidating relations which it has with stable and serious parties; expanding relations with ruling parties in socialist countries and all avowed Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist parties and organizations elsewhere; and promoting anti-imperialist unity and the proletarian spirit in the international communist movement through a series of bilateral relations of friendship. Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the CPP establishes and develops relations with foreign parties on the basis of national integrity, independence, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, full equality, mutual respect, mutual support and mutual benefit.

Ang Bayan: What drives or impels the CPP to expand its relations with other communist and workers' parties abroad? Will not increased foreign support militate against self-reliance?

AL: US imperialism is escalating its military and non-military intervention in Philippine affairs. It is moving in the direction of all-out aggression, especially because the so-called "total war" and "low-intensity conflict" tactics under the Aquino puppet regime are bound to fail. As the revolutionary struggle moves to a higher stage, particularly the stage of the strategic stalemate, the US is bound to escalate its intervention and act more harshly. At any rate, whether there is a people's war or not, the US is engaged in intensifying the oppression and exploitation of the people in the Philippines.

It is US imperialist intervention and aggression which make it urgently necessary for the CPP and the entire Filipino people to seek the broadest possible international support for their revolutionary struggle. The people need moral and material assistance more than ever because of the escalating barbarity and destructiveness of the enemy.

While I frankly speak of the need of the CPP and the people for international support, it should also be recognized and stressed that they extend support to fraternal parties and the people of the world by carrying out the Philippine revolution. Our victories are also the victories of revolutionaries and peoples the world over. The revolutionary struggle led by the CPP con-

tributes to the advance of the revolutionary theory and practice of the world proletariat. To the extent that we are capable of, we also extend the most concrete and the most direct forms of support to revolutionary forces abroad.

Self-reliance can be maintained and even enhanced with the increase of international support. The support that comes must merely supplement and yet amplify the capacity of the revolutionary forces and the people to expand and intensify their struggle. Thus, even if international support becomes larger, it remains small or becomes smaller in proportion to the people's overall self-reliant efforts.

The CPP will never ask for support it does not need, cannot receive and absorb and cannot reduce in proportion to the total increased self-reliant effort of the revolutionary people. After all, it is the Filipino revolutionaries who do the fighting and the dying to achieve victory in their just cause.

Even after total victory is won, cooperative relations with other communist and workers' parties shall be needed for consolidation, national reconstruction, socialist revolution and construction. In the process of these, we shall be able to make bigger contributions to the strength and unity of the world anti-imperialist struggle and communist movement..

Ang Bayan: So far, we have been talking about party-to-party relations. Can you describe how the Philippine revolutionary movement can comprehensively seek and gain broad international support?

AL: There are three levels of relations at which the revolutionary movement can comprehensively seek and gain broad international support. These are party-to-party, people-to-people, and country-to-country or state-to-state relations.

The CPP can establish friendly relations not only with Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations but also with other types of political parties anywhere abroad which are supportive of the Philippine revolutionary struggle to any degree and on any issue.

The CPP also gives a positive eye to or even encourages any other Philippine party which seeks to develop friendly relations with parties abroad on an anti-imperialist and progressive basis.

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines or any legal alliance or organization in the Philippines can facilitate the opening and development of CPP relations with parties abroad. But of course, the CPP can now deploy enough personnel to develop its own party-to-party relations.

At the level of people-to-people relations, the National Democratic Front and its component organizations can develop relations with their counterparts in any country. So can the legal alliances and organizations.

Alliances and organizations which are under CPP leadership in varying degrees or even those which are not under CPP leadership are encouraged to develop people-to-people relations that are supportive of the people's democratic interests.

What comes closest to an entity capable of developing country-to-country or state-to-state relations is the National Democratic Front. At least, the NDF can deal with the national liberation movements, united front organizations and the pertinent state organs in a number of countries.

In due time, however, the People's Revolutionary Government shall take to the diplomatic field, especially when its status of belligerency can no longer be denied by the Philippine reactionary government or is recognized by other states. In the meantime, the NDF is laying the ground for developing state-to-state relations.

Ang Bayan: What is the relationship between Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism on the one hand and the three levels of relations that you mentioned on the other hand?

AL: As a matter of fundamental principle, the CPP upholds and adheres to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in developing international relations. All these relations must be helpful to the advance of the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people and promotive of the world revolutionary process.

The three levels of relations are distinct from each other even as they are interrelated and integral. Each distinct level has its own characteristics and therefore demands distinct approaches.

At the level of party-to-party relations, the CPP does not require its foreign counterpart to agree to the CPP stand, viewpoint and method on issues. But the CPP can open and develop friendly relations. On the basis of such friendly relations, the CPP can start to develop fraternal or comradely relations with communist and workers' parties.

At the level of people-to-people relations, it suffices that friendly or anti-imperialist relations are started and developed even if there are as yet no relevant party-to-party relations or even without any prospect of relevant

party-to-party relations. It is enough that there is friendly, anti-imperialist or progressive cooperation.

At the level of country-to-country or state-to-state relations, the National Democratic Front or the People's Revolutionary Government or the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines can establish relations with national liberation movements and with any state irrespective of ideology or social system.

Ang Bayan: Can you further explain national integrity, independence, equality, Mutual respect, mutual support and mutual benefit as the guiding principles of the CPP in developing friendly relations with parties abroad?

AL: National integrity means that the CPP acts according to the sovereign rights and interests of the Filipino nation and people and that it is responsible for the revolutionary movement in the Philippines by applying the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism on the concrete conditions of the Philippines.

Independence proceeds from the national integrity of the CPP. It means that the CPP does not expect and does not allow itself to be dictated upon by any foreign entity and refuses interference and intervention of any kind in Philippine affairs and in domestic Party matters under any guise.

Equality means that the CPP is not any higher or lower than any party even if there are bigger or smaller parties as well as parties in power and out of power. To arrive at any consensus between the CPP and any other party, they must have equal basic rights and obligations. To arrive at any practical agreement, there must be mutual understanding of each other's situation and capabilities.

Mutual respect means that the CPP and another party respect each other's national integrity, independence and equality. Mutual support means that the CPP must extend support within its capabilities to the other party as it seeks support from the other party within its own capabilities. Of course, if there is mutual support, there is mutual benefit.

In general, the CPP cannot offer much material support to the other party because the CPP is engaged in a life-and-death struggle and is not yet in power. But certainly, the best way it can extend support and benefit to the other party and to mankind in general is by carrying out effectively and victoriously the revolutionary struggle in the Philippines.

The CPP takes the prudent line of building friendly and fraternal relations with other communist and workers' parties through a series of bilateral relations. In this regard, the CPP does not demand anything which is harmful to the relations of the other party with a third party. Neither does it submit to any demand which would harm its own relations with a third party and the broadest interests of the Filipino people's revolutionary movement.

Ang Bayan: Do all the guiding principles apply to the friendly relations of the CPP with all parties abroad? Obviously, you make a distinction between friendly and fraternal relations. Can you explain?

AL: The guiding principles apply to friendly relations with all parties abroad.

Of course, there is a distinction between friendly and fraternal relations. The former is a broad expression and the latter is a special one. While friendly relations cover relations with all types of parties abroad, fraternal relations are the relations with communist and workers' parties guided by Marxism-Leninism.

Fraternal relations can grow on the basis of friendly relations between two Marxist-Leninist parties. We do not use the term friendly relations to preclude or downgrade fraternal relations. Neither do we use the term fraternal relations to depreciate or deprecate friendly relations.

Ang Bayan: What are the guiding principles in developing people to people relations?

AL: The legal and illegal organizations of a mass character and their multisectoral and sectoral alliances have complete freedom in developing relations with their counterparts abroad. The CPP sets no ideological preconditions. The CPP welcomes any people-to-people relations, especially when these contribute to strengthening the national democratic movement in the Philippines and the cause of anti-imperialism, justice, freedom, world peace and progress.

Ang Bayan: What are the guiding principles in country-to-country or state-to-state relations? What is the attitude of the CPP to the fact that socialist countries have relations with the Philippine reactionary government?

AL: Countries and states irrespective of ideology and state system can have relations under the general policy of peaceful coexistence. The five principles of peaceful coexistence define the framework of state-to-state relations.

Socialist countries can have diplomatic and trade relations with the Philippine reactionary government under the general policy of peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of ideology and social system.

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines can also establish and develop relations with national liberation movements, united front organizations and pertinent state organs in socialist and other countries. There is no insurmountable obstacle to these relations.

There are instances in history when two governments in one country have relations with governments abroad. For instance, the Soviet Union had relations with the Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party government as well as with the government of the northern warlords in China in the 1920s.

The time will come when the People's Revolutionary Government shall be able to enjoy at least the recognition of its status of belligerency and would expect socialist states to relate accordingly with this people's government. Of course, the best thing that can happen is for the revolutionary movement to win total victory and establish the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

Ang Bayan: Are you now in the process of establishing party-to-party relations with the ruling parties in Eastern Europe and elsewhere? How do you override the ideological and political differences since the 1960s?

AL: Yes, we are now in the process of seeking and establishing relations with the ruling parties in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It is high time that the CPP does its part in strengthening anti-imperialist unity with them and taking advantage of the crisis of the world capitalist system.

The ruling parties of Eastern Europe can be of great help to the Philippine revolution as we try to be of help to them through revolutionary struggle against US imperialism. To start with, we have a common No. 1 enemy in US imperialism.

These ruling parties of Eastern Europe have been of great help to the national liberation movements and the newly liberated peoples. They have helped movements and governments consisting of communists and non-communists. It would be ironical if the CPP or they would refuse to establish relations; and if the CPP-led Philippine revolution does not get any support from them.

I see no insurmountable obstacle to the establishment of friendly and fraternal relations between the CPP and the parties in Eastern Europe and

elsewhere. There are no direct bones of contention between the CPP and any one of them. The basis of friendly relations is the common struggle against US imperialism. When friendly relations are established, fraternal or comradely relations can begin to grow.

The CPP considers as matters belonging to history those differences in the past arising from disputes between certain parties. We cannot afford to engage in endless open ideological disputes which can only benefit US imperialism, our common enemy.

The point is to establish anti-imperialist unity, gather as many points of agreement as possible and look forward to further developing friendly and fraternal relations. We would be breaking our necks if we keep looking back to the past. It would be quite messy for one party to demand that the other party make some public self-flagellation.

Because of their different conditions, communist and workers' parties have different views on the world situation and the situation in particular countries. To open and maintain friendly and fraternal relations, these parties must collect points of agreement, reserve points of disagreement and increase mutual understanding.

If any party wants to discuss any theoretical problem, it can do so within its own confines, or if the other party is willing, within the discreet venue of bilateral party-to-party relations. Friendly and fraternal relations will certainly put an end to the open debates and conflicts beneficial to and gloated over by the imperialists and reactionaries.

Ang Bayan: What can you say now about previous CPP declarations that certain parties are revisionist and that certain countries are social imperialist rather than socialist and practice global or regional hegemonism?

AL: Those previous declarations belong to history in the same way that the declarations made against the CPP by other communist and workers' parties belong to history. Let history and our current studies prove the correctness, partial correctness or incorrectness of such declarations. So much water has passed under the bridge in more than two decades of disputation. Since a few years ago, the CPP has voluntarily ceased to apply certain terms or labels to other parties.

Only the CPP can examine and reexamine its previous declarations. We are now in the process of summing up our experience in international relations during the seventies and up to the present. We try to study all major

pertinent questions and actual developments in the world situation and in the international communist movement. Our independent studies and conclusions will be aided by discussions with and learning from other communist and workers' parties with which we have relations.

Theoretical discussions regarding other parties are now kept within the confines of the CPP. The most important thing is for the CPP to uphold and promote its internal revolutionary unity; maintain its independence in the international communist movement; and not to allow debates and splits within, between or among other parties to divide the CPP.

In the course of developing bilateral relations with another party, the CPP does not take the position or attitude of settling old accounts. Neither does it expect the other party to take the position or attitude of settling old accounts.

However, if the other party insists on discussing old accounts, the CPP will still put the stress on discreet bilateral discussion on such matters and giving full play to anti-imperialist unity and a new and higher level of mutual understanding.

Ang Bayan: How do you override the fact that certain parties have had relations with the Lava group? Will not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other parties close to it demand that the CPP merge or have a united front with the Lava group?

AL: The Lava pseudo-communist group committed political suicide in the Philippines in 1974 when it capitulated to the fascist dictatorship of the US-Marcos clique. It has been a political corpse since then. It does not matter at all if any of the Eastern European and other parties have residual or vestigial relations with this group. After all, this group is isolated from the masses and have been responsible for a lot of misinformation about the situation and revolutionary movement in the Philippines.

Merger is totally unacceptable. The Lava pseudo-communist group can try to pursue its counterrevolutionary existence for as long as it can. But the CPP will never agree to merge with counterrevolutionaries. In a merger, the small Lavaite sect will only be magnified and gain knowledge that it can use against the revolutionary movement.

Lenin established as a principle a long time ago that in the building of the Bolshevik party, membership in such a party is on an individual basis. To

merge a counterrevolutionary group with the CPP would only bring into it a ready-made counterrevolutionary faction.

The Lava group has been engaged in counterrevolution, especially in collaboration with the US-directed Marcos fascist dictatorship, for so long that it will be impossible or difficult to find any member of the group to qualify as a member of the CPP. If there is any such rare element, the CPP is ready to accept him provided he makes a self-criticism and repudiates the Lava group.

In the particular history of the Philippines, the merger of the Communist and Socialist Parties in 1938 eventually led to the long line of Lavaite errors. Too many non-Marxists had come into the CPP from the Socialist Party.

At any rate, the question of the CPP dealing with the Lavaite problem is a domestic matter internal to the Philippines. The CPP is of the firm view that the Lava group is a political corpse or at the most a withering vine.

A united front, formal or informal, can be broad enough to accommodate any political corpse that comes to life by becoming anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and antifascist to some extent and ceasing to specialize in attacking the CPP.

Ang Bayan: Will not the US further escalate its intervention in Philippine affairs if the CPP has relations with the CPSU or other Eastern European parties close to it?

AL: The US is driven by its imperialist interests to intervene in Philippine affairs. Whether the CPP has relations with the CPSU or not, the US will escalate its intervention to promote its imperialist interests and will assert that the CPSU is supporting the CPP.

If there are relations between the CPP and the CPSU, or any European party close to it, the Philippine revolution will be favored by increased international support. The US and local reactionaries cannot do any more harm by intensifying their anticommunist propaganda to conceal their master puppet relationship.

Ang Bayan: In your estimate, what would be the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party to the CPP's establishing and developing relations with the Eastern European parties, especially the CPSU? Will you manage to keep the relations between the CCP and CPP?

AL: The Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Philippines are two independent parties exercising mutual respect. The princi-

ples of the CCP and CPP regarding party-to-party relations are agreeable to each other.

The CCP itself has restored relations with all parties in Eastern Europe except the Soviet Union. Relations with the Albanian Party of Labour are frozen.

There are still bones of contention between China and the Soviet Union which have an impact on the possibility of restoring party-to-party relations.

However, the CCP and the CPSU have relations with the same parties in many countries of the world. The CCP has not taken offense that these parties have relations with the CPSU. Neither has the CPSU taken offense that these parties have relations with the CCP.

The CPP is determined to keep and develop long-standing friendly and fraternal relations with other parties. At the same time, proceeding from its own analysis of the international situation and its assessment of the needs of the Filipino people's revolutionary struggle, the CPP is duty-bound to independently broaden its international relations and develop greater international support for the Philippine revolution. In the well-rounded awareness of its internationalist obligations, the Party aims to help develop the broadest possible anti-imperialist unity and contribute its share in the building of the strongest possible unity of the international communist movement.

Ang Bayan: How do you handle such questions as the Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Soviet troops along the Chinese border? Would not certain parties demand that the CPP take a stand to their liking?

AL: The current stand of the CPP is to encourage and let the parties directly involved in these questions settle them in a peaceful way through negotiations. Conflicts between socialist countries have taken too long and have exacted some serious toll on themselves, the international communist movement and revolutionary movements like that of the Filipino people.

The CPP will not exacerbate the conflict between other parties by helping inflame passions. We want the US and the reactionaries to stop being delighted by conflicts of socialist countries and communist and workers' parties.

On fundamental issues, the CPP has the right and duty to make a stand on international issues and express views different from those with which it has friendly and fraternal relations.

At the same time, the CPP is more interested than ever in collecting points of agreement on a bilateral basis with other communist and workers' parties than in collecting points of disagreement on questions beyond bilateral relations.

Ang Bayan: What would be the attitude of the majority of Southeast Asian parties to the CPP's expansion of international relations to the point of having relations with all or most of the Eastern European parties?

AL: The CPP has had close relations and mutual understanding with most of its fellow Southeast Asian parties. I am confident that they have no objection to the CPP's expansion of international relations. I think that they themselves are seeking to expand their international relations for the benefit of their people's revolutionary movements.

Ang Bayan: In the whole of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the CPP has developed relations with revolutionary parties and movements. Does the CPP intend to expand relations in this direction?

AL: Of course, the CPP must expand and strengthen its relations with revolutionary parties and movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They are either struggling for the national liberation of their respective peoples or are already in power as a result of hard struggle for national liberation and are engaged in construction and revolution.

They are closely akin to the CPP and the Philippine revolutionary movement. They understand the conditions, revolutionary cause and needs of the CPP and the Filipino people. They are as eager as the CPP in building anti-imperialist unity and engaging in mutual support and cooperation. The CPP has learned much from the revolutionary parties and movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America in pursuing the line of broadening and maximizing international support for the Philippine revolution and Filipino people.

Ang Bayan: Which revolutionary parties and movements does the CPP emulate as examples in gathering international support?

AL: The CPP emulates the examples of parties and movements of the people of Korea and Cuba; Vietnam in the sixties and early seventies against the US war of aggression; Palestine against the US-Zionist combine; Namibia and South Africa against the US and apartheid rule; Nicaragua and El Salvador against US imperialism and its local stooges.

The CPP wants the Philippine revolutionary movement to gain the broadest and most effective international support, especially because of the escalating US intervention.

Ang Bayan: Is the CPP developing its relations with communist and workers' parties in the capitalist countries? To what extent are they responding?

AL: The CPP is developing its relations with the communist and workers' parties in the capitalist countries. These parties are responding very well. They are conscious of performing their proletarian internationalist duty and developing the interest of their own forces in the revolutionary cause by building anti-imperialist unity and cooperation with the CPP and extending moral and material support to the Philippine revolutionary movement.

Ang Bayan: Towards the CPP's drive to expand its international relations, what is the attitude of the parties or small groups that have arisen for the first time in the sixties and proclaimed themselves as adherents of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought?

AL: Those that have been successful in their revolutionary practice understand the needs of the CPP and the Filipino people; and recognize that the CPP can best perform its internationalist duty by leading the Philippine revolution to total victory and availing itself of all domestic and international factors in favor of the Philippine revolution. There are also the dogmatists who keep on debating, splitting and liquidating their parties or groups over theoretical and international questions, divorced from revolutionary practice in their respective countries.

Ang Bayan: In what way does the CPP regard Mao Zedong?

AL: The CPP has high regard for Mao Zedong as a great communist thinker and leader of world significance for having made the most comprehensive and profound critique of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and for having led to victory the new democratic revolution among hundreds of millions of people in so huge a country as China and laid the foundation for socialism there.

The CPP has a special high regard for Mao Zedong because of the light he has provided on the problems of imperialism and feudalism and on the road of armed revolution for the completion of the national-democratic revolution and the establishment of socialism.

The CPP owes a lot to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong Thought is a major part of the great treasury of Marxism-Leninism. But the basic principles and lessons we learn from abroad—from all the great communist thinkers and leaders—can only be as useful and valuable to the CPP as it can make its own concrete analysis of concrete conditions and win its own victories in the course of revolutionary practice.

Ang Bayan: How does the CPP go about establishing or restoring relations with other communist or workers' parties?

AL: The CPP has some representatives abroad. They are under the organ of the Central Committee for international relations—the International Department. They do preliminary approaches to and exploratory talks with the appropriate representatives of other parties; and enter into whatever possible agreements upon authorization of the Central Committee.

Informal contacts mature into formal ones when, on behalf of the Central Committee, either the Chairman of the Central Committee of the CPP or the highest Party leader (Chairman or General Secretary) of the other party takes the initiative of writing a letter of proposal for a bilateral meeting of the Central Committee delegations.

It is this meeting which can formally establish or restore relations between the CPP and another party on the basis of mutual understanding and agreements. I hope that the central committees of other parties will honor the full powers extended by the Central Committee of the CPP to its delegations.

Ang Bayan: Is the CPP interested in the holding of a meeting of the international Communist movement or any regional meeting of communist and workers' parties in Asia or Southeast Asia?

AL: The CPP prefers to expand and develop its relations with other parties in a series of bilateral relations. As to the congress or any important affair of another party though, the CPP is willing to send representatives as guests.

At the moment and for quite some time, the CPP is not interested in any multilateral meetings of communist and workers' parties to decide on international questions. Such meetings will only tend to harden differences among the parties or exclude some parties and provide US imperialism a spectacle to gloat over. In the first place, some parties do not wish to join such a meeting.

The CPP has so close relations with the Southeast Asian communist parties that the idea of holding a regional meeting among them is tempting at times. But some parties will certainly object to such a meeting. And another point is that it is not good for the security of the Southeast Asian parties which are not in power to expose their leaders to unnecessary dangers from the US and the reactionaries through multilateral meetings.

**Brief Review of the
History of the Communist
Party of the Philippines**

On the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary
of Its Reestablishment

December 26, 1988

INTRODUCTION

This brief review of the history of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) seeks to outline the background, the twenty-year development and prospects of the Communist Party of the Philippines reestablished on December 26, 1968.

I. THE OLD CPP AND THE CPP-SPP MERGER PARTY

The Communist Party of the Philippines was established for the first time in Manila on November 7, 1930, by Crisanto Evangelista, the most outstanding leader of the Philippine trade union movement in his time.

The establishment of the Party marked the initial attempt to integrate the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete conditions of the Philippines; and draw the most advanced activists of the worker and peasant movement into the vanguard party of the Philippine revolution. The leadership and membership came mainly from the workers' ranks.

A few months afterwards, on May 1, 1931, a workers' rally organized by the Party in Manila was disrupted by the armed agents of the US colonial and local reactionary authorities. The CPP leaders were arrested and hauled to court on the charge of sedition. In 1932, they were convicted and sentenced to internal exile; and the Party was declared illegal by the Supreme Court of the US colonial regime.

Despite illegalization and difficulties in working underground, the Party continued to exist and work among the workers and peasants in limited areas in the country. In 1932, the Socialist Party of the Philippines (SPP) was organized independently of the CPP by Comrade Pedro Abad Santos and was able to develop the peasant movement on a scale larger than the CPP could in Central Luzon, a region adjoining Manila.

In 1937, the CPP was legalized by the Commonwealth government as a result of the mounting popular demand for social justice amidst worldwide depression and for a broad popular front against fascism. In 1938, the CPP and SPP merged into one party.

The CPP-SPP merger party was an excellent development insofar as the large worker following of the CPP in Manila and the large peasant following of the SPP in Central Luzon came under one party leadership. But underneath this development was the penetration of the Party by unremolded pet-

ty-bourgeois elements headed by the Lava brothers in Manila and by the Taruc brothers in Central Luzon.

In 1942, after the outbreak of World War II, the principal leaders of the merger party were arrested and murdered by the Japanese occupation authorities. The Party leadership had not been able to clarify the national democratic character of the Philippine revolution in a comprehensive and profound way. Party leaders had been preoccupied with practical actions and utopian agitation about a communist paradise to come through the class struggle between the proletariat and an undifferentiated bourgeoisie. The second-echelon leaders, like the Lava and Taruc brothers, became the principal leaders of the merger party.

At any rate, the merger party established the People's Army Against Japan (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon-Hukbalahap, in short) on March 29, 1942; and was compelled by circumstances of war to exert more efforts to organize the peasant masses in Central Luzon.

There was no clear program of anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggle going beyond the antifascist struggle against Japan and no plan to expand the revolutionary forces beyond Manila and Central Luzon. The line of the people's struggle was narrowed to armed resistance against the Japanese occupation forces and their Filipino collaborators.

Even with regards to armed struggle, the leadership of the merger party with Vicente Lava as general secretary adopted the line of "retreat for defense," a policy of reducing guerrilla units into impotent teams of three to five persons and avoiding armed combat with the enemy. This line was proclaimed after the Japanese fascist troops attacked the main base of the Hukbalahap at the foot of a small vulnerable mountain, Mount Arayat in the middle of the Central Luzon plains.

However, the people's army made significant strides in armed struggle mainly because several platoon-size and company-size units disregarded the policy and spontaneously fought the enemy; and because finally in September 1944 a Party conference declared the "retreat for defense" policy erroneous. But soon after, the US military forces landed to reoccupy the Philippines and arm their puppets.

In the same conference, Vicente Lava was demoted from his position as general secretary. But he remained in the Political Bureau and pushed the line of welcoming the US invading forces and seeking the open and legal participation of the merger party in the semi-colonial and semi-feudal polit-

ical framework and liquidating the people's army and converting it into a veterans' organization.

The US and the local reactionary forces of the comprador big bourgeoisie and landlord class had none of the illusions of the leadership of the CPP-SPP merger party. They proceeded to suppress the revolutionary forces; reimpose their authority on the people in the city and the countryside; and impose a series of unequal treaties, agreements and arrangements binding the Philippines to the status of a neocolonial appendage to the United States.

In the years immediately following the end of World War II, the Lava and Taruc brothers begged for general amnesty for the people's actions against the Japanese fascists and their collaborators, concentrated efforts on getting positions in the pro-US semi-colonial government and allowed one cadre after another to briefly assume the position of Party general secretary and pursue a Right opportunist line. Despite all these, Jesus Lava, Luis Taruc and other elected candidates of the Democratic Alliance were booted out of the Lower House of the Philippine Congress.

In 1948, Jose Lava seized political initiative within the merger party by advocating armed struggle without, however, proposing a clear strategy and tactics for its conduct. At the same time, the commander-in-chief of the people's army Luis Taruc was allowed to seek general amnesty from the neocolonial regime under terms violative of the revolutionary cause and principles.

When the Party leadership with Jose Lava as general secretary declared "all-out armed struggle" in 1950, it was an adventurist line of seeking quick military victory in two years' time in complete disregard of the limited strength of the revolutionary forces and of the need for painstaking mass work and expanding on a nationwide scale over a long period of time. The mass base then was no more than 300,000 people and the rifle strength of the people's army, no more than 3,000. Both were concentrated in Central Luzon.

The people's army launched the March and August 1950 offensives mainly from unpopulated mountain bases far from its mass base in Central Luzon. The enemy could effectively make counter-attacks against the overextended units of the people's army. In late 1950 the main units of the people's army had been destroyed or rendered impotent and the so-called Politburo-In headed by Jose Lava was arrested by the enemy in Manila.

As general secretary of the Politburo-Out, Jesus Lava assumed party leadership upon the capture of his brother Jose. He preoccupied himself with fac-

tional strife with the Taruc brothers, Luis and Peregrino, over issues peripheral to the main issue of adventurism.

He failed to solve the problems of the revolutionary movement. After a few years of trying to solve these from a purely military viewpoint, he issued a series of Right opportunist policies which proved to be even more fatal to the revolutionary movement.

In 1955, he issued the directive to liquidate the people's army under the guise of converting it into organizational brigades. In 1957, after having been forced by the enemy to hide himself in Manila as an individual divorced from the masses and without any party collective, he issued the "single-file" policy which liquidated basic units, territorial organizations and leading organs of the merger party.

At the onset of the 1960s, the CPP-SPP merger party was practically nonexistent. The general secretary had been reduced to issuing occasional "political transmissions" on the basis of newspaper clippings and without the benefit of collective discussion. Remnants of the people's army persisted in spontaneous defense against the enemy and in disobedience to the 1955 directive of Jesus Lava.

However, in the early 1960s, advanced elements of the youth and trade union movements led by Jose Maria Sison emerged to carry forward the anti-imperialist and antifeudal line among the masses. Independently of the CPP-SPP merger party, they had begun since the late 1950s to study the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Philippine conditions and the revolutionary experience of the Filipino people.

Encouraged by the reemergence of the revolutionary mass movement among the youth, workers and peasants, Jesus Lava first invited Amado Guerrero in late 1962 and then a trade union leader in early 1963 to join the Executive Committee that he formed to function as the highest executive organ of the CPP-SPP merger party.

But Lava packed this five-person committee with two Lava nephews, Vicente, Jr. and Francisco, Jr. and one close friend of the latter. These three had neither revolutionary experience nor connection with the mass movement.

Before Jesus Lava surrendered to the reactionary government in 1964, he appointed four secretaries of the CPP-SPP merger party: Pedro Taruc, for peasants; the trade union leader, for workers; Amado Guerrero, for youth; and one Lava nephew, for professionals.

Confusion ensued. Pedro Taruc had no prior understanding with Jesus Lava and was a mere figurehead leader of the gravely deteriorating people's army under the actual leadership of Commander Sumulong or Faustino del Mundo. Under the direction of Sumulong, Taruc refused to recognize the three other secretaries.

The two Lava nephews quarreled over trivial intrafamily matters and from 1965 onward one refused to attend the same meeting where the other would be present. At the same time, the Lava nephew secretary for professionals provoked a row with the secretary for workers by high-handedly issuing orders to him in the name of a "higher organ."

As early as 1964, Amado Guerrero proposed a summing up of the experience of the Party since 1930. By decision of the Executive Committee, he was assigned to write a general report, which he promptly submitted in 1966. This report included among others an analysis of Philippine and international conditions, a criticism of errors of the series of Party leaderships and a definition of revolutionary tasks.

The report was suppressed upon the motion of the Lava nephew secretary for professionals. He demanded that it be considered a mere memorandum and that he would submit his own draft. He never submitted one. Instead, he proceeded to sow intrigues against Amado Guerrero.

However, cadres led by Amado Guerrero conducted theoretical studies, promoted the line of national democratic revolution, formed secret party units in localities and mass organizations and stepped up the building of the legal mass organizations.

Jose Maria Sison meanwhile wrote comprehensively and definitively on the struggle for national democracy and played a key role in the youth and trade union movements, the legal party of the workers and the broad united front. He promoted work among the masses of workers and peasants.

The mass movement of the working people and the youth surged forward despite the confusion in the Executive Committee and among the secretaries of the CPP-SPP merger party. The proletarian revolutionary cadres at the core of the mass movement increasingly considered the Executive Committee as a useless vestige of the past. Upon their advocacy of the resumption of the revolutionary struggle, they differentiated themselves from those who followed the Lavaite line.

In April 1967 the Lava nephew secretary for professionals convened a group of seven persons, mostly obsequious to him and opposed to the line of resum-

ing the armed struggle, to declare themselves the provisional Political Bureau and have himself “elected” general secretary of the CPP-SPP merger party.

The proletarian revolutionary cadres, including veterans since the 1930s, objected to the usurpation of authority, the wrong line of the Lavaite group and the baseless ambition of the Lava scion to become the fourth general secretary from the same family. They condemned the practice of dynasticism as a sure mark of the complete degeneration of the remnants of the CPP-SPP merger party.

Within the same month of April 1967, the proletarian revolutionary cadres who were effectively at the core of the growing mass movement of workers, peasants and youth decided to prepare for the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The Lavaite remnants of the CPP-SPP merger party became utterly isolated from the masses, further degenerated and eventually in 1974 capitulated to and collaborated openly with the fascist dictatorial regime of the US-Marcos clique. The Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique in the old people’s army disintegrated in 1971 upon the capture of Commander Sumulong and his betrayal of Pedro Taruc.

II. REESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH OF THE CPP

On December 26, 1968, the proletarian revolutionary cadres led by Amado Guerrero reestablished the Communist Party of the Philippines under the guidance of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and along the general line of national democratic revolution.

The reestablishment of the Party was exceedingly timely. The chronic crisis of the ruling system was rapidly worsening. The socio-economic crisis aggravated and the political crisis was increasingly characterized by violence among the reactionary factions.

National industrialization was blocked; even the repackaging and reassembly plants could no longer be tolerated by the United States. At the same time, there was exhaustion of the land frontier for spontaneous peasant resettlement as the principal way out for the ever increasing surplus labor.

Violent strife was incipient among the reactionary political factions as they competed to gain influence in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and to form small private armies. The Marcos ruling clique was determined to hold on to power by taking the initiative in using counterrevolutionary

violence under the guise of anticommunism. The tendency toward fascism was on the rise.

The subjective forces were resurgent and had steadily grown in strength in the preceding decade through the emergence of fresh proletarian cadres, painstaking mass work and comprehensive and militant legal mass movement. Such pseudo-revolutionaries as the Lavas and Tarucs were obstacles to the growth of the revolutionary mass movement. But their negative examples became the target of criticism, were repudiated and served to firm up the resolve of the proletarian cadres and the broad mass movement to take the correct revolutionary path.

The causes and factors for the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines were mainly and essentially internal to the Philippines. However, under the aegis of proletarian internationalism, the Party took the firm and militant stand of uniting with all forces participating in or supporting armed movements for national liberation and democracy in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The main achievement of the Party in the course of its reestablishment was the criticism and repudiation of the erroneous lines of the Lavas and Tarucs; and, positively and more importantly, the critique of Philippine history and society, the clarification of the national democratic revolution, its class line, tasks and methods.

In this regard, the founding congress of the Party issued such basic documents as "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," a new Party Constitution and the Program for a People's Democratic Revolution. Comrade Amado Guerrero, who had been elected chairman of the Central Committee, subsequently wrote and issued *Philippine Society and Revolution* in 1969.

The reestablished Party regarded itself as the genuine continuation of the Communist Party established in 1930; and also as one at a new and higher level of ideological and political development.

As never before, the CPP laid bare the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of Philippine society and firmly put forward the general line of national democratic revolution against US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The basic tasks of the revolution are to achieve national liberation by ridding the nation of US domination in the political, economic, military, cultural and other fields; and to realize democracy not only by fighting the growing

repressiveness of the enemy but more substantively by emancipating the peasant masses and the entire people from feudal and semi-feudal conditions.

The motive forces of the revolution are the working class, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie. These are also the positive forces within the national united front for national liberation and democracy.

The working class, comprising only 15 percent of the Philippine population, is the leading class because it is the most progressive political and productive force. The Communist Party of the Philippines is its advanced detachment, enabling it to concentrate its ideological, political and organizational strength and win victory against the class enemy.

To augment its strength immediately in carrying out the revolution, the working class must unite with the peasantry, which comprises 75 percent of the population. These two most oppressed and exploited classes, embracing more than ninety percent of the people, form the basic alliance serving as the foundation of the united front.

The CPP deploys and develops its proletarian cadres among the peasant masses in order to build the basic alliance of the workers and peasants. In doing revolutionary work among the peasant masses, the antifeudal line has to be pursued within the framework of the national democratic revolution. The line involves relying mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers; winning over the middle peasants; neutralizing the rich peasants; and differentiating the enlightened and evil gentry in order to isolate and destroy the power of the latter and, in effect, the entire landlord class.

The Communist Party of the Philippines has pursued this line in building the New People's Army, peasant movement and the organs of political power in the countryside; and thereby realizing the basic worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class.

In carrying out the revolutionary struggle in the countryside, the Party has integrated armed struggle, land reform and mass base building. The Party has always rejected all forms of thinking and activities that separate armed struggle from the all-round mobilization of the people.

The armed struggle hews to the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside over a protracted period of time, until sufficient forces are accumulated in the countryside to smash the final holdouts of the enemy forces in the cities.

The Party has also solved in theoretical and practical terms the problem of conducting armed struggle in an archipelagic country like the Philippines. In

1974, Comrade Amado Guerrero would elaborate on the specific characteristics of people's war in the Philippines and explain how the initial disadvantage of fighting in an archipelago could be turned into a long-term advantage compatible with the advantage of encircling the cities from the countryside.

Land reform is carried out to the extent made possible by the strength of the people's army and the peasant movement. It is the principal method for building the socio-economic and political strength of the peasant masses and ensuring their deep-going and substantial support for the people's army and the entire process of the national democratic revolution.

Mass base building involves the comprehensive building of all major types of mass organizations, such as those for the workers, peasants, youth, women, cultural activists and other sectors; and the building of organs of political power (committees of people's self-government) assisted by working committees on mass organizations, education, land reform, livelihood, finance, health, defense, arbitration, cultural affairs and other functions.

Though the working class and peasantry comprise the overwhelming majority of the people, their strength needs to be further augmented by the urban petty bourgeoisie, consisting of small entrepreneurs and traders and the general run of professionals and technicians and comprising some eight percent of the population.

The urban petty bourgeoisie is a small but knowledgeable, skillful and influential part of society. If it remains a passive though exploited adjunct of the exploiting classes, it delays the flow of the revolutionary movement. If it joins the revolutionary movement, then it hastens that flow nationwide. The urban petty bourgeoisie is a basic force of the revolution.

Notwithstanding its dual characteristics, its progressive and reactionary tendencies, the middle bourgeoisie (national bourgeoisie) is on the whole a positive though non-basic force of the revolution. The CPP encourages its anti-imperialist and antifeudal interests and aspirations while exercising vigilance against its anti-people tendency.

The working class, peasantry, urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie are the positive forces in the broad national united front. But the revolutionary movement must also derive advantages from the contradictions among the contending factions of the exploiting classes.

At certain times, it is good policy to have some cooperation with one reactionary faction against another. At other times, it suffices to let the reactionary factions fight and destroy each other.

The broadest range of forces can be mustered at every given time against the reactionary faction which seeks to prevail by being the worst of the reactionary factions and the most subservient to US imperialism.

The CPP is acutely cognizant of the oppression and exploitation of the national minorities, upholds their right to national self-determination and seeks to integrate their struggle into the national democratic revolution. Their right to self-determination extends from the right to regional autonomy under the people's democratic state to the right to secede from an oppressive state.

The CPP has consistently sought unity, cooperation and coordination with the MNLF as well as with other forces of the Moro people even as the Party criticized their acceptance of regional autonomy within the framework of an oppressive state as provided in the Tripoli Agreement.

Since the 1960s there has been a heavy exodus of Filipino professionals, technicians and workers from the Philippines because they cannot be absorbed by the economy. Overseas Filipinos, especially migrant workers, can be aroused, organized and mobilized in line with the national democratic revolution. They can also develop relations of mutual support and cooperation with the progressive forces in their host countries and in the worldwide anti-imperialist movement.

The CPP wages and coordinates all forms of struggle: armed struggle and united front; legal and illegal; and aboveground and underground. Because the central question in any genuine revolutionary movement is the seizure of political power and because conditions in the Philippines make the armed revolution possible and necessary, the Party since its reestablishment has consistently taken the road of armed struggle and considers armed struggle the main form of revolutionary struggle. But the armed struggle cannot advance if the legal forms of struggle are not developed.

The Party envisions two stages in the Philippine revolution: the national democratic and socialist. The national democratic revolution is now being carried out. Upon basic completion of this through the seizure of political power, the socialist revolution can commence. The national revolution has a socialist perspective; and prepares the requisites for the start of the socialist revolution.

The CPP is determined to lead the Filipino people to victory in the revolutionary struggle for national and social liberation while upholding the principle of independence and utmost self-reliance. Nevertheless, the Par-

ty seeks from abroad whatever amount of moral and material support is possible, without becoming dependent on it. The Party maintains its independence and at the same time upholds proletarian internationalism. It is conscious of the fact that while foreign support from abroad is needed, the revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people in turn supports all anti-imperialist and progressive forces abroad.

At its reestablishment in 1968, the CPP was able to consolidate the proletarian revolutionary cadres as well as the revolutionary mass movement by upholding Marxism-Leninism and the program of national democratic revolution and by repudiating and rectifying the dogmatist and empiricist and “Left” and Right opportunist errors of the Lavas and Tarucs.

At the beginning, the CPP had only a few scores of members. These surpassed in number the few remnants of the CPP-SPP merger party who joined the Lava group. But, more importantly, they were the effective leaders of the mass movement. Party membership increased to several hundred in 1970 and 1971 due to the outbreak of the First Quarter Storm of 1970 and the workers’ and student strike movement in the cities; and the expansion and intensification of revolutionary work in the countryside.

Before the US-Marcos dictatorship could impose fascist dictatorship on the people, the Party had increased its membership to a few thousands and had deployed cadres to form seven regional committees (Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas and Mindanao) covering the entire country.

It was possible for the Party to go nationwide and strike deep roots among the people because the proletarian cadres had organized the urban-based legal mass organizations of the working people and the youth and created the guerrilla zones at selected strategic areas in the archipelago.

On March 29, 1969, only a few months after the reestablishment of the CPP, the New People’s Army was established. The people’s army’s reestablishment was facilitated by the conjoining of the proletarian cadres from the urban areas and the Red fighters of the old people’s army, who together repudiated the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique.

The New People’s Army started with sixty fighters, armed with nine automatic rifles and twenty-six single-shot rifles and handguns in the second district of Tarlac province. The peasant mass base there was about 80,000, mainly organized through a legal peasant association and administered by barrio organizing committees.

By carrying out tactical offensives, the NPA was able to accumulate some 200 rifles in 1969 and 1970. But since the latter half of 1969, the enemy had concentrated the division-size Task Force Lawin and organized the “barrio self-defense units” (BSDU) to operate against the NPA. In December 1970, the enemy was proclaiming the elimination of the NPA and the peasant movement because some NPA units had been destroyed and scores of peasant leaders had been murdered.

The enemy was scarcely aware of the fact that since early 1969 CPP cadres had been sent to build the NPA, peasant and other mass organizations in the rural areas of Isabela, a province in Northern Luzon. A far bigger mass base reaching up to 300,000 in 1972 was built there. Most of the seed cadres deployed to various regions in the country were trained here. They were joined by Party cadres and members as well as mass activists developed by the nationwide urban-based mass movement in proceeding to the countryside.

From 1969 to 1971 a substantial number of cadres from the worker and youth mass organizations were able to either get politico-military training for armed revolution or team up with cadres and fighters already tempered by revolutionary work in the countryside. The First Quarter Storm of 1970 and the mass movement up to 1972 interacted with the armed offensives in Tarlac to encourage the proletarian revolutionaries and the broad masses of the people to carry out the national democratic revolution.

Upon the declaration of martial law in 1972, the urban-based legal democratic mass organizations under the broad alliance banner of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines were outlawed and forced underground. Party cadres and mass activists had to be absorbed by the urban underground and by the revolutionary movement in the countryside.

On April 24, 1973 the National Democratic Front was organized to embrace the underground mass organizations, base itself in principle on organs of political power built at the village level and facilitate the formation of united front committees and secret cells at higher levels.

To the satisfaction of US imperialism, the Marcos dictatorship at first appeared to have succeeded in quelling the revolutionary mass movement, especially in the urban areas. But in fact, the massive repression and aggravation of the social crisis, despite the heavy inflow of foreign loans, served as stimulus to revolutionary work on a nationwide scale.

Despite the arrests of CPP Central Committee members in 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1977, the erstwhile skeletal regional Party organizations gained

flesh and muscle from the growth of the armed revolutionary movement and the urban underground. As early as late 1974, all regional Party committees—then numbering nine—became basically self-reliant, no longer receiving any significant amount of subsidy from the Central Committee.

A large number of cadres from the bureaus of the Party General Secretariat were also deployed to reinforce the regional Party Committees of Northwest Luzon, Northeast Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas and Mindanao.

From October 1975 to January 1976 workers in 300 enterprises nationwide went on strike despite the strike ban and the generally intense repression. Political demonstrations by the broad masses also emerged in Manila and other cities. It was also in 1976 that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines issued “Our Urgent Tasks” in order to promote the antifascist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal line and raise higher all forms of revolutionary struggle.

On April 6, 1978, on the eve of the electoral farce, the entire Metro Manila reverberated with the sound of protest from almost every house and street. This should have been the signal for a sustained nationwide mass protest movement. But differences between the Central Committee and the Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee regarding the 1978 elections and political tactics, problems caused by the latter’s violations of organizational discipline, and the internal debates which preoccupied leading cadres and gave way to other adverse results, disabled the Party from effecting a strong mass protest movement in Manila-Rizal and other cities in the country.

However, the Party and other revolutionary forces kept on advancing and growing in strength nationwide, especially under the guidance of “Our Urgent Tasks” and “Specific Characteristics of Our People’s War.”

In the 1980s, the urban mass protest movement advanced even more vigorously. Progressive trade unions grew tremendously, seized overall leadership away from the yellow trade unions and led the workers in sustained militant economic and political struggles. The student youth expanded and intensified their democratic reform struggle and their antifascist, antifeudal and anti-imperialist propaganda. The peasant masses also became more active in urban protest actions.

The militant struggles, waged largely by the basic masses, prepared the way for the unprecedentedly large mass actions from 1983 to 1986 which

involved the repeated direct participation of 500,000 to two million people and eventually caused the downfall of Marcos on February 22–25, 1986.

Up to 1977, the NPA had only 1,000 high-powered rifles, although the mass base in both urban and rural areas reached a million people. It may be said that from 1969 to 1979, the typical or most widespread unit of the New People's Army was the armed propaganda team, which devoted more than 95 percent of its time to mass work in the countryside.

But in 1979, platoon-size tactical offensives became frequent and widespread, especially in Samar island. By 1981, company-size tactical offensives emerged in several regions, especially in Mindanao. By 1983, company-size tactical offensives had become widespread and the NPA had amassed nearly 5000 high-powered rifles.

The growth in armed strength has been cumulative. Currently, the number of high-powered rifles is around 10,000, excluding 7,000 inferior firearms. The units of the NPA operate in at least 60 guerrilla fronts covering 12,000 villages or significant portions of 800 municipalities and 63 provinces of the Philippines.

In most guerilla fronts, company-size main guerilla units have been formed to serve as centers of gravity of the smaller and weaker, but more widespread units of local guerillas, armed propagandists and people's militia. The development of company-size guerilla units has led to a more effective use and combination of main and secondary guerilla units, in enhanced direct and indirect coordination among different guerilla fronts and regions, and in greater capacity to disperse enemy troops, thus creating more and better opportunities for our tactical offensives and defensive maneuvers as well.

The general level of land reform being carried out by the revolutionary movement still involves rent reduction, elimination of usury, fair wages for farm workers, fair prices for farm products and higher productivity through elementary forms of cooperation. But in increasing areas, the land of despotic landlords and landgrabbers has been confiscated or taken back and distributed to the tillers or managed by them collectively through their peasant associations.

The mass base in the countryside is seven million people. They are administered by the organs of political power; and are partially enlisted in mass organizations with the Party at the core through Party groups and local Party branches. The urban and rural mass base totals ten million people.

The Party has increased its membership to 35,000 through the urban and rural revolutionary mass movement. They are in central organizations and in fourteen regional Party organizations. Out of the total membership, 5,000 members are of cadre quality and are capable of leading at least a committee or a squad.

The Party can lead ten million people because its members are surrounded and assisted by several tens of thousands more of mass activists from whose ranks the most advanced elements are drawn to become Party members.

In twenty years of existence, the Communist Party of the Philippines has consistently proven itself to be the vanguard party of the Filipino proletariat and the Filipino people, because it has been guided by Marxism-Leninism, creatively applied it in the concrete practice of the Philippine revolution and aroused, organized and mobilized the people in their millions; and conducted criticism and self-criticism on the basis of facts and with the aim of firming up unity and heightening the revolutionary struggle.

The Party remains at the center of the national political stage no matter how the United States and its reactionary agents try to marginalize it through violence and deception. It is because the Party relies on the all-round participation and support of the people; and employs the magic weapons of armed struggle and the national united front against the enemy.

So long as no grave errors of ideological subjectivism, political opportunism and organizational sectarianism or laxity are committed, the Party and the revolutionary people has no other way but to advance and grow in strength because the all-round crisis of the ruling system continues to deepen and aggravate.

The ruling system continues to deteriorate and decline towards its destruction. The socio-economic crisis is insoluble and worsening. The fundamental problems that brought about the Marcos despotism have remained unsolved. The reactionary factions are increasingly involved in violent strife at an unprecedented level.

The United States itself which manipulates them is in the irreversible process of global decline and is finding the effectiveness of its interventions diminishing. There is no way the United States can defeat a resolute protracted people's war in the Philippines.

III. ONWARD TO VICTORY

It is reasonable for the Communist Party of the Philippines to aim for total victory in the national democratic revolution within the next ten years. The disintegration process of the ruling system is irreversible. The process of resistance and revolution induces the contradictions within the system to aggravate; and guarantees the strengthening of all positive forces against the enemy.

The ideological, political and organizational strength that the Party has accumulated since 1968 provides a basis for advancing at a cumulative rate toward the maturation of the strategic defensive, further on toward the strategic stalemate and finally toward the strategic offensive in the armed revolution. The insoluble and ever worsening economic and political crisis of the ruling system provides fertile ground for the growth and advance of the Party and all other revolutionary forces.

It is all up to the Party to further strengthen itself ideologically, politically and organizationally in preparation for total victory. The process of strengthening the Party, however, is not easy. It involves sacrifices, hard work and struggle. The enemy also seeks to destroy the Party frontally and otherwise.

In the course of revolutionary struggle, the Party must consciously avoid errors of subjectivism and opportunism; and must always take into account the actual balance of forces as it tries to defeat the enemy in the most efficient way.

It is in the nature of life, especially in revolutionary struggle, to be confronted with problems. By their mastery of the law of contradiction, Marxist-Leninists thrive on confronting and solving these problems and raising the level of development of the revolutionary struggle.

Errors of subjectivism and opportunism of the “Left” and Right varieties have occurred because of the inability to handle contradictory aspects of a thing or process. Sometimes, the principal and secondary aspects are correctly posed; but the secondary aspect is underestimated, sometimes given a weight of zero, or is regarded as static. At other times, the distinction of principal and secondary aspects is blurred; and the two aspects are blended into an unwarranted compromise.

To strengthen themselves ideologically, all Party cadres and members must study the theory of Marxism-Leninism and grasp the proletarian revolutionary stand, viewpoint and method. Whenever an issue arises, all sides and all facts pertaining to them must be taken into account and then the proletarian

revolutionary stand and the national democratic line can be firmly taken and flexible tactics can be worked out.

Ideological building among Party cadres and members will always be uneven. But the Party leadership, together with the organs responsible for education and propaganda, must ensure a general level of understanding of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and the program of national democratic revolution.

To win total victory, the Party needs thousands of Party cadres with a comprehensive and profound knowledge of dialectical and historical materialism, the critique of capitalism and modern imperialism, revolutionary strategy and tactics, and the principles of scientific socialism; tens of thousands of Party cadres who have read and studied at least articles by the great communist leaders selected by the Party for their relevance to the Philippine revolution and who can issue propaganda at least on issues within their sphere of work; and hundreds of thousands of Party members who have studied the Party documents integrating the Marxist-Leninist theory with the concrete conditions of the Philippines and who can conduct agitation in their specific areas.

These large numbers can be attained only by proceeding from hundreds to thousands; from thousands to tens of thousands; and from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. The growth in ideological strength of the Party is inseparable from its growth in political strength.

The key to total victory within the next ten years is the militant all-sided participation and support of the broad masses of the people in their tens of millions and through organizations whose membership run into millions. All political, economic, military and cultural requirements must be fulfilled.

The balance of strength between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces as well as the domestic and international environment must always be taken into account in considering the prospect of winning total victory. But to win total victory the Party and other revolutionary forces must rely on themselves rather than depend on external forces and conditions.

Come what may, in terms of foreign assistance or favorable external developments, all revolutionary forces and the people in general must wage revolutionary struggle, gain strength and win victory. The CPP exerts all efforts to gain international support but this can only be as effective as the revolutionary movement can absorb it.

Efforts to advance must be planned on the basis of the given strength of the revolutionary movement, a clear knowledge of enemy strength, a grasp of the law of motion and a realistic estimate of what is achievable within the time scope of the plan.

At the moment, the revolutionary movement has enough armed strength to reach the maturation of the strategic defensive and pass on to the stage of strategic stalemate within a few years' time.

The cumulative trend in the growth of the New People's Army over the last twenty years can give us a fair idea of what is achievable.

So long as all the political, economic and cultural requirements are fulfilled in the course of the revolutionary mass movement, the strategic stalemate and strategic offensive will be far shorter stages than the strategic defensive. The politico-military capabilities of US imperialism and the local reactionaries to delay the advance of the already protracted but ever cumulative people's war is predictable and calculable; and can be prepared against domestically and internationally.

The CPP and the Filipino people must be prepared to thwart every escalation of US intervention; and shift from the current civil war to a national war in case of an outright US war of aggression. The vicious attacks instigated by the United States against the revolutionaries and the people must be countered with utmost determination. The revolutionary movement must act against US military installations and business enterprises.

Reactionary politicians who actively work for the prolongation of the US military bases must be denounced as traitors. They are the worst accomplices of the United States in the oppression of the Filipino people.

The current number of Red fighters armed with high-powered rifles should not give rise to the purely military viewpoint, commandism, arrogance and impetuosity. The vertical growth of military formations and firepower should not be made at the cost of neglecting such civil organizations as the Party, the mass organizations and the organs of political power.

To keep on enlarging military formations while neglecting the development of the civil organizations absolutely necessary to sustain the people's army and the people's war is to enter into a purely military situation where the superior military forces and paramilitary formations of the enemy can win. That is the reason why the enemy is trying to do everything to destroy the political infrastructure of the revolutionary movement in the so-called "total war" or "low-intensity" conflict.

The growth of the main guerilla formations must always be kept in proper balance with the maintenance and development of small but effective and widespread units of the people's army. Given the current level of the armed struggle, we need to develop the optimum combination of company-size main units in every front, guerilla platoons as secondary units deployed in as many towns and districts, and squads of people's militia in every barrio, to achieve a high degree of initiative and flexibility.

The Party must wage a widespread and intensive people's war through guerrilla warfare with ever increasing organized mass support. The horizontal growth of the armed movement which is indissolubly connected with the continuous deepening of the mass base and the strengthening of revolutionary political power in the different localities, forms the solid basis for the vertical growth of military formations, the development of command ability at higher levels and coordination of larger forces (either organic or separate) for tactical offensives and offensive campaigns.

Guerrilla warfare with the enthusiastic support of the masses must be extensively and intensively employed to wipe out and disarm the enemy, destroy his anti-people facilities and drain him of his strength politically, militarily, economically and morally.

On a nationwide scale, the principal form of revolutionary struggle is the armed struggle fought mainly in the countryside until conditions are ripe for the strategic offensive. Before this final stage in the people's war, the principal form of struggle in the urban areas is legal and defensive.

The armed reactionary factions themselves use the cities as the main arena for their violent strife and the ruling faction is thereby compelled to retain sufficient anti-coup and counter-revolutionary forces here. The operations of armed city partisans should run at a rate and in a style not overshadowing the violent internal strife of the reactionaries and not prejudicial to the legal democratic mass movement.

The revolutionary struggle cannot be brought to total victory by armed struggle alone although this is the main weapon for smashing the enemy state and securing the people's democratic state. This must be carried out within the framework of national democratic revolution, combined with the development of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal united front and linked to the advances of the people in revolutionary consciousness, organization and mobilization in every major field of social activity.

The Party should maintain the general level of land reform being carried out until such time that enough strength has been accumulated by the people's army and the peasant movement to effect a higher level characterized by land confiscation. The current level of land reform being undertaken by the revolutionary movement is genuinely beneficial to the peasant masses in contrast to the bogus land reform programs dished out by one reactionary regime after another.

The mass organization of workers, peasants, fishermen, youth, women and other patriotic and progressive people must be formed both in urban and rural areas. Multisectoral and sectoral alliances must be fostered. The united front can be ever expanding so long as the revolutionary or progressive forces can retain their integrity, independence and initiative through consensual and consultative arrangements.

There is a need to broaden the united front wherever possible in order to arouse, organize and mobilize a greater number of people for national liberation and democracy and defend the progressive forces against the enemy scheme to isolate and destroy them.

The organs of political power must continue to be built at the village level and from the village level upward along the line of the united front. The National Democratic Front should be chiefly instrumental in paving the way for the formation of organs of political power from the municipal level to the national level until the People's Revolutionary Government can be proclaimed.

The National Democratic Front can study, assist in and administer certain functions of the emerging people's government. The Party can continue to lead even as the NDF and the existing organs of political power take on more responsibilities.

The Party should see to it that the National Democratic Front keeps on enlarging and strengthening itself, without diluting its national democratic line and composition. But the NDF must always be open to the broadening of the national united front through formal and informal arrangements with other forces, eventually towards the formation of a people's consultative council and finally the people's democratic government.

In the future, the NDF will play the major role in negotiations, leading to the recognition of its status of belligerency or the recognition of the provisional revolutionary government. We must therefore learn lessons from the ceasefire agreement of December 10, 1986. There should be no more

negotiations leading to an agreement expressly stipulating that the NDF is not invested with the status of belligerency. Furthermore, the venue of the negotiations should not be subject to enemy surveillance and exposure of Party cadres and allies should be guarded against.

The Party should never allow itself to be preoccupied with and divided over the question of boycott or participation in any voting exercises initiated and staged by the reactionary state. This is even more so in situations like the 1978 and 1986 elections, when being engrossed with the question of boycott or participation resulted in the failure to correctly appraise the upsurge in mass political activity.

It suffices for the Party, which in the first place is excluded from the voting exercise, to expose the farcical character of the exercise and propagate the line of national democratic revolution.

At the same time, the Party can counter the enemy's counterrevolutionary dual tactics of conjuring the illusion of democracy through the voting exercise by using revolutionary dual tactics and encouraging the legal progressive parties to expose the limits of the voting exercise and at the same time use it to gain certain advantages for the people.

Progressive mass organizations and alliances can stand above the voting exercise of the reactionary government by exposing its farcical character or its limits and declaring the criteria and objectives of a truly democratic exercise. They should avoid becoming minor objects or players in reactionary electioneering. Instead, they should concentrate on the fundamental issues.

Regarding secret Party units and members assigned to work inside reactionary parties, trade unions and other mass organizations, bourgeois institutions, churches, and the civil bureaucracy and the military of the enemy, they must be encouraged and allowed to adopt the appropriate methods and style of doing their work effectively and must not be burdened with demands that would negate their role.

To win total victory, the organizational strength of the Party must increase by several folds from its current level. The few hundreds of thousands of Party members necessary for winning total victory must be drawn from militated organized masses running into millions.

The increase in Party membership can be planned and carried out in stages. The plan can be based on the current membership; and directions of growth can be seen in the light of territorial and functional needs.

There must be so many Party members able to lead work and handle functions in 42,000 villages, 1,500 municipalities and cities, 73 provinces and in central offices of the future people's democratic state. This is the maximum goal towards which the Party membership must grow in stages.

The line is to boldly increase the membership of the Party on the basis of the mass movement, without letting in a single enemy agent. All requirements for enrolling, verifying and developing candidate-members and full members must be strictly and promptly followed.

The guarantee for the effectiveness as well as the security of the Party is the principle and exercise of democratic centralism; and the vigilance and militance of Party cadres and members with a mature sense of judgment and tested in the crucible of revolutionary struggle.

The overwhelming majority of Party members are good communists at every given time. Neither suspiciousness nor intrigues of the enemy can divide or reduce the unity and strength of the Party. The weaknesses and errors of Party members are overcome through criticism and self-criticism. Any enemy agent can be sifted out through the correct methods of observation, tests, evaluations, investigation, trial and judgment.

Higher organs must be sufficiently representative of the Party organizations they encompass, must issue timely guidelines and directives, and must put into full play the dedication, energy, creativity and resourcefulness of the lower organs, organizations and their members.

The system of political officers, who are not integrated into the units they supervise and who practically comprise another layer of authority, should be set aside. The problem of bureaucratism has been exaggerated by the system of political officers which tends to breed authoritarianism, make lower collectives dependent on individuals who either do not show up promptly or are hyperactive to the point of stifling initiative in the lower organs.

The decision from a higher organ may be correct and prompt. But should it encounter any objection or resistance, the persuasive style based on facts and correct arguments rather than invocation of authority and threats of disciplinary action must be used. The particular conditions of the lower organs and organizations and their political environment must be taken into account.

In the Communist Party of the Philippines, the principle of collective responsibility is principal to individual responsibility but should not be used to stifle the latter. Party cadres must be able to exercise executive functions and

Party members must be able to take initiative in accordance with provisions of the Party constitution, standing policies and the accumulation of decisions.

Study and work meetings are necessary to make for collective life. But these should not be unnecessarily frequent or prolonged to the point of robbing the Party cadres and members of the time and energy to implement the decisions.

Certain leading organs and staffs must be streamlined in order to release more cadres to the field. There must be prompt decisions by leading organs on major problems and issues at their own levels to avoid the hardening and anarchy of contradictory positions among lower organs and units.

It is bad not to have any record of any kind and depend solely on an oral tradition. Major decisions and guidelines have to be put on record as the result of collective decision-making. But excessive recording of detailed information and raw minutes of meetings can be equally bad or even worse when the enemy gets hold of the data.

The advantages and disadvantages of modern technical equipment like computers and radio have to be fully understood. While they could enhance the recording, filing and sharing of information necessary for decision-making and coordination, they can also be used to excess or handled carelessly leading to the loss of sensitive and tactical information to the enemy.

The use of radio equipment other than for tactical offensives and mobile broadcasts can also be dangerous. Frequent and prolonged communications through transceivers between fixed points are easily traced by the enemy. Strict rules must be observed to limit the use of radio communications to the truly necessary and to ensure the security of all transmissions.

The regular structure of the Party must be continuously developed. There must be a fluid interaction between higher and lower organs and organizations; and between coordinated organs and organizations under a higher organ. Just as there is a structure and division of responsibilities vertically and horizontally, there should be a correspondent structure and division of detailed information which need not be over-concentrated on the impetus of modern technical equipment so as to prevent the enemy from getting undue knowledge of the revolutionary movement.

So long as it resolutely, militantly and thoroughly carries out its ideological, political and organizational building, the Communist Party of the Philippines is certain to lead the broad masses of the Filipino people of various nationalities and ethno-linguistic communities to total victory in the nation-

al democratic revolution against US imperialism and the local reactionaries;
and bring about the start of the socialist revolution.

Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!

Long live the Filipino proletariat and people!

Onward to total victory!

**Red Salute to the New
People's Army, Persevere
in Protracted People's War**

March 29, 1994

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines formulated and approved the Rules of the New People's Army (NPA) and subsequently established the NPA on March 29, 1969, in line with the 1967–68 basic rectification document, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the Party Constitution and the *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution*. Since then, 25 years ago, the NPA under the leadership of the Party has made great advances and won great victories in the Filipino people's armed revolution against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. Today, the NPA stands as the largest, strongest and most tempered army ever nurtured and developed by the revolutionary proletariat and the other exploited people in Philippine history. It has surpassed the army of the old national democratic revolution of 1896 to 1902 in terms of revolutionary content and direction and in terms of strategy and tactics, nationwide scope and perseverance. It has also far surpassed the old people's army that was established in 1942.

The NPA is a revolutionary army tested and tempered in the crucible of 25 years of fierce revolutionary struggle. It resolutely combated the US-Marcos regime from 1969 to 1986 and was a major and indispensable factor for its overthrow. The imperialists and the local reactionaries decided to remove the fascist dictator in order to preempt the advance of the revolutionary forces. But the NPA has continued to fight and win brilliant victories against the succeeding big comprador-landlord regimes of Aquino and Ramos and overcome every escalation of armed counterrevolution, including the most deceptive propaganda.

We salute the heroic and valiant New People's Army, the proletarian revolutionaries, the Red commanders and fighters for the/r great achievements. They have scored great victories by pursuing the correct revolutionary line under the leadership of the Party through hard work, courageous struggle and sacrifices. We pay our highest respects to the revolutionary martyrs who have made the supreme sacrifice by selflessly giving up their lives in the service of the people. The broad masses of the people cherish and support the NPA because it fights for their national and democratic rights and interests.

Through the twists and turns of the armed revolution, errors in line, erroneous tendencies, shortcomings and setbacks of varying scales have occurred at different times. But these have always been overcome through criticism and self-criticism and through comprehensive rectification as a process of

clarifying and implementing the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

The current rectification movement has won an overwhelming and resounding victory. The reaffirmation of basic revolutionary principles and the rectification of accumulated gross deviations, errors and shortcomings have raised to a new and higher level the fighting will and capabilities of the revolutionary forces and the entire people against foreign monopoly capitalism and the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords.

I

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

In line with the current rectification movement being conducted by the Party, let us uphold the basic revolutionary principles that have correctly and successfully guided the NPA. Without these basic principles, it would have been impossible for the Party even only to establish the NPA and start the people's war. The concrete semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions that impelled and justified the establishment of the people's army have persisted and worsened. The people's war continues until the ruling system is overthrown and national liberation and democracy are achieved.

The establishment of the NPA along the proletarian revolutionary line was the fruit of the struggle between those who upheld Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and those who peddled modern *revisionism* in the Philippines and internationally. Only after the establishment of the CPP on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was it possible to establish the NPA and overcome the long train of Right and "Left" opportunist errors of the Lava revisionist renegades in the old merger party of the Communist and Socialist parties and the gangsterism of the Taruc-Sumulong clique among the roving remnants of the old people's army.

In applying Marxism-Leninism on the concrete conditions of the Philippines, the Party correctly analyzed and described Philippine history and circumstances. In *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the *Party Constitution*, *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution*, *Rules of the New People's Army* and *Philippine Society and Revolution*, the Party clarified the character of Philippine society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, the new democratic character of the current stage of the Philippine revolution, the motive forces and targets, the strategy and tactics, the tasks and socialist perspective of the revolution.

Since the very start, the Party has clarified that correspondent to the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of Philippine society, the new democratic revolution for achieving national liberation and democracy is necessary. The basic social conditions have not changed but have deepened and worsened under the weight of neocolonialism. The ruling system is in chronic crisis. The crisis has plunged from one level to another since 1969. It has consistently and increasingly made the ground ever more fertile for protracted people's war.

Under the pretext of looking for an easier and quicker way to power, the “Left” and Right opportunists have discarded the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Philippine society. They have metaphysically credited US imperialism and the Marcos fascist dictatorship with having industrialized and urbanized Philippine society to the extent of negating the strategic line of protracted people’s war and validating putschism or reformism as the way to power. In the early 1980s, it became fashionable for some petty-bourgeois dilettantes to adopt or be swayed by either the official development theory promoted by the UN, IMF and World Bank or the theory of dependent capitalism promoted by the neo-Kautskyites and to disregard the analysis of the particular mode of production in the Philippines.

As Lin Biao had erroneously extrapolated that the fate of the world was one-sidedly to be decided by the countryside of the world, there were those who extrapolated that the fate of the world was to be one-sidedly decided by the metropolis of the world. This latter extrapolation most suited the Right opportunists who argued for bourgeois reformism against the line of protracted people’s war in the Philippines. On the other hand, the “Left” opportunists grabbed the claim of a high degree of industrialization and urbanization in order to propose shortcuts to the seizure of political power. Uprisings abroad, irrespective of historical context and social content, were touted as models to emulate.

The NPA is under the absolute leadership of the CPP. This is in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist principle that the working class through its advance detachment is the leading class in the current new democratic stage and in the subsequent socialist stage of the Philippine revolution. The Party must command the gun in order to use it as an instrument for overthrowing the exploiting classes, effecting national and social liberation, empowering the working people and ensuring the rule of the working class in socialist society until communism is attained.

The Party is at the head and at the core of the NPA. It sets the line of the NPA ideologically, politically and organizationally. The Party’s organs of leadership lead the NPA at various levels of command. Within the NPA, there are Party units and Party cadres to ensure the absolute leadership of the Party over the NPA. The principle of democratic centralism guides the Party as well as the people’s army.

It is wrong to propagate and carry out the line that the NPA is independent of the Party and that it must have an independent and separate machinery. This was the noxious line pursued by the renegades Romulo Kintanar and Arturo

Tabara while they were still in commanding positions within the NPA. It was their license for converting certain parts of the NPA into their independent kingdoms, engaging in militarism, gangsterism and gross malversation of funds, together with Filemon Lagman. All the aforementioned criminal gangsters had the same political and organizational line as Ricardo Reyes and Benjamin de Vera in whipping up the "Left" opportunist line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism.

It is likewise wrong to counterpose the revolutionary armed struggle to the revolutionary united front, misrepresenting the former as purely military and the latter as purely legal and political. The Right opportunists sought to convert certain legal organizations into their independent kingdoms and sought to use the united front as a vehicle for liquidating the vanguard role, the independence and initiative of the Party and for misleading the revolutionary forces into parliamentarism, reformism and pacifism.

Armed struggle is the principal form of revolutionary struggle in the Philippines today and until political power is seized nationwide. The legal form or struggle is secondary even as these are important and indispensable. The revolutionary armed struggle, like the legal forms of struggle, runs along the revolutionary class line of the united front. The united front is principally for promoting the armed struggle and secondarily the legal struggle. And there can be no revolutionary united front without the class leadership of the proletariat through its advance detachment.

In building the people's army in the countryside under the current social circumstances, the Party is performing the proletarian revolutionary duty of wielding the most effective weapon for overthrowing the enemy and seizing political power. After all, the central task of any revolution is the seizure of political power. The genuine proletarian revolutionary party does not shirk the responsibility of waging armed revolution where and when conditions permit.

There is revolutionary class logic in pursuing and carrying out the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside and accumulating strength over an extended period, until it is possible to seize the cities in a nationwide offensive. The protracted people's war allows the working class and its party to forge the worker-peasant alliance as the foundation of the united front and victory; and to build the organs of democratic power even as the enemy is still entrenched in the cities.

The majority of our people are peasants. They are the main force of the new-democratic revolution, while the proletariat is the leading force. The agrar-

ian revolution is the main content of the democratic revolution. This must be accomplished. Otherwise the proletariat and the Party cannot gain the mass support of the peasantry and base the strengthening of the people's army and the advance of the protracted people's war on this support.

Revolution is a mass undertaking for the seizure of political power and for the radical transformation of the society by the revolutionary class. The revolutionary forces and the people in the Philippines have no choice but to wage a revolution that decisively puts an end to oppression and exploitation by foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and proceeds to socialist revolution.

So long as the objective of the Party and the NPA is to carry out the new-democratic and socialist stages of the Philippine revolution, there is no other way but to pursue the people's war. The Philippine revolution differs fundamentally from liberation movements seeking decolonization through negotiated neocolonial compromise. It also differs from those seeking mere bourgeois democracy against despotism through popular urban uprisings. Certainly, it differs from the coups d'état engineered by Soviet social-imperialism in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and other countries.

As a result of people's war, there is now dual political power in the Philippines. The reactionary state is still entrenched in the cities. But Red political power has arisen and will continue to grow until it displaces and overthrows the reactionary state all over the country. Only upon nationwide seizure of political power is the new-democratic revolution basically completed and the proletariat acquires the ground and opportunity for commencing the socialist revolution.

Without the people's army, the people have nothing. This was true of China when Comrade Mao first said it. This is still true of the Philippines. Without the people's army, there would be no Red organs of political power, no revolutionary mass organizations and no effective land reform campaign and other campaigns for the socioeconomic benefit of the people in the guerrilla fronts. Without the revolutionary armed struggle as a powerful coordinate, even the legal democratic mass movement would weaken.

Were the people's army to be liquidated or made completely passive by capitulation, prolonged ceasefire or a truce, the Party and the revolutionary mass organizations would become as marginal, inconsequential and vulnerable to reactionary manipulation or suppression as the puny pseudo-progressive and reformist groups all clamoring for peace under the terms of the ruling system. The long time Lavaite revisionists, the Gorbachevites, the bourgeois populists,

liberals, Christian social democrats and Trotskyites have not grown any larger nor any more powerful by their line of thinking and activity. In fact, they are no more than special agents of the principal reactionaries in opposing the revolutionary forces.

After being frustrated with their line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism, the incorrigible "Left" opportunists have become blatantly counterrevolutionary Rightists and joined up with anticommunist petty bourgeois groups along the line of liquidationism, reformism and pacifism. Some of them still speak of uprisings in the vague future, while others have plunged into private business or have openly become psy-war and intelligence agents of the enemy. As the results of the rectification movement come into full play in advancing the revolution, these scoundrels will further expose their degenerate counterrevolutionary character.

The NPA is the main mass organization of the Party. It is the instrument of the Party for waging the principal form of revolutionary struggle and for integrating the armed struggle with land reform and the building of the revolutionary mass base (organs of political power and the mass organizations). It is the type of mass organization that now has the highest concentration of Party members.

The NPA is principally a fighting force. At the same time, it is a force for propaganda, mass organizing and production. Without painstaking mass work, it cannot win the participation and support of the people in the armed struggle. The notion that the NPA is solely a military force or the purely military viewpoint is anathema to the theory and practice of people's war. However, to deny the necessity of having a military force is wrong in view of the necessity of smashing military and bureaucratic machinery of the state. The theory of spontaneous masses, which exaggerates the importance of sweeping mass campaigns (or street activism) without painstaking mass work and solid mass organizing is detrimental to the armed revolution.

Only by building the people's army and carrying out the people's war in stages is it possible to seize, keep and consolidate political power and carry out social revolution. The probable course of the protracted people's war involves three strategic stages: the defensive, the stalemate and the offensive (or counter-offensive). There is no other probable course for the successful development of a people's army that starts from being small and weak against an antipeople army that is big and strong.

In the strategic defensive, tactical offensives are waged to accumulate armed strength. Extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare is carried out on the basis of an ever expanding and ever deepening mass base. As our experience in the past 10 years has shown, it is disastrous to rush into regular mobile warfare when the general level of development of the people's war is still guerrilla warfare. The premature formation of larger units of the people's army is destructive to the mass base. When the people's army fails to expand and consolidate its mass base, the situation takes a purely military character and becomes favorable to the militarily superior enemy forces. Thus, the "Left" opportunist line of premature regularization and "strategic counteroffensive" and the line of combining insurrectionism and military adventurism have been disastrous.

To be able to build the mass base and fight effectively, the NPA maintains a correct and well-balanced force structure. A higher level of command can have a concentrated force acting as the center of gravity but should echelon the forces in such a manner that lower levels of the revolutionary forces can develop and that the work of expanding and consolidating the mass base is not adversely affected. In every guerrilla front, there is a center of gravity (rallying point or strike force) which is in relative concentration when there are no operations requiring absolute concentration. At the same time, there are the more dispersed small units which can do mass work on a wide scale, expand the room for maneuver of the center of gravity and impede the ability of the concentrated enemy forces to occupy territory.

It is self-destructive for a people's army to put certain larger units into constant absolute concentration at the cost of having to eliminate or drastically reduce the necessarily bigger number of small units which are dispersed on a wider scale for mass work. To create a prematurely large center of gravity is to separate it from the mass base, impose a heavy logistical burden on the people and offer a visible target to the enemy. The center of gravity cannot function as such if it is not surrounded and supported by the dispersed small units, militia and self-defense units, and, of course, by the local organs of political power, the mass organizations and the broad masses of the people.

So far, in the NPA's entire 25-year history, the small units (armed propaganda teams, squads and platoons) closely linked to the masses have been the most effective in annihilating enemy units and most responsible for seizing most of the firearms from the enemy. In sharp contrast, the prematurely formed companies in Mindanao in 1983–84 and nationwide in 1986 onward were capable of only a few dramatic actions until they were bogged down by logistical problems

and exposed to enemy counterattack due to the loss of mass base. Were it not for the erroneous lines of premature regularization and "strategic counteroffensive," combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and all their variants, the people's army would have made steadier, greater and cumulative advances and would not have suffered serious losses.

In leading the NPA, the Party pursues the antifeudal revolutionary line. It relies mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers; wins over the middle peasants, neutralizes the rich peasants, and takes advantage of the contradictions between the enlightened and evil gentry in order to destroy the power of one despotic landlord clique after another. The degree of enlightenment among the exploiters is measured by their willingness to negotiate and conform to the laws and regulations of the people's revolutionary government.

Until now, the minimum land reform program of land rent reduction and elimination of usury is being carried out. Certainly, the maximum land reform program of land confiscation and free distribution of land to the tillers shall be undertaken at the appropriate stage. Agrarian revolution is the unwavering objective of the new democratic revolution even as we are against premature outbursts of peasant insurrections or uprisings, which expose the organized peasantry and thrust the peasant masses to a level of struggle beyond their capacity to win. In this regard, we have thoroughly studied and drawn lessons from instances of premature confiscation of land in our own experience and from the peasant uprisings in Asia from the 1920s to the Naxalbari movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The antifeudal line is within the framework of the general line of the people's democratic revolution. The Party upholds the leading role of the working class; builds the worker-peasant alliance as the foundation of the revolution; wins over the petty bourgeoisie as one more basic revolutionary force; further wins over the middle bourgeoisie as a positive force, upholding its legitimate interests while being on guard against its dual and vacillating character; and takes advantage of the contradictions among the reactionaries, isolates and destroys the power of one big comprador-landlord clique in power after another, until the entire ruling system is defeated.

The united front policy of the Party has the objective of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the people in their millions. It serves mainly to promote the revolutionary armed struggle. At the same time, it involves various forms of alliances, including the local organs of political power, the National Democratic Front

and the legal alliances. It promotes all forms of revolutionary struggle even as it promotes the armed struggle as the principal form of revolutionary struggle.

The NPA is the instrument of the Party and the people for destroying the political power of the reactionaries and clearing the way for the establishment of the local organs of political power until the power of the reactionaries that is entrenched in the cities can be completely overthrown and replaced with the people's democratic state. There is no other way to achieve the basic completion of the new democratic revolution. Subsequently, socialist revolution and construction can be undertaken in the Philippines. The unwavering perspective of the NPA is to become the pillar for the defense of socialist society.

The NPA carries out the armed revolution in accordance with the principle of self-reliance. In its 25-year history it has grown in strength and advanced because of the people's participation and support. The Red commanders and fighters have learned to fight and increase their fighting capacity in the course of revolutionary struggle. Nearly all their weapons have been accumulated through tactical offensives against the enemy. All previous attempts to import weapons have either resulted in little or no benefit and even adverse consequences. Under the present international circumstances, the NPA recognizes that it has to wage revolutionary armed struggle more self-reliantly than ever before.

The NPA is guided by the principle of proletarian internationalism. By waging protracted people's war under the leadership of the Party, the NPA is performing the internationalist duty of fighting—in common with the proletariat and people of the world—against imperialism and all reaction and for the bright future of socialism and communism. By waging the revolutionary struggle self-reliantly, it can contribute significantly and substantially to the cause of world proletarian revolution. It is self-defeating to be dependent on material assistance from abroad.

The Philippine revolution stands to benefit from the rise of revolutionary movements led by the proletariat all over the world and from the political and moral support of the proletariat and people of the world. The revolutionary forces in the Philippines will always welcome material assistance from abroad but will never become dependent on it. The victory of the Philippine revolution cannot depend on any other but the revolutionary consciousness, strength and struggle of the Filipino proletariat and people.

II

FORWARD MARCH OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Soon after reestablishment in 1968, the Party deployed proletarian revolutionary cadres to the countryside to resume the armed revolution. They took a decisive step in upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, carrying forward the general line of new-democratic revolution through protracted people's war and repudiating both the Lava revisionist renegades and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique.

A. FORMATIVE PERIOD OF THE NPA, 1969–79

The proletarian revolutionary cadres conjoined with the good part of remnants of the old people's army and formed the NPA 25 years ago today. The NPA started with only 60 guerilla squad leaders and fighters armed with nine automatic rifles and 26 single-shot rifles and handguns and had a mass base of some 80,000 people in the second district of Tarlac province in Central Luzon.

The Party inherited what it could from the previous armed revolutionary movement and sought to raise this to a new and higher level guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. From the very outset, the Party Central Committee led and directed the strengthening of the NPA through revolutionary education, mass work, land reform and tactical offensives against the enemy in the initial guerrilla front; and immediately trained cadres for nationwide expansion, particularly for Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon and the Visayas.

In April 1969, the Party militated thousands of peasants from Tarlac to join the workers and youth in a demonstration of 15,000 people in Manila against US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. This served to further put into the hands of the reestablished Party the highest initiative in the legal democratic mass movement and at the same time squelch the Lava revisionist renegades' taunt that the Party was Maoist but had no peasant following.

In May 1969, the Plenum of the Party Central Committee focused on the application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought on the concrete conditions of the Philippines, summed up the revolutionary experience in Central Luzon, further clarified the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war and integrated into the Party the veteran peasant cadres and Red fighters from the old revolutionary movement.

The need for nationwide expansion was stressed. Strategic points in the country and terrain more favorable for guerrilla warfare than the plains of Central Luzon were identified for the deployment of expansion cadres. At the same time, plans were laid out for expansion in Central Luzon, for overcoming the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique and for using the region as the resource base for nationwide expansion. The Plenum also decided to seek foreign military assistance.

The Party vigorously reproduced and propagated the founding documents of the Party and the NPA and the works of Comrade Mao Zedong and his great predecessors in the international communist movement. Before the end of 1969, *Philippine Society and Revolution* was produced and it served as the basic text for Party and mass education on Philippine history, the basic problems of the Filipino people and the new-democratic revolution.

From early 1969 to the end of 1970, tactical offensives brought NPA armed strength in Central Luzon to 200 automatic rifles. The mass base expanded rapidly in Isabela in Northern Luzon, while the expansion cadres assigned to Negros island in the Visayas met with failure in 1969 due to premature show of firearms before they could start organizing a mass base. While successful, the armed struggle in the initial guerrilla front in Central Luzon served as a powerful inspiration to the legal democratic mass movement that peaked with the First Quarter Storm of 1970. In the series of mass actions, each participated in by 50,000 to 100,000 people, the streets of Manila-Rizal reverberated with the slogan, “People’s war is the answer to martial rule!”

In reaction to the resounding successes of the revolutionary forces, the US-Marcos regime sought to nip the NPA in the bud by launching the very first campaign of military suppression—code named “Operation Prophylaxis”—in the middle of 1969, carrying out a number of massacres, concentrating a full division (Task Force Lawin) against the small NPA force and organizing paramilitary forces called “barrio self-defense units.” The mass base of the NPA was relatively deep going because of the long revolutionary experience of the people and the upgrading of the barrio organizing committees along the antifeudal class line. But it was narrow. By late 1970, the enemy succeeded through sheer concentration of forces in disrupting the mass base and the revolutionary forces in the initial guerrilla front.

After capturing the weapons of the NPA main unit in a raid on its encampment in the Tarlac-Zambales mountain, the enemy boasted of having wiped out the NPA. But unknown to him, Party and NPA expansion cadres had already

developed a far larger mass base of some 150,000 in Isabela province in Northern Luzon by 1970, which was an achievement because for the first time, the revolutionary forces led by the proletariat gained wide ground in Northern Luzon. As a fitting riposte to the enemy's boast that he had wiped out the NPA, an NPA force raided the armory of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City on the last day of 1970 and seized scores of automatic rifles in a special operation directed by the Party Central Committee.

In 1971, NPA guerrilla warfare started in the Partido district of Camarines Sur in Bicol and caught national attention. By the middle of 1971, the NPA guerrilla zones in Northern Luzon had spread to Aurora subprovince, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao. In late 1971, the NPA in Isabela had some 200 automatic rifles, some 500 shotguns in the hands of the militia and a mass base of 300,000. The disintegration of the Taruc-Sumulung gangster clique in 1971 also opened the whole of Central Luzon wide for NPA expansion.

In the period of 1969–71, the Party skillfully adopted the united front policy of cooperating with allies and taking advantage of the splits among the reactionaries to gather military and financial resources neutralize the local officials of the reactionary government and municipal police forces and facilitate the growth of the NPA especially in Tarlac, Isabela and Ifugao. This was possible because the ruling system is always breached by concrete political and economic contradictions among the reactionaries themselves.

In June 1971, the Party Central Committee Plenum summed up and drew lessons from the revolutionary experience in Central Luzon, Northern Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon and Negros island. Party cadres were assigned to form or firm up regional Party committees and expand guerrilla warfare in seven regions covering the entire country. From the experience summed up and the lessons drawn, the Plenum finalized the *Organizational Guide and Outline of Reports* (OG/OR). On the basis of discussions and consensus in the Plenum, the Party central leadership formulated and issued the *Rules for Establishing the People's Revolutionary Government* and *Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform* (RGLR).

In order to apply further the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the general line of the new-democratic revolution on concrete conditions, the regional Party committees were required to make social investigation and preliminary reports. These were necessary for laying the ground for the people's war. These followed the example of the Preliminary Report on Northern Luzon written in 1969. Using the OG/OR, Party cadres and Red

fighters in the guerrilla units undertook concrete social investigation and class analysis in their particular areas of operation in order to grasp the class line in arousing, organizing and mobilizing the masses in mass campaigns against local tyrants and bad elements.

From 1971 to 1974, the general trend was to form regional Party and NPA organizations from the Party members and revolutionary mass activists and to start mass work and guerrilla warfare at strategic points. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 and the declaration of martial law in 1972 did not cow the revolutionary forces and the people but goaded them to wage revolutionary armed struggle. The US-Marcos regime, using its own agents and some renegades, attempted to put the blame for the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing on Benigno Aquino and the Party but failed because its intended scapegoats vigorously made denials and the public saw clearly that the massacre was calculated to destroy all kinds of opposition and pave the way for the Marcos dictatorship.

Despite some gross setbacks in 1972–74, the principal fact was the significant growth in strength and advance of the Party, the NPA and other revolutionary forces from year to year. The nationwide expansion of the revolutionary forces far outweighed the setbacks which occurred at different places and different times. The armed propaganda teams became the most important means for carrying out mass work and implanting the Party and the NPA in the terrain most favorable for conducting guerrilla warfare all over the country.

All regional organizations of the Party and the NPA (outside Manila-Rizal) took deep roots and expanded at an unprecedented rate. The Party and NPA organizations in Northwestern Luzon (Ilocos, Mountain Provinces and Pangasinan), Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas and Mindanao were steadily developing. In 1974 the Party Politburo decided to streamline the Manila-Rizal-based central staff organs and to dispatch an unprecedented number of Party members and revolutionary mass activists (in the hundreds) to the countryside because of the greatly increased capacity of the Party and NPA regional organizations to absorb them.

Three NPA companies were formed in Isabela in 1971–72 in connection with a plan to receive imported firearms in 1972. After the failure of the importation plan, the three companies were wrongly kept in absolute concentration. Two of these became isolated in the Isabela forest region, which had been depopulated by the enemy since the latter half of 1972. The third company disintegrated in Nueva Vizcaya. In 1972–73, the initial armed propaganda teams in Mindanao were all wiped out because they bypassed the Visayan peasants on lower ground

and went directly to the armed hill tribes. But the revolutionary forces learned their lessons and took roots better in subsequent years.

In Western Visayas, incidents with losses in armed strength occurred but the armed struggle continued in 1973–74. In Sorsogon, an ill-armed platoon grew into a company also in 1973–74 but the company disintegrated in 1974 as a result of “Left” adventurist errors. A platoon remnant of the company which had broken up in Nueva Vizcaya grew into a company through tactical offensives in 1974–75 in Aurora subprovince. But the company had to break up into platoons in 1975, with one of the platoons marching to Nueva Ecija and becoming a force of Central Luzon.

In accordance with the decision of the May 1971 Central Committee Plenum, another arms importation plan was implemented in 1974 and again failed with worse results within its own scope. As in 1972, the failure was promptly and thoroughly assessed and criticized. The two arms importation plans did not involve any change of line and their adverse effects were inconsequential to the principal achievement of the Party and the NPA, which was their nationwide expansion and consolidation.

In 1974, *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War in the Philippines* further integrated the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war with the concrete conditions of the Philippines and summed up the rich experience acquired so far in the revolutionary armed struggle. It was adopted by the Party Central Committee in 1975 and it comprehensively guided the further development of people's war.

The document related the geographic and social conditions as well as the international conditions to the protracted people's war in the Philippines. It further clarified the correct strategy and tactics in class and operational terms. It put forward—among several points—the principle of centralized ideological and political leadership and decentralized operations; the line of major islands first, minor islands next; the need for self-reliance in developing the armed struggle; and the use of both the armed struggle and the united front to break enemy blockades. It raised the revolutionary confidence of the Party and the NPA in the conduct of people's war.

By the end of 1975, at the time of the Party Central Committee Plenum, the number of NPA Red fighters armed with automatic rifles had risen to a full thousand, excluding the far more numerous militia and self-defense units. All regional organizations of the Party and the NPA had become basically self-reliant. The central leadership no longer gave subsidies to the regional Party com-

mittees. On the other hand, it urged them to deliver their surpluses to the Party center for assisting weaker regional committees and the administrative and educational work of the Party center. In terms of its significant agenda and the replenishment of the Central Committee through nominations and election, the Plenum had the weight of a Party Congress.

On the basis of the discussions of the 1975 CC Plenum, the Party Executive Committee formulated and issued *Our Urgent Tasks* to guide in a comprehensive and deep-going way various aspects of revolutionary work along the antifascist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal line. The document summed up the experience of the revolutionary forces until 1975 and set the tasks for advancing the revolutionary struggle to a higher level. It spelled out the processes and phases of mass work, from social investigation to the building of the mass organizations, organs of political power and the Party branches. Together with *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War in the Philippines*, it would serve as an effective practical guide to the development of the revolutionary forces.

Throughout 1976, the guerrilla zones were multiplying nationwide. In an increasing number of regions, these zones were cohering into guerrilla fronts, consisting of well-consolidated guerrilla zones or stable guerrilla bases and a bigger number of guerrilla zones. The center of gravity was typically a guerrilla squad surrounded by widely dispersed squads, each responsible for a guerrilla zone equivalent to the size of a municipality and divisible into armed propaganda teams. The number of platoon-size tactical offensives increased significantly.

From 1977 to 1979, platoons emerged as the centers of gravity in some regions and guerrilla fronts in line with *Specific Characteristics of Our People's War in the Philippines* and *Our Urgent Tasks*. Tactical offensives by NPA units ranging in size from a platoon to two or three platoons further increased. It was in this period that the NPA forces in Eastern Visayas, especially in Samar island, caught nationwide attention for their successes in guerrilla warfare and mass work. The guerrilla forces grew in strength even as the enemy was concentrating larger forces against them.

Following the arrest of the principal leaders of the Party in 1976 and 1977, a new central leadership assumed responsibility in November 1977. As early as 1970, certain elements in the central leadership and some staff members, without benefit of concrete social investigation, started to put forward and propagate the notion that the Philippines was more urbanized and industrialized than China at the stage of its new-democratic revolution and thus urban struggle was

of greater importance in the Philippines than in China. Some of these elements spread the "Left" opportunist view that urban uprisings would be the key to effecting a leap from the early to the advanced substage of the people's war even as the NPA had no more than 2000 automatic rifles. Others spread the Right opportunist line that urban legal struggle was of decisive importance but that the Party was neglecting it.

B. RAPID ADVANCE, TWO-LINE STRUGGLE AND RECTIFICATION

From 1980 to 1983, the chronic crisis of the semi-feudal and semi-colonial system deepened further and rapidly worsened. This propelled the advance of the revolutionary movement. Under the guidance of *Our Urgent Tasks*, the Party and the NPA accelerated the building of the guerrilla fronts and guerrilla units and the launching of tactical offensives nationwide. Until 1981, a significant number of Party cadres and mass activists from the cities were deployed to the countryside.

The number of barrios covered by organs of political power increased yearly by more than 1200. Hundreds of thousands of peasants benefited from the open and underground implementation of the minimum land reform program. Guerrilla fronts covered almost entire provinces and big chunks of provinces. Those in Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol spanned two-thirds to three-fourths of the total land area and number of barrios. They extended to well-populated areas, including environs of town centers, along highways, seashores and plains.

In 1981 NPA fighters armed with automatic rifles were around 3000 NPA platoons had been formed in the most advanced guerrilla fronts and grew to 34 for the entire country by 1982. The NPA squads numbered more than 200. The NPA paid attention mainly to mass work. The squads and platoons could confiscate from the enemy an average of 900 automatic rifles annually from 1981 to 1983.

However, during the same period of 1980–83, the opportunist line became assertive in the Central Committee Exactly when the chronic crisis of the ruling system was becoming more virulent than ever and more favorable for the people's war, the opportunists of both "Left" and Right variety used the 1980 Central Committee Plenum to cast doubts on the Party's correct analysis of Philippine society as semi-colonial and semi-feudal and float the idea of modifying the strategic line of protracted people's war in order to shift the emphasis of work to urban-based legal and insurrectionary struggle and thereby effect a

leap from the early to the advanced substage of the strategic defensive. Albeit, the 1980 CC Plenum continued to express adherence to the ideological and political line of the Party and to the strategic line of protracted people's war, replenished the ranks of the Central Committee and defined 16 regional Party committees and army commands under interregional commissions called territorial commissions.

In 1981, the Political Bureau decided to push the "Left" opportunist line of making a leap from the early to the advanced substage of the strategic defensive through insurrections in third and fourth class municipalities and projected the line of "strategic counteroffensive" as the third and final stage of the strategic defensive through the "regularization" of the guerrilla forces and intensification of the war. On the assumption that the Philippines was 40 percent urban and 60 percent rural, the formula was set that the existing number of Party cadres and armed personnel were to be deployed in accordance with such a proportion. This laid the ground for the urban basing of the Party central leadership and the reverse flow of cadres from the rural areas to the urban areas.

Urban-basing of the central leading and staff organs in turn further encouraged the Right opportunists to exaggerate their urban-based assignments and increase their clout through their access to and use of funds from foreign funding agencies. They created more city offices and absorbed young Party members and mass activists who would otherwise have gone to the countryside to serve in the people's army. They dared to promote the line of liquidating the leadership of the Party in the united front, particularly through the proposal to convert the National Democratic Front into the so-called "New Katipunan" under the pretext of making the revolutionary movement more attractive to the anti-Marcos sections of the bourgeoisie.

From 1981 onwards, the Right opportunists circulated the draft of the "New Katipunan" program which drastically departed from the Party's Program for a People's Democratic Revolution and spread the line of giving away the initiative to the anti-Marcos reactionaries and petty bourgeois liberals and delivering to them the masses organized by the Party. The proletarian revolutionary cadres, especially from the regional Party committees and organizations, strongly criticized the Right opportunists and compelled the withdrawal of their draft.

In 1982, the central leadership dismantled the Education and Propaganda Commission and the National Instruction Bureau of the Central Committee. Handling of the basic and intermediate Party courses was passed on to the interregional commissions and regional committees while that of the advance Party

course and the theoretical organ was given to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. The result was that Party study courses and study materials, including basic Party documents, dwindled and disappeared as the Party and the NPA were pushed at all levels to concentrate attention and resources on military and other practical tasks in the political struggle.

Marxist-Leninist theoretical and political education was neglected exactly at a time that Party members and NPA commanders were being promoted to higher positions in the drive to “regularize,” complete the “advanced substage” of the strategic defensive and reach the final substage of “strategic counteroffensive.” Resources were easily made available for purely military training and for the purchase of ammunition, firearms, radio equipment, computers, cars and other urban underground facilities; but not for theoretical and political education and the production of study materials.

Under the influence of the wrong line set by the 1981 Politburo meeting, key members of the Mindanao Commission and its Executive Committee designed their own “Left” opportunist line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism in 1982. They had the erroneous presumption that the Party’s strategic line of protracted people’s war precluded giving due importance to work in the White areas, urban-based legal political struggle and international work (especially with regard to seeking military and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and Soviet-related countries). They adopted and spread the line that urban insurrection was the highest form of politico-military struggle—to be achieved through sweeping propaganda, urban mass actions and armed city partisan warfare—and that the NPA was a purely military and secondary force in the service of urban insurrection.

From the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 to the downfall of Marcos in 1986, the revolutionary armed struggle and the legal democratic mass movement surged forward in an unprecedented manner. In the main, the NPA carried out guerrilla warfare nationwide. Through tactical offensives, NPA guerrilla forces seized an average of 1000 automatic rifles every year, including mortars and machine guns, captured or killed high-ranking military and police officers (including generals) and extensively used radio communications, land mines and other explosives. The level of military training, technique, intelligence and medical work rose but the “Left” opportunists had started separating the military aspects of the struggle from the ideological and political line of the Party.

Simultaneously in their respective ways, the “Left” and the Right opportunists were at work in undermining and opposing the ideological and politi-

cal line of the Party. The “Left” opportunists in Mindanao implemented their line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and brought disaster to the revolutionary movement. The Right opportunists preoccupied themselves with building legal coalitions under the leadership of anti-Marcos bourgeois personalities, watering down the program of revolutionary struggle and obscuring the vanguard role of the Party; and, like the “Left” opportunists, neglected to build the Party core in the militant mass movement. The line of the Right opportunists tended to be obscured by the real need to broaden the range of forces for bringing about the downfall of the fascist dictatorship.

From 1983 to 1985, the drive in Mindanao was to raise the number of NPA companies to 15 by forming 10 new companies. The formation of these companies meant the absorption of previously widespread squads and platoons into the absolutely concentrated main and secondary regional guerrilla units separated from mass work. The term “full-time fighters” was reinterpreted to mean complete concentration on military tasks and separation from mass work. For Red fighters to attend to mass work was deemed as conservatism and “detracting” from what should be the principal task of the NPA.

The neglect of mass work resulted in the thinning out and narrowing of the mass base. At the peak of the drive to form companies, about 70-80 percent of the fighters were concentrated in main and secondary regional guerrilla units and only 20-30 percent were deployed as squads and platoons for mass work. By 1984, all the companies were in isolated and passive positions and suffered gross setbacks as the enemy escalated his strategic and tactical offensives in a purely military situation resulting from the “Left” opportunist error.

The “Left” opportunists in the Mindanao Commission ascribed the gross setbacks in 1984 to “deep-penetration agents” (DPAs) and they spread panic within the Party and the NPA. Upon the approval of the Executive Committee of the Mindanao Commission, its so-called Caretaker Committee launched in 1985 the anti-DPA campaign, codenamed Kampanyang Ahos. This involved the murder and torture of hundreds upon hundreds of Party members, Red fighters, mass activists and allies who were suspected of being DPAs. The rights of the victims were trampled upon in complete violation of the Bill of Rights in the *Rules for Establishing the People’s Revolutionary Government*, the *Party Constitution* and the *Rules of the NPA*.

For the first time in the history of the reestablished Party and the NPA, simultaneous losses in several regional organizations in Mindanao caused in 1985 a decline in their national growth. By 1986 Party membership in Mind-

anao fell from 9000 to 3000, the fifteen companies and 30 platoons fell to two companies and 17 platoons and the mass base shrunk by more than 50 percent. Despite the debacle in Mindanao, however, the overall growth rate of the NPA was an average of 1000 rifles each year from 1983–86 due to the advances of the regional Party and army organizations in the Visayas and Luzon.

The objective conditions for advancing the armed revolutionary movement were exceedingly favorable. The fascist dictatorship was undergoing its most severe crisis and was disintegrating as a result of popular outrage over the assassination of Aquino. The legal democratic mass movement and the armed revolutionary movement were both striking lethal blows at the regime. Although opportunist lines had started to undermine the revolutionary movement, these could not yet overcome the correct line and the accumulated strength of the revolutionary forces nationwide.

In the 1985 CC Plenum, the “Left” opportunists who had caused the disaster in Mindanao strutted about as if they were victorious strategists and tacticians and dared to demand the liquidation of the line of protracted people's war. The person who led the attack on the correct line of the Party was the same individual (Ricardo Reyes) who had written in 1984—in the name but without the approval of the Mindanao Commission—the document further elaborating on the line of combining urban insurrectionism with military adventurism.

The central leadership rebuffed the attack on the line of the Party by invoking the Party and NPA founding documents but upheld the line of “regularization” and “strategic counteroffensive” which parented the line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and which pushed for a quick shift to regular mobile warfare and spread the notion of toying with urban insurrections. The 1985 Plenum drew up the three-year program of achieving the “strategic counteroffensive” by forming many more companies (regular and guerrilla) and even battalions, raising the level of guerrilla warfare to regular mobile warfare and intensifying the war.

The tasks and objectives drawn up were far beyond the given level of development and actual capacity of the revolutionary forces. These included aiming for decisive revolutionary overthrow of the entire reactionary state together with the US-Marcos dictatorship. Furthermore, the Plenum promoted the principal architects of the “Left” opportunist line in Mindanao (Romulo Kintanar, Benjamin de Vera and Ricardo Reyes) to key positions in the central leadership of the Party and the national military staff of the NPA as these scoundrels kept the

Central Committee ignorant of the gross setbacks (which started in 1984) and Kampanyang Ahos (which started in 1985) in that island.

From 1985 onward, the Political Bureau and the Military Commission already packed with the “Left” opportunists—and the national military staff (renamed general command in 1988) pushed the disastrous line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism nationwide. From 1986 onward, various regions at various times suffered setbacks as a result of their own adaptations of the “Left” opportunist line.

These included the Southern Luzon Commission’s “victory in three years” concept of “fast-track/slow-track insurrection” in 1986; the Southern Tagalog regional Party committee version adopted also in 1986 (patterned after the Mindanao “pol-mil” approach), setting seven cities and provincial capitals as “insurrectionary flashpoints” and targeting 1990 for local insurrections; the concentration of guerrilla units under the regional command in Bicol in 1987; the Northern Luzon Commission’s “preparation of the SCO requirements” in 1986–88, with the Cagayan-Apayao-Ilocos Norte (CAIN) version of “carving out the solid North” and the Vizcaya-Quirino version of aiming for “localized strategic stalemate”; the “play to win, victory in one year” through insurrection in Central Luzon as late as 1991; the “second Edsa uprising” or “bugso” of the Manila-Rizal regional Party committee under Lagman from 1990 to 1992; and so on.

The nationwide implementation of the wrong line peaked in the drive to form 36 companies and several battalions from 1986 to 1988. This meant putting more than 60 percent of the Red fighters into the prematurely large formations which were absolutely concentrated for military tasks and leaving less than 40 percent of them in small units for mass work. In the Visayas, the chief purveyor of “Left” opportunism, Arturo Tabara, pushed the rapid formation of 15 companies and one battalion until 1988, which caused the drastic contraction of the mass base by more than 50 percent. In the worst cases in particular regions and guerrilla fronts, 80 percent of the Red fighters were put into main guerrilla units divorced from mass work and only 20 percent were in small units for mass work. In 1987, a significant number of NPA companies were already experiencing serious problems of discipline and coarseness among their personnel. There was unevenness in both the adoption and implementation of the “Left” opportunist line in various regions. The correct line could still continue in the gap between decision and implementation of the wrong line. And more importantly, when the line was proven wrong in practice, comrades sincerely

committed to the armed revolution usually made their own adjustments and rectification. Without these, it would have been more difficult for the central leadership to launch a comprehensive rectification movement in 1992.

Until sometime in 1987, the guerrilla fronts in Northern Luzon expanded even as they bore the main brunt of enemy campaigns of suppression. The number of barrios under local organs of political power were more or less maintained in the Visayas. In 1987, the national military staff unsuccessfully launched an anti-“low-intensity conflict” campaign and “nationally coordinated offensives” consisting of more than 600 major and minor mainly attritive operations targeting enemy hard points, and thus wasting ammunition and other resources. The urban insurrectionists of Metro Manila and a few other cities also accelerated operations of armed city partisans at a rate prejudicial to the legal democratic mass movement, especially to the urban poor communities. In 1988, in the wake of the costly extravaganza of the militarists and urban insurrectionists in 1987, there was widespread realization within the Party and the NPA that a lot of wrong had transpired and that these had to be rectified.

In 1988, the enemy mounted an intensive attack of unprecedented scale against the revolutionary forces in both rural and urban areas. This was a high point in his campaign of suppression which had been escalating since 1984. The urban-based central Party organs and the NPA general command were hit hard by enemy raids. Also in 1988, the proletarian revolutionaries in the Party central leadership noticed the 12 percent drop in the rural mass base of the revolutionary movement and the dwindling of NPA tactical offensives and they began to see the sabotage wrought on the legal democratic mass movement by the exponents of urban insurrectionism.

As a result of the enemy raids on its urban underground houses, the NPA general command lost a lot of its personnel, documents, funds, stock of electronic equipment, vehicles and seagoing vessels. An arms importation project went to naught at a cost far higher than that in the failed projects of the same nature in 1972 and 1974, excluding the high cost of the project of befriending Soviet-associated parties and soliciting arms donations since 1986.

The 1988 Party anniversary statement started to criticize the opportunist lines, the imbalances in work and the adverse results. The opportunists opposed many portions of the statement and made amendments according to their stand. However, the 1989 Politburo meeting decided to scale down the target for the verticalization of forces and to redeploy the forces for expansion, recovery and consolidation of the mass base. The proletarian revolutionary

cadres in the regional organizations of the Party and the army welcomed the corrections and adjustments.

In the 1989 Party anniversary statement, the Party central leadership issued the call to carry out rectification, further strengthen the Party and intensify the people's revolutionary struggle. The opportunists opposed the statement even more strongly than they did that of the previous year. In its 1990 meeting, the Politburo withdrew the erroneous line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" but inconsistently approved the erroneous resolutions of the 1989 NPA National Command Conference. This inconsistency manifested the two-line struggle intensifying between adherents of the proletarian revolutionary line and those "Left" opportunists opposed to it.

In 1991, however, the First National Conference on Political Work in the NPA identified some of the major errors and shortcomings and pointed out the extent of the damage caused by these. The report on the political work of the NPA (Refer to *Rebolusyon*, Series 1993 #2, April-June) and the conference itself took up the Party Central Committee's call for rectification in its 1988 and 1989 Party anniversary statements and made an assessment of the major problems besetting the people's army and adopted resolutions for solving them.

Even as corrections and adjustments were being made by the proletarian revolutionaries in the central leadership from 1988 onward, the "Left" opportunists intensified their opposition to the proletarian revolutionary line from year to year. They spread intrigues in particular units, organs and territories where they were, tried to convert these into their independent kingdoms, prevented the distribution of the Party's central documents and disrupted communications between the central leadership and the lower Party organs and organizations. They tried to paralyze and liquidate the central leadership by claiming that the Executive Committee of the Central Committee had no authority between meetings of the Political Bureau. They pushed lines diametrically opposed to the line of the Party and usurped authority for themselves.

Frustrated in implementing their wrong line, refusing to rectify their grave errors and afraid of being held to account for these errors and the consequences as well as for the crimes of bloody witch-hunt and gangsterism, the ringleaders of "Left" opportunism increasingly conspired with long-running Right opportunists against the Party and the central leadership from 1990 onward. Together, they spoke and acted along the line of liquidating the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

One of the scoundrels (Ricardo Reyes) was a promoter of the line of urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and the bloody witch-hunt, Kampanyang Ahos. He had a long record of flip-flopping from "Left" to Right opportunism or combining both types of opportunism in one big error. He played the key role in swinging the "Left" opportunists to a liquidation and counterrevolutionary Rightist line by using Gorbachevite arguments.

He was among the Right opportunists who sought to negate the character of the National Democratic Front as a united front organization and to degrade it into a mixed-up federated and unitary organization with a program of bourgeois nationalism, pluralism and mixed economy. These Right opportunists interpreted the united front as a framework for liquidating the Party and the NPA and for capitulating to the enemy. They pushed the line of going Right to reach the "Left" objective of insurrection in the medium term combined with Filemon Lagman's line of inducing urban insurrection through agent provocateur actions by a few armed city partisans during mass actions and sabotaged the legal democratic mass movement.

Later in 1991 the central leadership of the Party had gathered enough facts to assess comprehensively the state of the revolutionary forces. From 1987 to 1990, the Party membership declined by 15 percent, the number of Red fighters by 28 percent, the number of barrios covered by the local organs of political power by 16 percent and the number of organized masses in the countryside by 60 percent. The automatic rifles and other high-powered weapons of the NPA increased but the rate of increase dropped to the 1976–78 level.

In the face of these dismal figures, the Party central leadership decided to carry out a comprehensive and thoroughgoing rectification movement. The rectification movement is based on the information and decision arrived at through democratic interaction between the central leadership and lower Party organs and organizations through direct investigation, consultations, letters, conferences, reports and recommendations. In 1992, the rectification document "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" was approved in a series by the Executive Committee, the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Party.

Since 1992, the former "Left" opportunists have publicly swung to a blatantly counterrevolutionary Rightist and liquidationist position. They published vicious slander articles against the Party, the Central Committee and its 1992 Plenum, and the principal leaders of the Party. In so doing, they have openly combined with anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups and individuals in

attacking Marxism-Leninism and the Party by using arguments drawn from Gorbachevism, bourgeois populism, liberalism, social-democracy and Trotskyism. They have cast anticommunist, anti-Stalin slogans against the Party, the NPA, the NDF and the progressive mass organizations. They have sought to destroy and discredit these forces of the people. And they are now openly working with the US-Ramos regime and other anticommunist and antipeople forces in the country.

Although a two-line struggle between proletarian revolutionaries and bourgeois opportunists existed in the period of 1968–79, the deviations, errors and shortcomings were criticized and rectified promptly. However in the period of 1980–91, serious deviations, errors and shortcomings were allowed to run rampant for a long time. These even went into decisions of the central leading organs. The bourgeois opportunists violated the ideological, political and organizational line of the Party, the Party Constitution and Program. Fortunately, they failed to legitimize through a congress their violation of the line and basic revolutionary principles of the Party. They started clamoring for a Party congress under their terms only after the Party central leadership announced substantive preparations for a congress through a movement to criticize and repudiate major deviations and errors.

Notwithstanding the gross deviations and errors generated by the “Left” and Right opportunists from 1980 to 1991, the Party has upheld, defended and promoted the correct ideological, political and organizational line. Under the leadership of the Party, the NPA has grown in strength and advanced in line with the new-democratic revolution through protracted people’s war. The NPA could have won greater victories were it not for the long-running deviations and gross errors of the opportunists. The achievements of the proletarian revolutionaries and Red fighters were considerably reduced and sabotaged by the deviations and errors. The general level of development of the revolutionary forces had been set back to 1983–84 in several important respects at year-end 1991.

The NPA’s sum total of Red fighters armed with automatic rifles is equivalent to 24 basic battalions or eight basic regiments, excluding the far more numerous personnel of the militia and self-defense units armed with inferior weapons. There are 15 regional commands which are under the leadership of the Central Committee and the regional Party committees. Guerrilla fronts cover about 10,000 or 25 percent of the 41,000 Philippine barrios and substantial portions of more than 60 provinces of the total 74 provinces of the Philippines. NPA

guerrilla units can operate in more than 700 out of the 1540 municipalities and armed city partisans in many of the 60 chartered cities.

The NPA has been able to score its achievements by following the correct revolutionary class line and by paying special attention to giving full play to the role and initiative of women, youth, ethnic minorities, fishermen and progressive religious groups. The NPA has promoted the active participation of these sectors in the armed revolution to an extent and in a manner unprecedented in the entire history of the Philippines.

Since the rectification movement was launched, the NPA has become stronger than ever. The ideological, political and organizational leadership of the Party over the NPA has been consolidated. The Party core within the NPA is reinvigorated and growing. Revolutionary education has been promoted in all the NPA commands and units, through the reaffirmation of basic revolutionary principles and the rectification of the deviations and errors and shortcomings. The revolutionary experience of the NPA is summed up, lessons are drawn, criticism and self-criticism are conducted and the revolutionary tasks are set forth.

The Red fighters and units are enthusiastically engaged in mass work. They undertake mass education and propaganda among the people and assist them in forming the mass organizations and in conducting land reform and other mass campaigns. They are helping to build the local organs of political power. They are expanding into new areas, recovering lost ones and consolidating them. They are doing everything to create a wider and deeper mass base in order to be able to conduct the protracted people's war and win ever greater victories.

Since the rectification movement, the NPA has launched tactical offensives according to its given level of development and has overcome the attempts of the enemy to take advantage of weaknesses wrought by previous opportunist errors. In the first quarter of this year, a series of successful tactical offensives has occurred in close succession at various points of the archipelago, serving notice that the NPA continues to fight in the interest of the people and that it can neither be crushed nor wished away by the enemy.

III

FAVORABLE SITUATION FOR PROTRACTED PEOPLE'S WAR

Since the establishment of the NPA, the objective conditions favorable for waging a protracted people's war have persisted. The oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of the people have become even more intolerable. The socioeconomic and political crisis of the ruling system has deepened and has been aggravated from the time of Marcos, through that of Aquino to that of Ramos.

A. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The social economy remains agrarian, semi-feudal and preindustrial. Agriculture is landlord-dominated, prevalently backward, non-mechanized, principally for subsistence and secondarily for domestic and foreign trade. The economy lacks basic industries that produce basic metals, chemicals, equipment and precision instruments. It is dependent on the importation of equipment, raw materials (especially fuel) and semi-processed components. The service sector revolves around the exchange of raw-material exports and manufactured imports.

The degree of urbanization in the Philippines is still around 25 percent, although official demographers artificially raise it to the level of more than 40 percent by simply adding up the total population of Metro Manila, the chartered cities, provincial capitals and town centers. In fact, conditions of rural poverty and backwardness have moved into the monster city of Metro Manila, with some 88 percent of the urban population dependent on odd jobs, living in shanties or as homeless occupying sidewalks and public places, and deprived of piped-in water and any sewage system.

The exhaustion of the land frontier since the end of the 1960s has created a huge army of surplus labor in the countryside, an excessive number of seasonal farm workers competing for odd jobs in the rural and urban areas. A great part of the odd jobbers in Metro Manila double as seasonal farm workers in nearby provinces. The overwhelming majority of the residents in the provincial "urban" areas are peasants. The huge emigration since the 1970s of six million Filipinos (mostly women, especially after the construction boom in the Middle East) or nearly ten percent of the population (mainly as overseas contract workers and

secondarily as professionals) has been the result of the inability of the domestic economy to employ them.

In terms of estimated GNP, the size of the Philippine economy at current prices is around P/1.4 trillion or US\$51 billion. Averaging this figure with a population of 68 million to get an annual per capita income of US\$750 is a misleading exercise because the bulk of the GNP goes to the foreign monopolies and the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords, comprising less than one percent of the population. More than 40 percent of the GNP is accounted for by transactions involving foreign exchange. If we further subtract from the GNP what goes to the urban middle social strata, comprising no more than nine percent, what is left for the working class and peasantry—that together comprise 90 percent of the population—amounts to intolerable poverty, deprivation and misery. According to independent estimates, those who live below the poverty line fluctuate between 75 and 80 percent of the people. Some 40 to 50 percent cannot afford even the barest nutritional needs.

The Philippines is dependent on the export of agricultural and mineral products whose prices have been depressed since the 1970s due to the global overproduction of primary products. The deteriorating terms of trade have continuously pressed down the export income of neo-colonies like the Philippines. Low value-added manufactures for reexport (garments, semiconductors, shoes, toys and the like) fetch little or no net income due to transfer-pricing. At the end of 1993, the foreign trade deficit stood at US\$6.1 billion. Notwithstanding continued foreign borrowing and the increased dollar receipts from overseas contract workers, the balance of payments registered a negative US\$92 million.

As of August 1993, the acknowledged foreign debt of the Philippines is US\$34.4 billion, increasing by 16.3 percent from the previous acknowledged level. It is projected that 32.5 percent of the 1994 budget of the reactionary government will be spent on foreign debt service. More than nine percent is further allocated for military expenditures, excluding expenditures for the national police, the intelligence agency under the president, intelligence units under various government departments, and other military-related expenditures camouflaged under civilian accounts. According to understated projected figures, 41.69 percent of the 1994 budget will be gobbled up by foreign debt service and military expenditures alone. The actual expenditures for these usually go beyond 60 percent annually.

Deficit-spending by the reactionary government continues to rise. It is characterized by decreased spending on infrastructure and social services and

increased spending on debt service and the military. Due to tighter foreign credit and the IMF dictation that highest priority should be given to debt service, domestic borrowing continues unabated and has pushed up the level of public debt to P/656 billion or US\$24 billion at year-end 1993. In 1986, the year-end level of domestic public debt was P/123 billion. In 1992, the last year of the Aquino regime, it reached P/508 billion. The six-year Aquino regime outstripped by several times the 20-year Marcos regime in this regard. The Ramos regime is raising the domestic public debt at an even faster rate.

The principal multilateral agencies controlling and dictating the economic policy of the reactionary government are the IMF, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the GATT and other agreements on world trade. The US, Japanese and other foreign monopolies compete and collude against the economic sovereignty and interests of the Filipino people. They extract superprofits mainly through transfer pricing in trade and through debt service rather than through declared profit remittances from direct investments. The annual rate of investment inflow chiefly from US and Japanese transnational corporations is around US\$300 million. These investments, together with official “development aid” (ODA) and commercial loans, merely facilitate the sale of foreign manufactures and the production of raw materials and fringe processing of certain manufactures and do not promote but counter industrial development.

There is an accumulated unemployment of more than 50 percent among the 28 million people with the capacity to work. But official statistics make it appear that the unemployment rate is only eight percent (as of October 1993), thus beating on paper most of the industrial capitalist countries. The same statistics currently puts the unemployment rate in Metro Manila and Central Luzon at 16.4 and 11.2 percent, respectively. Independent analysts estimate the underemployment rate of 32.9 percent in addition to the officially acknowledged unemployment rate. Official statistics regarding employment are unreliable because they exclude from the range of reckoning those who have ceased to look for jobs and include as fully employed many of those who have no regular employment.

Unemployment in the Philippines has risen drastically in recent years because of the scarcity of foreign exchange for importing producer goods (especially equipment and fuel) and the resultant breakdown of production in both industry and agriculture. Infrastructures and basic social services have also broken down. The destruction of the environment is worse than ever due to the

exploitation of human and natural resources by the foreign monopolies and their big comprador agents.

The scarcity of basic consumer and producer goods has caused an inflationary spiral, victimizing the toiling masses and even the urban middle social strata. But official statistics claim an inflation rate fluctuating only between nine and eleven percent, a computation kept low by manipulating the content of the basket of basic goods. However, the consumer price index and the depreciation of the peso show the inflationary spiral. The legislated daily minimum wage in Metro Manila remains at P/118, which is normally not followed where workers are not unionized. The value of this amount shrank to P/63.72 in real terms in 1993. But the daily cost of living for a family of six is P/243.5. As a result of protest actions of the trade union movement, the regime was compelled to promise an increase of a measly P/25 in the daily minimum wage. But until now this has not been legislated.

Unemployment is rampant among the workers which comprise around 15 percent or four million of the labor force. Employers in the Philippines follow the world trend among capitalists of reducing the number of regular workers entitled to security of tenure and social security benefits. They do so by dismissing regular workers and taking in irregular workers under various terms, like agency workers, contract workers, casuals, part-timers, learners and apprentices. The devices to reduce the number of regular workers, press down wages and maximize profits are the same devices for breaking up organized labor. As before, the reactionary regime used yellow trade unions to preempt genuine trade unions. At worst, the military, police and paramilitary forces are used to harass and destroy genuine trade unions and to physically break up strikes and other concerted actions.

The peasant masses, especially the poor and middle peasants, comprising 75 percent of the population suffer severely from feudal and semi-feudal conditions. Eighty percent of the peasants or sixty percent of the entire population do not own the land that they till. Most of what they produce is for their subsistence, whose level keeps on going down and their surplus product is appropriated by the landlords for exchange in the domestic and foreign commodity market. Since 1969, the surplus labor in the rural areas has rapidly increased and has been hemmed in due to the exhaustion of the land frontier and the lack of industrial development. Thus, there has been an explosive increase in the number of farm workers, urban oddjobbers and overseas contract workers

In sharp contrast to previous regimes, which made big promises of land reform with token results, the current Ramos regime unabashedly assures landlords of continued possession of their estates and likewise the foreign transnational corporations of their privilege to use land and exploit the natural resources through 75-year lease contracts. The preponderant types of exploitation in the countryside include the traditional forms of sharecropping, the fixed rent system, the hiring of cheap seasonal farm workers, usury and the use of imported inputs (mechanical and chemical) to extract a bigger share of income for the landlords and merchant usurers. Because of the huge surplus of labor, the landlords and farm capitalists do not find it necessary to mechanize or use harvester combines.

Aside from economic exploitation, the peasant masses suffer the most violent forms of oppression in the form of military campaigns against the guerrilla fronts and against peasant associations, even if these are formed legally. From 1984 to the present, the reactionary armed forces have concentrated full divisions and brigades (regiments) on selected target areas to depopulate and devastate them over extended periods of time. From the time of Aquino to Ramos, a series of nationwide strategic offensives called Oplan Lambat Bitag (I, II, III) have been launched to attack the revolutionary forces, the peasant masses and the ethnic minorities. But these have all failed to suppress the armed revolutionary movement. The peasant masses serve as the inexhaustible reservoir of the armed resistance.

Contrary to the claims of the opportunists that the Philippines has become industrialized and urbanized, crediting the US-Marcos regime with having developed it, the US-Ramos regime admits the underdeveloped preindustrial character of Philippine society and promises to turn the Philippine into a newly industrializing economy before the year 2000 through his so-called Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP). Now, the opportunists who have blatantly become counterrevolutionary Rightists make a hullabaloo about seeking convergences with the regime, hailing Ramos as an anti-oligarch and endorsing his bid for a “strong state” as well as his propaganda about “peace” and “economic development.” They argue for the liquidation of the revolutionary armed struggle.

The MTDP is premised on the “negotiated” capitulation as well as the violent suppression of the revolutionary forces and the people, the preservation of the interests of the imperialists and feudalists, the increase of antinational investment incentives for the foreign transnational corporations, import liber-

alization, tax exemptions, unrestricted profit remittances, privatization of the state corporations and the suppression of workers' rights in order to carry out the declared policy of low wages and union-free and strike-free areas. The plan is bound to fail. Industrial development for the Philippines is simply impossible without the determination to carry out land reform and national industrialization. The broad masses of the people, especially the workers and the peasants, can never accept increased oppression and exploitation and can never agree to stop the revolutionary armed resistance.

The imperialist countries themselves are now in the throes of a crisis of overproduction (both industrial and agricultural) and are carrying out policies that will not increase any kind of productive investments in the Philippines. Conditions of prolonged recession, widespread unemployment and even depression have struck the imperialist countries. High technology has brought about large inventories of unsold industrial and agricultural goods. The abuse of finance capitalism through corporate speculation and neocolonial operations has struck the limits because effective demand has shrunk in a world of excessive public and private debts and imposed austerity in both the neo-colonies and the industrial capitalist countries.

Winning monopoly firms tend to adopt ever higher technology to wipe out their competitors and in the process kill employment. While the individual monopoly firms increase their productivity, that of entire economies have decreased. Rising unemployment, social cutbacks and therefore underconsumption have led to a further shrinking of the market and profit rates in industrial capitalist countries and are adversely affecting the "economic tigers" of East Asia, including the coastal provinces of China that produce cheap manufactures.

The centers of world capitalism, the United States, Japan and Western Europe, are competing for a redivision of the world, consolidating their national and regional positions and restricting the flow of direct and indirect investments to the neo-colonies, which have long become unable to repay their loans. To assure itself of a regional market contiguous with its national economy, the United States has called into existence the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the coming years this will tend to cut down orders for cheap manufactures from East Asia. The United States expects cheaper manufactures from Mexican cheap labor.

In this connection, Japan and the economic "tigers" of Asia (including China's coastal provinces) will tend to intensify the exploitation of the Philippines and prevent its economic development under the Japan-dominated

ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). At the same time, the United States is bent on keeping its economic and military supremacy in the entire Pacific area through an Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC). In the years to come, the trade war between the United States and Japan will have the effect of further preventing the industrial development of the Philippines. Surplus manufactures will be dumped on the country not only by the two economic superpowers but also by the four “economic tigers” and China. The crisis of the world capitalist system coincides with the ever-worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system in the Philippines.

B. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The economic ground for mutual accommodation among political factions of the reactionary classes in the Philippines is narrower than over and continues to shrink. There can only be temporary lulls in the violent contradictions between any current ruling clique in the Philippines and its rival factions. The conflicts among the reactionaries cannot completely be contained within the frame of electoral competition but will increasingly find expression in the ruling clique’s drive to wield authoritarian power and in the armed factionalization of the exploiting classes and the reactionary armed forces.

The Ramos ruling clique is a bureaucrat big comprador-landlord clique and is as rapacious as the Marcos ruling clique. Its dummies are cornering the contracts (especially energy and infrastructures) generated by foreign loans and the skyrocketing domestic public borrowing. Driven by its own greed and afraid of its own rivals within the ruling system, the Ramos ruling clique has taken every measure to consolidate and entrench its power by pursuing and shaking down rival big compradors.

As the socioeconomic crisis worsens, so does the political crisis. Every time that there is a dramatic confrontation between the ruling clique and the oppressed masses, the rival factions of reactionaries will try to make their own political gains. So will the reactionary ruling clique try to keep and accumulate its power with the coercive apparatuses of the state. Even before the revolutionary mass movement is able to demonstrate fully its renewed strength through extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, the US-Ramos clique has been maneuvering to lull both the revolutionary and reactionary opposition with calls for “peace and reconciliation” while at the same time steadily preparing for a Marcos-type power grab through control of the legislature and so-called constitutional reforms.

In the most recent upsurge of the legal democratic mass movement, particularly the nationwide mass actions in February this year, which broke out as a result of the attempt of the US-Ramos regime to impose a higher oil levy (causing higher prices and higher electricity and transport rates), the legal progressive forces, the revolutionary forces and the broad masses of the people stood up and stood out. In addition, the reactionary rivals of the ruling clique (including those in the Armed Forces of the Philippines) stirred against the ruling clique, notwithstanding their previously well-publicized co-optation.

The general tendency of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal ruling system to disintegrate arises from the internal contradictions among the reactionaries as well as from the perseverance of the revolutionary forces in protracted people's war. Notwithstanding the grave errors and setbacks due to "Left" and Right opportunism, the current strength of the armed revolutionary movement is still formidable and has high potential for accelerated growth as a result of the rectification movement and the worsening crisis of the ruling system. The revolutionary forces and the people are in fundamental and serious contention with the entire ruling system. They wield and continue to develop and accumulate the power necessary for ultimately replacing the current social system with a new one to make the Philippines truly independent, democratic, just, prosperous and peaceful.

From year to year since 1987, the Aquino regime and General Ramos had boasted of achieving strategic victory over the revolutionary forces before the end of the Aquino regime as they escalated the military campaigns of suppression. But the enemy forces have miserably failed to achieve their military objective, even after scaling it down to mere "strategic control." The revolutionary forces continue to flourish nationwide. The dwindling of armed resistance by the Moro organizations and the lull in coup threats from anti-Ramos military factions have allowed the regime to deploy more troops against the guerrilla fronts of the NPA. But the total size and capability of the enemy forces are not sufficient to cover the entire country, especially because the enemy forces try to maximize their effectiveness by applying the principle of concentration and prolonged occupation of territory.

It is self-defeating for the regime to further increase troops, spend more money and commit more atrocities. The political and financial limits of the ruling system can be seen by considering even only the understated amount of money spent since 1969 for the military. The amount is at least P/750 billion or US\$25 billion, excluding US military assistance, equivalent to at least US\$15 billion

or 60 percent of it. Notwithstanding the dismantling of the US military bases, the United States maintains access to military bases and extends military and military-related assistance to the reactionary government. But the United States and its imperialist allies are being drawn unprecedentedly to so many turbulent parts of the world.

The escalation of military onslaughts under the total war policy has resulted in massacres, assassinations, torture, illegal detention, looting, arson, bombardments, forced mass evacuation and the destruction of the people's livelihood. All these have alienated the people from the ruling system and have driven them to persevere in and intensify the protracted people's war. In the last 25 years, tens of thousands of people have been tortured and killed and millions of people have been deprived of their homes and land by the enemy.

Upholding their just revolutionary cause, the people and the revolutionary forces have defended themselves and the NPA has launched tactical offensives, wiping out tens of thousands of enemy troops in the last 25 years. The reactionary government has failed to provide sufficient compensation to those killed as well as hospitalization and rehabilitation to the wounded among its own troops, while corrupt military officers cheat their own troops and engage in criminal operations for themselves. Thus, demoralization among the enemy troops is widespread.

Military spending is high for equipment and operations but official compensation is low for officers and men of the reactionary armed forces and the national police and even far lower for the paramilitary forces. Thus, the armed personnel of the enemy are characteristically engaged in criminal activities, including illegal logging, robbery, kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, and maintaining or protecting gambling and prostitution dens. The most notorious criminal syndicates are run by military and police officers. The military and police establishment is factionalized not only into political groups but more predominantly into criminal syndicates.

In consonance with its superiority in number of troops, equipment and training, the reactionary armed forces undertake strategic offensive by concentrating divisions and brigades on a few selected target areas for long periods of time, supposedly in order to "hold, clear, consolidate and develop" these areas. Within the strategic encirclement, special operations teams (SOTs) are deployed and paramilitary forces are organized to create an artificial or coerced "mass base" against the NPA. Then within the strategic encirclement, the ene-

my uses companies and battalions to conduct search-and-destroy or mopping-up operations.

It suits the enemy to carry out what it calls the strategy of the “war of quick decision” and the tactics of “gradual constriction,” including the tactics of prolonged intelligence and civil deception. In the face of such offensive strategy and tactics of the enemy, it is wrong to abandon the strategic defensive by absolutely concentrating the overwhelming majority of Red fighters into a few large units and giving up the mass base. The loss of mass base means playing into the hands of the enemy and ultimately losing initiative and failing to launch tactical offensives. The “Left” opportunists have practically served the enemy under the pretext of hastening victory.

From start to finish, the enemy forces lose if the proletarian revolutionary cadres and fighters of the NPA respond with a defensive strategy and launch tactical offensives along the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an expanding and deepening mass base. The failure of the enemy is essentially due to the fact that he is fighting for the interests of the imperialists and the local exploiting classes and that, when he concentrates his forces on a target area, he gives away space elsewhere. Only when they operate in an ever expanding and ever consolidated mass base can the guerrilla forces seize the initiative by shifting, dispersing and concentrating at will. With the active participation and support of the people, the NPA can muster a superior force to wipe out an enemy force part by part—by using the element of surprise—in tactical offensives even if the enemy force is ten times stronger than the NPA at the strategic level.

In its 25 years of revolutionary experience, the NPA has preserved and accumulated its armed strength because the proletarian revolutionary cadres and Red fighters have adhered to the strategic line of protracted people's war by carrying out extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an ever-expanding and deepening mass base. On the other hand, the “Left” opportunists drastically reduced the number of cadres and small units for mass work, prematurely built absolutely concentrated companies and two battalions, sent experienced cadres and fighters to the urban areas to become armed city partisans and thereby reduced and sabotaged the further development of the people's war.

Both the “Left” opportunists—who pushed the line of “regularization” and “strategic counteroffensive” and combining insurrectionism and military adventurism—and the Right opportunists—who pushed bourgeois reformism and parliamentarism confined themselves to foreign-funded offices and paper coalitions—based themselves in Metro Manila and other urban areas and drastically

reduced the flow of Party members and mass activists from the urban to the rural areas. The two types of opportunism laid stress on urban-basing throughout the 1980s exactly when the US and Philippine intelligence agencies were improving their system of intelligence and surveillance in the cities and ironically when the accumulated armed strength of the NPA required direct and close leadership of the most responsible Party cadres and provided the best possible basing for the Party leadership and NPA command.

Notwithstanding the grave errors in line committed, that resulted in a considerable degree of criminal degeneration among the opportunists, such as bloody witch-hunts, gangsterism and corruption, the proletarian cadres and fighters of the NPA have held their ground and have prevailed. They have defeated the opportunists by launching the current rectification movement. The rectification movement further strengthens the revolutionary forces ideologically, politically and organizationally. It has raised the NPA's revolutionary integrity, fighting will and capabilities and the determination to do mass work and engage in production. Now and in time to come, the NPA can inflict deadlier blows on the enemy forces and at the same time enjoy ever greater militant support from the broad masses of the people both in the rural and urban areas.

Following the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, the regional and lower organs and organizations of the Party and the NPA have made summings-up of their experiences, drawn positive and negative lessons, criticized and repudiated deviations and errors and set forth their revolutionary tasks. Only a few incorrigible opportunists have opposed the rectification movement and have gone over to the enemy side to become shameless agents of counter-revolution. There were pockets of opportunists in rabid counterrevolutionary opposition to the rectification movement in only three of the 17 regional Party organizations and in only two central staff organs. These incorrigible opportunists have been roundly defeated by the revolutionaries and have been driven by their own wrong line to the side of the enemy.

The reactionary state has always used deception combined with brutal terror against the revolutionary movement. Having fought the NPA since 1969, the counterrevolutionary chieftain General Ramos knows that he cannot destroy it frontally by military means alone. In fact the total war policy, which he has been carrying out under the Marcos and Aquino regimes and now, is not simply an all-out military warfare against the revolutionary forces. It includes psychological warfare as a form of outflanking tactics. Thus, the Ramos regime has launched propaganda campaigns to drum up illusions of peace and reconcilia-

tion and in seeking to discredit the revolutionary movement and to disintegrate the revolutionary forces.

In this regard, the US government (especially its intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence and the Bureau of Foreign Intelligence of the State Department) has closely collaborated with General Ramos since 1985 to bring about the replacement of Marcos by another reactionary figure and restore bourgeois democratic institutions and processes; and, at the same time, to preempt and seek to destroy the revolutionary movement not only by force of arms (military actions against the NPA and the "political infrastructure" of the revolutionary forces) but also by propaganda in what has been termed as "low intensity conflict." The psy-war scheme includes the drumming up of rumors of "peace and reconciliation," the attempt to confuse the masses and alienate them from the revolutionary forces, and the coddling of renegades in a bid to split the revolutionary movement.

From 1986 to the present, the scheme is reflected in the articles of known "academic" analysts of the CIA and DIA, an increasing number of Filipino, American and other foreign bourgeois journalists; Filipino academic and journalist assets of Philippine and US intelligence agencies; and certain foreign and local bureaucrats of some foreign funding agencies and so-called nongovernmental organizations. Their common line is that the restoration of "democracy" and "economic reforms" in the Philippines leave the revolutionary forces no choice but to capitulate and go for parliamentary struggle or else suffer marginalization.

By correctly stressing the line of new democratic revolution as the line for a just and lasting peace, the National Democratic Front has prevented the enemy from confusing the people and making the revolutionary forces appear "terrorist." In the process, it has also exposed and frustrated the Right opportunists and counterrevolutionary renegades as well as those who misrepresent themselves as "third force" and pressure or induce the revolutionary forces to capitulate to the enemy. The Party has thwarted the most insidious attempts to impugn and undermine the just revolutionary cause. These attempts include sham multisectoral alliances for peace and the so-called medium-term plan for insurrection.

The psy-war and intelligence agents of the imperialists and reactionaries have combined with certain renegades and an array of anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups to push the anticommunist, anti-Stalin line, against both the revolutionary forces and the legal progressive forces, to drum up and organize new anticommunist formations and hold rallies in concert with organiza-

tions associated with the US, the Ramos ruling clique and the religious Right wing. In the rallies of July 26 and November 30, 1993, the renegades and anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups blared out their anticommunist and anti-Stalin slogans.

The new anticommunist groups whipped up by the renegades carry such names as *Suriang Sosyalista*, *Sanlakas*, *Siglaya*, *Kapatirang Anakpawis*, *Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa para sa Pagbabago*, *National Confederation of Labor of the Philippines*, and *Demokratikong KMP*. They collude and compete with earlier anticommunist petty bourgeois formations like Movement for Popular Democracy, the Christian “social-democrats,” Forum for Philippine Alternatives and the like in conducting anticommunist campaigns and getting funds from the reactionary government and from foreign agencies.

The anticommunist, anti-Stalin line originated from the US and Philippine psy-war mill and intelligence agents, the Gorbachevites, the Trotskyites, bourgeois populists and the religious Right wing. The incorrigible “Left” opportunists who were criminally most responsible for Kampanyang Ahos (like Benjamin de Vera, Ricardo Reyes, Salvador Bas, Frank Gonzales and Nathan Quimpo) as well as such criminal practitioners of urban terrorism and gangsterism (like Romulo Kintanar, Arturo Tabara, Filemon Lagman and Antonio Cabardo) spout the anticommunist and anti-Stalin line and misrepresent themselves as champions of democracy and due process. The charges against these malefactors have been published.

As a step towards rendering justice, Kampanyang Ahos has been declared a criminal offense against the victims, the Party and the people. Party disciplinary action of expulsion has been taken against those principally responsible for the atrocity such as Benjamin de Vera, Ricardo Reyes, Salvador Bas, Frank Gonzales and Nathan Quimpo. In addition, these individuals are criminally liable and subject to prosecution and trial before the people’s court.

This late, the counterrevolutionaries are still trying to ride on the imperialist ideological offensive, which misrepresents the revisionist parties and revisionist-ruled regimes as communist and socialist and gloats over the disintegration of these as the hopelessness of the anti-imperialist and socialist cause. They concentrate their vicious slander on the founding chairman of the Party whom they compare to the great Stalin and the Party and its Central Committee which they describe as Stalinist. They believe that if they can discredit the Party and its leadership, they can destroy the entire revolutionary movement of the people.

The rectification movement has effectively foiled the ideological and political offensive of the imperialists and the reactionaries with their retinue of anticommunist petty-bourgeois. The reaffirmation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has raised higher the level of revolutionary consciousness and militancy of the revolutionary forces. The worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system necessitates and favors the armed revolutionary movement. The revolutionary forces have a higher confidence now in waging the protracted people's war in order to achieve victory in the national-democratic revolution and prepare the ground for socialist revolution and construction.

The fall of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes has served to verify the antirevisionist critique pioneered by Comrade Mao Zedong. The proven betrayal of socialism by the revisionists for nearly four decades can only incite the genuine revolutionaries to fight imperialism, revisionism and neocolonialism more resolutely than ever before. Mao's theory and initial practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship to combat modern revisionism, prevent the restoration of capitalism and consolidate socialism gives the proletarian revolutionary cadres and Red fighters a clear view of the long revolutionary struggle still to be waged.

The rectification movement has strengthened the ranks of the revolutionary forces comprehensively and profoundly. The proletarian revolutionary core of the NPA is ever stronger. So is that of the legal progressive forces. The urban legal democratic mass movement has demonstrated its strength on May 1, 1993 and on February 9 and 25, 1994 against the US-Ramos regime and its anti-communist petty bourgeois hirelings. The armed revolutionary movement is expanding and consolidating its mass base and is developing it for extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare.

The Party and the NPA do not announce any time schedule for winning total victory. On the other hand, they are determined to wage the protracted people's war for as long as it is necessary in order to overthrow the ruling system and to develop and fulfill the comprehensive requirements for total victory. They can only be sure of the extent of victories already gained and aim for victories that the level of strength of the revolutionary forces and the circumstances permit.

IV

REVOLUTIONARY TASKS OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the NPA must take advantage of the favorable objective conditions provided by the ever worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system.

The current rectification movement must be carried through to the end. It must enhance the ideological, political and organizational strength accumulated through 25 years of revolutionary struggle and overcome the accumulated serious deviations, errors and shortcomings, especially those which have caused serious damage and reduced the growth of the revolutionary forces.

The rectification movement is essentially a movement of education in revolutionary theory and practice. The proletarian revolutionary cadres, commanders and Red fighters must study and apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the general line of the new democratic revolution and the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war. Revolutionary education is necessary for developing a high level of conscious discipline, fighting morale and revolutionary spirit of service to the people.

Selected articles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao must be propagated within the NPA. A focus on the works of Mao on protracted people's war and guerrilla warfare is appropriate. The basic documents of the Party and the NPA that have correctly and successfully guided the revolutionary movement must be studied. At the same time, it is appropriate to focus on the current rectification documents and summings-up of the Party Central Committee.

Theoretical and political education is facilitated when it is linked to the concrete conditions of the people and the actual revolutionary work and struggle. The proletarian revolutionary cadres and the Red commanders and fighters must link themselves closely with the people, especially the toiling masses of workers and peasants; carefully assess their strength and work; practice criticism and self-criticism; and militantly carry out their fighting and other tasks.

The fine tradition of having a high concentration of Party members in the NPA must be carried forward. There must be a Party group in every squad. The Party branch may be based in the platoon or company. Literate Party members must raise the literacy level of Red fighters who cannot read and

write or who can barely read and write. Simplified study materials and methods must be used for the benefit of those who are barely literate.

There can be a higher ratio of Party members in the NPA than in other forms of mass organizations because the Red fighters are constantly together in study and work and are engaged in the most intense form of revolutionary struggle, which is the best learning process. Even during periods of frequent battles and accelerated recruitment, the proportion of Party members among the Red fighters can be more than 50 percent. Every time a new NPA unit is formed there must be Party members at the core coming from a previously existing unit.

In keeping with its distinctive character as a fighting organization, the NPA must engage in military training to raise its fighting ability and level of military technique. But this military training should always be linked to and never divorced from political education. Thus, we always call for politico-military training. To speak of strategy and tactics or training and upgrading technique in purely military terms is to fall into bourgeois militarism, criminal gangsterism and counterrevolutionary turncoatism as such renegades as Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara have fallen into.

The NPA must resolutely adhere to the strategic line of protracted people's war. It should never be led astray either by the importuning of the "Left" opportunists about an easy or quick way to victory through premature regularization, urban insurrectionism and military adventurism, scorning painstaking mass work and development in stages; or by the importuning of the Right opportunists about parliamentarism or reformism as the comfortable and painless way to power.

We must encircle the cities from the countryside until we accumulate enough strength to seize the cities. For an extended period of time, we are on the strategic defensive but we must launch tactical offensives on the basis of the people's participation and support. We must militate the peasant masses as the main force of the revolution and strengthen the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry as the foundation of the new democratic revolution.

Peasant associations must be built and must be constituted essentially and mainly by the poor peasants and farm workers. NPA Red fighters must be recruited mainly from their ranks. Consequently, the middle peasants can be won over and the rich peasants can be neutralized. Further, the contradictions between the enlightened and evil gentry can be taken advantage of. The result must be the isolation and destruction of the power of the evil

gentry. This antifeudal line is the main component of the general line of the new-democratic revolution.

The Party must attract and deploy revolutionary workers and educated youth to the NPA. It must coordinate the urban-based legal democratic mass movement and the rural-based armed revolutionary movement and thus be in a position to make the two forms of struggle complement and help each other in advancing the revolutionary cause. It must combat both reformism and urban insurrectionism because these derail the revolution. These have discouraged and prevented the flow of Party cadres from the cities to the countryside.

The urban insurrectionists and reformists falsely accuse the Party of having neglected the legal democratic mass movement in the urban areas by pursuing the strategic line of protracted people's war. Let us remind these charlatans that the proletarian revolutionaries have been the ones responsible for developing the legal democratic mass movement from the 1960s to the present, that the reformists and insurrectionists are merely little tails of the reactionary forces and that their foreign models have gone into a dead end. Let us repudiate these charlatans, especially those who have become anti-communist hirelings, criminal gangsters and thieves of resources belonging to the Party and the people.

As we repudiate the "Left" and Right opportunists who have become outright counterrevolutionaries, we must increase and intensify our tactical offensives within the strategic defensive. We must wage extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an ever expanding and deepening mass base through painstaking mass work. The wide-scale participation and support of the people in the revolutionary war must determine the nature and direction of the NPA and other revolutionary forces and must render to naught the present military superiority and strategic offensive of the enemy.

With the people's militant participation and support, the NPA must keep the enemy deaf and blind and wage only the battles that it can win. It must destroy the enemy forces part-by-part. It must determine the time and place for wiping out enemy units by surprise. It can launch tactical offensives to annihilate the enemy by discovering his weak points and inducing him to commit mistakes.

At the tactical level, the NPA must assemble the superior force to ambush or raid the enemy unit it is capable of wiping out. Never should it put to risk its total strength in the entire country, in any region or any guerrilla front in any single decisive engagement. When the enemy force is well entrenched,

the NPA does not rush headlong against the hard point but waits for the enemy force to divide or send out a part of itself.

When an enemy force comes out in superior strength and is looking for a fight, the NPA does not go for frontal collision but lets it punch the air or lures it further in until it falls into a trap or is compelled to divide itself and expose its weak parts. It is also possible to snipe at an advancing enemy force in order to delay, hamper or derail its advance.

The NPA can evade a superior enemy force in order to attack an inferior enemy force. It can induce the enemy force to move in a certain direction so that it can attack in another direction or it can induce the enemy to fall into one trap after another in the same direction if there is certainty that there is no follow-up enemy force within a definite period. Flexibility in guerrilla tactics can be achieved only if there is firm adherence to the principle and practice of expanding and consolidating the mass base. Without such a mass base, the situation becomes purely military and favorable to the superior military force.

The enemy can always concentrate forces on a definite target area and deny the NPA access to the area for a long period of time. But the total capacity of the enemy to occupy territory has certain limits. He can seize any piece of territory but he leaves much wider space elsewhere. He cannot occupy even his target area without dividing his units. This allows NPA guerrilla units to attack such units one by one.

The NPA must cast away completely false illusions previously whipped up by the erroneous lines of “regularization” and “strategic counteroffensive” and of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism. It must make the correct and well-balanced deployment of the full-time Red fighters with automatic rifles. The force structure must be in consonance with the given strength of the NPA, with the balance of forces or the given level of development of the war and with the need to fulfill the comprehensive requirements of the people's war.

The center of gravity (rallying point or strike force) in a region may be a company or—in a guerrilla front—a platoon or company but must not absorb more than 30 percent of the total number of Red fighters and must be in relative concentration so that it can do mass work when it is not engaged in operations requiring absolute concentration. Relative concentration means a smaller radius for mass work of the unit acting as the center of gravity than that of the dispersed smaller units. In offensive operations, the

center of gravity can augment its strength by assembling or joining up with the appropriate number of smaller and more dispersed units.

It is absolutely necessary to have smaller and more dispersed units in order to develop the mass base on a wide scale. These are the horizontal force upon which the vertical force can arise and develop in stages. They must create the wide room for maneuver of the NPA. Under favorable conditions (when there is no enemy concentration), it is possible for an NPA squad to cover an entire municipality or its equivalent as a guerrilla zone. Such a squad can divide into propaganda teams to do mass work. It can be augmented by the militia and by the self-defense units in every barrio.

Armed city partisan and self-defense units must exist and operate to an extent and in a manner not harmful to the legal democratic mass movement and to the revolutionary armed struggle. The Party and NPA must have full command and control over these. Recruitment of armed city partisans must not be used as pretext for withholding from the countryside those in the urban areas who wish to join the NPA.

In fact, no one should become an armed city partisan without undergoing NPA politico-military training and service in the countryside. So as not to harm the legal democratic mass movement, armed city partisan actions must neither be a substitute for legal mass actions nor be openly and directly linked to them. Armed city partisan units must not be created or used to serve any opportunist line and must not be allowed to degenerate into criminal gangs such as those maintained by Romulo Kintanar, Arturo Tabara, Filemon Lagman and Antonio Cabardo.

Adequate social investigation should always be undertaken to lay the ground for mass work. Mass work by the NPA means arousing, organizing and mobilizing the people along the new-democratic line. Mass education, including propaganda and agitation, must accompany mass organizing and campaigns. The organs of political power and the various types of mass organizations for peasants, workers, youth, women, cultural activists and children must be formed. Mass campaigns must be carried out, especially the land reform campaign, so that the people empower themselves and gain social benefits for themselves. Under these circumstances, the local Party branches can arise.

On the basis of success in mass work, the organs of political power can advance from the stage of the appointive barrio organizing committee to that of the elected barrio revolutionary committee. The latter is elected by

representatives of the mass organizations or directly by the entire people (depending on the circumstances) and assisted by the working committees for public education, mass organization, land reform, production, finance, health, defense, arbitration and cultural affairs and supported by the various types of mass organizations.

The revolutionary armed struggle cannot flourish without being integrated with land reform and the building of the mass base. While the NPA is still engaged in guerrilla warfare during the strategic defensive, it is wise in general to carry out the minimum land reform program of land rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, raising the prices of farm products at the farm gate and promoting production in agriculture and sideline occupations. Building the mass base means building the organs of political power and the mass organizations.

It is the responsibility of the Party to clarify the functions of and direct the organs of political power and the mass campaigns. In this regard, the National Democratic Front can help the Party in drawing the broadest range of support and in making governance and mass campaigns more effective.

As the enforcers of revolutionary law and justice, the NPA as well as the militia and self-defense units must study the basic democratic rights of all individuals and must know the correct principles and methods in performing their appropriate functions in civil and criminal cases. The people's court, the court martial (in case of NPA personnel) or the arbitration committee (in minor cases among the people) decides the cases. The enforcers of revolutionary law and justice should at the same time know what constitutes a battle situation against enemy units and elements as well as against those considered by proper authority as armed and dangerous criminals who resist arrest and refuse to submit themselves to investigation by the people's prosecutors and to trial by a people's court.

The Party and the NPA can become more self-reliant than ever and can gather more resources for strengthening revolutionary work by carrying out land reform, promoting production, collecting contributions from the people who benefit from land reform, production and other mass campaigns, applying a tax policy on the well-to-do and the enlightened sections of the exploiting classes and confiscating weapons and other resources from the enemy. Our tax policy allows certain enterprises to operate and prosper, provided these are not harmful to the people and the environment, safeguards and constructive action are undertaken to conserve or renew resources and

keep a clean and healthy environment. If we have a well-formulated and well-implemented tax policy, revenues collected by the NPA on behalf of the Party and the people's revolutionary government would be far bigger than any inflow of foreign assistance. Our 25-year history proves this.

The incorrigible "Left" opportunists who previously put their hopes on foreign military and financial assistance have disoriented themselves and others and have degenerated into criminal gangsters. The incorrigible Right opportunists who have become dependent on Western funding agencies have become blatant anticommunists just like the former "Left" opportunists who opposed the line of protracted people's war and pushed the deviation from the Marxist-Leninist and antirevisionist line of the Party.

The Party and the NPA must be vigilant towards foreign funding agencies and other foreign entities that spread counterrevolutionary ideas and provide funds to groups that are attacking the CPP, NPA, NDF and other patriotic and progressive forces. Some Western funding agencies have spawned reformism, created NGO bureaucrats, encouraged some talented activists to stick to urban offices and spread the dole-out mentality in project areas. Countermeasures must be adopted and carried out. No foreign financed organization and personnel whose character is not examined and approved by the NOP International Office should be allowed into the guerrilla fronts and other areas which we can interdict. Counterrevolutionary groups and projects must be kept out.

The Party and the NPA must not harbor any more illusions about getting significant military and financial assistance from abroad. Previous efforts to bring this in have been disorienting, up to the point of causing a deviation from our Marxist-Leninist and antirevisionist line. The progress of the armed struggle does not necessitate arms importation. The enemy has always been our most reliable arms supplier. He transports the arms from the imperialists and we subsequently get them when we launch our tactical offensives.

By being self-reliant and by being able to raise higher the level of the revolutionary armed struggle, the Party and the NPA can better perform their internationalist duty. Their victories are tangible contributions to the world proletarian revolution. Their example inspires the people of the world to wage revolutionary struggle. By winning greater victories in their own country they are in a better position to cooperate with other revolutionary forces in the world.

The New People's Army is today one of the most outstanding among revolutionary armies led by Marxist-Leninist parties. It has been thrust into this position by the perseverance of the proletarian revolutionaries, Red commanders and fighters in protracted people's war. The NPA holds high the flaming torch of armed revolution as the proletariat and people of the world move from one period of revolutionary struggle to another, following the end of the bipolar world and the temporary strategic defeat of the world proletarian revolution due to the protracted workings of neocolonialism and the revisionist betrayal of socialism.

While the Party can be proud of the brilliant record and standing of the NPA, all proletarian revolutionary cadres, Red commanders and fighters must be vigilant, modest and ever more determined to fight because the forces of imperialism and reaction are hell-bent on destroying them.

Social turmoil is all over the world—in the home grounds of imperialism and in the neo-colonies. The world is once more on the eve of a great social upheaval and an upswing of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. The NPA is in the special position of having come tested from an old period of revolutionary struggle to a new and more challenging period.

Long live the New People's Army!

Persevere in protracted people's war!

Long live the Filipino people!

Fight for national liberation, democracy and socialism!

Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!

The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside of the mind is objective reality. Consequently what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study, while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing their enemy, and some are the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Zi, the great military scientist of ancient China, “Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat,”⁷ which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly. War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes, or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined by each side’s subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavor to win a war, a military man cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military man is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and color, power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material foundations, i.e., the military, political, economic and natural conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies and to transform this evil world.⁸

⁷ Sun Wu Zi, or Sun Wu, was a famous Chinese military scientist in the 5th century B.C., who wrote *The Art of War*, a treatise on war containing thirteen chapters. This quotation is from Chapter 3, “The Strategy of Attack.”

⁸ “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. 1, Paris, Foreign Languages Press, 2021, pp. 169-170.

**Long Live Lenin and Stalin,
Condemn the Modern Revisionists,
Resume the Proletarian Revolution**

November 8, 1996

Message and Contribution of the Communist Party of the Philippines to the Conference of the International Committee for the Restoration of the Soviet Union and the International Conference for the formation of the Modern Communist Doctrine

In the spirit of proletarian internationalism, we the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) leading the New People's Army (NPA), the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) and other revolutionary forces of the Filipino people convey our warmest comradely greetings of solidarity to all participants of your conference on "Class Analysis in the Modern Communist Movement" on November 8 and 9 in Moscow.

We thank the joint organizers, the International Committee for the Restoration of the Soviet Union (ICRSU) and the International Conference for the formation of the Modern Communist Doctrine (ICFMCD), for inviting us to this conference. We join you in celebrating the 79th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and in renewing our common resolve to carry forward the historic mission of the working class in waging the class struggle for socialism until imperialism is defeated on a global scale and communism is attained.

We are pleased to know that this conference is the result and continuation of the 1994 international seminar of the ICRSU on "Stalin Today," which upheld Comrade Joseph Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist and repudiated the modern revisionists. We are interested in getting copies of the most significant papers of the seminar in English translation.

We agree with you that the objective conditions are favorable for making revolution in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union. We are glad that large sections of the working class are moving towards militant positions and that you are striving to clear the path for the formation of a genuine Marxist-Leninist party.

Following the bureaucrat monopoly capitalists' thirty-five years of revisionist rule and disguised capitalist restoration, the destruction of the Soviet Union and undisguised restoration of capitalism since 1991 have brought about far more intolerable suffering to the proletariat and people in Russia and the former Soviet Union than ever before.

The undisguised bureaucrat monopoly capitalists have continued to use their public office for private gain. In combination with their private collaborators, including Western monopoly capitalists, the domestic businessmen

and criminal syndicates, they have privatized public assets and entire lines of economic activity. They have drastically reduced, chopped up or closed down production in entire enterprises and have thrown out of work huge numbers of workers and thereby further worsened the oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and the people.

As a result of the ever worsening conditions of oppression and exploitation, the anticommunist slogans of bourgeois nationalism, neoliberalism, social democracy and religion, mouthed by the big bourgeoisie and by their ideological and political subalterns, have been rapidly discredited among the proletariat and people. The point now is to reaffirm Marxism-Leninism and socialism to reassert the legacy of Lenin and Stalin and overcome four decades of imperialist, revisionist and reactionary misrepresentation of socialism.

DEFEND LENIN AND STALIN

The revisionist ruling cliques, from Khrushchev through the long period of Brezhnev to Gorbachev, restored capitalism by negating Stalin, his principles and his work. They stood for bureaucrat monopoly capitalism against socialism.

To account for the degradation of the Soviet Union from a socialist state to an antisocialist one under the revisionist ruling cliques, we must grasp the internal factors before we proceed to the external ones. We must grasp materialist dialectics and apply the law of contradiction. Otherwise, outward appearances in the superpower rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Cold War can lead to wrong conclusions regarding the nature of the Brezhnev regime.

The most clever forms of revisionism and opportunism persist. These are Brezhnevism and neo-Brezhnevism which pay some lip service to Lenin and Stalin but in fact continue to undermine and confuse basic Marxist-Leninist teachings in philosophy, political economy and social science. In the main and in essence, the Brezhnevites and neo-Brezhnevites misrepresent the anti-Stalin Brezhnev as a faithful descendant of Stalin.

Khrushchev, the initial chieftain of revisionism in power, and Gorbachev, the ultimate revisionist destroyer of the Soviet Union, were, of course, the most blatant anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist rulers of the Soviet Union, with their vicious and vociferous total negation of Stalin and their ill-disguised efforts at restoring capitalism. In the case of these two revisionist scoundrels,

it is so clear that they used the attacks on Stalin in order to attack Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

Brezhnev had the longest record of revisionism and capitalist restoration. His “new economic system” entrenched, empowered and enriched the bureaucrat monopoly capitalists and the criminal syndicates and restored capitalism far more than Khrushchev had done. With a genuine Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, we should be able to cut through the phrase mongering of Brezhnev, Suslov and Kosygin and their current descendants.

In addition to allowing the new bourgeoisie to loot the social wealth, Brezhnev was responsible for wasting tremendous amounts of the surplus product by rushing headlong into the arms race and foreign adventures. In the pursuit of social-imperialism, his regime competed and colluded with US imperialism in the practice of neocolonialism.

In the past, only the steadfast Marxist-Leninists and loyal followers of Lenin and Stalin could promptly see through the shallow phrase mongering of the Brezhnev ruling clique. When the stagnation and corruption, which had been brought about by bureaucrat monopoly capitalism, came to the fore in the late 70s, the new bourgeoisie could capitalize on these as the “sins of socialism” because the bourgeois ideology of modern revisionism had succeeded in misrepresenting itself as Marxism-Leninism and had been able to misrepresent bureaucrat monopoly capitalism as socialism.

Today, the full track record and consequences of the Brezhnevite line are exposed as inimical to the interest of the proletariat and the people. But the imperialists and the revisionists ceaselessly help each other out in falsely claiming that the Brezhnev regime was socialist. Thus, the genuine communists of today are required to clarify both the real antisocialist record of Brezhnev and the misuse of the term socialism.

With the support of the multilayered new bourgeoisie in the state, party, economy and culture, the bureaucrat monopoly capitalists overthrew the proletariat from state power in 1956 and, from one revisionist regime to another, proceeded to further subordinate the proletariat. They obscured their counterrevolutionary policies and acts by usurping the name of Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the name of socialism as well as by retaining the formal public ownership of the principal means of production and some vestigial social and cultural provisions.

Internationally, Soviet contention with the stronger superpower, US imperialism, obscured the social-imperialist character of the Soviet modern revi-

sionists. Such contention obliged the Soviet Union from time to time to put itself on the side of revolutionary movements abroad as well as on the side of counterrevolutionary movements and regimes. Originally, the US launched the Cold War against socialism and the national liberation movements. But from 1956 onward, the Cold War became increasingly characterized by the contention and collusion of US monopoly capitalism and Soviet bureaucrat monopoly capitalism at the expense of the world proletariat and people.

Before Gorbachev could disorganize and destroy the Soviet Union, Brezhnev in his own extended period of time had already severely damaged the social well-being of the Soviet proletariat and people, unwittingly undermined the base of Soviet social-imperialism and prepared the way for Gorbachevite treason in the following manner:

- (1) The new bourgeoisie (the bureaucrat monopoly capitalists, the bourgeoisie in military production and armed forces and the criminal syndicates) were engaged in unofficial private appropriation of a large part of the social wealth created by the working people, and developed a strong appetite for high-grade consumer goods from the West and the hard currency for acquiring these.
- (2) In science and technology, research and development in the Soviet Union were directed towards military production, the arms race and space exploration at the expense of civil production. Thus the renovation and expansion of civil production were neglected the military expenditures gobbled up a great part of the Soviet state budget.
- (3) The Soviet Union became dependent on the export of weapons, oil and other raw materials to earn hard currency from the world capitalist market for the importation of high-grade consumer goods for the new bourgeoisie and necessities like wheat. Foreign trade transactions involved corruption and private stashing away of foreign exchange earnings. The US-led alliance of traditional capitalist powers assigned West Germany the task of getting the revisionist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe hooked to Western foreign loans and manufactured supplies.
- (4) The US tightened the noose around the neck of Soviet social-imperialism by promoting a global overproduction of oil and other raw materials since the 70s and by instigating “people’s wars in reverse” driven by nationalist, tribalist and religious motivations in the neo-colonies

of Soviet social-imperialism, as in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and so on. The neo-colonies lost the means to pay for Soviet supplies and became unprofitable.

It is fine that by upholding, defending and promoting the proletarian-socialist line of Stalin the papers of the seminar “Stalin Today” have inspired the formation of a number of organizations that advocate Marxist-Leninist principles in theory and practice and expose revisionism, especially in the form of Brezhnevism and neo-Brezhnevism. It is also fine that the papers have been widely disseminated in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, if such papers can promote the criticism and repudiation of Brezhnevism and Neo-Brezhnevism. The papers should be translated into other major languages for study by dedicated Marxist-Leninists and the working class in various countries.

It is of crucial importance for the Marxist-Leninists and the working class movement not only in Russia or the former Soviet Union but also throughout the world to make a comprehensive and profound criticism and condemnation of the full range of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union, from 1956 onwards.

The imperialist ideologues and publicists have falsely described the long Brezhnev period as neo-Stalinist simply because it recentralized the planning ministries and the industries that Khrushchev had decentralized to breach and fracture the socialist work of Stalin. To this day, they continue to sum up all the revisionist regimes in the Soviet Union as Stalinist.

But the worst of the mis-interpreters of Soviet history in the world today are some neo-revisionists who seek to mislead the working class movement by proclaiming themselves as staunch defenders of Stalin but self-contradictorily defending Brezhnev as a Marxist-Leninist and builder of real socialism. They obscure the fact that he was the longest-reigning, most clever and most effective anti-Stalin destroyer of socialism in Soviet history. They also get out of the track of Soviet history to collide Stalin and Mao, misrepresent Mao as the complete opposite of Stalin and defend the anti-Stalin Brezhnev.

It is completely absurd to contrapose and collide Stalin and Mao. each of whom made great contributions to the communist cause and fought to advance socialism on the scale of their respective countries, and fail to contrapose the entire Lenin-Stalin period to the entire period of modern revisionism in Soviet history for the purpose of passing off Brezhnev as a Marxist-Leninist and as a

real socialist. Mao had the advantage of learning from the theory and practice of Lenin and Stalin in building socialism and understanding the origins and development of modern revisionism. He was therefore in a position to defend Lenin and Stalin and combat modern revisionism.

Soviet modern revisionism started to exert strong influence on the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese revolution as soon as Khrushchev succeeded in overthrowing the proletariat in the Soviet Union in 1956. The initial response of the Political Bureau of the CPC in April 1956 to Khrushchev's February 1956 speech, which totally negated Stalin, was to concede that the Soviet Party knew best its own history and situation and concur partially with the anti-Stalin charge of "personality cult" and at the same time opposed the total negation of Stalin and regarded him on the whole as a great Marxist-Leninist, with his merits weighing 70 percent and his demerits 30 percent.

Subsequently, within the same year and outside the Politburo which included such elements as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao increasingly defended Stalin, warned that throwing away the sword of Stalin was also doing away with the sword of Lenin and strongly condemned those who were throwing away these two swords, not only in the Soviet Union but also in Eastern Europe. Mao saw through the scheme of the revisionists to destroy socialism and attack Leninism by attacking Stalin.

The CPC had a high regard for the CPSU. The two parties had close comradesly relations and cooperation, involving the exchange of many Chinese students and trainees on the one hand and Soviet experts and other personnel on the other. The Right opportunists and revisionists in the CPC whipped up an uncritical acceptance of the latest from the Soviet Union, especially modern revisionism.

Since 1956, Mao had to begin fighting difficult battles against the Right opportunists and revisionists within the CPC. Driven by their erroneous view of the concrete circumstances within China and by the influence of Soviet modern revisionism, they attacked him from behind in the same way that Khrushchev and other revisionists in the CPSU attacked Stalin. Khrushchev and his Chinese revisionist followers denigrated Mao as a Stalinist, especially for launching the Great Leap Forward and for standing his ground against modern revisionism.

To uphold Marxism-Leninism and advance the cause of socialism. Mao fought his way from one high point to another high point, in the sequence of

the Great Leap forward, the international debate against modern revisionism and the theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in order to combat revisionism, prevent the restoration of capitalism and consolidate socialism.

Had Mao not fought to defend Marxism-Leninism and socialism brilliantly and effectively, he and his line could have been completely overthrown earlier than 1960. The revisionist reversal of Mao's line and capitalist restoration after his death do not impeach but unwittingly vindicate his great theoretical and practical achievements in the same way that the great achievements of Stalin cannot be invalidated and cannot but be vindicated by his revisionist betrayers.

A year before his death, Stalin realized fully that the power and influence of the Right opportunists had grown in Soviet society but unfortunately he had no more opportunity to launch a successful counteroffensive. In the case of Mao, he had the opportunity to look over fully the transition of socialism under Stalin to the revisionism of Khrushchev and the more clever anti-Stalin and antisocialist line of Brezhnev, to fight battles against the modern revisionists in the Soviet Union, in China and on a world scale and to strive to advance the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet modern revisionists banned Mao's works, especially the anti-revisionist ones. We must study and read these. His critique of modern revisionism and his theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship are certainly important to the study and understanding of the entire Soviet history. Such study and understanding are necessary to answer the question of whether Marxist-Leninists and the proletariat can build and consolidate socialism and prevent capitalist subversion and restoration in the forthcoming great battles between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Because the dictatorship of the proletariat has been overthrown in the Soviet Union since 1956, revolutionary violence is required to overthrow capitalism and restore socialism. To bring about proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship, the basic principles taught by Lenin and Stalin are adequate. But it is also necessary to study how to consolidate socialism, combat revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism in order to answer the recurrent jibe that socialism is destined to revert to capitalism and also in order to anticipate scientifically the problems of the future. So far, no figure has surpassed Mao in criticizing modern revisionism and in striving to overcome it in accordance with Marxist-Leninist principles.

Of course, new theoretical and practical advances will have to be made under new conditions in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution and in the context of the world proletarian-socialist revolution. To stay within that context, we cannot deviate from the basic Marxist-Leninist teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao.

CLASS ANALYSIS IN THE MODERN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

In consonance with the topic of your conference, “Class analysis in the modern communist movement,” allow us to state our views. We appreciate the position that the definition of the class concept of the proletariat as a revolutionary class is crucial to the formation of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party, in the face of the unceasing attempts of the Brezhnevites and neo-Brezhnevites to revise the concept.

It is our view that the definition first put forward by Marx and further developed by Lenin in “A Great Beginning” remains valid, historically and currently. It is a definition that is grounded on the mode of production in accordance with historical materialism. Upon the material conditions of large-scale industrial production, the working class arises and grows in contradiction with the dominant capitalist class in capitalist society. Consequently, it becomes the dominant class in socialist society after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and continues to wage class struggle until classes are abolished.

Lenin taught us,

Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labor, and, consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.

He said further that classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labor of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.

He pointed out,

Clearly, in order to abolish classes completely, it is not enough to overthrow the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, not enough to abolish their rights of ownership; it is necessary also

to abolish all private ownership of the means of production, it is necessary to abolish the distinction between town and country, as well as the distinction between manual and mental workers. This requires a very long period of time.

He added,

In order to achieve this, an enormous step must be taken in developing the productive forces; it is necessary to overcome the resistance (frequently passive, which is particularly stubborn and particularly difficult to overcome) of the numerous survivals of small scale production; it is necessary to overcome the enormous force of habit and conservatism which are connected with these survivals.

As a dialectical materialist, Lenin recognized first that the classes and class struggle arise in the mode of production and he proceeded to look at the interaction of the superstructure and the mode of production in the course of class struggle. He did not confine classes and class struggle to the mode of production and the development of the productive forces.

He combated the attempts to expand and vulgarize the meaning of proletariat as to include all toilers and the petty bourgeoisie. He also combated the confabulations of the petty bourgeois (Kautsky, Martov and the like) about liberty, equality, democracy in general, equality of labor democracy, etc., as the supposed way to solve the problems in the transition from capitalism to socialism. At the same time, he called for the alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry and other revolutionary forces.

The proletariat cannot build socialism by confining itself to economic struggle in the mode of production and without developing its revolutionary theory as guide to its revolutionary movement. without smashing the bourgeois class dictatorship and replacing it with the proletarian class dictatorship and without supplanting the bourgeois and other antiquated culture with the proletarian-socialist culture.

In the course of socialist revolution and construction, the exploiting classes can be abolished in the economic and legal spheres. Although basically required, socialist economic construction alone cannot automatically create a proletarian-socialist superstructure that can extirpate the vestiges or new shoots of the bourgeoisie in the superstructure. The revolutionary proletar-

iat must make a conscious and deliberate effort to extend and win the class struggle in the superstructure.

In the historical experience of both the Soviet Union and China, the old bourgeoisie and the landlord class took their last line of resistance in the superstructure under many pretenses and eventually a new petty bourgeoisie arose from the new intelligentsia and bureaucracy as a result of uneven development and the errors and shortcomings of the revolutionary party of the proletariat in the conduct of the two-line struggle with the bourgeoisie. Mao observed and fought the new petty bourgeoisie and won against it in his lifetime but his line would still be defeated after his death.

The new petty bourgeoisie is the initial social base of modern revisionism in socialist society. It generates supraclass or prematurely classless concepts, contempt for the proletariat and cynical disdain for the proletariat's historic mission of building socialism. It corrodes the ranks of communists. As a technocratic force, it buttresses and promotes at the highest level of the ruling communist party and socialist state a clique of revisionists ready to seize power from the proletariat at the opportune moment. It adulates the international bourgeoisie and contraposes bourgeois cosmopolitanism to proletarian internationalism.

After seizing political power, the top revisionists become bureaucrat monopoly capitalists. They revise the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and whip up idealism and mechanical materialism. They prate about “universal humanism” and at the same time about the theory of productive forces. They proclaim as in the Soviet Union that the proletariat has already accomplished its historic mission of building socialism or as in China that classes and class struggle are dying out while they restore capitalism and impose social-fascism on the proletariat and the people.

They whip up the slogans of bourgeois populism, bourgeois democracy and bourgeois pacifism as Khrushchev initially did in order to lay aside the proletariat's epochal mission. They reinstate the capitalist law of value and re Commodify living labor and the means of production and expand the bourgeois right to exploit the working people. They claim at first that a certain amount of private enterprise in agriculture, handicrafts and services would help build socialism and they go so far as to say that a retrogression into the “new economic policy” is the main path to socialism rather than a transitory measure of the past. Eventually they widen the road to capitalism for the domestic and international bourgeoisie.

For a long while, they use the names of the communist party and the socialist state and systematically further change their character and composition until the time comes for discarding shallow tokens of socialism and legalizing bureaucratic loot and unbridled privatization of public assets. The genuine communists know very well the historical course and ongoing consequences of revisionist betrayal and capitalist restoration in the former Soviet Union are in a better position to tell us about these. We admire the determination and effort to restore socialism and the Soviet Union and look forward to the resurgence and advance of the revolutionary movement for socialism.

It is our view that for them to be successful, proletarian revolutionaries must avail of the Marxist-Leninist legacy of Lenin and Stalin and rebuild a genuine Bolshevik party. They must arouse, organize and mobilize the proletariat and the entire people against the big bourgeoisie and the local reactionaries. They must build their independent armed organization and, in the same way that their Bolshevik forefathers did, build communist cells within the reactionary armed forces. They must overthrow the bourgeois class dictatorship and replace it with the proletarian class dictatorship.

If the objective is to restore a socialist Soviet Union, it is necessary to resolutely keep in mind and practice the teachings of Lenin and Stalin on proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship as well as on the nationality question. Great Russian chauvinism and imperialism are now in force and at work in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and so is local bourgeois nationalism in various parts of the former Soviet Union against the proletariat and people.

The proletarian revolutionaries must pick up the swords of Lenin and Stalin, lead the proletariat and the oppressed nations and peoples, take away the initiative from the Russian imperialists and the local bourgeois nationalists and smite them in order to restore proletarian dictatorship and build socialism. The oppressors and exploiters are vulnerable to armed revolution because they have so flagrantly robbed the social wealth created by the proletariat and people. The world's proletariat and people are eagerly awaiting an armed revolutionary movement to arise and punish the traitors and robbers in the former Soviet Union.

It is not only in the former Soviet Union that revisionist and neo-revisionist currents about classes and class struggle are running in order to lead the proletariat and the people astray. In imperialist countries and some third world countries, there are parties that persist in generating these currents. Their

understanding of classes and class struggle is preconditioned by Brezhnevism and neo-Brezhnevism even as they may either condemn Gorbachev or continue to adulate him as one who “sincerely” tried to “renew socialism.”

The imperialist countries are powerful sources of the main conspicuously bourgeois ideas about classes and class struggle as well as deviously petty bourgeois ideas about these. The consistent line running through all these ideas is the obfuscation of class struggle and the espousal of class conciliation between the monopoly bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These ideas revolve around the practice of tripartism (collaboration of the state, the monopoly capitalists and the bureaucratized trade unions) or simply bipartism between the state and the monopoly capitalists.

The monopoly bourgeoisie has never ceased to use petty-bourgeois ideas in order to reinforce state power and impose social order in capitalist society. It has systematically spread the petty-bourgeois mentality among the more highly paid workers and has successfully done so in relative calm periods of the class struggle. In times of severe crisis, such petty-bourgeois ideas as bourgeois laborism, opportunism, reformism and revisionism are let loose to block the proletarian revolutionaries before the ultimate weapon of fascist violence is used against an irrepressible revolutionary proletariat.

In recent decades, the most fantastic tale is that the proletariat is a vanishing tribe in a “post-industrial” society and that the “service sector” in the industrial capitalist countries is expanding the ranks of the white collars. The term “middle class” has been used to include the white collars and the more highly paid stratum of the blue collars. Some babblers speak of the white collars as the new vanguard to displace the “outdated” proletariat in fundamental change against the monopoly bourgeoisie. Other babblers more timidly describe the white collars as no more than beggars of reform and cooperators of the big bourgeoisie within the capitalist system.

The information technology has been presumed to reduce and replace the blue collars on the way from one severe crisis of overproduction to another. And yet they have remained as basic producers, despite the rise of productivity and chronic unemployment. The basic electro-mechanical processes cannot run without the blue collars operating them and producing new values with their labor power. In the 80s, the blue collars appeared to be more vulnerable than the white collars to displacement by automatons and computers. But now, in the 00s, the white collars are as vulnerable as or even more

so than the blue collars in the drive of the monopoly bourgeois to maximize profits, accumulate constant capital and reduce the wage fund.

In industrial capitalist societies, the blue collars by themselves alone outnumber by so many times their class opponent, the monopoly bourgeoisie. But if we were to divide these societies into those that own capital and those that have to sell their labor power in order to subsist, including the blue and white collars, then Marx's prediction of capitalist society being divided into the two camps has long been fulfilled.

In the most advanced capitalist countries, as well as in the semi-colonies and dependent countries where cheap labor is resorted to by the multinational corporations, the proletariat as a class concept remains valid. The proletariat continues to be a real force for fighting and overthrowing the monopoly bourgeoisie and for building socialism in the future. To make believe that the proletariat is disappearing or has become inconsequential will not create any other new vanguard for socialism.

The petty bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeois-minded cannot move away from their servitude and servility to capitalism unless they follow the class leadership of the proletariat and join the broad revolutionary mass movement. By remolding themselves into communists in the course of revolutionary struggle, some petty bourgeois can change their class position to that of the proletariat. But the general run of the petty bourgeoisie will tend to be servitors of the bourgeoisie in periods of relatively unhindered capital expansion and tend to follow the revolutionary proletariat in periods of severe crisis in the capitalist system.

The imperialists and the most reactionary forces have long funded a few petty-bourgeois hirelings in the industrial capitalist and underdeveloped countries to specialize in spreading anticommunist and anti-proletarian notions and undertake programs and projects to obscure and blunt the class struggle of the proletariat and the big bourgeoisie and the anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations.

The petty-bourgeois hirelings pretend to criticize their imperialist and reactionary benefactors but prettify them by conjuring illusions that these can reform themselves about such issues as oppression and exploitation, sustainable development, poverty alleviation, environment, gender equality, ethnicity, civil society and so on. Pretending to be engaged in social movement or civic initiative, above classes and without class or government sup-

port, they misappropriate certain issues to slander and attack the proletariat and its revolutionary party.

The reality of exploiting and exploited classes and class struggle in the underdeveloped countries of the third world is similar to that obtaining in the many economically depressed and underdeveloped republics of Russia and the former Soviet Union. The long process of restoring capitalism and the current depredations of undisguised capitalism of the most barbaric kind have destroyed the productive forces in a big and deepgoing way and have degraded many republics to the status of backward third world countries. To prevent Russia from rebounding as a major imperialist rival and to let her military capability deteriorate further, the US, the European Union and Japan are deliberately carrying out a policy of dumping surplus goods on her, limiting productive investments from abroad and effecting the further destruction of her industrial and military-industrial base.

In most of the underdeveloped countries of the third world, a modern industrial proletariat has somehow arisen from import-dependent manufacturing, transport and communications, public utilities, mining and so on. Only in a few countries of the third world is there a modern industrial proletariat arising from some comprehensive industrial foundation or some heavy and basic industries, where once before socialism was in place as in China or where once before an anti-imperialist bourgeois nationalism could insist on national industrialization as in India.

There is a new development in the world arising from high-tech capitalist production for profit and the most avaricious forms of profit-taking by finance capitalism. There is an unprecedentedly high rate of capital accumulation, concentration and centralization of capital in such global centers of capitalism as the US, the European Union and Japan. As a result, there is a rapid process of deindustrialization and decapitalization in most countries of the world.

In some ten countries outside the said global centers of capitalism, investments are concentrated on sweatshops engaged in the manufacture or reassembly of consumer goods for the industrial capitalist countries. These avail of cheap labor, do not provide job tenure and other workers' rights, are easily relocated, undermine the national industry and are now increasingly vulnerable to their own distinctive crisis of overproduction and to reduced consumption in the recession-ridden export market.

At the same time, in most of the underdeveloped countries where these sweatshops are not established and where production equipment are not renovated, there are depressed economic conditions, extreme poverty and social disorder as a result of the overproduction of raw materials since the 1970s. Production of raw materials and some manufactures with the old equipment has become uncompetitive in the world capitalist system and has resulted in stagnation and closures.

At present, there is a great spasm in the world capitalist system due to the crisis of overproduction induced by high technology for profit and the most abusive forms of finance capitalism. There is widespread destruction of productive forces through mass unemployment and closures of factories. Conditions in the republics of the former Soviet Union are increasingly becoming similar to those in the third world.

But the monopoly capitalists will always need a proletariat to exploit in their own home grounds and on a world scale. No matter how far the current crisis of the world capitalist system goes, the modern industrial proletariat will continue to exist in most countries of the world and remain as the most productive and progressive political force against monopoly capitalism. There is no way for another class to take away from the proletariat the revolutionary role of class leadership in the struggle for socialism against imperialism.

We are still in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution as defined by Lenin. This is true especially because of the revisionist betrayal and capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union and other former socialist countries. The teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao about classes and class struggle remain valid to this day. Without a foundation in the revolutionary theory and practice, we cannot make new theoretical and practical advances in the struggle of the proletariat for socialism and communism.

Long live Lenin and Stalin!

Build a Marxist-Leninist party in Russia!

Long live Marxism-Leninism!

Requirements of the Revolutionary United Front

April 24, 1998

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), it is important and appropriate to review the requirements of the revolutionary united front.

Such requirements take into account the semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions of the Philippines and the need for a national-democratic revolution of a new type through people's war in the global era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.

The class line of the revolutionary united front in the new-democratic revolution is to uphold the class leadership of the proletariat, to rely on the peasantry as the main ally of the proletariat, to win over the urban petty-bourgeoisie as a progressive force, further to win over the middle bourgeoisie as a positive force and to take advantage of the splits among the reactionaries who are big comprador-bourgeois and landlords in order to isolate and destroy the power of the enemy.

At every given time in the civil war, the enemy is the worst among the reactionaries and the most servile to the imperialists. In a national war of liberation against foreign aggression, the foreign aggressor is the enemy. At the moment, the ruling reactionary clique is the enemy being propped up by the imperialists.

The revolutionary united front is aimed at arousing and mobilizing the broad masses of the people in their millions and the broadest range of organized forces against the narrowest target, the enemy at every given time. By adopting and employing the united front policy and tactics, the revolutionary party of the proletariat amplifies the strength of the revolutionary movement as it fights one enemy after another.

The revolutionary united front is both an offensive and defensive weapon and takes both illegal and legal forms. In connection with the revolutionary armed struggle, it seeks to isolate the enemy in order to make more effective the blows of the people's army, which is the principal weapon for overthrowing the enemy and seizing political power. In this regard, it can be said that the NDFP is a united front for armed struggle, for seizing political power.

FIRST REQUIREMENT

The class leadership of the proletariat is upheld in the revolutionary united front. The proletariat is the most productive and progressive political force now and in the future. In the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, no other class can lead the revolutionary united front.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is the advanced detachment of the proletariat. It is the materialization of the class leadership of the proletariat. There can be no revolutionary united front in the Philippines without the leadership of the proletariat and the CPP.

The time is past for any stratum of the bourgeoisie to lead the Philippine revolution. We honor the bourgeois-liberal revolutionaries of 1896 for waging the democratic revolution of the old type. But recycling the class line of this revolution under present conditions is retrogressive and reactionary.

The Right opportunists were utterly wrong when in the early 1980s they tried to convert the NDFP into a so-called New Katipunan. Their intent was to reproduce the old democratic revolution and to deny and liquidate the class leadership of the proletariat under the pretext of attracting more people.

Until they were confronted and repudiated by the Second Great Rectification Movement, they tried until 1991 to convert the NDFP into a federation in which the CPP was subject to the numerical preponderance of urban petty-bourgeois organizations. They asserted that voting rather than consensus was the rule among the allied organizations.

They adulated the so-called vanguard united front and touted as their models the liberation fronts in Central America and Africa. They spread the prejudice that the CPP was undeserving of its leading role in the Philippine revolution and ultimately exposed their rabid anticommunist character.

The CPP is not simply one of many organizations in the united front. It is the party of the proletariat with the historic mission of leading the democratic revolution and consequently the socialist revolution. As a matter of principle and practice, the CPP is the highest form of working class organization in the Philippines. It is the Party that directly leads the New People's Army and is the ruling party wherever Red political power has been established.

It uses the method of consultations to arrive at a consensus with its allies. The united front is an important and necessary instrument for harmonizing the legitimate interests of allies at the level of policy. It is not the instrument for requiring the CPP to give up the principle of working class leadership in the revolution, its historic mission and its independence and initiative.

The reestablished CPP came into being before any formal united front organization like the NDFP. In fact, in the exercise of revolutionary leadership, it initiated the formation of the Preparatory Committee of the NDF in 1971 and subsequently the promulgation of the 10-point program of the NDFP on April 24, 1973, which is now considered the founding day of the NDFP.

True to its character as the revolutionary party of the proletariat, the CPP has led the masses of workers in class struggle against their oppressors and exploiters and has recruited from their ranks the proletarian revolutionaries for the comprehensive struggle for national liberation and democracy. The cadres of the CPP lead a significant number of trade unions. At the same time, they link up the trade unions that they lead with others having varying degrees of commitment to the revolutionary cause of the working class. Revolutionary work is conducted even within reactionary trade unions.

SECOND REQUIREMENT

The foundation of the revolutionary united front is the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry. By this basic alliance, the strength of the proletariat is augmented by the strength of the peasant majority of the people. There can be no revolutionary united front without the basic worker-peasant alliance.

By leading and relying mainly on the peasantry, the proletariat and its revolutionary party can pursue the general line of the new-democratic revolution through people's war. The main content of this revolution is the satisfaction of the peasants' demand for land.

The CPP carries out the antifeudal class line in the countryside. The proletariat relies mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers, wins over the middle peasants, neutralizes and further wins over the rich peasants and takes advantage of the contradictions of the enlightened and evil gentry in order to isolate and destroy the power of the evil gentry or despotic landlords.

To realize the worker-peasant alliance, the CPP has built the New People's Army and the revolutionary peasant movement. Thus, organs of democratic political power have been established. When we speak of Red political power, we mean the people's government based on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the proletariat and its party.

The revolutionary united front can exist because in the very first place there is the basic worker-peasant alliance, the realization of the antifeudal class line in the peasant movement, the building of the people's army as the main component of Red political power and the building of the organs of political power.

Building the organs of political power from one level to a higher level depends on the development of the worker-peasant alliance, the people's army and the people's war. Consequent to such development, allies from other class-

es and social strata can be won over by their recognition of the increasing strength of the armed revolution and the growing defeat of the enemy.

Long before the establishment of the NDFP in 1973, the CPP had given priority to building the worker-peasant alliance. By doing so, the CPP laid the sound basis for initiating the NDFP and making available a framework for attracting and integrating a broad range of democratic forces being subjected to escalating levels of suppression during and after the Marcos fascist dictatorship.

As a united front organization, the NDFP helps to pave the way for levels of people's government higher than the village level to arise. But the NDFP is not the people's government, contrary to the views of the Right opportunists. Neither does it supplant the political leadership of the CPP in the people's government.

THIRD REQUIREMENT

With the worker-peasant alliance assured, the revolutionary united front involves the development of the alliance of the basic revolutionary forces or progressive forces. These forces are those of the working class, peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie.

The urban petty-bourgeoisie is an important social stratum. The exploiting classes cannot rule without their support. If the urban petty-bourgeoisie swings in large numbers to the revolutionary cause, the ruling system rapidly becomes discredited and weakens. The revolutionary movement becomes stronger both in terms of the positive contributions of the urban petty-bourgeoisie as well as in terms of combating and isolating the enemy.

When won over to the revolutionary cause, the urban petty-bourgeois are good at spreading the revolutionary message, engaging in mass activism and providing a wide range of skills and talent. The advanced section of the urban petty-bourgeoisie has been a rich source of educated activists for the national-democratic movement. The most advanced activists among them have further progressed and remolded themselves into communists and have become cadres in the armed revolutionary movement and the legal democratic movement.

The urban petty-bourgeoisie is so important that the new-democratic revolution cannot win if it does not gain the support of the most advanced of such stratum. That is the reason why the enemy plays on its selfish tendencies and does everything to prevent or redirect its revolutionary tendency from

siding with the toiling masses of the people. The enemy recruits from among the urban petty-bourgeois some elements who pose as progressive or even as revolutionary and act as special agents to attack the CPP and disrupt or derail the revolutionary united front.

The NDFP is the sole underground and consolidated alliance of the basic revolutionary forces, dedicated to the new-democratic revolution through people's war. It is a united front for armed struggle. What distinguishes the NDFP from other revolutionary formations is that it is focused on the alliance of the basic revolutionary forces.

Within the NDFP, there is in fact a preponderance of sectoral organizations with an urban petty-bourgeois character or tendency, even if such organizations are led by CPP cadres. Such preponderance is a concession to the urban petty-bourgeois as a basic revolutionary force in order to attract them further to the armed revolution.

But the rule of consensus must apply among the allied organizations within the NDFP. Otherwise, the NDFP would become a framework for the urban petty-bourgeois to outnumber and outvote the fewer but far larger organizations of the workers and peasants and liquidate the class leadership of the proletariat and its party.

In fact, the Right opportunists tried from the early '80s to the early '90s to undermine and destroy the revolutionary character of the NDFP and to use the name of the NDFP against the CPP. Thus, in response to the Right opportunists, the NDFP has found it necessary to spell out the class leadership of the proletariat and its party and the socialist perspective of the Philippine revolution since 1992 in the course of the Second Great Rectification Movement.

In this regard, there should be no swing to "Left" opportunism and sectarianism because the NDFP has also spelled out that it unites, cooperates and coordinates with other forces in the furtherance of the revolutionary united front in the national-democratic revolution. The NDFP recognizes that it is not by itself the complete embodiment of the revolutionary united front and is always open to the formal and informal broadening of the united front.

Since 1971 when the CPP initiated the formation of the Preparatory Committee of the NDFP, the cadres of the CPP assigned to united front work had tried to attract to the organizational fold of the NDFP not only the urban petty-bourgeois but also the middle bourgeois and even the anti-Marcos reactionaries.

But the middle bourgeois and anti-Marcos reactionaries refused. Thus, the NDFP has remained a united front of the basic revolutionary forces, despite any development of the informal united front with the middle bourgeoisie and anti-Marcos reactionaries, especially in the period of 1983 to 1986 when the Marcos fascist dictatorship was already in the process of falling.

No amount of diluting the program of the NDFP under the deceptive banner of New Katipunan in the '80s or in the bogus NDFP congress of 1990 has been able to attract the middle bourgeois and the lesser reactionaries to its fold. Instead, the incorrigible Right opportunists and renegades were trying to liquidate the CPP, the NDFP and the entire revolutionary movement.

Thanks to the Second Great Rectification Movement, the CPP was able to take the initiative in clarifying its united front policy and revitalizing the NDFP as an alliance of basic revolutionary forces. The NDFP stands ever ready to link up formally and informally with other classes, social strata and forces willing to come to a broader revolutionary united front.

The cadres of the CPP and the NDFP are active in linking up with the sectoral and multisectoral legal alliances, with issue-based alliances, with Moro organizations for national self-determination and with temporary and unstable allies among the reactionaries opposed to the US-Ramos regime.

FOURTH REQUIREMENT

So long as the alliance of the basic revolutionary forces is assured, the revolutionary united front can be expanded in the form of the alliance of the positive or patriotic forces. This adds the middle bourgeoisie to the toiling masses and the urban petty bourgeoisie.

The middle bourgeois, sometimes referred to as the national bourgeois, have at their core those entrepreneurs running productive enterprises using local raw materials and serving the domestic market. Traditionally, the middle bourgeois are weak because they do not own heavy and basic industries and they have been further weakened historically by the sequence of import-substitution and export-oriented manufacturing after World War II, under the dominance of the foreign monopoly firms.

The policy of the CPP and the NDFP towards the middle bourgeois is to recognize their dual character, both their progressive and reactionary aspects, to attract them to the united front because of their progressive aspect and to be vigilant towards them because of their reactionary aspect.

So far, the middle bourgeois are not well organized as bourgeois nationalists and as anti-imperialist producers and have refused to join the NDFP or even the legal democratic alliance. But it does not mean that they cannot be in the united front if they are not there formally.

In practice, the middle bourgeois have come to the united front in an informal way. When the enterprise of the middle bourgeois is in the territory of the armed revolutionary movement, they can be persuaded to respond fairly and reasonably to the demand of the workers for better wage and living conditions, to pay their tax obligation to the people's government and allow the revolutionary forces the use of their facilities.

When a revolutionary trade union exists in their enterprise, the middle bourgeois are likely to plead that they should not be treated like the foreign monopoly firms which repatriate superprofits and that they should be given the chance to play their role in national economic development. In accordance with united front policy, the revolutionary forces give concessions to the legitimate interests of the national bourgeoisie.

A more active united front policy can involve preventing foreign monopolies and big compradors from continuing their dominance and allowing the national bourgeois to take over certain lines of economic activity in exchange for their support and cooperation. Certain goods that can be produced by the national bourgeois can be promoted and protected and similar goods that are being dumped into the country by the imperialists and big compradors can be banned.

FIFTH REQUIREMENT

The revolutionary forces take advantage of the contradictions among the reactionary forces of the big compradors and landlords. By themselves, these contradictions weaken the entire ruling system. But to further weaken the ruling system, the united front can be expanded as to involve formal or informal alliances with the lesser reactionaries opposed to the enemy at every given time, so long as the worker-peasant alliance, the alliance of the basic revolutionary forces and the alliance of positive or patriotic forces are being developed.

Reactionaries are characteristically unstable and unreliable allies. They are willing to ally themselves with the revolutionary forces for as long as there is a temporary need to do so in order to advance their own reactionary interests. The revolutionary forces are likewise willing to enter into temporary alliances with lesser reactionary forces in order to intensify the contradictions among

the reactionaries, weaken the ruling system and strengthen the armed revolutionary movement.

The CPP, NPA and the NDFP have rich experience in alliance work with reactionary forces. They distinguish the enlightened gentry from the evil gentry, the enlightened businessmen from the unenlightened ones, the local reactionaries from the Manila-based ruling clique, the smaller reactionaries from the bigger ones and the reactionaries out of power from the reactionaries in power.

All exploiting classes and their reactionary political agents that come within the range of power of the revolutionary movement are required to comply with the laws and regulations of the people's democratic government. Violations of or noncompliance with such laws and regulations are properly dealt with by the apparatuses of law enforcement. Activities that are harmful to the people and the environment are banned. Permissible economic activities are subject to the tax policy of the people's government.

In the course of competition among the reactionaries for political power and economic privileges within the ruling system, some of them approach the revolutionary movement for alliance against their opponents. The approaches increase and intensify during the electoral processes of the ruling system and in any period when the reactionaries fight over certain privileges and confront each other with armed personnel. The revolutionary forces can skillfully utilize the contradictions to the advantage of the revolutionary movement and the people.

In a prolonged, comprehensive and profound way, the armed revolutionary movement as well as the legal democratic movement persevered in a policy of united front with the reactionary forces opposed to the US-directed Marcos fascist dictatorship. The reactionary forces headed by Aquino were able to replace Marcos in the ruling system. But in the process of developing the united front against the fascist dictatorship, the revolutionary forces were able to gain strength. What is regrettable is that the "Left" and Right opportunists undermined the revolutionary gains.

So far, the only experience in united front work that the current revolutionary forces have not yet had is an alliance with the reactionary ruling clique against a foreign aggressor, as in the case of the alliance between the Guomindang (Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party) and the Communist Party of China against the Japanese invasion.

To this day, united front with reactionaries is usually informal at various levels. These reactionaries are also usually mostly outside of the ruling clique. However, contradictions develop within the ruling clique and can be taken advantage of by the revolutionary forces. For instance, the Marcos fascist dictatorship could not have fallen without the split within. The law of contradiction applies to everything. Nothing is indivisible.

SIXTH REQUIREMENT

The different types of alliances are all intended to weaken, isolate and destroy the enemy. An alliance with reactionaries opposed to the enemy is done in accordance with the principle and policy of defeating the reactionaries one by one, defeating the enemy one after the other and in the process strengthening the revolutionary forces until they can overthrow the entire ruling system and establish the people's democratic government.

If indeed the objective in carrying out the united front policy is to isolate and destroy the enemy at every given time, why is it that the NDFP negotiating panel has been authorized by the revolutionary movement to negotiate with the GRP negotiating panel of the US-Ramos regime which is identified as the enemy?

By way of quick reply, we say that the Guomintang was the enemy of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people before the Guomintang agreed to be an ally against the Japanese aggressors. But we do not mean to say that the US-Ramos regime is about to become an ally of the revolutionary forces.

At the moment, the regime can be challenged to recognize the basic problems generating the armed revolution and can thus be exposed to the broad masses of the people as not really interested in a just and lasting peace. Had the revolutionary forces refused to accept Ramos' offer of peace negotiations, he and his regime would have come out as the lovers of peace and the revolutionary forces would have appeared as no better than warmongers.

The CPP, NPA and the NDFP have always made clear the following: 1) that in entering into the peace negotiations with the GRP, they continue to adhere to the line of new-democratic revolution as the line for a just and lasting peace and 2) that the peace negotiations, as properly conducted by the authorized negotiating panel, is a form of legal struggle, which is subordinate to the revolutionary armed struggle or even to the legal democratic mass struggles.

In only one important respect are the peace negotiations conducted by the NDFP superior to the other forms of legal struggle. The NDFP has put itself forward as the equal of the GRP as a co-belligerent in a civil war in the light of international law. The NDFP takes certain risks in going into peace negotiations with the enemy. But the enemy likewise takes certain risks. The NDFP is aware of the balance of risks and the antidote measures it has to undertake in order to avoid confusing the revolutionary ranks and falling into the pit of capitulation.

So far, the most that has been attained in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations is the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. This is a significant document, beneficial to the people and the revolutionary forces, even if it has limitations and defects.

The revolutionary integrity of the CPP, NPA and NDFP is intact. There is no surrender to the legal and judicial system of the reactionary state, in contrast with what happened in the case of the human rights agreement between the FMLN and the El Salvador reactionary government. There is still a long way to go in the negotiations of social, economic, political and constitutional reforms before the question of truce can be taken up.

The Filipino people and the revolutionary forces are clear about the continuing hostile counterrevolutionary character of the US-Ramos regime and about the principal and secondary forms of struggle that need to be waged in order to advance the cause of the new-democratic revolution against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The policy of the revolutionary united front in the Philippines has an international dimension. It is linked to the anti-imperialist united front on an international scale. The Philippine revolution is part of the common struggle of the people of the world against imperialism. It is as well the internationalist duty of the Filipino people to contribute their strength to the international united front.

Such a united front is led by the proletariat and Marxist-Leninist parties, which are bound by proletarian internationalism. But there is a certain broadness of solidarity in this united front. It allows the active participation of all individuals and forces, with varying degrees of anti-imperialist consciousness and militancy and without ideological requirements, provided that there is vigilance against special agents who pretend to be anti-imperialist but whose main objective is to attack the proletarian revolutionaries and subvert the united front.

According to circumstances, the revolutionary forces can take advantage of the inter-imperialist contradictions in the same manner as they can take advantage of the contradictions among the domestic reactionaries. The imperialist powers are united against the people of the world but they are increasingly driven to compete against each other by the worsening crisis of the world capitalist system. The imperialist alliance headed by the United States is bound to crack up. Crisis and war are characteristics of imperialism.

There is a new world disorder, following the defeat of Soviet social-imperialism in the Cold War and the proven bankruptcy of the neoliberal policy of the traditional imperialist powers. We are in a period of transition to the resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. We are once again on the eve of social revolution on a global scale. In building the subjective forces of the revolution, we uphold proletarian internationalism and at the same time adopt a broad united front against imperialism.

Long live the National Democratic Front of the Philippines!

Carry forward the new-democratic revolution!

Long live the Filipino people!

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44. *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*
V. I. Lenin
45. *History of the CPSU(B) Short Course*
Joseph Stalin
46. *Ireland and the Irish Question*
Karl Marx & Frederick Engels
47. *On Communist Education*
M. I. Kalinin