This February, some 20-odd local Marxist-Leninist groups with the Philadelphia Workers’ Organizing Committee (PWOC) as their center established an Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center (OC) as part of the party-building efforts of the antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist forces.
The following document outlines the Guardian’s position on the OC, placing the development in the context of an overall view of the state of the U.S. communist movement. The document was developed through a number of discussions of the Guardian staff, and was adopted unanimously.
The paper is divided into the following sections:
• The state of the U.S. communist movement.
• The independent, antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist tendency.
• Brief history of the “Trend” and the Guardian’s relation to it.
• The establishment of the OC, its strengths and weaknesses.
• The OC’s 18 points of unity, their strengths and weaknesses.
• An outline of the reasons why the Guardian does not intend to join the OC for the forseeable future.
World events and developments within the left have wrought a number of significant changes among the various Marxist-Leninist parties, preparties, groups and tendencies in the U.S. during the past year. It is important to note these, however briefly, if we are to develop a proper perspective on the Guardian’s party-building work and its relations to the party-building movement in general.
The major part of this paper will deal with an appraisal of the political developments recently within the “Trend,” a grouping within the antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist movement. The Guardian identifies with this movement and has a considerable degree of unity with some “Trend” groups.
First, however, it is important to locate the independent M-L movement in the present political spectrum.
At this stage, there are three established tendencies that regard themselves as Marxist-Leninist.
The first is the revisionist tendency, represented by the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). A matchless model of revisionism completely in allegiance to the USSR, the CPUSA probably remains the single most influential “communist” organization in the U.S. It has a daily newspaper, the only “communist” group able to do so; a large corps of full-time cadre and positions of influence in a range of mass organizations and in some sectors of the trade union movement; some base in the working class, and organizational experience.
At the same time, revisionism has sapped the CPUSA’s organizational vitality. Its theoretical level, even in defense of its own line, is woefully weak and there is little in its general line to inspire a sense of confidence even within its own ranks. Party members do not appear to be particularly proud of their party these days; 800 people marching on May Day in New York City is a travesty these days.
But the party has staying power, material resources and immense organizational experience. As the principal expression of revisionism in the U.S., it remains by far the most dangerous of all the “communist” organizations.
The second tendency is the Trotskyists, represented principally by the Socialist Workers Party by virtue of its connection with the Fourth International, and the various Trotskyist sects. (An analysis of recent developments in the Trotskyist movement is long overdue and should be the subject of further discussion in a more appropriate document.)
The third tendency is the “dogmatist” tendency (for want of a better term). It is represented by the Communist Party Marxist-Leninist, CP(M-L), by virtue of its recognition by China as the sole legitimate communist party in the U.S., and the various other ultra-“left” sects. Already, two of the more important nationality M-L organizations–I Wor Kuen (largely Chinese) and the August 29th Movement (largely Chicano)– have joined with the CP(M-L) in a Unity Committee, a step which must be seen as further enhancing the leading role of the CP(M-L).
However, the prospects for the CP(M-L) becoming anything more than a local Peking party, possibly attaining as much influence as its Australian counterpart, are dim. So long as it remains wedded to China’s international line based on the ”’three worlds theory” with its particular present emphasis on directing the main blow at the Soviet Union, it will find itself trapped by an inherent class collaborationism with U.S. monopoly capital which it will find increasingly difficult to keep out of its “domestic” line.
The independent M-L movement, now developing its party-building efforts, is the fourth tendency. It is important to distinguish between the third and fourth tendencies. To confuse them leads to the error by the OC in identifying “left dogmatism” as the principal danger within the independent M-L tendency.
It is entirely possible that a fifth tendency is in the offing, composed of those groups which broke with China over the “three worlds theory” and/or the “gang of four” affair. In this context, it is significant to note the recent split in Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), which was until then probably the largest of the “new” communist parties.
Neither side in the split would appear to have much of a future on its own. The pro-China Jarvis group sooner or later will have to trend toward the CP(M-L)–either en masse or through a process of attrition. The Avakian group might link up with some of the emerging pro-Albanian groups or simply perpetuate itself as a sect.
A developing sixth tendency, which is basically left social-democratic or right revisionist (Eurocommunist) in character but which defines itself as Marxist may also be in serious formation with In These Times as its possible center.
This movement, of which the Guardian is a part, views itself as antirevisionist, anti-Trotskyist and anti-dogmatist, committed to developing a genuine Marxist-Leninist party based on the independent application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions which prevail in the U.S. today. This tendency is influenced by the revolutionary contributions to Marxism-Leninism made by Mao Tsetung, Kim Il Sung, Stalin and some others.
This developing fourth political tendency in the U.S. is in its very beginning stages. It will not take as long to consolidate as the third, “dogmatist” tendency but it will be a process of several years at the least. (The third tendency began its process of development with the formation of the Progressive Labor Movement in the early 1960s. It took over a decade to reach the last stage before consolidation with the formation of the “new communist movement” in the early 1970s. Several important trends were involved in this final ideological struggle for unity and hegemony from which the CP(M-L) emerged supreme late last year.)
During the growth of our fourth tendency, just as in the third, a number of political currents or trends will emerge to engage in struggle and unification. At this stage, two such trends have emerged.
One is a trend around the Guardian and its political line. The most important development in this trend has been publication of the Guardian’s party-building supplement and the establishment of Guardian Clubs. The organizational expression of the Guardian trend is as yet quite primitive in form, consisting of the newspaper itself, six Cubs which are still largely untested, and a good number of individuals closely associated with the Guardian in a much less formal way.
The other trend, which informally calls itself, the “Trend,” has the Philadelphia Workers Organizing Committee at its center. Largely due to PWOC’s efforts, some 20 small and regional Marxist-Leninist groupings, representing relatively wide divergencies in political sophistication and organization, formed the OC at a conference in Detroit in February 1978. The Guardian participated in the conference, has considerable unity with many of its positions, but did not join the OC.
The development of these two currents has drawn into the independent Marxist-Leninist party-building movement in a more active way a good number of individuals and small groups who until now have been merely observing the party-building movement from a distance. As time goes on, more people will enter this movement, aligning with the two existing currents or going on to establish additional currents. It is not unreasonable to speculate that four, five or more currents or trends will exist when the consolidation of this fourth tendency begins in earnest. The Guardian and the trend it represents intend to retain independence during much of this period. An outline of the reasons will appear in the summation of this document.
The 20 or so local M-L groups who have joined the OC represent a wide diversity of background, political development and practical experience. PWOC, one of the oldest, dates back to an earlier stage of the new communist movement. But most groups appear to have come into being somewhat later during the period when the leading organizations in the new communist movement took concrete organizational steps to form their respective parties. The emergence of these groups had two aspects.
One aspect was part of the break with dogmatism and ultra-“leftism.” This was its positive aspect. The other was from a localist and somewhat economist perspective which tended to subordinate the task of building M-L unity on the basis of a developed political line to the acquiring of direct experience in the working-class movement in each locality–a view that was rationalized on the basis of seeing ’“fusion” as the principal answer to dogmatism. This is its negative aspect, and it expresses a general right-opportunist error which is reflected in every aspect of the OC’s political line and party-building strategy.
Many of these groups emerged in response to what they conceived to be the errors of dogmatism, and a number of them lacked a thorough-going political critique of the line and practice of the revisionist CPUSA. In fact, many have a more extensive critique of the CP(M-L) and the RCP than they do of the CPUSA.
While this critique quite properly focuses on some of the chief manifestations of dogmatism and ultra-“leftism,” it also tends to go overboard in its criticisms of the new communist movement, making suspect some of its positive accomplishments. Thus there is a tendency to dismiss all efforts at developing the subjective factor, the initiative of Marxist-Leninists in the party-building process, as “voluntarist.” There is also a marked tendency to approach the struggle against revisionism with some reluctance, if not suspicion, reflecting a view which seems to imply that there is something inherently sectarian about the struggle against revisionism. This, of course, is reinforced by the widely prevalent view that dogmatism and ultra-“leftism” continue to be the principal danger before the party-building movement.
We must also touch briefly on the history of the relationship between the Guardian and the principal organizers of the OC. We do this because the PWOC and others have stated publicly that the Guardian has never explained why it has not joined the OC or its predecessor, the Committee of Five.
We have had a number of meetings, both with the Committee of Five and with PWOC in which we have put forward our criticisms of their political line and the party-building strategy they were unfolding. In these meetings, we outlined our reasons for deciding not to become a part of their organizational form. During this time we participated in all of the forums organized by the Committee of Five, playing an active role in some of them, and also cooperated with a number of the groups who were active in coalitions in which we were also playing a role.
From the very beginning it was clear that there were important political differences between the Guardian and the groups in the Committee of Five. This came out most sharply in the forums on party-building and on international line. Everyone is familiar with our differences over the “fusion” strategy. There were also significant differences on the nature of revisionism, the importance of the struggle against it, the international role of the Soviet Union, and the critique of the errors made by the leading groups in the new communist movement.
Second, there was a decided tendency within the Committee of Five to view the Guardian as “less equal” than the other groups because its practice consisted primarily in putting out a newspaper rather than direct involvement in working-class organizing.
While there are obviously certain limitations to the Guardian’s practice–especially heretofore when we were not developing our own organizational expression of political line–this view reflects a very narrow conception of “practice.”
Even simply as a newspaper, the practical tasks of the Guardian collective–reporting, analyzing, investigating a wide range of contemporary political events and phenomena for a national audience of both progressives and Marxist-Leninists–puts it in a good position to make a significant contribution to the development of political line. Wasn’t it precisely the Guardian’s role as a national newspaper which put it in the position at the time of the break with dogmatism to thoroughly research and report on the struggle in Angola, and to build necessary support for the MPLA? Such a task was beyond the capacity of a local collective or even a federation of local collectives.
Third, during the Committee of Five period, the Guardian undertook extensive concrete investigation of the various groups and the political lines they were advancing. What quickly became evident were many of the points cited later in this analysis, particularly concerning the level of development of the forces involved and the existence of important political differences between the Guardian and the other groups in a situation in which there seemed little likelihood of our own point of view being given serious consideration.
Nevertheless, we continued to view the Committee of Five as fraternal forces, cooperating with them on a number of levels. However, we did not believe that it was incumbent upon us to commit ourselves to their particular form of organizational cohesion as the only or best method for advancing the party-building movement.
We should recognize the positive aspects of the OC. These are:
1. The establishment of a national framework for the 20 or so local groups represents a step forward in a vision that has been characterized by a considerable degree of provincialism, small circle mentality and localism.
2. While virtually all of the local groups which now make up the OC formally subscribe to the “fusion” thesis on party-building advanced by the PWOC, in trying to establish a national center they found themselves obliged to unite with each other on the basis of a minimum political line.
3. The minimum political line put forward in their 18 principles of unity provides us with an enlightening barometer of the political consensus today among these forces.
With some important exceptions, the 18 principles represent a basic theoretical break with revisionism and a definite break with the class collaborationist international line that has subverted large sections of the new-communist movement.
4. In establishing the beginnings of an ideological center, the “Trend” forces have established a mechanism that could, and hopefully will, be used to raise the level of political unity and advance the formation of a leading political line.
5. As expressed in their formal documents and deliberations, the establishment of the OC is not seen as bringing into being the only legitimate organizational center for the antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist party-building forces.
However, these points are markedly offset by a number of other factors and concurrent developments:
1. The national structure is essentially a formality. Different groups have a different perception of what they belong to. A strong current prevails among the forces that local work is still the principal consideration for each of the groups and that the ideological center should take up questions in relation to local work. And as presently structured, the OC opens the door to a federationist preparty form in which semi-autonomous (if not completely autonomous) local groups, each practicing their own democratic centralism, will negotiate with each other over political line and organizational questions.
2. The actual practice of establishing the OC clearly had little to do with the measure of fusion achieved in the working-class movement by any of the groups involved. It was a practical demonstration of the fact that unity around political line is the inevitable starting point for party-building. However, while this happened in practice, there was little consciousness of this fact and the various groups by and large remain committed to a “fusion” strategy of party-building.
One of the participating groups, the Buffalo Workers Movement, made the following interesting observations on the OC founding conference shortly afterwards. ”The ’underdeveloped’ groups all spoke to their needs; learning from the practice of the more ’developed’ groups, learning more about organizational structure, above all understanding how to go about fusion of the workers movement with the communist movement. The developed groups, on the other hand, stressed the need to ’centralize the ideological debate,’ deepen our understanding of the 18 points, and focus a debate on the nature of ultra-leftism. The developed groups want to increase ideological unity of Marxist-Leninists, while the underdeveloped groups want to understand better how to fuse with the working class. While both tasks must go on, the national center must serve the more underdeveloped groups–practice should be summarized in order to draw the lessons in theory. The steering committee, inevitably composed of the more developed groups, should guard against their bias in favor of a purely theoretical debate.
“On the whole, there was far too little discussion of fusion in either the papers before the conference or at the conference itself. Agreement on fusion as a key task of this period and as the linch-pin of our party-building strategy was assumed, not discussed. It’s a shaky assumption. At least one group clearly disagrees (the Guardian) and others undoubtedly place different importance to fusion–and precious few groups have been able to advance very far in achieving fusion.”
3. The conference took a major step forward by adopting the 18 principles of unity. But it then took a significant step backward by adopting a proposal which, in effect, made agreement with the principles “optional” for groups wishing to join the formation.
This vacillating move was made largely in response to pressure from the Proletarian Unity League (PUD and its supporters who do not want to see Principle #18 (U.S. imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s peoples) become a political condition for joining the organization. PUL and its supporters claim not to have made up their minds on this question, but there is good reason to believe that they are still strongly swayed by China’s international line.
Retreat by the OC on this point was sheer opportunism, a fear of alienating a handful of groups who would have pulled out either because they agreed with PUL or because they had adopted a liberal stance on the question. One can argue that this is only a reflection of the political underdevelopment of certain groups–although several of the most active participants in the “Trend” conference held this line. In fact, one such group holds a place on the steering committee.
We will discuss actual weaknesses with the 18 principles of unity themselves a little later on.
4. While the establishment of a national ideological center might seem to indicate a greater measure of attention to the current theoretical tasks of the party-building movement, there is as yet no evidence of any guiding strategic concept for this theoretical work.
All that the OC has said is that its function will be to “centralize debate” among Marxist-Leninist forces. But what this centralized debate will be about or what purpose it is supposed to serve has not been specified at all. Is it aimed at working out a leading political line, deepening the critique of revisionism, taking up some of the fundamental theoretical questions facing our movement–the class nature of the Soviet Union or the national question in the U.S., for instance–or developing a plan for studying the relationship of class forces in the U.S.?
The history of the various groups involved in the undertaking–with the exception of the PWOC which has itself attempted some important theoretical work in a number of areas–is not encouraging in this respect. In fact, judging by the statements made by a number of groups, it would seem that principal emphasis in the ideological debate will be on questions arising out of the attempts by local organizations to develop “fusion” with the working-class movement and to resolve the immediate questions raised by their practice–thus committing the error of empiricism.
5. While the “Trend” conference in Detroit reflected an appropriate modesty about its decision to establish an organizing committee for an ideological center, the leading group in this process, the PWOC, is still insisting that allegiance to this particular organizational form is the test of every group’s sincerity.
But is a communist’s loyalty “to the interests of [an] emerging trend” or is it to the task of party-building and, in particular, to a set of political principles which will guide the development of a leading political line in the party-building process?
Neither the “Trend” nor the PWOC can command loyalty to its organizing efforts as the sole road to party-building simply by holding a conference or establishing an organizing committee. Why should the “Trend” groups be surprised that other Marxist-Leninists would, at this stage, be pursuing other forms of organization? Surely the Guardian is not the only organization to do so.
In the process of forming the OC, a considerable discussion emerged over political line.
But it was often the lowest-common-denominator approach to make it possible for different groups to work together. There is nothing wrong with this except that it hardly represents a political advance in the movement. And in the process, there were a number of right-opportunist errors committed in the resolution of political-line questions.
An increasingly important question in relation to the OC is not only the need to organize around political line, but what is the content of that line. In this regard, we take up the 18 points.
There is obviously much here that we can agree with. The principles take a good stand against revisionism as the principal theoretical deviation from Marxism-Leninism on which the CPUSA and other revisionist parties have foundered. Many of its other principles are fundamental and obvious, including points on the struggle against racism, sexism and opportunism.
Unfortunately, in the form of “principles,” most of this has been stated in a very general fashion, leaving open a wide variety of interpretations.
Many of the 18 principles could and should be strengthened. But there are two with which the Guardian has serious disagreements; two where note must be taken of their implications, and two where we believe there are disturbing questions as to their inadequacy and application in practice.
Principle #10: The goals enunciated in this principle should, of course, unite all Marxist-Leninists. But this is more than a statement of what the party aims to do. It is the enunciation of a strategy for bringing a new vanguard party into being.
And there is the problem. The OC wants the party to be born full-grown, already a mature organization which has been able to fuse communism with the workers’ movement even before the party itself exists. This is a mechanical view of party-building which perpetuates primitiveness of organization in the communist movement and downplays the central role of political line in party-building.
In effect, the OC believes that the period of party-building comes to an end with the establishment of the vanguard party. They want the party to come into being as a fully established and recognized vanguard. What they do not recognize is that the establishment of the party is itself the chief tool in party-building; that the party form is the means whereby communists organize themselves precisely in order to effect a fusion between communism and the working-class movement; that the principal precondition for establishing the party is the development of a leading political line capable of uniting the best and most developed Marxist-Leninists.
Can the party be built “in isolation from the great movements of the working class and the oppressed nationalities”? Of course not. But what the OC fails to take up is the nature of the relationship between the communists and the spontaneous mass movements in the preparty period. In fact, the obvious implication of the general “fusion” approach has been that there is no qualitative difference in the relationship between the communists and the mass movements before and after the party is established. But this is absurd. To make “fusion” in effect a precondition for establishing the party liquidates the need for the party itself.
Differences over this question are not of a secondary nature. For the dominant self-identification among the OC groups continues to be their view that the answer to dogmatism is “fusion” with the working class to develop a real understanding of present conditions, to learn from the workers and to infuse the class struggle with some genuine communist influence.
As might be expected, however, these primitive attempts at “fusion” have borne little relationship to the communist conception of fusing the revolutionary ideas and program of a communist party with the spontaneous movement of the working class.
Principle #15: There are two significant errors here. One is on the identification of the principal danger in the party-building movement. The other is in the way in which the errors of dogmatism are characterized.
The OC says that “within the forces struggling to build a new revolutionary party, the main danger takes the form of ’left’ opportunism.” Despite a certain vagueness on the meaning of the term “’left’ opportunism,” this was an accurate description of the party-building movement in the U.S. up until about a year ago.
But the statement can no longer stand– because the “new communist movement” no longer exists.
This is a serious matter. It is a failure to recognize that one period ended and another began.
If the error here is principally holding on to a formulation after the situation it describes no longer prevails, it can be readily corrected–and it is important to do so.
Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that the real meaning of Principle #15 is that “’left’ opportunism” is the principal danger in the ranks of the “antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist” party-building movement. But is this true? Do the problems of the “Trend” stem from a rigid and mechanical application of Marxist-Leninist theory (dogmatism) or from a tendency to substitute the consciousness of the advanced elements for the actual consciousness of the masses (left-sectarianism)? In what ways do the principal concrete ultra-“left” errors of the “new communist movement” manifest themselves in the “Trend”?
To the contrary, any real examination of the forces in the antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist current reveals that the problems stem principally from a tendency toward spontaneity, tailing after the consciousness of the masses, downplaying of the role of Marxist-Leninist theory, reluctance to abandon localism, ultra-democracy and a tendency to conciliate with more sophisticated expressions of reformism, revisionism, and right opportunism.
In making an estimate of the principal “opportunist danger,” it is always necessary to identify the forces involved. For in the party-building process we are considering not just disembodied ideas in general but real organizations and individuals who advance particular lines. Considering the debates on fusion, international line, the struggle against racism, work in the trade unions, etc., it becomes increasingly clear that when the PWOC and the other forces in the OC see the principal danger coming from the left, the particular target they have in mind is the Guardian and other Marxist-Leninist forces who have not accepted their strategic conception of party-building and who are fighting for a more developed leading political line.
On four other principles, there are inadequacies and omissions that lend additional weight to out estimate that the principal danger in the “Trend” comes from the right and not from the left. The two most serious problems are in Principles #9 and #18.
Principle #9: This principle deals with the U.S. Communist Party and identifies that organization’s principal theoretical deviations from Marxism-Leninism. But this question cannot be left in the realm of theory.
First, we must recognize the consolidation of the CPUSA as a thorough-going revisionist organization. Second, we must forcefully take up the program and activity of the CPUSA as still the single most influential party organization on the left. Today, in the actual practice of the left, the CPUSA is the foremost redbaiting and anticommunist organization, the organization with the greatest capacity (and willingness) to sell out the interests of the working-class movement for its own short-term political gain.
The latest version of Principle #9 contains an advance in that it identifies the CPUSA as “open supporters of the international revisionist movement centered in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Thus, for the first time, the Soviet Union is brought into the questions confronting the OC. Unfortunately, this is the only reference to the USSR in the entire document.
In our view, the above description of the CPUSA and the Soviet Union is inadequate. First, the critique is limited to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and tends to perpetuate the identification of revisionism as solely a theoretical deviation. But revisionism holding state power in the USSR represents much more than bad theory. Today, the Soviet Union is a superpower whose foreign policy is based upon great power chauvinism and narrow nationalism. Revisionism holding state power is a material force in the world capable of invading other countries (Czechoslovakia), backing expansionist schemes (Bangladesh), selling out national liberation struggles (Cambodia, Eritrea) and threatening socialist countries (China, Albania). Its pronouncements of “limited sovereignty” for the “socialist camp” and the “international division of labor” are the basis for armed intervention in neighboring countries and the creation of economic dependencies.
Nor is it sufficient to characterize the CPUSA as “open supporters” of the Soviet Union. They are much more. They are craven flunkeyists who will not hesitate to betray the real interests of the working class at home or national liberation struggles abroad in the interests of Soviet foreign policy and depending upon the ebbs and flows of superpower relations.
We do not claim to have the definitive analysis of the Soviet Union. This is an essential and complex theoretical task for the party-building movement. But in rejecting the assertion that there has been a complete and all-sided restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union–a thesis which has been asserted far more vigorously than it has been demonstrated–neither do we deny that socialism has suffered a severe setback in the Soviet Union and that many decisive features of capitalist production relations now prevail in the USSR.
Communists cannot simply ignore the Soviet Union which, for all practical purposes is what the OC does. To do so is in effect to permit the Soviet Union’s own self-definition as a “socialist country” to stand. Some “Trend” groups say that they have not arrived at a position. But this won’t do. The question has been before the international communist movement for at least 15 years, ever since China’s publication of its Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement. Views on the Soviet Union probably vary widely among OC groups, with some dubious about the wisdom of taking a strong antirevisionist stand. So the question has been passed over rather lightly. But this means that a certain basic political instability exists within the OC.
Principle #18: This principle identifies U.S. imperialism as “the main enemy” of the world’s peoples.
There can be no question of the importance of this principle since it is precisely around this point that the line of demarcation has been drawn within the communist movement between class collaboration and proletarian internationalism. But despite the fact that the OC. if anything, overemphasizes the struggle against dogmatism and “left” opportunism, this is the one principle on which they have wavered. And the reason is right opportunism. This tends to confirm our judgment about the importance of a correct formulation on the main danger within the present party-building movement.
We say right opportunism because the failure to uphold, fight for and make a line of demarcation out of Principle #18 is basically a reflection of a narrow, pragmatic outlook that underestimates the significance of political line and places an organizational question ahead of the political question.
Furthermore, the whole formulation of “main enemy” is inadequate and, left standing by itself, signifies an important theoretical weakness.
Can we really develop a scientific world view by identifying only one aspect of a contradiction? The revisionists, for instance, certainly agree that U.S. imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s peoples and go on to formulate their position that the principal contradiction in the world is between the imperialist camp headed by the U.S. and the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union.
At an earlier meeting of the “Trend” groups, the Guardian specifically urged the adoption of the formulation that “the principal contradiction in the world at the present time is between U.S. imperialism and its capitalist allies on the one hand and the oppressed peoples and nations of the world on the other.” This proposal was turned down and was never seriously discussed. But doesn’t such a view of the question better help us to answer the question: who are our friends and who are our enemies?
Saying that U.S. imperialism is the main enemy and failing to cite that there is at least a secondary contradiction between Soviet hegemonism and many oppressed peoples and nations opens the door to support of Soviet hegemonism. For instance, in the contradiction between the Soviet Union and China, where clearly at the moment the U.S. backs China, Principle #18 as formulated leaves the door open to siding with the Soviet Union. And why should communists condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia when, as everyone knows, U.S. imperialism would have been happy to see the Dubcek regime win a measure of independence from the Soviet Union.
Principle #13: This principle, dealing with the woman question, is quite perfunctory. Surely some recognition of the changed social and economic status of women in the U.S. today–the result of the massive entry of women into the work force along with the mass struggles of the women’s movement– must be a part of the assumptions put forward by a communist group today.
It is also essential to see that the democratic women’s movement is a significant social and political force whose aspirations for women’s equality bring it into objective contradiction with monopoly capital’s needs for a reserve army of labor and a segregated work force.
From the little we have been able to judge of the practice of the various OC groups, there would seem to be a general underestimation of the woman question–both as a strategic revolutionary question before U.S. communists and as a crucial question in the development of left and communist unity.
It is unfortunate, but perhaps reflective, that in all of the forums and debates leading up to the first large-scale meetings of the OC the one meeting that was canceled and never rescheduled was on the woman question.
Principles #11 and #12: We must express some reservations as to the strategy and program the PWOC and some “Trend” groups have adopted on the national question. We agree with Principles #11 and #12, which address national oppression– especially the provision stating, “The white workers must be won to taking up the special demands of nationally oppressed peoples.” But there are some gaps in the consistent application of this centrally important struggle.
Winning the white workers to the special demands of the nationally oppressed is founded on the premise that these demands serve to unite the working class rather than divide it. It is on this question that the U.S. left has historically faltered–using the argument that special demands divide the working class and objectively serve the ruling class. Elements of the antirevisionist movement, notably Progressive Labor and the RCP, have fallen into this objectively racist line of reasoning.
The highest vigilance is required within the anti-dogmatist. antirevisionist tendency against this error. One concrete example of this error within the “Trend”–particularly as advanced by PWOC–is opposition to the demand by the nationally oppressed workers for “superseniority”–i.e., preferential treatment on the basis of race in regard to promotions and layoffs.
We fully support this demand, which must be won in order to protect the hiring gains third world workers have won. All the agitation against racism in the abstract means nothing unless the communists are able to demonstrate in practice their willingness to fight for special demands like superseniority.
What does all this add up to? In our view, the political line and party-building strategy now unfolded by the OC is characterized by a serious right opportunist error. While the principal expressions of this error are in the “fusion” strategy for party-building, the OC’s international line and a number of other points cited in this document, its roots are to be found in other factors. These are:
1. Localism. A small, locally based independent Marxist-Leninist collective is inevitably subject to a loss of revolutionary perspective. The bourgeoisie appears powerful enough to a party organized nationally and with the ability to assess a variety of experiences on a large scale.
But to a small, local group, the enormity of the task of overthrowing capitalism tends to appear so formidable, so beyond reach, that there is a tendency to retreat into solving political problems that fall within the capacity of a small collective. That such groups cannot–nor are they impelled to–take on larger political tasks leads to a limited vision of what a party is capable of doing. The members of small, isolated groups tend to reinforce each other’s amateurishness and to raise the limitations that define them to a virtue, thus breeding small-group mentality.
2. Theoretical weakness and underdevelopment. This is a general negative feature of the U.S. communist movement. But it is particularly marked within the OC; internal theoretical development among its groups and their members is extremely uneven, with a considerable degree of theoretical weakness and backwardness prevalent.
Localism tends to reinforce theoretical underdevelopment, sometimes even to exalt it. The small scale of activity of a local group does not pose significant theoretical questions that can lead to the development of a general political line. Fusion with the working class thus becomes objectively not a strategy for making revolution but a means of avoiding theoretical tasks and then justifying such avoidance by romantic “workerist” views.
3. The lack of cadres with any previous party experience. This is a problem with the entire antirevisionist movement, especially since 20 years have passed since the consolidation of revisionism in the CPUSA. But it is a particularly marked phenomenon in these OC collectives. As a result, comrades do not have a sense of historical continuity with the U.S. communist movement, nor do they develop the breadth of political vision which flows out of the experiences of large-scale party organization.
4. Over-reaction to the errors of dogmatism and ultra-“leftism,” a tendency to dismiss all of the experience of the antirevisionist movement as fatally flawed. Reaction against the principal ultra-“left” errors has led to an underestimation of the dangers of reformism, conciliation with revisionism, downplaying the importance of theory and a glorification of the limited experiences generated by small-scale practice.
By and large, we see the source of the OC’s right opportunist error in its low level of theoretical development and organizational form, its inevitably circumscribed practice, its lack of experience and its shortage of experienced and trained Marxist-Leninist leaders. We summarize it this way because we do not see this error flowing out of a consolidated right opportunist political line but rather the result of political shortcomings and certain objective conditions.
Why has the Guardian not joined the OC at this time?
First, the Guardian has important theoretical and political differences with the OC and probably will have with some of the other currents which will develop in time within the antirevisionist, anti-dogmatist tendency. Therefore, during the consolidation period of the fourth tendency it would be more fruitful for the Guardian trend to retain its own identity in order to better conduct the inevitable struggle required for unity and consolidation.
Second, while the Guardian believes it has certain important theoretical and political contributions to make to this party-building tendency, it recognizes that it must acquire additional practical experience and consolidate its organizational form in order to maximize its efforts.
Third, the Guardian is a unique political phenomenon–an influential national organ of revolutionary propaganda serving both the Marxist-Leninist movement and the broad progressive movement as a whole. As such, it can play its most useful role at this stage in retaining an independent identity and continuing to serve both constituencies at the same time. In the process it will become an even more useful vehicle for struggle and unity within the Marxist-Leninist movement and at the same time serve as a conduit to draw people from the broad progressive movement into the more politically advanced independent Marxist-Leninist tendency.
We will not undertake at this time a political evaluation of the Guardian current. That will be the subject of an analysis at some time in the near future.
Fourth, we have serious reservations regarding the organizational premises underlying the formation and structure of the OC. The OC’s outline for a preparty formation and eventually into a party is schematic and offers few prospects for overcoming the federationism inherent when two dozen or so local M-L organizations come together, each with their own democratic centralism guiding their party-building efforts.
Fifth, the OC is characterized by a relatively low political development of most of its constituent groups and, within that context, an extremely uneven development among them. The fact that the PWOC is its leading force but denies that this is the case suggests either an unhealthy degree of political manipulation or the felt necessity to conciliate with strong ultra-democratic and anti-leadership tendencies within the OC.
Does this mean that we look at the OC as an “enemy” or outside of Marxism-Leninism? Does it mean that we see no prospects for political cooperation? Do we anticipate that ultimately there can be no organizational unity between the individuals presently holding the OC views and those who subscribe to the Guardian’s general line?
Not at all. What we are defining here is part of the area for the principled ideological struggle that should take place today among Marxist-Leninist party-building forces. That struggle includes not only debates and polemics. It also includes the whole process of organizing Marxist-Leninists around political line.
Our methodology in this contradiction should be unity-struggle-unity. However, it cannot be struggle-compromise-unity, although on a purely tactical level we do not rule out the process of finding mutually acceptable formulations when the differences in principle have been sufficiently narrowed.
At the same time, we do not envision any organizational ties between the Guardian (and Guardian Clubs) and the OC for the foreseeable future. Within the party-building movement we should engage in principled ideological struggle with the leading forces in the OC and attempt to win them over to the Guardian’s views on the key questions developed in this report. Within the broader left and anti-imperialist movement, there can be many occasions for joint activity and. on certain occasions, for forming M-L caucuses in the framework of common perspectives in relation to coalitions and mass actions.
We will proceed with our own organizational efforts–concretely, to build, expand and consolidate the Guardian trend on the basis of the political line summed up by the Guardian and as a means of giving that line a firm organizational expression, principally through the Guardian Clubs. In the next period it will be essential for the Guardian and the Clubs to develop a more concrete conception of a party-building strategy, one that aims at contributing to uniting the most advanced Marxist-Leninists–both in the Clubs and in other organizations–on the basis of a leading political line and an accumulation of revolutionary experience into the highest expression of Marxism-Leninism, a genuine working-class vanguard party.
This document should be made available to organizations and leading individuals in the party-building movement. Its main political points should serve as the basis for the Guardian’s views in public debates with OC representatives and provide the general political context for relations between Guardian Clubs and other party-building groups.