Before we unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation. Otherwise, our unity will be fictitious, it will conceal the prevailing confusion and hinder its radical elimination. – Lenin, (Declaration of the Editorial Board of Iskra)
One must not allow oneself to be misled by the cry for ̶o;unity.” Those who have this word most often on their lips are the ones who sow the most dissension... These unity fanatics are either people of limited intelligence who want to stir everything into one nondescript brew, which, the moment it is left to settle, throws up the differences again but in much sharper contrast because they will then all be in one pot... – or else they are people who unconsciously.. .or consciously want to adulterate the movement. For this reason the biggest sectarians and the biggest brawlers and rogues at times shout loudest for unity. Nobody in our lifetime has given us more trouble and been more treacherous than the shouters for unity. (Engels, Letter to Bebel, June 20, 1873)
In order to resolve the continuing debate within the Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center (OC) and to advance its consolidation, the Steering Committee (SC) of the OC prepared 13 theses on why Principle 18 should be a principle of unity of the OC and asked the Boston Party-Building Organization, as the major proponent within the OC of the opposite view, to write a response to the theses in the form of a paper stating why Principle 18 should not be a principle of unity of the OC. Along with the Communist Unity Organization, the Milwaukee Alliance, and the Worker Unity Organization, they wrote Opposition to Revisionism is Not Ultra-leftism. Why the OC Should Reject Principle 18. (For convenience, the four organizations will be referred to simply as “our comrades.”) This paper is the SC’s response to that paper.
Our comrades dispute the theses from two main points of view. The first is best regarded as disagreement with the content of Principle 18. They disagree that Angola was a crucial exposure, in practice, of the ultra-left line and, in fact, maintain that it was sectarian for U.S. communists to fail to support the FNLA and UNITA. And they justify attacks on Cuba for its support of the MPLA. Not surprisingly, in light of their view of Angola, they maintain that the identification of US imperialism as the main enemy of the world’s people is not necessary to guard against class collaboration and concretize the OC’s proletarian internationalism. Further, although appearing to grant that Principle 18 is formally true at this particular time, they argue that it is “superficial, static, and misleading” and “invites collaboration with Soviet imperialism.”
The second point of view from which they dispute the theses is disagreement that opposition to Principle 18 is a component part of the ultra-leftism of our movement. But, since they have not even grasped that opposition to Principle 18 is an error, it is hardly surprising that they fail to grasp the ultra-left character of the error. Nevertheless, we will devote a good deal of attention to this point because, on the one hand, it is useful in understanding why opposition to Principle 18 is an error and, on the other, it serves as a point of departure for extending and deepening the critique of the ultra-left line.
Additionally, our comrades raise a number of secondary points. We will discuss their confusion over what they seem to think is a “shift” by the leadership of the OC in the identification of the main danger to party building, discuss the role of “left” internationalism in maintaining the hegemony of ultra-leftism, and finally, discuss our different points of view on how to consolidate a decisive break with ultra-leftism.
In Angola the U.S. fomented a civil war in order to establish a neo-colonial government favorable to its designs for Southern Africa. Such a government would have meant a profound setback to the liberation struggle being waged in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Had the U.S. achieved its designs, it is safe to say that Smith’s illegal regime would not be facing defeat, South Africa would not have been forced to take steps towards ending its illegal occupation of Namibia, and the Soweto uprising would have been postponed for several years. Thus, to have supported U.S. imperialism in Angola would inevitably mean support for reactionary forces in Southern Africa, particularly strengthening the hands of Smith and Vorster. [Clay Newlin, Dogmatism, the Main Enemy, and “Left” Opportunism, in the pamphlet The Ultra-Left Danger and How to Fight It: Party Building and the Main Danger, p. 73]
In the face of the concrete facts of Angola, our comrades retreat to dogmatism and untruths in order to justify support for the FNLA and UNITA, and attacks on Cuba for its assistance to the MPLA. They shy away from any discussion of the actual roles which the FNLA and UNITA played, in the context of the civil war, and appeal to: “The Marxist-Leninist principle is that the U.S. working class and its vanguard must support the national liberation struggles of oppressed peoples. These struggles proceed on many fronts – we must give support to all of them.” (p. 22) We certainly agree with the principle. But the addition of the second sentence transforms it from a principle to a dogma. Marxist-Leninists have discussed the question of the correct application of this principle at length and long ago agreed that:
This does not mean, of course, that the proletariat must support every national movement, everywhere and always, in every single concrete case. It means that support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, tot overthrow imperialism, and not tot strengthen and preserve it. [Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, International Publishers, 1939, p. 79]
Our comrades’ dogmatic application of the principle frees them from dealing with such concrete questions as whether or not the FNLA and UNITA tended to weaken and overthrow imperialism or tended to strengthen and preserve it. Marxist-Leninists cannot evade such questions by hiding behind dogmas. After the stage of national liberation was completed, the principal contradiction was no longer between national liberation and imperialism, but between anti-imperialism and neo-colonialism. The FNLA and UNITA came down squarely on the side of neo-colonialism. Is it any accident that South Africa, Zaire, and the United States rushed to the support of the FNLA and UNITA? Of course not. It was precisely because the FNLA and UNITA favored a neo-colonial path for Angola.
We also should not fail to note the thoroughly Utopian character of the thinking which our comrades’ abstraction leads them to. Before the stage of national liberation was completed, before the period of the Angolan Civil War, a case could have been made for support to all three liberation movements. But after the outbreak of the civil war, the period under discussion, two sides were pitted against each other in armed struggle. The MPLA and Cuba, supported by the SU, were on one side and the FNLA, UNITA, Zaire, and South Africa, supported by US imperialism, were on the other. What possible sense could it have made to urge support for both sides in this conflict?
Our comrades’ approach to the attacks which our “lefts” made on Cuba for its support of the MPLA, by retreating to abstraction, similarly avoids the concrete question which was posed. Their approach is very “even-handed” (i.e., non-materialist, dogmatic). They argue that since it was justifiable for the EPLF to issue a warning to Cuba over its role in Ethiopia, it was justifiable for US revolutionaries to attack Cuba for its role in Angola. The “even-handed” (i.e., non-materialist, dogmatic) approach does not have to:
1) consider the concrete role which Cuba played in Angola versus its role in Ethiopia;
2) distinguish a warning from the EPLF to a country which is involved in a direct attack on it and which it nevertheless considers an ally from the “Cuban mercenaries invade Angola” counterrevolutionary trash that many of our “lefts” served up; or
3) differentiate between the proletarian internationalist responsibilities of the Eritrean liberation movement and the responsibilities of US revolutionaries who, in the heart of US imperialism above all have the responsibility of combatting their “own” bourgeoisie – a bourgeoisie which made Cuban assistance to the MPLA the centerpiece of their propaganda effort to drum up support for intervention in Angola.
The approach of our comrades may be “even-handed,” but it is not Marxist.
It is worth quoting at length from the leadership of the EPLF so that their warning to Cuba can be seen in its proper context.
The contradiction between us and those socialist and democratic systems and organizations that have taken a wrong stand on the Eritrean question and have sided with the Dergue is a contradiction within the world revolutionary force. For this reason, it occupies a secondary position. Hence, to make them understand the situation of the Eritrean revolution and to correct their wrong stand through opposition, we shall continue our struggle within the world revolutionary force. To see this struggle as identical and on the same level as the struggle waged against imperialism, colonialism and reaction is wrong. It will not enable the masses to recognize their strategic friends from enemies and will lead to failure and disaster; it means to fall into the trap of imperialism and reaction. [Vanguard, Vol. 3, No. 5 June 1978, our emphasis].
The comrades of the EPLF, who have maintained such a clear view of the struggle against US imperialism in the face of direct conflict with some of the most reactionary aspects of Soviet revisionism, put our movement to shame.
In an attempt to bolster their position on Angola by discrediting the internationalist approach to support for national liberation, our comrades resort to untruth. They characterize the PWOC’s position[1] as:
Some comrades’ approach has been to insist that we not only agree on the identification of the leading force in a national liberation struggle, but that we reserve our exclusive support for that force. If we fail to do this they say, it is a sign of ultra-leftism and is even cause for expulsion from the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninists, [p. 22]
Apparently our comrades assume that the PWOC shared their dogmatism and “even-handed” approach so that, if in one particular national liberation struggle the PWOC supports only one force, they will apply the “principle” in an “even-handed” way to all national liberation struggles. But, since the PWOC proceeded on the basis of a concrete analysis of concrete conditions, it made a difference to them that, in the case of Angola, the other national “liberation” forces were in open collaboration with the CIA and South Africa and were advancing the interests of US imperialism. The MPLA did not receive exclusive support because it was the leading national liberation force, but because it was the only national liberation force. The FNLA and UNITA were counter-revolutionary forces. Contrary to what our comrades claim, the PWOC and all of the organizations on the SC for that matter, support both ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe (the PWOC’s view has appeared in the Organizer and was arrived at before the formation of the Patriotic Front.) All support both the ANC and the PAC in South Africa. But none adhere to the ridiculous dogmatic view which holds that every force which calls itself a national liberation force deserves the support of the world proletariat.
Our comrades do make an attempt to criticize the ultra-lefts around Angola, but their criticism only serves to expose the contradiction in their own position. They say:
Many of the “left” groups, such as the CP [ML], committed a sectarian error when they denounced the MPLA simply because it received Soviet aide. They further failed to carry out their internationalist responsibilities in neglecting to expose and denounce U.SM imperialism’s intervention in Angola, while effectively giving “exclusive” support to FNLA and UNITA. Finally, they compounded these errors by taking a sectarian stance toward the movement in the U.S. against U.S. intervention, when they refused to unite with its overwhelmingly progressive content while struggling within it for their view of the Soviet danger, [pp. 22-23]
Since U.S. imperialism’s intervention in Angola consisted mainly of support of the FNLA and UNITA, and our comrades also support these groups, what exposures and denunciations of U.S. imperialism do they think are called for?!! If our comrades believe that exposure and denunciations of US imperialism for supporting groups that they themselves support makes the slightest shred of sense, small wonder they have not been able to understand the first thing that has been said about why “left” internationalism leads to class collaboration. Could it be that they are so removed from having any effect 0n the class struggle that they view their support for the FNLA and UNITA only from the perspective of its use in fighting revisionism in the inner circles of the communist movement and, because it has no effect in the real world, do not regard it as class collaboration?
The analysis our comrades make of the course the CP (ML) should have taken with respect to the nonintervention movement is a good argument for consolidation around Principle 18 by the OC. The CP (ML) was in opposition to the nonintervention movement. U.S. imperialism’s main intervention was support for the FNLA and UNITA and the non-intervention movement’s main thrust was against this support. Our comrades say, essentially, that the CP (ML) should have taken a “non-sectarian approach” to pushing their ultra-left politics and “bored within” the non-intervention movement in order to push their view of the Soviet danger (i.e., to push the views of Kissinger and the State Department.) We can be thankful, for once, that the CP (ML) took a sectarian approach. And we should be on guard against others who may wish to take a “non-sectarian approach” to advancing ultra-left politics.
Our comrades’ charges of sectarianism against the SC also deserve comment. Comparing PUL to the FNLA and UNITA, they say that just as the SC was sectarian in excluding the FNLA and UNITA from the ranks of the genuine liberation forces in Angola, it is sectarian in supporting the exclusion of PUL from the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninists in the US. We hardly think this comparison does service to PUL or is well chosen to convince the OC of its sectarian attitude toward PUL. More importantly, the statement does a disservice to the struggle against sectarianism. Dialectics teaches us that things can turn into their opposites. When support for national liberation is taken to the point where support for every force is called for, it becomes, objectively opposed to national liberation. In the same way, when the call for unity of all anti-“left” is taken to the point of calling for unity of every force that says it is committed to the struggle against ultra-leftism, regardless of the fact that they are committed to struggle to maintain a key aspect of the ultra-left line, it becomes, objectively, a call for disunity.
Angola is indeed the watershed of the ultra-left line. It is the first nail in the coffin of ultra-leftism. Is it any wonder that, in planning the completion of the task, the SC is opposed to uniting with those who so strongly resist driving in the first nail?
We saw in the first section how our comrades fail to grasp the implications of “left” internationalism in practice. In this section we’ll see how this failure carries over into a failure to understand why the identification of the main enemy of the world’s people is necessary for the practice of proletarian internationalism. The 13 Theses maintain that if US revolutionaries do not identify US imperialism as the main enemy of the world’s people, the practice of proletarian internationalism is impossible and class collaboration will inevitably result. Our comrades dispute this and propose that the following principle is sufficient to guard against class collaboration and concretely express the OC’s commitment to proletarian internationalism.
The chief responsibility of U.S. revolutionaries is to overthrow U.S. imperialism, while fighting against all imperialism, [p. 8]
But this principle evades the concrete question which social practice has posed. An extremely significant two-line struggle raged within the US communist movement over Angola. And it was not significant for any superficial reason. Angola posed an extremely significant question not only for our movement but for the entire international anti-imperialist movement. A major realignment took place within our movement. Organizations sharply questioned some aspects of the CPC’s line for the first time. And can there be any question that this, two-line struggle is intimately bound up with the developing break with ultra-leftism? Angola posed a very significant question for our movement. It is the practice of proletarian internationalism, in the present context, possible without identifying US imperialism as the main enemy of the world’s people? The lines were very clearly drawn. On the one hand, we have those who saw support for the FNLA and UNITA as a grievous act of class collaboration and an extremely serious departure from proletarian internationalism. On the other, we have those, like our comrades, who think that failure to support the FNLA and UNITA was an equally serious departure from Marxism-Leninism. How do we sum up that struggle? Principle 18, in part, must be seen as this sum-up. Our comrades’ principle, on the other hand, evades the question.
It evades the question because it is abstract. We do not question the “commitment,” in the abstract, of the “left” internationalists to proletarian internationalism. It is the content of the actual agitation and propaganda of the “lefts” which expose their class collaboration and departure from Marxism-Leninism, not their commitment. There is probably not a single ultra-leftist who would fail to agree with our comrades’ proposed principle!
Abstraction and dogmatism is the refuge of “left” internationalism. We can further demonstrate this by examining how our comrades understand Lenin’s formulation that: “only he is an internationalist who in a really internationalist way combats his own bourgeoisie, ...” Our comrades argue that this formulation was sufficient to demarcate social chauvinists (national chauvinists with a socialist cover) in 1914 and therefore, since national chauvinism was even more developed then, it is sufficient to demarcate social chauvinists today. We agree completely with our comrades on this last point. But, as we shall see, the thrust of Lenin’s position (if it is grasped and not merely quoted from) goes completely against our comrades.
Our quotation clipping comrades failed to read (or perhaps to understand) the rest of the page which they clipped the quote from Lenin.
Socialists in every country must now, when the question of peace is so directly posed, unfailingly and more vigorously than usual expose their own government and their own bourgeoisie. ... For the Socialist of another country cannot expose the government and bourgeoisie of a country at war with “his own” nation, and not only because he does not know that country’s language, history, specific features, etc., but also because such exposure is part of imperialist intrigue, and is not an internationalist duty.
He is not an internationalist who vows and swears by internationalism. Only he is an internationalist who in a really internationalist way combats his own Kautskyites. [LCW 23, p. 209]
Lenin points out that in a situation of inter-imperialist war, exposure of a rival bourgeoisie is not an internationalist duty but, on the contrary, is an act of imperialist intrigue – i.e. it only serves to bolster the imperialist bourgeoisie’s attempt to inflame the national chauvinism of the workers. Our comrades view the SU as an imperialist county in fierce contention with US imperialism. The US bourgeoisie does everything it can to inflame the anti-Soviet sentiments of the working class. In this situation, our comrades are preoccupied with upholding “the danger of the Soviet threat.” It is apparent that: our comrades can receive little support from Lenin on this score. For Lenin, their preoccupation would seem to have much more in common with imperialist intrigue than with proletarian internationalism.
Today, the strongest attacks on our “own” bourgeoisie are being carried out by struggles of national liberation. Support for national liberation and steadfast resistance to our “own” bourgeoisie’s attempts to hold back the rising tide of national liberation is demanded of us if we are to seriously take up the task of combatting our “own” bourgeoisie. In this situation, we cannot begin to orient ourselves and answer the concrete questions which social practice insistently poses without an orientation towards US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. What concrete practice with respect to the Angolan civil war, for example, did combat our own bourgeoisie? A statement of our internationalist commitment will remain abstract (i.e. good for nothing) if it avoids the central questions which are posed. It is for this reason that Principle 18 states: “In the present context the practice of proletarian internationalism is impossible without correctly identifying the main enemy of the world’s people.”
Our comrades are especially anxious to detach opposition to Principle 18 from class collaboration. And with good reason. They understand full well that class collaboration is the essence of opportunism. They attempt to argue that only the formulation “aim the main blow at the Soviet Union” is a class collaborationist formulation by disputing the assertion in Theses 4 that: ”The failure of the ’lefts’ to correctly aim their main blow at US imperialism has caused them to engage in collaboration with the internationalist aims of their ’own’ ruling class.” In fact, they claim that, “as all of us (including the SC) know perfectly well,” (p. 17) this is false! We would like to assure our comrades that we are quite confident that it is true.
Our differences, of course, arise because our comrades, themselves defenders of the “left” line, find relatively few examples of class collaboration in the recent history of our movement. But support of the FNLA and UNITA was class collaborationist. The success of the FNLA and UNITA was clearly part of the internationalist aims of “our” bourgeoisie. There can be no question of that. How do the authors justify their own support for these forces and defend it from the charge of collaboration? There is one circumstance in which this kind of alliance with your “own” bourgeoisie is justified – when the alliance is directed at a greater enemy. The alliance of the US working class with its “own” bourgeoisie against fascism, for example, was not class collaborationist because fascism was the main enemy. In the same way, our comrades’ alliance with their “own” ruling class in support of the FNLA and UNITA can only be justified if the SU is the main enemy. (It is for this reason that Thesis 3 states: “In practice their position amounts to aiming the main blow at the USSR.”) The authors themselves have provided a verification of Thesis 4! Our comrades’ failure to correctly aim the main blow at US imperialism has caused them to collaborate with the aims of their “own” ruling class.
We should be clear that while support for forces like the FNLA and UNITA are acts of open class collaboration, the question of class collaboration goes deeper. We can give a concrete example. The US government is presently engaged in a propaganda campaign against the “Cuban threat in Africa” in order to create a “climate of opinion” which will free its hands to intervene in Africa. This campaign goes into full gear at times like the Shaba rebellion and abates at others. But it is a persistent theme. In this context, attacks on Cuba, which are not carefully subordinated to exposing our “own” bourgeoisie, are (objectively) acts of class collaboration. Their effect is precisely to reinforce the bourgeoisie’s efforts.
Finally, it should be clear to our comrades at this point that they are incorrect when they say that the theses are aimed not against the ultra-left trend, but against the CP (ML).” (p. 18) They should realize that the theses are aimed not only at the ultra-left trend, but also at those who, like our comrades, merely keep one foot in the ultra-left camp.
According to our comrades, Principle 18 1) is at best an assertion that US imperialism is currently the dominant economic power; 2) invites the error of collaboration with Soviet revisionism; and 3) is “superficial, static, and ultimately misleading.” And yet they do not disagree with Principle 18 but only oppose its use as a line of demarcation! We’ll examine each of these objections – and leave it to our comrades to explain why they don’t disagree with Principle 18.
First, our comrades’ statement that:
At best principle 18 is an “obvious” statement referring to the fact that currently the U.S. is the economically dominant imperialist power. Worse, it asserts that this situation is a stable one. [p. 27]
This is nothing but an attempt by our comrades to attempt to belittle the significance of Principle 18 by both obscuring the significance of determining the main enemy of the world’s people and by suggesting that the concrete analysis behind it consists of nothing more than a superficial examination of economic balance sheets. It is significant that nowhere in our comrades’ paper do they refute the statement in Principle 18: “In the present context the practice of proletarian internationalism is impossible without correctly identifying the main enemy of the world’s people.” They do not refute it because they cannot. The identification of the main enemy is the starting point for formulating a concrete conception of the united front against imperialism. Without a determination of the main enemy the united front against imperialism is a pious wish, not a guide to the practice of proletarian internationalism. (We urge comrades to study the relevant sections of Dogmatism, the Main Enemy, and “Left” Opportunism for a fuller exposition of the central importance of determining the main enemy of the world’s people for the practice of proletarian internationalism.)
The weight of evidence in support of the identification of US imperialism as the main enemy is overwhelming. Who stands as the main obstacle to the national liberation of the people of Africa and to their consolidation of socialism? Is not Africa the region of sharpest conflict between imperialism and anti-imperialism today? Who stands as the main obstacle to progress in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia? Can anyone deny that, along with Africa, these are the areas of sharpest contention in the world today? We do not base Principle 18 on a simplistic assessment of the balance of economic forces in the world today but on a sum-up of all the factors (economic, military, political and ideological) in the concrete role which US Imperialism plays in each of these areas and the international class struggle in general. It would be ludicrous to maintain, for example, that England is the main obstacle to progress in South Africa simply because it is the dominant imperialist economic power there.
While the determination of the main enemy cannot be reduced to a question of economic dominance, it is clear that the global economic of US imperialism is one of the main weapons it uses to achieve its counter-revolutionary objectives. Our comrades attempt to cast doubt on Principle 18 by calling the stability of this dominance into question and (implicitly) suggesting that the SU is threatening to overturn the economic balance of forces. But there is no evidence that the economic balance of forces is likely to qualitatively shift in the coming period. Furthermore, to the extent that US economic dominance is being threatened, it is not the SU but Japan and Western Europe who are challenging the US. The economy of the SU is, in fact, falling behind the economies of the US, Japan, and Western Europe in productivity and advanced technology. Revisionism’s failures in advancing economic development are no less glaring than its other failures.
Second, the objection that Principle 18 invites collaboration with Soviet revisionism. Principle 18 is only the starting point for elaborating an international line. The determination of secondary enemies, friends and allies, strategy and tactics, etc. are all left open. Many questions remain to be answered. In particular Principle 18 leaves open the question of whether the SU is a secondary enemy or an ally of the world’s people. That is, it leaves open the question of whether the correct formation for the united front against imperialism is a united front against US imperialism. The former position, for example, was held by China from the time of the Czechoslovakian intervention until the initiation of the Sino-American detente with Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. During that period China held that the SU was an imperialist superpower but that US imperialism was the main enemy. That position is completely consistent with Principle 18.
For the sake of clarity, we need to clear up a confusion which our comrades may have created. They are mistaken when they claim that the SC asserts that:
...a direct and inevitable connection exists between recognition that the Soviet Union is an imperialist superpower, on the one hand, and collaboration with U.S. imperialism, on the other hand. [p. 16]
What the SC did say was that:
The failure of the “lefts” to correctly aim their main blow at US imperialism has caused them to engage in collaborationism with the international aims of their “own” ruling class. [Thesis 4]
As we pointed out above, one can argue, as the CPC did at one time, that the Soviet Union is an imperialist superpower but that the main blow should be directed against US imperialism – i.e. that US imperialism is the main enemy. Contrary to the claim of our comrades, the theses do not assert that this position leads to class collaboration. It is simply not true that the determination that the SU is an imperialist superpower would, in and of itself, imply that US imperialism was no longer the main enemy of the world’s people. Even if it were true that the SU is best characterized as an imperialist superpower, Principle 18 could only be refuted on the basis of a concrete analysis of the roles which the US and the SU play in the international class struggle.
But Principle 18 does leave open the possibility of coming to the conclusion that the correct strategic formulation is a united front against US imperialism and that the SU is an ally of the world’s people. This, presumably, is the concern of our comrades when they say that it “invites collaboration with Soviet revisionism.” They want to revoke the break with the “left” which the adoption of Principle 18 represents because, in their eyes, it “invites” a revisionist deviation.
It is important to view this in historical perspective. Ever since the early development of the anti-revisionist movement in the early 60’s and its rapid consolidation of an ultra-left perspective, there have been repeated attempts to consolidate a break with both revisionism and ultra-leftism. Our attempt is not the first. None of these attempts has succeeded in breaking free from the grasp of ultra-leftism. In 1973, in Party Building in the US, the October League wrote:
The past decade has witnessed the failure of every group [up until now] that broke organizationally from the rightism of the CPUSA to keep away the influences of “ultra-leftism.” These groups include the Provisional Organizing Committee [POC] which split from the CP in the late 50’s and the Progressive Labor Party [PLP] which began in the early 60’s. Both of these groups at one time represented the hopes of many honest communists within and outside of the CP that a new revolutionary communist party could be built.
...In part, this leftism today stems from a reaction to the rightism of the revisionist party. In part, it reflects the social base of the communist movement at the present time. ...within the conditions of life of these students and middle class revolutionaries lie the very seeds of these “leftist” diseases; sectarianism, dogmatism, and anarchism.
There are some elements of the movement, generally characterized by “ultra-leftism” who think that a Party can be called into being or “declared” at one or another conference. These people have disdain for the mass struggle of the people and view communists only in a narrow sense of holding certain Marxist ideas, [p. 12, 16]
We have quoted at length from the OL because it is very important for us to firmly grasp the fact that we are not the first to attempt to consolidate a trend that was both anti-revisionist and anti-“left”, and to show that it is a demanding task. Subjective desire to break with ultra-leftism won’t guarantee anything, as the OL has amply demonstrated. What has prevented our movement from consolidating an anti-revisionist, anti-“left” trend? A major factor has been precisely the influences of those, like our comrades, who have strived to hold back decisive breaks with ultra-leftism by trumpeting the danger of revisionism. Our comrades object to Principle 18 not so much because it is an incorrect assessment of the state of the international class struggle, but because it “invites collaboration with Soviet revisionism.” This kind of thinking will get us nowhere. If our embryonic tendency cannot learn to base its political perspective on a concrete analysis of concrete conditions rather than a subjective reaction to revisionism (or to ultra-leftism), it will fail to consolidate a Marxist-Leninist trend. And it will fail not only the US working class and oppressed peoples but the world-revolutionary movement. Principle 18 is based on a concrete analysis of the international class struggle over the past fifteen years. We cannot allow insinuations of collaboration with revisionism to blind our eyes to reality. If we do, we are doomed to repeat the errors of our movement.
Third, the objection that Principle 18 is “superficial, static and ultimately misleading.” We sharply disagree. Principle 18 is based on the actual course of the class struggle over the past decade. It is the starting point for elaborating a strategic perspective for the anti-imperialist movement. And the recent history of the communist movement in the US has repeatedly demonstrated that it is the failure to recognize Principle 18 which has misled US revolutionaries into collaborating with the main enemy of the world’s people.
Characteristically, our comrades do not attempt to establish the “superficial” and “static” character of Principle 18 by any reference to today’s reality, but by contrasting it with Lenin’s analysis. The contrast they attempt to draw turns out to be only an exercise in the irrelevant use of the profound quotation. They first point out that one would have been misled in 1914 in judging the imperialist power of the different imperialisms if the judgment was made on the basis of the size of their colonial possessions and subject populations. In contrast with this, it was necessary to see that imperialist power was primarily a question of economic power. But is Principle 18 based on counting up the size and populations of “spheres of influences?” Of course not. Does it ignore the question of economic power? Of course not. Is the extensive quotation from Lenin only meant to show that it is possible to make mistakes in analyzing imperialism? We can assure our comrades that we were well aware that such mistakes are possible. The contrast our comrades attempt to draw with the profound Lenin is profoundly irrelevant.
Our comrades think Principle 18 is “misleading” because it “deceives people into thinking that the SU is a friend who has come to fight the imperialists.” According to our comrades it is necessary for US revolutionaries to take up the task of keeping the Ho Chi Minhs, the Le Duans, the Kim II Sungs, the Machels, the Cabrals, the Netos, and the Castros of the world from being fooled by the SU. And in order to take up this task, it is necessary to reject Principle 18. Apparently, it is secondary to keep the US people from being fooled by the US bourgeoisie into thinking that the US only intervenes around the world to counter the “Soviet threat.” And our comrades presume to give us instructions on Lenin’s understanding that the task is to combat “our own bourgeoisie”!
It seems to us, in fact, that the leaders of the struggles which have produced the sharpest setbacks for imperialism and the most significant advances for socialism and the most significant advances for socialism are rather well qualified to give us instructions on what role the Soviet Union plays in the international class struggle. Without exception, the leaders named above agree that not only in US imperialism the main enemy of the world’s peoples, but that the SU is an ally in the struggle against US imperialism. There is much to be learned from these revolutionary leaders and the revolutions which they lead. Which brings up another aspect of the negative consequences of “left” internationalism and the thinking of our comrades. Solidarity with these revolutions should serve as an important source of inspiration and instruction for US revolutionaries and all class conscious fighters. Viewing these leaders as dupes of the Soviet Union will hardly contribute to this revolutionary inspiration and education.
Our comrades contend that “the 13 theses fail to show what is ’left’ about so-called ’left’ internationalism, and they do not demonstrate that this error is characteristic of the ultra-left line.” (p. 19)
It is a characteristic right opportunist and revisionist error to overestimate the significance of contradictions within the enemy camp (e.g. the CP’s exaggeration of the contradiction between the monopoly and non-monopoly sectors of capital) and to downplay the struggle against secondary enemies (e.g. the CP’s attitude toward the trade-union bureaucracy). In the same way (as a unity of opposites), it is a characteristic ultra-left error to ignore contradictions within the camp of the enemy and to confuse secondary enemies with the main enemy. Our comrades do not dispute that this error is a general characteristic of ultra-leftism, but argue against the application of this understanding to those who fail to subordinate the struggle against Soviet revisionism to the struggle against US imperialism. They argue that the struggles against both revisionism and imperialism are, in essence, the struggle against the bourgeoisie so that it is an error to distinguish between these struggles. But it is one thing to say that two forces are, in essence, bourgeois forces and another to say that as actual class enemies in the material world they are equal threats. This simplistic equation of equivalence in essence, with equivalence as material forces is a hallmark of ultra-leftism. It is firmly rooted in the idealist viewpoint of ultra-leftism.
Consider our comrades’ comment on the statement in Thesis 8 that (domestically) the ultra-lefts elevate “the fight against reformism and revisionism over the struggle against their ’own’ ruling class.” They charge that this tends toward making a certain separation between the struggle against revisionism and the struggle against the bourgeoisie. They go so far as the say that this statement seems to counterpose the struggle against revisionism to the struggle against the bourgeoisie. They go so far as to say that this statement seems to counterpose the struggle against revisionism to the struggle against the bourgeoisie. It was precisely this “’left-wing’ mentality” that Lenin criticized in “left-Wing Communism – An Infantile Disorder.” In arguing against the sectarian approach to reformism taken by the British communists, Lenin said:
The difference between the Churchills and the Lloyd Georges – with insignificant national distinctions, these political types exist in all countries – on the one hand, and between the Hendersons and the Lloyd Georges on the other, are quite minor and unimportant from the standpoint of pure [i.e. abstract] communism, i.e., communism which has not matured to the stage of political action by the masses. However, from the standpoint of this practical action by the masses, these differences are most important. [LCW 31, p. 94, second underlining ours – Churchill was a leader of the Conservative Party, Lloyd George of the Liberal Party, and Henderson of the reformist Labor Party]
Lenin did not allow the fact that the politics of the Labor Party was (in essence) bourgeois, to obscure the fact that, in practice, it was a serious “left-wing” error to confuse the reformists with actual representatives of the bourgeoisie. Our comrades, on the other hand, object to the “separation” we make in distinguishing between the struggle against reformism and revisionism, and the struggle against the ruling class.
The association of this error with ultra-leftism has a long and sordid history. The Third International, in its ultra-left “Third Period,” was led to a ruinous policy of objective collaboration with fascism by its failure to sharply distinguish its policy towards the actual fascists with that towards the social democrats who they regarded as “social” fascists. The fact that social democracy was bourgeois in essence did not at all imply that, in practice, social democracy should be considered as the “twin” of fascism (to use Stalin’s phrase). The ultra-leftism of the Third Period was rectified by the United Front Against Fascism in which communists and social democrats joined in common struggle against the main enemy, fascism. A major component of the ultra-left line which afflicted the CPC in the mid-thirties was a failure to distinguish the main enemy, Japanese imperialism, from the secondary enemy, the Kuomintang. This period ended with the consolidation of the policy of a united front with the Kuomintang against Japanese imperialism. In our own movement today, the ultra-left trade union line is based on an equation between the struggles against the capitalists, the trade-union bureaucracy, and trade union reformists. In the ultimate sense, each of these forces is bourgeois in essence. But in the realm of the actual practice of the class struggle, it is necessary to clearly “separate” these forces. The OL’s ultra-leftism was clearly exposed by their attitude towards the Sadlowski movement in the USWA. They failed to distinguish between the reformist character of the Sadlowski movement and the open allegiance of the Abel forces with the steel companies in spite of the very different roles they played in the class struggle. In just the same way, the OL’s ultra-leftism was exposed by their failure to distinguish between the actual role which was played by the revisionists in Angola from the actual role played by US imperialism.
In our opinion, the basic ideological and political links which “left” internationalism has with “left-wing” conceptions of strategy and tactics should be apparent. The connection from the standpoint of the theoretical basis of modern ultra-leftism, dogmatism, has been explained at length in Clay Newlin’s recent response to PUL (written for the Committee of Five).
We’ll now turn to the connection of “left” internationalism with ultra-leftism from the point of view of the social forces involved. Contrary to the implication of our comrades the SC has never tried to prove the incorrectness of opposition to Principle 18 by merely claiming that it was a position that virtually all of the “left” organizations have adopted. However, given an understanding of the incorrectness of opposition to Principle 18, it is absolutely correct from the standpoint of the Marxist-Leninist method to correlate the two line ideological struggle with the material forces which hold the two positions in order to deepen the understanding of the nature of the error. The example of the dictatorship of the proletariat which our comrades advance is, to speak frankly, silly. It is a correct position which is held by the entire communist movement. On the other hand, opposition to Principle 18 is an incorrect position and all of the many organizations which have broken with ultra-leftism sufficiently to recognize the existence of a (relatively) consolidated ultra-left trend and have decided to take the path of attempting to consolidate a new Marxist-Leninist trend, only a handful dispute the correctness of Principle 18. And virtually all of the many groups in the ultra-left trend staunchly oppose Principle 18. What sense can it make to anyone but an academician to compare this to the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat? It seems as if our comrades are grasping at straws.
Their last straw is the “deviant” group, the CLP, the ultra-left group that supports Principle 18. In the first place, it is clear that the CLP is hardly in the mainstream of the ultra-left trend. Secondly, it should be clear that in discussing a trend, the example of one group, which also distinguishes itself in other ways, is hardly significant. Lenin said, with reference to those who held up this or that isolated example in an attempt to obscure the relationship between the social-chauvinism that had developed within the Second International and the right opportunist trend within it, that:
Those who refuse to see the closest and unbreakable link, between social-chauvinism and opportunism clutch at individual instances – this opportunist or another, they say, has turned internationalist; this radical or another has turned chauvinist. But his kind of argument carries no weight as far as the development of trends is concerned. ...one must remember that social science [like science generally] usually deals with mass phenomena, not with individual cases. [Lenin, The Collapse of the Second International, LCW 21 p. 244]
If our comrades would direct themselves to examining the actual course of the international class struggle over the last fifteen years instead of concentrating their attention on defending us from the Soviet threat and justifying the views of the CPC, they would soon come to see that US imperialism is indeed the main enemy of the world’s people. Once they accomplished this, their understanding of the ultra-left character of opposition to Principle 18 would follow easily.
It is instructive to examine another aspect of the ultra-leftism of “left” internationalism – the connection between the “left” line of the CPC in its struggle against revisionism in the international arena and the domestic politics of our “lefts.” Our comrades themselves provide us with a good example. They agree that:
Exaggerating the importance of the CP[USA] and the struggle against it has been a hallmark of the ultra-left line in our movement. The October League’s slogan, “No unity of action with the revisionists!” is a typical and typically destructive example.
But our comrades fail to provide any explanation for why the OL arrived at such an isolating and destructive policy. There is a simple explanation. The OL was simply copying the policies which the CPC pursued in the international arena. Exaggerating the importance of the “revisionist danger” and the struggle against it has been a hallmark of the CPC’s line in the international communist movement. And the slogan, “No unity of action with the revisionists!” is taken directly from the CPC. The OL learned some of its “left-wing” politics from the CPC. And we should be clear that, in this case, it is not simply a question of correct international policy of the CPC incorrectly applied by the OL in the US. The CPC’s international policy itself was ultra-left. Of course, this is a partial explanation. One must still explain why the OL chose this particular lesson and why it chose to learn its politics from the CPC and not, for example, from the CPSU. Nevertheless, it is an important aspect of an all-sided explanation.
If we look at the historical development of the CPC’s line on Soviet revisionism its turn to ultra-leftism in the mid-60’s is striking. The slogan “No unity of action with revisionists!” was born in 1965, when, in the face of a massive buildup of US troops in Viet Nam, China adopted a policy of refusing to join in united action with the SU for the defense of Viet Nam. This marked a sharp “left” turn in China’s anti-imperialist policy. And, in practice, it not only harmed the anti-imperialist struggle but led to a severe setback for the struggle against revisionism. In the early 60’s, the CPC had managed to build an anti-revisionist bloc within the world communist movement which included Viet Nam, Korea, and even, to some extent, Cuba. China’s sectarianism toward the SU, which objectively impeded the anti-imperialist struggle, led to the rapid disintegration of this anti-revisionist bloc.
The CPC justified their sectarianism toward the SU within the anti-imperialist movement with typical ultra-left arguments. Firstly, they correctly cited the ideological antagonism between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. But it is a typical ultra-left error to demand ideological unity as a precondition for united action. Would any of the great united fronts which have made communist history have succeeded if ideological unity had been demanded? The “lefts” who rejected joint action with the Sadlowski movement because of its reformist character committed exactly this error.
Secondly, the CPC said that united action with the SU would help the CPUS A deceive the Soviet people:
If we should cease exposing and combating the domestic and external revisionist policies of the new leaders of the CPSU, if we should abandon our principled stand and take so-called “united action” with them, that would suit them very well. It would help them to hoodwink the Soviet people. [Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on “United Action,” Peking Review, 12 November 1965]
But, as practice demonstrated, it only discredited anti-revisionism, raised the stock of revisionism, and began the isolation of China from the anti-imperialist movement which we see today. Our “lefts” use similar arguments to justify their sectarianism towards the reform movement. China -contributed about as much to exposing revisionism for the Soviet people as the “lefts” who rejected joint action with Sadlowski contributed to exposing reformism for the steelworkers.
And thirdly, the CPC charged that the SU was an enemy of the Vietnamese people and an ally of US imperialism. To substantiate this charge, the CPC reviews their correct critique of revisionism – its conciliation with imperialism, its strong tendency towards compromise, negotiations, and peaceful solutions–and concludes that the SU was an enemy of the Vietnamese people. The ultra-leftism of this was to take an analysis which demonstrated only the vacillating and wavering character of revisionism with respect to the anti-imperialist struggle and conclude that the SU was an enemy. The material contribution which the SU made to the Vietnamese struggle was, as everyone knows, enormous. And the leaders of the Vietnamese struggle were unanimous that the SU was a firm ally of the Vietnamese people.
The Vietnamese people always bear in mind that their victories are inseparable from the considerable assistance of them Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and the brother socialist countries, inseparable from the active support of progressive people all over the world. [Ho Chi Minh, October 1961 Selected Writings, pg. 336]
Our comrades draw the inspiration for their justification of the “left-wing” approach to revisionism from Lenin’s famous statement: “...the fight against imperialism is a sham and a humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.” [LCW 22, p. 302]
They draw the conclusion from this that it is “a serious ideological error” to speak of subordinating the struggle against opportunism to the struggle against imperialism. For them, “inseparably bound up with” seems to mean that the two struggles are identical. But this is absurd. Consider our struggle against the US ruling class. It is a fundamental Marxist-Leninist principle that this struggle also is a sham and a humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the struggle against reformism. But does this mean that the struggle against reformism should be identified with the struggle against the ruling class? Certainly not. Should the struggle against reformist movements in the trade unions be conducted in the same manner as a struggle against the ruling class? Of course not. But many of our “lefts” think so.
A dogmatic understanding of Lenin’s statement has provided the justification for other forces besides our comrades to indulge their ultra-left tendencies. The Party of Labor of Albania has recently revealed that, as early as 1962, they sent a delegation to China which urged the CPC to abandon anti-imperialist cooperation with the SU and adopt a “united front against the two superpowers” approach.
The delegation of our Party upheld the line of the Party of Labor of Albania which was based on Lenin’s teachings according to which no successful struggle could be waged against imperialism without simultaneously combatting revisionism. Our delegation insisted on the view of the Party of Labor of Albania that not only should the anti-imperialist front not include the Soviet revisionist, but, at the same time, it should spearhead its struggle both against imperialism in general, and US imperialism in particular, as well as against Soviet revisionism. The Chinese leadership argued its line of reconciliation with the Soviet revisionists with the need to unite “with everybody” against US imperialism, which, in its words, was the main enemy. [Letter of the CC of the Party of Labor and the Government of Albania to the CC of the Communist Party and the Government of China, 29 July 1978, pg. 26]
What clearer example could one ask for of dogmatism in the service of ultra-leftism? The PLA did not base itself on an objective assessment of the concrete forces at work, as the CPC was still able to do, but on an appeal to Lenin.
We’ll close this section with an extensive quote from Kim II Sung which gets right at the heart of the ultra-left errors discussed above – the ultra-left failure to grasp the dialectic of unity-struggle-unity within the context to joint action, and the ultra-left failure to understand that a sectarian approach to the struggle against revisionism does not do service to the struggle against revisionism and the cause of Marxism-Leninism.
Refusal to take joint action against imperialism is not an attitude of truly opposing revisionism and defending the purity of Marxism-Leninism, ...To refuse to take anti-imperialist united action means divorcing oneself from the masses and going in for isolationism; in fact, it will only bring about the serious consequences of undermining the anti-imperialist struggle. ...The history of the international communist movement knows of many instances of the Communists taking joint action with the right-wing Social Democrats in the struggle against imperialistic wars.
... whatever their motives, it is necessary to enlist all these forces in the anti-imperialist joint struggle. ...the joint struggle against US imperialism will draw a clear line of demarcation between the Marxist-Leninists and the revisionists. It will be clarified through the actual struggle whether one’s opposition to US imperialism or whether one’s support to the Vietnamese people is real or sham. Practice is the yardstick that tells right from wrong. Opportunism also can be overcome in the practical revolutionary struggle as well as in the ideological struggle.
In realizing joint action, Communists must always adhere to the principles of uniting while struggling and of struggling while uniting. The joint action we advocate does not mean unconditional unity or unprincipled compromises. What we mean is to take concerted action and joint efforts with anti-imperialist forces in opposing US imperialism and supporting the Vietnamese people, while abiding by Marxist-Leninist principles. In this way we should, in the course of our joint struggle, criticize and overcome the opportunist elements, support and encourage the anti-imperialist elements.
We consider that anti-imperialist joint action by no means conflicts with the struggle against revisionism. Rather, it is a positive form of struggle against opportunism of all hues. [Kim II Sung, 1966, The International Situation, in Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea, International Publishers, p. 134-137]
This is not the place to enter into an extensive discussion of the main danger to party building. As we will explain in Section 7, unity on this question is not a prerequisite to a decision to break with “left” internationalism. But since our comrades devote a good deal of attention to the question, some things must be clarified – particularly the so-called “shift” in the Committee of Five’s position on the main danger to party building.
Suppose two groups come to a meeting. Both hold that the movement has consolidated an ultra-left line and that a thoroughgoing campaign of rectification must be waged at all levels. One, however, thinks that the rectification campaign should be directed at the dogmatism which is employed to justify the line while the other thinks that it should be directed at the sectarian methods which are used to organize the movement. At the meeting they strike a compromise and agree only that such a rectification campaign should be conducted against ultra-leftism. Has either group changed its position? Of course not. But this is what our comrades say,
This is exactly what happened at the meeting in August 1977. Some forces held that the rectification campaign should be directed at “left” sectarianism in party-building line while others thought it should be directed at dogmatism. At that meeting the Committee of Five stated that, on the basis of the level of understanding of the tendency, it would be premature to adopt a sharp formulation of the main danger and a compromise should be struck for the time being. They also stated their intention to continue to struggle for a deeper understanding of the key role of dogmatism in generating and maintaining the ultra-left line. And they have kept their word. Their recent paper Dogmatism, the Main Enemy, and “Left” Opportunism, the fullest exposition so far of their position on the nature of the ultra-left error, demonstrates very concretely that they have indeed continued to struggle for this understanding. Our comrades are simply ignoring reality when they say: “Little by little a real shift took place. ’Dogmatism’ disappeared from the discussion and ultra-leftism took its place.” (p. 38)
Moreover, our comrades distort the nature of the compromise that was mad when they say that:
The grouping that is now the OC was called together under the banner of “anti-dogmatism.” Now, as if by magic, we find ourselves grouped under the banner of anti-ultra-leftism. [p. 39]
It is worth recalling the original version of Principle 15:
While in the long run the main opportunist danger to the developing Marxist-Leninist forces is presented by modern revisionism as manifested in the CPUSA, in the present period, within the forces struggling to build a new revolutionary party, the main opportunist danger is presented by modern dogmatism. Modern dogmatism in the US, which is ’left’ in form, right in essence, must be seen as the wages for the sins of revisionism; it is an overreaction to the revisionist capitulation to the bourgeoisie. Modern dogmatism fails to apply dialectics to the US reality; it seeks to transform living science into a set of lifeless dogma. It has failed to understand both the generalities and the particularities of the class struggle; and it has failed to see any creative tasks for Marxist-Leninists. It is this dogmatism which provides the theoretical foundation for a political and organizational practice of ultra-leftism and sectarianism.
The “original” Principle 15 clearly specifies that the political and organizational practice of our movement is ultra-left and sectarian. But it went deeper and specified the main danger to the party-building movement to be the dogmatism which provides the theoretical foundation for this practice. There is no “magic” in relaxing this principle of unity in order to united with forces who agree that the main opportunist danger has led to an ultra-left and sectarian political and organizational practice but who do not agree the dogmatism plays the key role. The formulation adopted in the present principle, “the main danger takes the form of ’left’ opportunism,” was adopted so that the two views of the main danger – dogmatism as the theoretical basis of the ultra-left line, and sectarianism in party-building line – could be included in the OC. A compromise, yes; but “magic,” no. (Further discussion of the main danger question within the OC is mandated in the proposal which the OC adopted in February 1977.)
The fact that there is no reference to dogmatism in the Theses on a Line of Demarcation with “Left” Opportunism is not due to any shift in position on the part of members of the SC. it is a simple reflection of the fact that the OC is not unified around a deep understanding of the nature of the ultra-left danger and that the theses were drawn up on the basis of the present principles of unity of the OC. Although the OC’s consolidated understanding of the nature of the ultra-left danger may not be deep at this point, in our opinion, it is quite sufficient to recognize that the OC must demarcate itself from “left” internationalism. This demarcation itself will mark a significant step forward in consolidating an understanding of the nature of the ultra-left line.
Why do our comrades devote so much attention to the so-called “shift?” Their discussion of this point, although it does not respond to any of the points in the theses and would not serve to refute the theses even if it were correct, is by far the most extensive and well-developed section of their paper. It would appear that there are two reasons.
In the first place, it is an attempt to discredit the theses by attempting to portray the SC as politically unstable and to divert attention away from the thrust of the theses. But, as we have seen, the Committee of Five and the SC which followed it have maintained a consistent line. We would urge comrades not to be distracted by this diversion and focus on the content of the theses. The OC will soon return to the main danger question.
Significantly, it is our comrades’ approach to Principle 18 which has undergone a major shift. In August 1977, neither the BPO nor WUO (the two forces involved at that time) raised objections to the content of Principle 18. The focus of their attack on the OC’s adoption of Principle 18 was that it was sectarian to demarcate around political line. That argument is entirely missing from their present paper. It is now clear that our comrades’ real objections are to the content of the Principle – particularly that it “invites” collaboration with revisionism. We do not fault them for shifting the focus of their attack on Principle 18. In fact, it is a very healthy thing for the tendency for the real contradictions to have finally emerged. Obscuring these differences has only hindered their elimination.
Second, our comrades want to establish the “positive” contribution which PUL’s influence has had on the OC. They offer the supposed “shift” as PUL’s contribution. As we have seen however, there was no “shift” but simply a compromise made with those who were influenced by PUL’s point of view that the main danger to party building is “left” sectarianism in party-building line.[2] While PUL has made some good contributions to the development of a critique of ultra-leftism, overall, their influence on the OC has not been positive. PUL’s sympathizers within the OC (i.e. our comrades), in spite of their recognition that our task is to consolidate a tendency in opposition to ultra-leftism, have strived to hold back the consolidation of the tendency and restrict it to the most rudimentary step –discussing our unities and differences. In our opinion, there is a simple explanation for this contradiction between their formal recognition of the need for consolidation and their actual resistance to steps in that direction. PUL is a firm adherent of “left” internationalism And it is apparent to all, including PUL as well as our comrades, that any significant step towards consolidation will inevitably involve a break with “left” internationalism.
There are several other misrepresentations and distortions in our comrades’ paper which do not bear directly on the question of Principle 18 but are, apparently only intended to discredit the leadership of the OC. We want to address one of them here since it is particularly blatant.
Our comrades write on page 26 that:
At some point, El Comite-MINP, one of the signers of the original letters, apparently decided that the shift from a conference to explore “unities and differences” to a conference to build an ideological center was too severe. They picked up and left the OC. We have seen little public discussion of this from either side [none from the C-5 and SC] and no self-criticism. Not much ideological struggle there – hardly an auspicious start for an ideological center!
On the basis of this, it is hard to believe that our comrades were present at the February meeting and participated in the process leading up to that meeting. Perhaps they were too preoccupied with the Principle 18 question to notice the actual content of that process and the ideological struggle that took place between El Comite-MINP and those who supported the Concrete Proposal. El Comite – MINP presented a critique of the basic conception embodied in the Draft Resolution in August 1977 in Party Building and Its Relationship to the Masses. The five questions which the Committee of Five addressed to all the organizations involved in the process dealt, for the most part, with the objections which El Comite-MINP had raised. The responses to the questions, which were circulated to all these organizations, and the struggle which took place at the February meeting, was an organized ideological struggle which centered on whether the character of the proposed IC should be predominantly national or local.
El Comite-MINP’s position was decisively rebuked and the Concrete Proposal, which emphasized the national character of our tasks, was passed. And our comrades snidely say “not much ideological struggle there.” Where were they? As for self-criticism, we do not think El Comite-MINP needs to criticize itself. They conducted their side of the struggle in an entirely principled way and have not changed their position. The same is true of the forces who opposed them.
In this section we want to discuss some points in the theses that our comrades don’t give much attention to. Thesis 6 asserts that:
Our “left-wing” comrades have consistently made advocacy of “left” internationalism the centerpiece of their struggle for hegemony over the communist forces. No other aspect of their “leftism” has either such broad appeal or played such a primary role in buttressing their political credibility. And it is worth noting that the organization which has made the most of its “left” collaboration has recently achieved the dominant position among the “leftists.”
Our comrades’ only comment on this thesis is to question the dominant position of the CPML. They say that regarding the CPML’s position as dominant is a “static” view. It seems that, unlike the SC, our comrades are very “dialectical” and able to see things in their development. This seems to be a favorite tool of argumentation of our comrades. Principle 18 was “questioned” in the same way. They didn’t say it was wrong – just “superficial, static, and misleading.” Our dialectical comrades produce the following examples to demonstrate that the movement is in “flux”: the split in the RCP (which certainly strengthened the dominant position of the CPML), and the merger of the ATM and IWK into the League of Revolutionary Struggle (which has joined a unity committee with the CPML, further strengthening its dominant position). These examples certainly show movement in the ultra-left trend. But unfortunately for the argument of our comrades, the “flux” is all in the direction of strengthening the position of the CPML. The CPML has indeed achieved the dominant position among the “lefts.”
And if their is any question of which aspect of their “leftism” played the major role in advancing them to the dominant position, the League of Revolutionary Struggle themselves furnishes us with the answer. In their Statements on the Founding of the League of Revolutionary Struggle (Marxist-Leninist) (1978), the analysis of the communist movement which they present consists of the following:
The communist movement today is composed of several national organizations, a number of local collectives and independent Marxist-Leninists. The major Marxist-Leninist groups have distinguished themselves by their upholding of Chairman Mao’s theory of the three worlds, upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat and supporting socialist China under the leadership of Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and the Communist Party of China, recognizing the significance of the alliance of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples in the U.S. revolution and other important points. [p. 12]
For the League of Revolutionary Struggle, the theory of the three worlds (the fullest expression of “left” internationalism) receives top billing among the distinguishing features of the major Marxist-Leninist groups. Note also that the US revolution receives scant mention.
Our comrades are very concerned that the OC does not close itself off to the reaction to ultra-leftism within the ranks of the ultra-left trend itself by attacking “left” internationalism, a key pillar of the ultra-left line. But this is a mistaken policy. The reaction to ultra-leftism has been occurring ever since the ultra-left trend began to consolidate. The CPML itself was once part of that reaction! What is required to build on that reaction is not appeasement of “left” collaborationism but an all-out attack on it. The “reaction” to ultra-leftism, if it is to come to anything, must be turned into a break with ultra-leftism. And given the powerful attraction of “left” internationalism, there can be no question of turning the reaction into a real break without undermining the main pole of attraction of the ultra-left line.
Because “left” internationalism plays such a central role in maintaining the hegemony of ultra-leftism, as Thesis 11 stated, “forces that oppose ’left’ opportunism but not ’left’ internationalism are unstable and subject to coming back under the influence of the ultra-left line.” Our comrades, not surprisingly, do not comment on this thesis. But we think it deserves further comment. BACU, of course, is the case in point. In February 1977, BACU’s Beginning Analysis strongly criticized the ultra-leftism of our movement, identified dogmatism and sectarianism as the main errors, and stated their intention to help build an anti-“left” tendency. It taught many important lessons and showed an advanced grasp of the concrete reality of the US class struggle as well as of the communist movement. It did not, however, reject “left” internationalism.
After the publication of this pamphlet, as the implications of its developing views for its “left” internationalist perspective became apparent, a major struggle broke out within BACU. In their Resolutions of Our Fourth General Meeting (July 1977), a turn back to ultra-leftism was consolidated. And they made it very clear that “the challenge to Mao’s thought” (i.e. a break with “left” internationalism) which a thoroughgoing break with ultra-leftism would have implied was central to their turn away from consolidating a solid anti-“left” stance.
Upholding the most backward views within the communist movement today are a loose, but fairly wide, assortment of organizations and collectives. Prominent among them is the current staff of the GUARDIAN newspaper and the Philadelphia Workers Organizing Committee [PWOC]. In the past, many of these forces upheld Mao’s Thought. However, now they have raised an open challenge to Mao’s Thought. ...Independently of each other, both the GUARDIAN staff and the PWOC have called for the formation of a new “anti-revisionist” party that considers “dogmatism” [i.e. Mao Tsetung Thought] to be the main danger confronting the U.S. communist movement. This notion, that anti-Mao Tsetung Thought is consistent with anti-revisionism, that a middle ground exists between the two, can find no material basis. The further these forces pursue their current misadventure, the harder it will be for them to escape the fall into revisionism. Either they must return to Marxism and fully grasp the correctness of Mao’s thinking, or they will, sooner or later, turn revisionist. It is not possible to walk the middle line for long. [p. 9, 10]
The pivotal role which BACU’s “left” internationalism played in their turn back to unity with the ultra-left trend is also clearly revealed in the reason BACU gives for renouncing its previous position that ultra-leftism is the main danger to our movement.
Events since the publication of that pamphlet have caused us to reconsider our views. It is no small matter that th struggle against “leftism”, sectarianism and dogmatism has become the battle cry of many revisionist forces outside our movement and of those who insist on backsliding in our movement. Under this banner they are making an attack on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. Under the banner of opposing “dogmatism” and “slavishness” they are attacking China’s revolutionary foreign policy and supporting the international aggression of Soviet social-imperialism. Under the banner of opposing “dogmatism,” they are attacking genuine communists as “class collaborationists.” etc. [p. 103]
It is clear that it was BACU’s failure to break with the “left” internationalism that caused their instability and led them to reconsider their views on the main danger to our movement. For it was their “left” internationalism that wedded them to China’s foreign policy, that led them to see attempts at rectification of the ultra-left international line as support for Soviet aggression, and that blinded them to the class collaboration which much of our movement had fallen into. We must also note with some anxiety that our comrades express similar concerns about “collaboration with Soviet revisionism” and attacking “genuine communists” as class collaborationists. We hope that they will not also be led to reconsider their views.
They identified “the OL, IWK, and ATM as among the more politically advanced forces in the communist movement” and made it clear that this was because of their adherence to China’s international line rather than their grasp of Marxism-Leninism and their ability to use it to make a concrete analysis of concrete conditions. The following passage is remarkable in showing why “left” internationalism plays such a central role in maintaining the hegemony of ultra-leftism.
...whether based on a shallow or firm grasp, upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought is essential to the advance of our movement. When this theory is being challenged and distorted by forces in our midst, this is extremely critical. In such instances, particularly when these challengers and distorters represent no small sector but a large sector of our movement, the defense of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought must come to the fore above all other issues. That is why despite all our criticisms of and differences with the OL, IWK, and ATM, we must uphold them as the advanced. Though their grasp of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and of the objective conditions in the U.S. may not be as great as we would hope [nor is our own grasp of these things] still they uphold Marxism more fully and consistently than do others, [p. 91, our emphasis]
The “lefts” reason like this. The alternative to upholding Mao’s Thought is revisionism. Therefore, an attack on any aspect of Mao’s Thought serves only to strengthen revisionism. Either Mao’s line is accepted in its entirety or the relapse into revisionism is inevitable. But what if there are aspects of Mao’s line which are incorrect? If there is anything that the history of our struggle against revisionism should have taught us is that this kind of “reasoning” is in contradiction with Marxism-Leninism. Ironically, it is exactly this kind of reasoning which the SU and its lackeys have used to keep their supporters in line. They say: “An attack on any aspect of the Soviet Union’s policy is, objectively, an attack on socialism.” The BACU even reproduces the “siege mentality” which is often used to justify this kind of thinking. The Soviet Union and its lackey say: “When the Soviet Union is under fierce attack by the imperialists...” BACU says: “When this theory is being challenged and distorted...”
We take strong exception with those who maintain that opposition to “left” internationalism and anti-revisionism are inconsistent. And we take even stronger exception with those who try to establish this simply by leaning on the authority of Mao. Has the full range of Mao’s ideas on how the struggle against revisionism should be conducted proved itself in practice? We think not. In fact, the practice of the struggle against imperialism over the past decade has proved time and again that there are major errors in Mao’s conception of the struggle against revisionism. The critique of revisionism which was developed by Mao and the CPC in the late 50’s and early 60’s was a milestone in the development of the international communist movement which all serious Marxist-Leninists must study and apply. But we must also recognize that, starting in the mid 60’s, the CPC’s developing conception of the struggle against revisionism took on a pronounced ultra-left character. We must now rectify its errors. This rectification must proceed from a concrete Marxist-Leninist analysis of concrete conditions. A recognition that US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people is the first step in that rectification.
We have established the class collaborationist, “left” opportunist character of opposition to Principle 18. Further, we have established that it is a fundamental feature of the ultra-left line and a key ingredient in the continued hegemony of that line over our movement. In this context, we turn to the question of whether the OC should consolidate its stand on Principle 18 or should take a step backwards and abandon unity on this point.
Our comrades themselves pose the question (more or less) correctly. On page 18 they ask: “Why is this particular point required by the task we are trying to accomplish?” This is an important question, because we can only give real meaning to “unite all who can be united” in terms of an answer to this question. Who can be united depends upon what task is to be accomplished. Although it is a somewhat narrow view of our tasks, the formulation given by our comrades that our current task is “building a tendency to combat ultra-leftism” (page 30) will suffice for the present discussion. Our comrades furnish us with another key question on page 39 when they ask: “How can we agree on strategy and tactics if we don’t agree on the nature of the enemy we are fighting?” We are in unity with our comrades on these points. Agreement on the nature of the ultra-left line is required in order to formulate a common plan (i.e. agree on strategy and tactics) for fighting ultra-leftism. It is imperative that the OC take significant steps forward in consolidating its unity on the nature of the ultra-left line.
At the present time, the most significant step forward the OC could take towards reaching this unity would be to recognize that Principle 18 is a line of demarcation with “left” opportunism. This step would not bring us to the point of full agreement on the nature of the ultra-left line. For this reason, the proposal adopted at the February conference calls for the initiation of a discussion on the nature of the ultra-left line in the party-building movement. But it would be a significant step forward in that direction. The SC has profound differences with our comrades on the nature of the ultra-left line. We think that opposition to Principle 18 is one of its fundamental features, that this feature has been thoroughly exposed in practice, that it leads to class collaboration and serious departures from proletarian internationalism, that it plays a central role in maintaining the hegemony of ultra-leftism, and that it is linked to other important features of the ultra-left line in its “left-wing” approach to strategy and tactics. Our comrades, on the other hand, dispute each one of these points and, in fact, regard Principle 18 as “superficial, static, and misleading.” It is impossible to draw any other conclusion from this than that, as we proceed to deepen our understanding of the nature of the ultra-left line, we will inevitably be led to, sharply different conclusions.
To proceed to discuss the nature of the ultra-left line while there are such profound differences on the important features of the ultra-left line would be an invitation to disunity and confusion. A key consideration in deciding whether a particular principle of unity is needed for an organizational form must be whether differences over the principle would obstruct common work within the ranks of that organizational form. It is perfectly clear that common work of the OC in its task of consolidating an understanding of the nature of the ultra-left line would be obstructed by such sharp differences on what the fundamental features of that line are.
The BPO argued at the August 1977 meeting (as did the BOC) that the OC should first come to unity on the nature of the ultra-left danger and then proceed to discuss Principle 18. In effect, they argued that coming to unity on the nature of the ultra-left line was a prerequisite to coming to unity on the key political errors of that line. Our comrades retain that perspective in their paper. That approach is mistaken. It reverses the fundamental process of the Marxist approach to knowledge. The process of knowledge is from the shallower to the deeper. We are in the process of deepening our knowledge of the ultra-left line. The starting point, the shallow, is our knowledge of the major political errors of the ultra-lefts – what we have called the fundamental features of the ultra-left line. We can proceed from this to deepen our knowledge of the ultra-left line and consolidate an understanding of its nature. This is the approach taken by the proposal which was adopted in February. Opposed to this, the approach our comrades advocate is “from the deeper to the shallower.”
They advocate taking up the discussion of the nature of the ultra-left line as a prerequisite to advancing our unity on what the important political errors of that line have been. That approach stands Marxism on its head. It is a prescription for confusion. It would merely reproduce the present struggle in a form which would serve only to obscure the real differences.
The slogan “Unite all who can be united!” has an undeniable and justified appeal. This appeal, however, can be abused. It is mistaken to take a onesided view of this slogan and focus only upon “unite all.” We must pay just as much attention to “can be.” Who actually can be united in the struggle to consolidate an anti-“left” trend? As we pointed out before, when the call to “unite all who can be united” is taken to the point of calling for unity in the struggle against ultra-leftism with forces who have demonstrated their commitment to defend a key feature of the ultra-left line, it is, objectively, a call for disunity. We have had too many abstract appeals to “unite all who can be united.” We should be perfectly clear that the process we are engaged in is aimed precisely at consolidating a split in the US communist movement. Marxist-Leninists must be good not only at uniting but also at splitting! They must not only be masters of the united front, but also masters of the principled split. The history of the Bolshevik party is rich with examples of the principled split – the struggle against the Economists; the struggle against the Mensheviks, the struggle against the Liquidators, and the split in the Second International. And of considerable interest of our own situation, in each case a segment of conciliators arose – and in each case the conciliators rallied under the banner of “unity.”
The historical example of Iskra is particularly instructive. The 1898 formation of the party has been stillborn. In 1900 the movement was in disarray as the struggle raged between the Economist line and the Marxist line. In this context, many advocated reuniting all the forces into a reestablished party. The approach of Iskra forces was quite different.
...we, as members of the Party, present the question of our immediate and direct tasks as follows: What plan of activity must we adopt to revive the Party on the firmest possible base?
The replay usually made to this question is that it is necessary to elect anew a central Party body and instruct it to resume the publication of the Party organ. But, in the period of confusion through which we are now passing, such a simple method is hardly expedient.
...Before we unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all draw firm and definite lines of demarcation. Otherwise, our unity will be purely fictitious, it will conceal the prevailing confusion and hinder its radical elimination. (Lenin, LCW 4, p. 353, Declaration of the Editorial Board of Iskra, our emphasis]
This course was followed by Iskra and led to the successful reestablishment of the party in 1903.
Isn’t it just as clear for us that unity in the struggle against ultra-leftism between forces who regard “left” internationalism as a central component of the ultra-left line and forces who defend “left” internationalism would be fictitious unity? And isn’t it just as clear that such a fictitious unity would only serve to hinder the radical elimination of ultra-leftism from our movement by concealing an important feature of the ultra-left line under the banner of anti-“leftism?”
[1] It is the PWOC who our comrades are referring to since it was the PWOC that used the phrase “genuine Marxist-Leninists” which irritates the defenders of “left” internationalism so much – since it was intended to exclude “left” internationalists.
[2] Some comrades have raised the point that the position of the Committee of Five was sharpened and clarified in some respects in the course of its struggle against PUL’s line and that, therefore, PUL has played a positive role. In one sense, of course, this is true. But in a very special sense. It is like concluding that, since “the correct line develops in struggle with the incorrect line” (Mao), that the incorrect line is positive. Or from “Bolshevism developed in struggle against Economism” (Stalin) that Iskra should have invited the Economists to sit on its Editorial Board.