AMBASSADOR MORRIS and I arrived at Vladivostok the evening of September 6, 1919, and 1 soon had my first experience with the new Japanese puppet in the person of General Rozanoff, who had been sent by Kolchak from Krasnoyarsk to Vladivostok to command the Russian troops of the Far East.
I had on my desk a report that the Russians, on September 2, in the presence of Japanese troops, had arrested an American Captain and a corporal at Iman, two hundred and fifty miles north of Vladivostok, for the reported reason that these men had no passports. As they wore the uniform of the American Army, and as there was no recognized government in Siberia, and further, as no military representative in Siberia was called upon for passports, the reason assigned for the arrest of these men was an insult almost on a par with the arrest.
On the morning of the 7th, I sent Colonel Robinson, my Chief of Staff, to General Rozanoff's office and demanded the immediate release of the corporal; the Captain having been permitted to leave the day they were arrested. General Rozanoff told Colonel Robin-son that he would investigate and let me know later.
This by no means satisfied me, so I directed Colonel Robinson to return and tell General Rozanoff it was not a question for him to investigate, and a refusal to order the release of Corporal Spurling would be construed by me as a definite refusal. When General Rozanoff got this message, he ordered the corporal's release.
When the corporal returned, we found that he had been beaten unmercifully.
Before his release and as soon as Major Shamatoulski, the local commanding officer, learned the Americans had been arrested, he obtained a train, took some American soldiers and went to Iman. When he arrived there, a Japanese officer notified him that the Japanese would not permit the Americans to attack the Cossacks and, if he did attack them, they would join the Cossacks and resist the Americans. Major Shamatoulski notified the Japanese Commander that he in-tended to rescue the corporal, and any resistance by the Japanese would be at their peril.
In the meantime, Major Shamatoulski had arrested three Cossacks in uniform. The Cossacks had built a trench, and occupied it preparatory to resisting the Americans. The Japanese joined the Cossacks in the trench evidently intending to start the trouble that they had for some time hoped for, but they evidently lost their nerve as, before firing started, they notified the American major that the corporal was not in Iman but had been sent to Habarovsk. Major Shamatoulski withdrew his troops and started to return to his station. The Japanese commander then came up and told him that he could not take the three Cossacks he had previously arrested away with him, but Major Shamatoulski said he would take them and hold them until the American was returned. The Japanese threatened to use force, but no force was used and Major Shamatoulski took his prisoners away with him.
The corporal stated on his return to American Command that he was whipped by two Cossack officers while on the train, and for fifteen minutes on the plat-form after arrival at Habarovsk, when the Japanese took charge of him.
It is often impossible to get definite legal evidence to establish what you know to be a fact, and this is such a case. I am sure this arrest and whipping of the American corporal was not only permitted by the Japanese, but the whole miserable act was engineered by them, although I am unable to charge any Japanese higher in authority than the major at Iman with this cowardly and dastardly act.
I make this charge because Kalmikoff and his soldiers formed a part of the Japanese command, and the Japanese commanding officer was in command of these Cossacks when this insult was directed against the United States. As Iman was not in the sector of the railroad assigned to Japan to guard, the Japanese troops had no responsibility at this town. They were there for some purpose, and the real purpose is shown by the arrest of the Americans.
On September 3, Colonel Sargent, who was in command during my absence in Omsk, cabled the War Department, in part:
"Semeonoff and Kalmikoff left Vladivostok for Habarovsk today."
These two Japanese puppets were going to Habarovsk together for some purpose. This purpose was to plan to attack American soldiers.
General Horvath, who was opposed to my policy of non-interference, came to me and warned me that Kalmikoff was going to kill some American soldiers, and if I did not concentrate the small detachments guarding the railroad, I would lose some of them. He said that Japan had sanctioned this and had given Kalmikoff thirty thousand yen and were prepared to send cablegrams throughout the world that the Russians were going to treat all Bolsheviks alike.
Colonel Butenko, Fortress Commander, had access to all telegrams coming through Vladivostok. He came to me about the same time as General Horvath, con-firmed what General Horvath had told me, and said that Semeonoff had telegraphed Kalmikoff to go ahead and attack American troops, and if he needed any help, he, Semeonoff, would send his Cossacks to assist him. The Japanese telegraphed Kalmikoff that they could not give him active support but would give him moral support.
In this connection, Major Slaughter at Omsk was told by Mr. Soukine, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Omsk Government, as follows:
"I can also tell you, if you do not know it already, that the Americans have not enough troops in the Far East to meet the emergency which will be created if you have any trouble with Semeonoff and Kalmikoff because the Japanese have arranged to support Semeonoff in every way, with troops if it becomes necessary."
At this time, Mr. Medviedeff, head of the Zemstvos in Primorsk Province, came to me and confirmed what General Horvath had told me. These three men be-longed to different social factions, and Medviedeff be-longed to a different political party from the other two, consequently, these three men would never get together for any purpose, much less for the purpose of making up a tale to tell me.
A colonel of the French Army, whose name I re-member but do not think it is wise to publish, also came to me and told me the Cossacks were trying to buy some rifles from the French and he felt sure they were planning to attack Americans.
When the corporal who had been beaten by the Cossacks returned, I wrote a letter to General Rozanoff, and demanded the names of the Cossacks who arrested the corporal, the names of the two Cossack officers who beat the corporal, and an apology in the local press for the outrage. I received no reply.
One week after the letter was sent, General Rozanoff's Chief of Staff came to American Headquarters on some business but I notified him I would have no dealings with Rozanoff's Headquarters until my letter was answered. I never heard from this directly, but I saw in the press that it was announced in Washington that suitable apologies had been made for the insult. I have no idea where the apologies were made or by whom, and I never had any dealings with General Rozanoff's Headquarters, or with him, after this time. He was overthrown on January 31, 1920.
On my return from Omsk, there was a report on my desk of a brutal and repulsive murder by Japanese. This report was to the effect that on July 27, 1919, a company of Japanese soldiers under the command of a Japanese major, arrested nine Russians in the town of Sviagina which was in the railroad sector assigned to Americans to guard. The Japanese told the American commander that these men were suspected of being Bolsheviks.
These Russians were told if they would give information about Bolsheviks they would let them go. Four of the nine were permitted to go. The other five were " roughly handled and beaten " but refused to talk.
The Japanese again had no responsibility at Sviagina.
The Japanese were beginning to act as if they in-tended to execute the five Russians who would not give any information to them and, as soon as the purpose of the Japanese was apparent, the American commander protested, but to no avail. The report of this execution is as follows :
"The five Russians were marched to some graves that had been dug in the vicinity of the railroad station; they were blindfolded and forced to kneel at the edge of the graves, bending forward with their hands tied behind them. Two Japanese officers, removing their coats and drawing their sabers, then proceeded to slash the victims on the back of the neck, while as each one fell forward into the grave, three to five
Japanese soldiers bayonetted him several times with cries of pleasure. Two were beheaded at once by the saber strokes; the others were apparently alive as the earth was thrown in upon them."
I regret to say these executions were witnessed by several officers and soldiers of the American Army.
These executions were committed by the Japanese, not because the victims had committed any offense, but because they were suspected of being Bolsheviks.
I felt so strongly about this murder that I brought the commanding officer of Sviagina to American Head-quarters at Vladivostok and, in the presence of the Japanese Chief of Staff, told him he should have used force to prevent it. I also told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if such a thing was ever attempted again in American sectors of the railroad, it would bring on a conflict between Japanese and American troops.
He said that he would like to investigate the report. I told him there could be no objection to his making an investigation, but I hoped he would tell me the result of his investigation, which he promised to do. After about five weeks he came to my office and said they would have to admit the truth of the report I had received, but he wanted me to know that was not in accordance with the practice of the Japanese Army.
On June 9, 1919, I received the following from Colonel Morrow at Verkhne-Udinsk :
"Owing to Semeonoff's armored cars continual interference with the railroad, seizure of cars, threatening employees, interference with working parties, continued menace to my guard, and firing upon and arresting Russian troops proceeding to the front, I, yesterday, at 5 P.M., June 8, at a conference between Major-General Yoshe, Japanese Army, General Mejak, Military Governor and General Pechinko, Commander of Russian troops in Beresovka, requested them on the grounds stated above to cause the removal of the armored cars out of the American sector and, at the same time, informed them that if my request was not complied with within twenty-four hours I would destroy these cars."
General Yoshe, in the presence of Colonel Morrow agreed to remain neutral, but later sent the following to Colonel Morrow:
"The Japanese say they will resist by force the removal of Semeonoff's armored cars by American troops, and will take the armored cars under Japanese guard to Beresovka and there protect them from American troops."
As this was in the American sector the only basis for action by the Japanese was that Japanese troops and Semeonoff's troops constituted one force. This was well known by everyone in Siberia, but the Japanese repeatedly said they were not responsible for the acts of Semeonoff and Kalmikoff.
By refusing to give consideration to Army reports, the State Department probably did not know of the modern methods being used by our Ally, Japan, in destroying bolshevism. By this time the State Department representatives had joined whole-heartedly in the fight for Kolchak, and they had as their Allies in this work, the British, the French, the Japanese, Atamans Semeonoff and Kalmikoff and General Rozanoff.
Apparently, the only ripple on the sea of satisfaction was my refusal to join the State Department and their Allies in their determination to destroy bolshevism, notwithstanding the announced policy of the United States of non-interference.
Mr. August Heid, War Trade Board, operating under the State Department, was careless enough at one time to send information that was apparently defective. At least, Mr. Heid brought a telegram to my office, and read it to me, and said that it came from the State Department. The telegram said:
"You are not sending the kind of information out of Siberia we want you to send."
As Mr. Heid was an employee of the State Department, I suppose it was not ethical to ignore his reports, as they did mine.
At this critical period, when the Cossacks in the east were trying to obtain arms for use against American troops, the rifles and ammunition supplied by the United States for Kolchak's fighting forces began arriving on United States Transports. These rifles were sent to Kolchak under the terms of Mr. Wilson's agreement of June 12, 1919: " to assist the Government of Admiral Kolchak and his associates with munitions, supplies, and food." I had been informed from Washington:
"General Haken, Chief of Ordinance Department of a special commission for the Far East, has been appointed by the Russian Government in Omsk to receive all military supplies sent to Vladivostok for the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak."
On September 16, I cabled the War Department:
"The one million gold was offered to me this morning and delivery of rifles requested. On account of anti-American activities of Kolchak agents here I have re-fused to take the gold, and have refused to give up the rifles. Mr. Morris here and approved."
My refusal was the occasion for an indignant out-burst by General Knox. He stated in the local press that these rifles had been paid for by Russia, and I was holding them up to injure Kolchak. I also saw in the American press the statement that the State Department had said I was interfering in things that did not concern me, although I had reported, fully, to Washington my reasons for refusal to give up the arms.
As to the refusal to give up these arms to Kolchak at Vladivostok, there was an unjust and unfair representation of the situation, if the newspapers reported correctly what they say was the action of the State Department.
Someone gave out the information that I held up the Kolchak arms because " of the anti-American character of articles in a Vladivostok newspaper." Another paper, now before me, says I held up the arms, " in retaliation for anti-American articles in a Vladivostok newspaper." In another paper the statement is made that I held up the arms " because of the publication of violent anti-American articles in a Vladivostok news-paper." One of these papers said the State Department repudiated my action. One of the other papers maintains the State Department " secured the delivery of the rifles." The other paper does not mention the State Department, but was very critical of my action.
Two questions come into my mind, with reference to these articles. The first is, " Was this information given to the newspaper correspondents in Washington? It seems to me the information is of such a nature that it is not unfair to assume that it was. The second thought is, " If given to the newspaper men, by what Department of the Government was this information given out? " No matter where or by whom it was given out, the information was unjust, unfair, and not in accordance with the facts.
The War Department knew my real reasons for refusing to turn these rifles over at Vladivostok.
The reason, printed in the press, for my refusal to turn them over, would certainly not be approved by the people of the United States and, if the people had known the truth, I do not believe a single American would have disapproved. The real reason for the refusal to deliver the arms, at Vladivostok, as reported to the War Department, was:
"Reference to your 357, the one million gold was offered to me this morning and delivery of rifles re-quested. On account of anti-American actions of Kolchak agents here, Semeonoff, Kalmikoff and Rozanoff, I have refused to take the gold and have refused to give up the rifles. Request approval of this action. Mr. Morris here and approved. I have told Slaughter to tell Omsk Government we will not give them any Military supplies, as long as Kolchak agents in the East, are threatening to use Military force against the United States."
I see nothing about retaliation for newspaper articles in this cable. As a matter of fact, I had an abundance of information which I could not doubt, I did not doubt, and I do not doubt now, that these Russians, above mentioned, had planned to attack American detachments and were, at the time these rifles came, trying to get rifles to arm more Cossacks so as to have a large superiority of strength over any American force I could get together.
The American troops had no field pieces, while the Cossacks did, and the Americans were separated, by nearly two thousand miles, into detachments guarding the railroad. By the destructions of small bridges, I could not have gotten the command together, and the seven thousand men I had would have been divided into not less than four detachments, and probably many more.
I can not think any American would expect me to turn these rifles over to people who wanted to use them against American troops. In fact, I considered the situation so serious that I deliberately and wilfully would have refused to turn the rifles over to any Russian in Vladivostok, no matter from whom the order came. If my action was ever repudiated by the State Department, I never heard of it.
Now, why was this erroneous information, as to my action, given out to the public? And by whom was it given out? I can not think it was given out by the War Department, as that Department was not mentioned in the newspaper articles, and, besides, the War Department had my reasons direct from me.
I believe it is not unfair to conclude that the information must have been given out by the State Department. As the State Department was relying entirely upon its own representatives in Siberia for information, and by inference, was ignoring the information furnished by War Department representatives, I am forced to the conclusion that the information came from representatives of the State Department, in Siberia.
General Haken came to see me about the rifles, and I agreed to deliver them at Irkutsk, which was outside the Cossack territory. This was satisfactory to him, in fact, he was pleased because he felt more certain of getting them. This arrangement did not satisfy. the Russian Military in the Far East, and they approached me with the proposition that the Americans would guard one train, and the Russians one, but this I refused to do.
Japan and General Knox had succeeded in stirring up such antagonism to the American Military by the Kolchak supporters that, on September 17, I cabled Washington:
"The Cossacks, under the leadership of Kalmikoff, are threatening to commence action against Americans, this action is supported by Semeonoff and I believe instigated by Japan. These Cossacks have armored cars which our present arms will not pierce. I believe this responsible for their insolence. Request one battalion three inch or mountain artillery be sent to report to me. I do not believe anything will happen if this is not sent, and I feel absolutely sure nothing will happen to Americans if sent."
It should be remembered that Semeonoff and Kalmikoff were brigands and murderers. They had no character which would deter them from committing any kind of offense. Nothing but physical fear, or fear of losing their Japanese support, would deter them from attacking Americans or anyone else.
The first train of rifles and ammunition for delivery by the United States Government " to the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak " went through to Irkutsk without any mishap. When the second train reached Chita, the headquarters of Semeonoff, on October 24, it was stopped and Semeonoff demanded fifteen thou-sand rifles. Lieutenant Ryan, who had charge of the train with fifty soldiers as guard, said he could not give up the rifles without instructions from Vladivostok. Semeonoff told the lieutenant that if he did not give up the rifles in thirty hours they would be taken by force. With this statement Semeonoff brought two of his armored cars and a battalion of Cossacks by the side of the American train.
Semeonoff's Chief of Staff, but was told if they were not delivered they would be taken by force. The consul suggested that the question be submitted to General Graves at Vladivostok, as Semeonoff was claiming that Kolchak had authorized him to take the rifles, and the Russians provided a wire to reach me. Lieutenant Ryan's telegram reached me about midnight of the 24th-25th of October. I telegraphed Lieutenant Ryan not to give him a rifle.
I felt safe in giving these instructions because I knew General Oi, Japanese Commander in Siberia, was with Semeonoff in Chita at the time the demand was made on Lieutenant Ryan for the arms. As this was in the railroad sector assigned to Japan to guard, and as the action of Semeonoff, without any protest by General Oi or the Japanese Commander at Chita, was a failure of Japan to carry out the railroad agreement, I felt sure Japan would not permit him to go to the extreme of attacking Lieutenant Ryan.
Semeonoff held Lieutenant Ryan for forty hours and then told him he could go.
As soon as Kolchak was driven out of Omsk and was coming east, I felt his end was in sight, so I refused to send any more rifles to him. Reports I received prior to his leaving Omsk showed that his power had gone, and most of the Kolchak troops had gone over to the Bolsheviks.
The American Consul General, Mr. Harris, was tenacious and would not give up. He telegraphed that the departure of Kolchak from Omsk should not be construed as an indication of weakness, but rather as an indication of strength. General Haken, naturally, wanted me to continue giving him the rifles as this would enable him to dispose of them as best suited to his own interest.
With reference to the rifles I cabled to 'Washington on October 29:
"In my judgement, if we by inaction or willingly permit American arms to reach Semeonoff, Kalmikoff and Rozanoff, we will be helping to arm the worst criminals in Siberia; we will be neglectful of the interest of the people, thereby causing a resentment of the great majority of the people of Siberia against the United States; and we will be helping Japan to delay the settlement of conditions in Siberia, because the domination and exploitation of over ninety percent of the people by such criminals as above named cannot be permanent no matter what assistance is given them."
Japanese Headquarters later informed me that the arms delivered by Lieutenant Ryan at Irkutsk had been returned to Semeonoff and the only other incident of interest relative to the rifles I turned over to Kolchak took place only a month or two before I left Vladivostok.
A Russian came to me and stated that four cars, giving me the numbers of the cars, were loaded with American rifles still in the original boxes. He told me the cars were on a certain out-of-the-way siding and in charge of Japanese soldiers. I asked this Russian for details, but instead of replying, he grabbed his cap and left, saying as he went out:
" I cannot tell you any more."
I felt sure the Russian was telling me the truth al-though I had no evidence upon which I could take action. In a few days after I received this information about the rifles, the Japanese Chief of Staff came to see me. I entertained him in a way he liked and, when he was feeling rather happy, told him about the cars loaded with American rifles, and told him as they had not been paid for by the Russians, I, therefore, demanded these rifles as American property. I watched the reaction, and decided the Russian report was true. He did not deny that they had the rifles, but said he would have to investigate.
In a short time another Japanese general came to see me, and I told him I had heard nothing from the Chief of Staff and I wanted those rifles. By this time I felt doubly sure the Russian had told me the truth.
In a week or ten days I wrote a letter to the Japanese Commander, stating as a fact that the Japanese had the rifles, and reciting my former efforts to get possession of them, and stating that, failing to receive a reply within forty-eight hours, I would take such steps as I deemed necessary to get possession of the arms. I sent the demand to Japanese Headquarters by a messenger and directed him to get a recei for the letter on the envelope. I waited twelve, twenty-four, and, after thirty-six hours, a message came from Japanese Headquarters asking for an appointment with me just one half an hour before my. specified time expired.
The next day, at the appointed time, the Japanese Chief of Staff came to my office, with sabre and gloves, which indicated he considered his business as being very official. He had my letter in his hand and said:
"We consider this letter very ` un-nice,' you imply Japan steals American property."
I asked him to take a seat, and then reminded him of my efforts to get this property, and that I had received no response of any kind. I suggested to him that if the tables were turned they would be making an international affair of it. I told him I was sorry they felt badly about it, but I was unable to apologize for the letter or to withdraw it. He then said we had been good friends so long they hated to have such a letter as I had written, a part of their records. I told him I took no pride in the letter, but I was going to have those rifles. He replied, I could have the rifles any time I sent for them. I told him troops would be at the train at 3 :30 in the afternoon and would take possession of the rifles. I then agreed to withdraw my letter.
I sent for the rifles and found they had five thousand and nine hundred still in the original boxes. These were part of the rifles turned over by the United States " for the fighting forces of Admiral Kolchak."
At times Consul General Harris let his enthusiasm for the Omsk Government lead him into what appeared to be efforts to keep certain information from reaching the United States. As an example:
Mr. Morris and I were notified by an Englishman, when in Omsk, that Annankoff, head of the Semipalatinsk Cossacks, had killed three thousand Jews at Ekaterinburg. Annankoff was known as a Cossack murderer, and the appropriate insignia which were on his cap and blouse, consisted of skull and cross-bones. Dr. Rosenblatt, who had been sent by the Jews in New York to do what he could for the Jews in Siberia, had also heard of this pogrom. Dr. Rosenblatt reported same, through my office, as he had been reproved by the Consul General for a former report and Mr. Harris evidently complained because I permitted Dr. Rosenblatt to report this pogrom. Mr. Harris telegraphed Dr. Rosenblatt as follows :
"While in Ekaterinburg you reported the Cossacks as having injured or killed three thousand Jews. Such false and irresponsible reports as these coming from you cannot help but have a tendency to embitter the Omsk Government against the Jews, therefore, I would suggest that in your future telegrams you state only the actual facts."
Consul General Harris was quibbling. The exact number killed was unimportant compared to the fact that there was a pogrom of the Jews in Ekaterinburg. This was well known and Mr. Harris knew it, or he did not want to know it. The military report I received of this pogrom was that thirty-five hundred had been killed by Annankoff-Cossacks. It further stated:
"When questioned, the Staff at Omsk would make no direct admission, but did not deny it, and hinted that something had occurred at Ekaterinburg that would give the Jews something to think about."
I received a cable from Washington saying Consul General Harris " states that Rosenblatt's report of Jewish pogrom is absolutely false. Do not transmit any news dispatches which have not been checked for accuracy."
Even Kolchak representatives would not go as far as the American Consul General and deny the truth of the report that there was a pogrom of the Jews. How did Consul General Harris get his information? He did not go to Ekaterinburg. He let his enthusiasm for the Kolchak Government run away with his discretion. With more justification than the Consul General had, Dr. Rosenblatt could have characterized Mr. Harris' statement " as false." If Consul General Harris meant the number reported killed by Dr. Rosenblatt was too large or too small, he could probably justify his statement, as no one was in a position to give the exact number killed. If Mr. Harris meant to say there were no Jews killed, he was woefully misinformed.
Dr. Rosenblatt was not the only American maligned by Kolchak supporters because they would not close their eyes to facts. The Y. M. C. A. in Siberia was con-ducted in a manner worthy of the best traditions of that organization. Mr. G. W. Phelps, head of the Y. M. C. A., was a man of character, a man of principles, a man with high ideals of duty, and a man who could not be swerved from his conception of duty by the desire to receive the plaudits of self-appointed rulers. On October 20, 1919, the Consul General telegraphed Mr. Phelps as follows :
"With regard to your difficulties with the Vladivostok custom authorities, I am informed by the Minister of Finance that he is in possession of definite information that hides have been purchased by the Y. M. C. A. with a view to exporting same, and that they are being kept in storage at Vladivostok. As the exportation of heavy hides is forbidden, they, therefore, regard the Y. M. C. A. as they would any other exporters and importers."
This charge had no foundation in fact, and it was an excuse to annoy the Y. M. C. A. As a matter of fact, the Kolchak Government tried to force the American Y. M. C. A. to become a supply agent for the Kolchak Military, as was the American Red Cross, and when this could not be done, they resorted to annoyances in every way they could. The only way the Y. M. C. A., or any other American agency, could get along amicably with Kolchak adherents was, not only to work for them, but to submit to dictation as to how they should support them.
It should be remembered that the Kolchak entourage had been a part of the ruling class in Russia. History will show that such a class will always, in any country, fight to the last ditch to retain their privileges, and this particular class was very near the last ditch in Siberia. The only objective the typical Czarist Russian officer-class had, was the restoration of conditions as they were before the revolution.
On October 21, I cabled to Washington :
"A British officer just returned from over three months service with Siberian Army describes military situation as follows : ` Stories of fighting and victories much exaggerated; there was nothing to prevent the Bolsheviki from taking Omsk a short time ago if their plan of campaign had so allowed; a rabble dressed in British uniforms is sent to the front and at the first opportunity they desert to the Bolsheviki.' "
If General Knox had known of this statement by this British officer, he would have taken as drastic action as the British Government took with Mr. O'Reilly, who was sent to Siberia to replace Sir Charles Eliot, as British High Commissioner, when Sir Charles went to Japan as Ambassador.
About a month after Mr. O'Reilly arrived in Vladivostok, I was surprised when he came to my office and said to me:
"You are the only foreign representative in Siberia carrying out the announced purpose of their government. I have investigated the conditions here the best that I could, and I am convinced the policy of ` non-interference ' is the only policy that can give any hope of success. From today, the British are with you and will follow the same policy you are following."
I was, of course, much gratified at Mr. O'Reilly's statement, and thanked him profusely as I had heard very few kind words since the signing of the Armistice, when I considered the time for the use of American troops in hostile action had passed.
Imagine my surprise, when, after about four days, Mr. O'Reilly again came to my office and showed me a cablegram from London which read:
"You get out of Siberia on the first ship leaving Vladivostok, do not wait for a British ship."
As a United States transport was leaving soon for San Francisco, I gave my only British friend, with any authority, transportation to San Francisco on an Army transport.
The nearer the Kolchak Government approached complete collapse, the more bitter his adherents, Russian and Allied, seemed to become against the American Military, whom they thought to be in a position to help Kolchak and would not. As a matter of fact, we were supporting Kolchak by helping to keep the rail-road open for his exclusive use.
Almost daily reports were printed about American arms captured in the possession of Bolsheviks. Rozanoff's Headquarters issued a summary of information stating that:
"Cossacks openly declare that Americans are helping the Bolsheviks; that according to a Red prisoner his detachment had a whole box of bombs supplied to them by Americans; also they have a box of Colt revolvers supplied to them by Americans."
These false statements were made so that papers in the Far East could copy them, and such statements might have some desired result if cabled to London and Tokio. It was impossible to combat these false statements. People in the United States can have no conception of the conditions in Eastern Siberia where there was no law, except the law of the jungle, which the Japanese and Kolchak supporters were using, and they knew Americans could not use.
A thing that hurt me as much as anything that took place in Siberia occurred at the railroad station in Vladivostok. An American soldier had been drinking, and was waiting for a train. A Russian military officer observed him and went to this soldier and called him " a blank Bolshevik." The American soldier hit at the Russian with his fist, but did not strike him. The Russian pulled a pistol and killed the soldier and, to make the scene more effective, some Japanese officers, who were at the station and saw the murder, congratulated the Russian by shaking hands with him over the American's body. The Russian went at once to the fake civil court, gave himself up, was tried, and in one hour acquitted. This Russian was a part of Kolchak's fighting forces to whom the United States was turning over arms and ammunition.
At another time a report was started that the leader of the Bolsheviks in the Far East was in American Headquarters. The Japanese Chief of Staff came to see me and said he had heard it. I told him I was deter-mined to run that lie to its source and if anyone refused to tell me where he got his information I was going to question his integrity. I said to him:
"You are the first. Who told you? "
He told me a Czech officer. I sent an aide to follow this story and finally reached Russian Headquarters. These false statements have been continued by the Russian Absolutists since the American troops left Siberia. In a Russian book, published in 1923 in Germany by General Sakharov one of the Kolchak generals, called " Belaia Sibir," meaning " White Siberia," it was stated that General Ivanoff-Rinoff arrested a number of dangerous persons who were in contact with the Bolsheviks, Medveidev, and Ogarev . . . and carried on propaganda among the population calling on them to revolt. General Sakharov said General Graves notified Ivanoff-Rinoff that he would not permit this arrest, and insisted on their liberation.
There was not a scintilla of fact in this statement: Mr. Medveidev and Mr. Ogarev were never arrested while I was in Siberia.
Many times Russians and General Knox had said to me, " you are helping the Bolsheviks " or, " people are accusing the Americans of helping the Bolsheviks." My invariable reply was that if any American military representative had taken sides they had violated the orders of the United States Government, and if they could cite any act of an American Military that did not accord with these orders, I would apologize to the Russians and disavow the act. Their invariable reply was, " by not supporting Kolchak you are encouraging the Bolsheviks to think the United States is supporting them." There were some truths in this claim.
When the Americans first reached Siberia, naturally most of us expected to find the experiences of the War and the Revolution would have changed the ideas of Government of the former official class, but as soon as this official class began to commit the terrible atrocities that were committed in Siberia, or supinely permitted or condoned these atrocities, then it was clear they had learned nothing.
I tried to keep in touch, as best I could, with what the United States Military was doing. I watched for tangible, as well as intangible evidence, so as to form an opinion of the different officers at the various stations. There was only one commander in the many different stations that appeared to me as having a personal bias but otherwise this was an excellent officer who did good work.
By the middle of October, 1919, the influence of Kolchak in the Far East was almost negligible. The Russian " Monarchist " was naturally trying to keep up the idea that Kolchak was still of some importance because foreign support was built around him. The scene, so far as Americans were concerned, had shifted to the Cossacks and Japanese.
There was evidently some maneuvering with the object of declaring Semeonoff dictator in the Far East when Kolchak fell. So far as Japan was concerned, such a step would have been, in effect, throwing off their mask of working for Russia, and bringing into bold relief their real intent from the first. Even General Knox could not have gone with them on such a bold scheme.
On October 16, I cabled the War Department that:
"There was now no danger of Cossack aggression except against very small organizations. The Czechs are now all along the railroad in the East and the Japanese know it will be difficult to control the conflagration if once started."
There was beginning to appear evidence of a general disintegration of all the Kolchak regime. I received a letter from Colonel Emerson, dated October 22, from Harbin, in which he said Soukine had told him :
"The Siberian Government was not able to enforce the Inter-Allied Agreement because of antagonism between railroad officials and military officers, who considered Allied efforts to reorganize the railroad was for the purpose of gaining control for Allied Governments."
The Kolchak Government had never carried out the intent behind the Inter-Allied Agreement. It was always a military road controlled and operated by Russian military officials. The guarding of such a one-sided rail-road caused a, great deal of resentment against the United States by the democratic class, and resulted in loss of prestige for the United States.
My Intelligence Officer reported on November 16, as follows :
"Local Russians evidence little real loyalty to Kolchak government, some now speaking of it as the ` Knox Government.' "