THE Provisional Government of Russia, better known as the Kerensky Government, approached the United States for help in rehabilitating and operating the Russian railroads and Mr. John F. Stevens, the well known engineer, went to Russia in the Spring of 1917, in response to this request, and was later made official adviser to the Minister of Communications at Petrograd.
At the request of the Provisional Government, and with the support of Mr. Stevens, the American Russian Railway Service Corps was organized for the purpose of helping to put the Russian railways in condition for efficient operation.
The members, who came principally from the North-ern Pacific and the Great Northern Railways, were a remarkable lot of men. While I did not meet many of them personally, I do know the services of this Corps and their work. The United States was very fortunate in having such a representative body of men in Siberia, as their efforts and energies were directed toward doing what was just and right for the Russians, regard-less of Russian claims of bolshevism or anti-bolshevism. These men were not swerved from their duty by the requests or mouthings of Russian or foreign officials.
This policy often resulted in obstacles being put in their path of progress. It would have been much easier for all of us to have gotten in step with the apparent dominant crowd and moved down " popular street " with Russian bands playing " Hail to the Saviors of the Motherland."
The Provisional or Kerensky Government was over-thrown by the Soviets before the Americans could reach Russia to begin their work, and, consequently, most of these men remained in Japan until March, 1918, when some went to the Headquarters of the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin.
When Allied troops arrived in Siberia, in August and September, 1918, the Russian railways were in a deplorable state. About all we could learn was that the Allies were negotiating for the operation of the rail-ways. Time passed, and more time passed; and nothing was done. All this time the railroads were getting worse and worse and it was not until March, 1919, when we received notice in Vladivostok that an agreement had been reached by the various governments concerned for the operation of the railways in Siberia. This agreement was so important to the United States Military in Siberia that I quote it in full :
" 1. The general supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating shall be exercised by a special Inter-Allied Committee which shall consist of representatives from each Allied power, having military forces in Siberia, including Russia, and the chairman of which shall be a Russian.
" The following boards shall be created, to be placed under the control of the Inter-Allied Committee:
" A Technical Board consisting of railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia, for the purpose of administering the technical and economic management of all railways in the said zone.
" An Allied Military Transportation Board for the purpose of co-ordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities.
" The protection of the railways shall be placed under the Allied military forces. At the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law.
" The Technical Board shall elect a president, to whom shall be entrusted the technical operation of railways. In matters of such technical operation the president may issue instructions to the Russian officials mentioned in the preceding clause. He may appoint assistants and inspectors in the service of the board, chosen from among the nationals of powers having military forces in Siberia, to be attached to the central office of the board, and define their duties. He may assign, if necessary, corps of railway experts to more important stations. In his assigning railway experts to any of the stations, interests of the respective Allied powers in charge of such stations shall be taken into due consideration. He shall distribute work among the clerical staff of the board, whom he may appoint at his discretion.
" The clerical staff of the Inter-Allied Committee shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Committee, who shall have the right of distributing work among such employees as well as of dismissing them.
5. " The present arrangement shall cease to be operative upon the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Siberia, and all the foreign railway experts appointed under the arrangement shall then be recalled forthwith."
In addition to this formal agreement, there was an agreement, " on the side," between the United States and Japan, that Mr. Stevens would be head of the technical board.
This long delay in perfecting these arrangements, and the probable controversies, seemed to be due to the differences in the views of the United States and Japan. A reading of the very minute details, contained in paragraph 3, shows that Japan was determined to " Scotch " any prestige that might come to the United States in the Far East, by the prominence of the Russian Railway Service Corps headed by Mr. Stevens.
One who did not have to function under this agreement would probably think it was a very satisfactory agreement. I must admit I did. I, however, later found a few jokers in the agreement that, in my judgement, nullified the effectiveness of the entire plan.
In section 1, paragraph 1, it is provided that the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee shall be a Russian. Kolchak jumped on this like a cat at a mouse, and immediately appointed his Minister of Communications, Mr. Ostrougoff, as Chairman.
Section 2 provided, that at the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager or director with the powers conferred by the existing Russian law. If it were the intention of the framers of this agreement that the anti-Bolsheviks should have complete control, and that the railways should be run exclusively for the Kolchak adherents, then the agreement proved a success. There was no way for the Inter-Allied Committee or anyone else, except Kolchak or his adherents, to change an officer or employee of the railways.
The reactionary Russians were not slow to take ad-vantage of that opportunity. I do not know what the requirements as to efficiency were in order to obtain employment on their railways, but the sine qua non was that everyone had to be an ardent supporter of Kolchak, or be so close-mouthed that no one knew where he stood, and this was dangerous. Soon the agent of every station was a partisan of Kolchak. They organized regional boards either to give Kolchak adherents more jobs, or to see that their political opponents had no chance to use the railways.
The United States had stated that the money put into these railways and the keeping of troops in Siberia were because:
" The population of Siberia, whose resources have almost been exhausted by the long years of war and the chaotic conditions which have existed there, can be protected from a further period of chaos and anarchy, only by the restoration and maintenance of traffic on the Siberian railway."
These were noble sentiments. The value of the operation of these railways to the great mass of the Russian people was absolutely nil. The majority of the people of Siberia enjoyed about the same value from the operation of these railways as did the people of Liberia. It is not always easy for an ordinary citizen to show by some overt act that he is a Democrat or a Republican, nor is it easy for a Russian to show that he is a Bolshevik or an anti-Bolshevik. Before a Russian could ride on the railways or ship a sack of flour on them, his credentials had to be beyond question.
After the big questions of financing and operating the railways were settled, then the smaller question of guarding the railroads, as provided in section 2, had to be taken up. This should have been easily settled. Ambassador Morris, at Tokyo, had asked me to take up the question informally with Japanese Headquarters at Vladivostok with a view to expediting the agreement.
The Japanese would discuss for a certain distance then stop and refuse to move further. I had nothing to conceal from them, but it was evident they had some scheme that I was not to know. They would ask what I thought, and when they got my ideas they would have to defer further consideration for this, that, or some other reason. I finally wrote them a letter saying it was futile for us to discuss the question any further and withdrawing all I had said to them, and stated we would start from scratch when the Inter-Allied Committee asked the Allied Commanders to take up the question of guarding the railways. The question of this guard was not settled until the middle of April.
When the question of guarding the railway was taken up, I expected controversy over the Chinese Eastern, which is in Manchuria. We, however, had no trouble in settling the sectors we were to guard. The British and French said that they were unable to guard any of the railroad as they did not have sufficient troops. I proposed that the Chinese and Russians be permitted to select the part of the railroad within their country they desired to guard, and the Americans, Japanese, Chinese, and Czechs would do what they could with the rest. This was approved.
The Russians stated that they were not in a position to guard any of the railways, but the Chinese at once agreed to guard all of the Chinese Eastern, which amounted to almost one thousand miles. I expected the Japanese to object, but this request was unanimously approved. The Americans were assigned some of the railroad in Eastern Siberia and some just east of Lake Baikal.
That evening the Chinese High Commissioner came to see me and told me as soon as the meeting of the Allied Commanders had adjourned, the Japanese Chiefof-Staff had called the attention of the Chinese member to the agreement entered into by Japan and China at the time Japan made the " Military Demands " on China and, pursuant to that agreement, both the Japanese and the Chinese would guard the Chinese Eastern. The High Commissioner said the Chinese wanted to guard it alone and asked me for suggestions. I told him that I could tell him that the majority of the Allied Commanders had in mind that China would guard the Chinese Eastern without the aid of Japan, and we made the distribution of the guard on that basis. This was cabled to the Chinese Government and they decided that China alone would guard the Chinese Eastern.
Japan apparently acceded to the decision but soon found it was necessary to build a field telephone line along the Chinese Eastern Railroad. This telephone line required guards where the Chinese had soldiers guarding the railroad.
The British, French, and Japanese thought the guarding of the railways gave them an opportunity to deprive me of any independence of action. The British and the French could not help guard the railways, but they could do more than their part in giving the rest of us unsolicited advice. The British could not guard a single mile of the railroad, but they could tell you how every mile should be guarded. The first proposition was to put the direction of the railway guards east of Lake Baikal under the Japanese Commander, and west of Lake Baikal under General Janin, French. I imagine this proposition was submitted to. the United States Government. I find I cabled the War Department, March 28, 1919, as follows:
" I hope no action will be taken putting American troops under any other commander because such course would soon result in using our troops against so-called Bolsheviki and would absolutely nullify everything we have accomplished, and would result, in so far as effect on Russians is concerned, in changing policy of non-interference to one of taking sides."
I imagine I am indebted to Ambassador Morris for never again hearing from this scheme.
General Knox then suggested that the guards not permit any Bolsheviks within ten kilometres of the railway. This proposition was submitted from some-where to Ambassador Morris. I finally told the Allied commanders (meant principally for General Knox) that I intended to guard my section of the railway in my own way, and that I did not consider it anyone's business unless and until I had failed, and then I would be glad to receive suggestions. This proposition never reached me again.
In the guarding of the railway it was necessary for me to move Headquarters and two battalions of the 27th Infantry under Colonel C. H. Morrow to Trans-Baikal, where we came in contact for the first time with the notorious Semeonoff. This. was a ticklish position as it took a particular kind of a man to handle Semeonoff and not get into serious trouble.
Colonel Morrow proved to be admirably equipped for this particular duty. He could be genial, he could be politic, he could be stern; and, if occasion demanded, he could bluff. It was not long until Morrow and Semeonoff clashed.
Morrow was carrying out the Railway Agreement to prevent interference with the operation of the rail-way within the American sector; Semeonoff came into Morrow's sector and arrested some railway employees on the ground that they were Bolsheviks. Morrow notified him that he would not permit him to arrest these men unless he convinced him they had committed some offense.
Semeonoff claimed to be horrified at the thought that any foreigner could tell him what he could or could not do in Russia, and he notified Morrow that he was going to repeat his former act.
Morrow told him that if he passed a certain place with his armored train he would blow him to perdition or some similar place, and prepared to carry out his part of the contract by placing his little 37 millimetre pieces on each side of the railroad and piling sandbags around them. I lost some sleep over this clash and feared that Morrow, because of lack of proper weapons, could not make good. I decided, however, not to. take any part in the controversy and let Morrow handle it. Morrow's bluff worked and Semeonoff did not appear.
The Railway Agreement provided that the Military would protect the railways, therefore, it became the duty of all military troops to see that the passengers and freight were not disturbed in passage through their respective sectors.
The Military had nothing to do with the class of freight, or for whom it was destined, and the same rule was to apply to passengers. This rule seemed to be so simple, that I anticipated no difficulty in following it, but it soon developed there were difficulties in the sector guarded by Japanese troops due to their construction of the Agreement.
On May 27, 1919, the Inter-Allied Railway Committee passed, unanimously, the following resolution:
" The execution of every transportation ordered, is to be entrusted to railway agents only. This resolution is in accord with the clear understanding of the Military Commanders."
On July 25; 1919, the Committee asked the Allied Commanders to see that its resolution, regarding the infraction of rules for train movements, were obeyed and stated that Semeonoff had violated the order many times. General Otani, the Japanese Commander, replied:
" In view of the fact that the Japanese troops area located in the province, with the aim of maintaining order and political quietness, they must, of course, render assistance to the railway against malefactors tending to harm the railway movement, in case their duty will require it. However, all misunderstandings arising, with regard to the railway, among Allied troops, including Russian and Allied agents which, by their character, are subject to the decision by corresponding governments or diplomatic representatives as well as small incidents which can be liquidated by Russian authorities or military, or incidents of a similar character do not permit of Japanese interference."
Japan was the only power following this policy, which meant that Japanese troops would not interfere with Semeonoff and Kalmikoff, no matter what they did in sections of the railway guarded by Japan, and as a result of this policy, Semeonoff was permitted to force indignities upon some members of the American Railway Service Corps, in the sectors guarded by the Japanese. He was also permitted to stop an American train, loaded with rifles destined for Kolchak, and demand fifteen thousand of the rifles, which he threatened to take by force unless the officer willingly gave them up.
Before the Americans took over their sectors, I issued to the people a proclamation, in Russian, and posted it in our various sectors in all villages and towns. The proclamation was in part:
" Now, therefore, the Russian people are notified and advised, that in the performance of such duty, the sole object. and purpose of the armed forces of the United States, on guard between the railroad points above stated, is to protect the railroad and railway property and insure the passage of passenger and freight trains through such sectors without obstruction or interruion."
" Our aim is to be of real assistance to all Russians in protecting necessary traffic movements within the sec-tors on the railroad in Siberia assigned to us to safe-guard. All will be equally benefitted, and all shall be treated alike by our forces irrespective of persons, nationality, religion or politics. Cooperation is re-quested and warning given to all persons, whomsoever, that interference with traffic will not be tolerated."
This seemed to me at the time, and seems to me now, a perfectly proper notice. We were guarding the rail-way, not against the actions of the Whites only; not against the actions of the Reds only; not against Bolshevik or anti-Bolshevik depredations; but we were to see that no one interfered with the railroads.
This proclamation was the occasion for an outburst. of abuse and vilification because I had included the Whites with the Bolsheviks. Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, head of the Russian Division of the State Department, later openly criticized me to an officer of the War Department at a conference where my activities in Siberia were being officially discussed, for using the words " irrespective of party " in my proclamation. If I had been as one sided as Mr. Poole in Russian affairs, I undoubtedly would not have used that expression but would have directed the troops to protect the rail-ways against the Bolsheviki. This criticism of me by Mr. Poole shows conclusively the difference in his conception and in my conception of the meaning of " non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian people and non-interference with the political sovereignty of Russia."
I had been, up to the time of the Railroad Agreement and the assignment of troops to guard the rail-roads, able to keep clear of the political differences in Siberia. I felt secure in the belief that no one could point to a single act of the American troops as evidence that we had violated the United States policy of " non-interference." As soon as the troops began guarding the railroads, all Kolchak adherents at once came under the protection of Allied troops. His adherents lived in towns along the railroads, and the troops could not permit armed conflicts in those towns.
In practice, these railroads became entirely Kolchak Railroads financed by the Allies. If a Russian, who was not sympathetic to Kolchak, approached a railroad station with the idea of travelling on the railroad or shipping supplies, he was in grave danger of losing his life or liberty. These statements are established by official reports. Soon the anti-Kolchaks began to complain that we were helping Kolchak by guarding his line of communications. My only reply to that was that I was guarding the railroad for them as well as for the other side, and that I had no means of knowing what was in the cars I was protecting while in American sectors. This did not satisfy the anti-Kolchak people and they soon began attacking the American detachments, or property under our charge.
We took vigorous actions against these attacks. The most serious troubles occurred near the Souchan coal mines or on the railroad leading from the mines to the main line of the railroad. The section around the Souchan mines was more pro-Bolshevik than any section with which we came in contact. Ivanoff-Rinoff was anxious to arrest some of the leaders who were working in the mines. It was the job of the Americans there to keep the mines in operation and I told Ivanoff-Rinoff that he could not send his troops to Souchan as that would cause a strike and the mines would be closed. The local pro-Kolchak press claimed I was protecting Bolsheviks. I told Ivanoff-Rinoff if any man in the mines was charged with an offense we would see that the police at the mines would arrest him and turn him over. to the civil authorities for trial.
This did not satisfy the anti-Bolsheviks, so I pro-posed to withdraw American troops and let them run the mines. This, they knew they could not do. We finally settled on a certain prescribed area wherein I would not permit any Bolshevik organizations, and Kolchak troops would not enter this area.
It was fortunate for me that Mr. C. H. Smith was designated as the United States representative on the Inter-Allied Committee as provided in section one of the Agreement. Mr. Smith was a railroad man in the United States, he spoke Russian, and had the confidence of the other men of the Committee.
On March 2, 1919, I received a letter from General Knox, which stated in part:
" I wish we could see more eye to eye in matters here. The objects we wish are undoubtedly very similar but we are falling into different ruts. The policy of our Government is to support Kolchak, and I believe in that policy, for if he goes there will be chaos. I don't for a moment pretend that Kolchak is the Angel Gabriel, but he has energy, patriotism and honesty and my eight years in Russia has taught me that when you get these qualities combined in one man he is a man to keep."
" There is a widespread propaganda to the effect that your Countrymen are pro-Bolshevik. I think in the interest of Allied solidarity, and of the safety of Allied detachments, you should try to contradict this."
This letter shows the basic differences in our policies which made it impossible to cooperate.
The British, the French, and the American Consul General Harris in Siberia were all doing everything they could to help Kolchak while I tried to remain neutral. These were my instructions and, in addition to the communication of the Chief of Staff dated March 28, 1919, telling me to follow that course until changed by the President, other quotations will be made which show conclusively that it was the expectation of the War Department that I remain neutral.
I replied to General Knox's letter, in part as follows:
" I believe it is well known, in fact it has been published, that the United States does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of the Russians. I have consistently followed this policy."
" As to the support of Kolchak, I do not feel under my orders that I can support or interfere with any individual. From your statement, ` and no more wants to return to the stupidity of the old regime than you do,' I fear you think some act of mine is due to the fact that I consider Admiral Kolchak has monarchial tendencies. I consider it none of my affair as to what the tendencies of any of the contending factions in Russian affairs are."
" With reference to your statement that there is a widespread Bolshevik propaganda to the effect that Americans are pro-Bolshevik, this is possibly true, but I am sure that the propaganda is more from the anti-Bolshevik crowd than from the Bolshevik crowd. If you will read the reports in certain local papers, I think you will agree with me that it is hopeless or useless to try to contradict such misrepresentations as appear in these papers. They emanate not from a desire to do justice, but from what they foolishly think they can force Americans to do by such misrepresentations."
This seemed to be General Knox's last effort in Siberia to force me to follow the British policy. He now transferred his efforts to London and to representatives of the State Department in Siberia. He soon approached Mr. Caldwell, the American Consul in Vladivostok, and suggested that he send a cable to the United States Government advising that Government that General Graves did not truly interpret America's policy towards Siberia, and that General Graves did not truly follow the will of the American Government and the American people.
I can not say but I suspect he approached Consul General Harris with the same proposal. If he did not, it is hard to imagine why, as he and Mr. Harris were following the same course in the support of Kolchak.
The reader will naturally ask how is it possible for such conflicting policies to be followed by the agents of different Departments of the United States Government, on such a vital and far reaching question as the use of troops in a foreign country? I am sorry I am not able to help elucidate this natural query, and I can only surmise. My surmise is, that as practically all accredited agents of all foreign Governments as well as all. former Czarist officials were very antagonistic to the Soviet system of Government, and were in fear of the spread of communism, there was a constant and determined effort to bring about intervention in the hope of checking the spread of communism in the Far East. These efforts were successful in inducing the representatives of the State Department to change from the policy, " not to interfere, recognize or become mixed up with any faction or partisan strife in Russia or Siberia " to a policy of giving support to the Russian faction fighting the Soviets. The idea of the formation of an Eastern front was advanced as the real reason behind the desire for Military Intervention, but probably the desire to check the spread of socialistic ideas was equally as prominent, but for some reason none of the Allied or associated powers considered it advisable to even mention, the now admitted fear of the spread of bolshevism in the Far East.
I have no information as to whether the State Department changed the instructions that Consul General Harris said he had, but my instructions which were to the same effect as those first given to him, were never changed.
At best, the means for getting information to and from Siberia were very meagre and unsatisfactory and, after the Czechs had taken the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok, it was practically impossible to get information except such as was designed to foster the idea of military intervention, the only exceion being through diplomatic or consular agents. If these agents had a closed mind, which was almost universally the case, it was not difficult for them to accept what information that came to them tending to show a need for intervention, and discard, as propaganda, all information opposed to their view, and this could be done with the most honest intentions and with a sincere conviction that they were advancing the interests of their Governments. As a result, the representatives of the War Department and the State Department were carrying out entirely different policies at the same time and in the same place. There can be no difference of opinion as to the accuracy of this statement, and the results were bitter criticism of all United States agents. All Russian and Allied representatives, who favoured military intervention, bitterly criticized my action, and those who believed in the policy of " non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Russian people," were equally vehement in their criticism of the State Department representatives. The criticism of both could be justified by pointing to the policy of the United States, that seemed best calculated to uphold their criticism.
It is, in my judgement, unfortunate that the United States had during such an upheaval as occurred in Russia, men handling Russian affairs who had had previous governmental service in the Far East, or Near East, or especially in Russia. These men had contacts with and formed friendships among the class with whom they associated, and if Russians, they were universally pro-Czarist. It is possible the men I have in mind belonged to the class of Americans who have no sympathy with the aspirations and desires of the so called submerged class, whether in Russia or in the United States.
There can be no question that the United States Consul General in Siberia, Mr. Harris, was an ardent supporter of Kolchak, and the principles of Government for Russia espoused by the Kolchak regime. The people put in office by Admiral Kolchak were practically all former Czarist officials and Absolutists, in so far as Russia was concerned, and Mr. MacGowan, American Consul at Irkutsk, and later at Vladivostok, was an extreme partisan and did all he could to advance the interests of the Absolutists, and he was the consul who notified the American Ambassador at Vologda that a train load of German Staff officers passed through Irkutsk with their insignia poorly concealed by Russian overcoats, and that these German officers were on their way to organize the German and Austrian prisoners with a view to taking the Trans-Siberian Railway. It is now known that Mr. MacGowan was imposed upon, and probably by some one interested in getting President Wilson to consent to send American troops to Siberia.
Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, who later had charge of Russian affairs in the State Department, showed by his efforts to espouse the cause of Kolchak, that he did not favour the announced policy of the United States, " not to intervene in the internal affairs of the Russian people."
The only logical conclusion one, who was present in Siberia during intervention and knew the sidelights, can come to is that the main reason for intervention was not given to the public. The action of the representatives of the Allies, as well as that of the Consul General of the United States, justifies the belief that all Allied and Associated nations had in mind to check the spread of Communism when troops went to Russia. As a further proof of this statement, there was and is a widespread belief, in the United States at least, to this effect. After the Armistice there was no effort made to conceal the fact that Allied troops were trying to destroy bolshevism. As a matter of fact, this was the only logical reason that can be advanced for keeping foreign troops in Siberia.
There was also great resentment against me and our forces because we followed the policy of non-interference, as ordered, and would not follow the Allied representatives in fighting what they called bolshevism. American soldiers could not have taken part in the horrors of Civil War in Siberia but, by their presence and by guarding the railroad which was used exclusively for the benefit of Kolchak, they contributed to the atrocities which shocked all people with normal sensibilities.
The Chief of Staff told me, after my return from the Far East, that I would never know half the pressure the British brought in Washington to have me relieved. I have other information equally reliable that they did not stop until they reached the President.
Other nationals know the ease with which they can discredit Army officers in the United States. I do not know and never will know what reports General Knox made to London about me and the American troops. I do know, however, that he had in his office a young Captain who was a " Barrister of the Inner Temple " of London, and who was reporting some things about Americans that were absolutely false. A British officer, who was occupying General Knox's office temporarily during his absence, unwittingly told me of some of these reports. General Knox had to send something to London of an unusual tenor before the British Government, through their Ambassador, would feel justifled in trying to have an Army officer relieved from command of American troops. General Knox could not afford to make up false reports, but he could afford to cable false reports made to him by that young irresponsible officer. The President naturally thought something must be radically wrong in Siberia and ex-pressed himself as being much disturbed. This was the effect General Knox hoped to create. He, or his representatives, more than once approached Americans to find out where my influence was and who was behind me in Washington. These efforts were brought direct to me.
No one who knows the American Army officer can imagine an officer even thinking of doing, much less doing, what General Knox did. The British would resent bitterly an American Army military man going to a representative of the British Foreign Office and trying to get him to take steps to relieve a British Army officer. If I had done the same thing that General Knox did, by taking steps to have him relieved because of improper performance of his duties, he probably would have taken my act as an insult that justified re-dress from the United States Government. If the tables had been turned, the British would have made representations to Washington of my unusual action.
As an example, I one time directed the military representative in Omsk to notify Mr. Soukine, Foreign Minister for Kolchak, that certain steps were going to be taken if certain acts continued. I was notified from Washington that, in future, I would communicate with the Kolchak Government through the State Department. That this was the proper procedure was well known to me, but the question brought to Mr. Soukine's attention was one that could not wait for the delay of the State Department. It is my judgement that I was the only military representative in Siberia who would have been subjected to an intended reproof for communicating on a matter very important to Americans, which required immediate action, with an individual, who claimed to represent a " Supreme Dictator " in Russia, who had never been recognized as the head of any government by any nation.
It is high time the American people realize that foreigners are well aware of the ease with which they can create suspicion in the United States against our own representatives when they refuse to follow the line of action desired by the foreigner.
It is well known that the British and French representatives were constantly trying to have me relieved from command, and the reason was that I followed the orders I had received from the United States Government, rather than the desires of General Knox. I understood that the Japanese stated to Washington that they would prefer to deal with a diplomat rather than with me. As to whether I was a diplomat or not is a matter of opinion, but certainly I was as diplomatic in my dealings with the representatives of England, France, and Japan as they were in their dealings with me.
Does any one imagine that our Government ever made representations to the British Government about the most unusual procedure of General Knox? I do not.
Another evidence of British unfair methods is shown in a book written by Colonel John Ward, Member of Parliament. As I saw this book in the Congressional Library in Washington, and as it purports to report occurrences relative to the action of the United States military representatives which are so at variance with the facts, I am noting a few extracts. Colonel Ward says:
" While at Nikolsk, a telegram from the Station-Master at Kraevsky was received, stating in effect, that he was using a line from his house because a detachment of the Red Guard had entered the station, and in the presence of American soldiers who were guarding the railway, had placed himself and his staff under arrest and had taken possession of the station."
This statement would appear so ridiculous to people who were in Siberia at the time that no additional comment would be necessary. I can assure those who know nothing of the conditions, that if this operator had been driven from his office he would not have been permitted to go to another telegraph office. It is most improbable that the operator had a line and a telegraphic instrument in his house.
This statement was designed to show that American soldiers were cooperating with Bolsheviks. I can not say that Colonel Ward did not receive the dispatch, but I can say the meaning he intended to convey is not justified by the facts. Colonel Ward again says:
" Out of sixty liaison officers and translators, over fifty were Russian Jews."
We had no such number of translators and interpreters around American Headquarters. The United States and Great Britain were both glad to have Jews in the service during the War. I never inquired whether a soldier was a Jew or not a Jew and it made absolutely no difference in my attitude to men under my command. I do not know who at my headquarters came of Jewish stock. I do know that my personal interpreter was a British subject, born in Scotland. I might also say that he was a very efficient, faithful, and deserving employee.
Colonel Ward knew that Jews were anathema to the autocracy of Russia, the particular party he was sup-porting and by this false statement he was trying to curry favour with his associates in Siberia. Colonel Ward's chaer on American Forces in Siberia is filled with mis-statements of alleged facts and occurrences, all of which showed a bitterness of feeling and resentment against our troops.
I have previously stated enough to show that this bitterness and resentment was due to the fact that I would not permit the British to dictate to me what I should do. This bitterness continued until General Knox boarded the ship to leave Siberia.
During the Spring of 1919, Kolchak was apparently having some success in organizing, arming, and equip-ping the men drafted into his forces. As all means of communication in the interior as well as at Vladivostok were in the control of Kolchak adherents, and as all foreign representatives were in sympathy with Kolchak's efforts, it is my judgement very few people knew what was going on at the front. It was easy to magnify successes and minimize setbacks. It was easy to make reports that would bolster up their cause. As an ex-ample of what is meant, reports in my possession read:
" The figures for rations showed on May 3oth, 1919, that Gaida's army did not exceed 120,000 men entitled to draw rations, and on June 9th, but ioo,ooo men. Figures showed that they were actually drawing rations from Omsk for 275,000 men.
" When asked to explain these figures, Gaida said he was unable to accomplish anything as his entire Staff was concerned in this misrepresentation. Of fighting men, he stated he had less than 30,000 on June 3oth, and on June 1st, he had little more than 6o,ooo exclusive of reserves who had been in his engagement."
Some of Gaida's Generals were claiming that the cause of their failure on the front was due to the dishonesty of the supply service. Gaida sent an officer to check rations shipped from Ekaterinburg with what was received at Perm. Notes of the most important of these are given below:
" The percentage of supplies shipped that failed to reach destination:
Vegetables, canned and fresh 100%
Tobacco, for issue 82%
Sugar, for troops and for sale to officers 78%
Forage for animals 90%
Meat 46%
Clothing 65%
Shoes 35%
Flour 45% "
The large shortages were for a period of three months, and were shortages between Ekaterinburg and the city of Perm only. Gaida took vigorous action with reference to these dishonest transactions and had some officers court-martialed and dismissed.
One would think that the Russians, especially the higher ranking officers in the Kolchak forces, would have rallied to Gaida's support for his action in trying to eradicate dishonesty from the Army. It was the general belief in Siberia that the Russian reaction to Gaida's actions was against Gaida, and had much to do with his final break with Kolchak.
Most of the uniforms for the mobilized Russians were supplied by the British. General Knox stated that one hundred thousand uniforms had been supplied by the British for Kolchak forces. This was partially substantiated by the number of men in the Red Army wearing British uniforms. General Knox was disgusted at the Reds wearing British uniforms and later is re-ported to have said that the British would supply nothing more to Kolchak because everything they supplied reached the Bolsheviks. The men found in the Red Army wearing the British uniforms were the same men, generally speaking, to whom these uniforms were issued when they were with the Kolchak forces. The great mass of these men had no heart for fighting for Kolchak.
The methods used by the Kolchak people to mobilize these Siberians created a resentment not easily re-moved. They went into the service embittered by fear, not of the enemy, but of their own forces. The result was, as soon as they were armed and equipped they deserted by regiments, battalions, and individually to the Bolsheviks.
On April 9, 1919, I reported :
" Numbers of so-called Bolshevik bands in Eastern Siberia increasing as result of mobilization order and extreme methods used in enforcing it. Peasants and working class do not desire to fight for Kolchak Government."
On April 13, the Japanese prepared a scheme to get me to take sides in the internal conflict. They approached all Allied military representatives claiming that Bolsheviks were threatening the railroad near the town of Skotova, stating that transportation had been stopped and requested all join a force being sent out by Japan to clean out the Bolsheviks. After all had agreed to take part, one Ally sending only one soldier and the others an insignificant force, the Japanese then approached me, through my Chief of Staff, asking me to join.
By this time I knew very well the object of Japan was to either force me to take part in operations against the Bolsheviks or to 'claim I refused to join all the other Allies in the movement against the Bolsheviks. They proposed to tell the Bolsheviks that they could not come west of a north and south line passing through Skotova.
The investigation of the situation showed that transportation had not been stopped and the only threats were in the form of twenty shots, fired by some unknown person, and no one knew for what purpose the shots were fired. In my judgement, the shots were fired by some Russian at Japanese instigation for the purpose of trying to force me into an embarrassing position. In reply to this suggestion of the Japanese, I said in writing :
" That the United States and Japan had both solemnly assured the Russian people that we would not interfere with her political sovereignty, not intervene in her internal affairs and, in view of this solemn assurance, I could not see how we could restrict Russians, in their own country, to the east or west, north or south, of any imaginary line Japan might wish to draw. I cannot join in any such proposed movement unless there is need for protecting the railroad."
This gave an occasion for an outburst in the Japanese press, and the local anti-American press, against the Americans.
Reports were being received from all sections of Eastern Siberia where American troops were stationed, of the killing and whipping of men, women, and children. Reports of similar outrages were coming to American Headquarters from peasant villages. I felt the reports received from American Army officers were true as they had personally investigated enough of the reports to justify them in reporting to Head-quarters. The atrocities reported by the peasants were so similar to those reported by the Army officers that I felt justified in believing the peasant reports. I have never been able to understand the psychology of a class of human beings who could think by such actions that they could establish a stable Government in Siberia. The Kolchak adherents, who committed these atrocities, knew they had only a weak structure of Government that would not last a month unless buttressed by foreign bayonets.
These atrocities, coupled with a few aggressive acts of Ivanoff-Rinoff troops, had aroused considerable friction between Ivanoff-Rinoff and myself. On May 9, 1919, I cabled the War Department that :
" Ivanoff-Rinoff ordered to proceed to Omsk at once turning over everything to Horvat. I am informed by reliable sources that the recall followed a demand on the Kolchak Government that he be made Commanderin-Chief in Eastern Siberia with Semeonoff in command of all troops. Significance not yet known."
Before he left for Omsk, he came to see me with his interpreter and aide. I brought my interpreter into my office expecting to have an unpleasant call. Much to my surprise, Ivanoff-Rinoff began by telling me he had no feeling in his heart against me and he hoped I had none against him; that he knew of no one he would like to join with in drinking a bottle of wine to the success of our respective countries better than he would with me, and he hoped when they had succeeded in getting rid of bolshevism, he and I could put our knees under the same table and have this bottle of wine.
He was very frank in saying:
" I want to tell you before I leave that we have tried every way in the world to cause you to change your policy. We have tried flattery, we have tried abuse, and we have tried putting you in embarrassing positions, but so far as I can tell, we have not changed you one particle. While I do not like your policy, I do admire your tenacity."
He remained about one hour and he and I discussed conditions in the Far East in a most amiable manner.
While the British were supplying Kolchak troops with uniforms, the United States, through the American Red Cross, was also supplying Kolchak troops.
As previously stated, Dr. Teusler, head of the American Red Cross, had no sympathy for the aspirations of the Russian people. I am sorry to have to record this fact, but truth demands that I state that the American Red Cross in Siberia was acting as a supply agent for Kolchak.
On April 16, 1919, Major Slaughter, U. S. A. at Omsk, received from Dr. Teusler, at Irkutsk, the following dispatch:
" Please inform Mr. Soukine we are purchasing three hundred thousand suits cotton underwear for Russian Army, in China and Japan. Will inform him later regarding second three hundred thousand suits ordered in America. Deeply regret any delay in this matter."
In addition to this I had been furnishing guards for Red Cross trains to Omsk thinking these supplies were to be delivered to the Russian people. One young officer in his report after his return in charge of the guard said:
" I did not get to stop at Omsk, as Kolchak troops expected a fight next day and I was rushed to the front to issue the supplies for the expected fight."
This put the American troops in the position of issuing supplies to Kolchak troops, and I had to notify Dr. Teusler that if this ever happened again he would get no more guards for his trains from me. I wonder what the outburst would have been if Americans had been discovered giving anything to the Bolsheviks.
The American Red Cross ran hospitals exclusively for Kolchak people, and acted in practice as Kolchak's supply agent as long as Dr. Teusler was in Siberia. In my judgement, it was most unfortunate that the head of the American Red Cross should act so directly contrary to the solemn assurance to the Russian people by the President of the United States. While the Red Cross is not a Government agent, its action reflected credit or discredit upon the United States.
On June 12, I cabled the War Department in part:
" Colonel Morrow told Semeonoff to remove his armored car from American sector or he would re-move it. General Yoshe, Japanese, said to Morrow ` the Japanese will resist by force the removal of Semeonoff's armored car by American troops from sector.' Slaughter telegraphs that Soukine (Minister Foreign Affairs, Omsk) informed him that Soukine considers this incident indicative that Japanese wished trouble between Americans and Russians. Prior to recei of message from Slaughter, Mr. Smith (American Member Inter-Allied Railway Committee) told me that Colonel Robertson, Acting High Commissioner, British, had informed him yesterday, very confidentially, that he thought the Japanese were behind this trouble between Semeonoff and Americans."
There was no question the Japanese were behind all of Semeonoff's serious moves. I had previously notified the War Department that, in considering Far Eastern questions the Cossacks and Japanese should be considered as one force. I had no occasion to change that view.
Some of the Japanese would have been glad to see the United States troops embroiled with the Russians, but others were more cautious, because they knew I had enough information to connect Japan with any hostile act against Americans taken by Semeonoff or Kalmikoff.
On June 24, I received a wire from Major Slaughter telling me of the resignation of Gaida, which had been accepted by the Omsk Government.