"AFTER THE ARMISTICE"

THE signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, changed materially the duties of American troops, and brought other causes for discord between myself and the representatives of England, France, and Japan. Such military operations as the Americans had taken part in were based upon the belief that the hostile troops were composed, in part at least, of German and Austrian prisoners. As far as the energy put into military activities by the representatives of England, France, and Japan is concerned, it made no difference with them whether the organizations were Bolsheviks or composed of Bolsheviks and German and Austrian prisoners. Therefore, as far as they were concerned, the Military was used just the same after the signing of the Armistice as before. I took the stand that, as far as American troops were concerned, the United States was not at War with any part of Russia and we could not take any hostile action except to protect ourselves or the property placed in our charge. This added some to the bitterness of feeling which was already rather intense.

For about five months from the signing of the Armistice until the American troops, in accordance with instructions from Washington, took over the duties of helping guard the railroad there was only the ordinary garrison duty for our troops.

On November 5, an extract from a letter the War Department had received from the State Department was cabled to me as it related directly to questions arising in Siberia. This letter stated that the Consul General was authorized, not only to keep in personal touch, if possible, with local Governments, but to permit consular officers under him to give aid and advice to these Governments, in their effort to improve local conditions. This communication also stated that the United States Government was not yet prepared to recognize any new Government in Russia. At this time all towns on the railroad in Siberia were in charge of the Whites and consular agents were all located along the rail-road. To give " aid and advice " to local and municipal officers, in practice, was giving aid and advice exclusively to the Whites, which naturally caused the Bolsheviks to claim the United States was helping the Czarist adherents. If these consular officials had any personal feelings as to the Russian factions, and in all probability all did have, the instructions opened the door, to some extent, for United States representatives to take sides, if they so desired, and these people had feelings and opinions like everybody else.

As anexample, I mention the wife of an American consular official at Vladivostok, who stated to me at a dinner where we were both guests, that she wished she had command of American soldiers, and stated as a reason for her wish, that she would send the Military to make those worthless people go to work. She also said that the ideas of freedom that were being placed in their heads had resulted in her having to in-crease the wages of her cook from ten to twelve dollars a month. Our personal interest has a great deal to do with shaping our judgement on all questions.

The instructions, above referred to, in my judgement, were the entering wedge to, what proved to be, a very distinct cleavage between the representatives of the State and the War Departments in Siberia. As time went on, further instructions were received by representatives of the State Department and these instructions were more indicative of the desires of someone higher in the scale of authority in Washington. All this time not a change of a single word was ever made in my instructions. The result should have been evident. The only benefit that I can imagine can come from such a policy is that it gives an opportunity to easily answer critics, by referring to the action of the State Department or the War Department, as the occasion demands. More will be said about these differences in the discussion of them later.

In April, 1918, the Allied diplomatic representatives were notified of the formation of the Government of autonomous Siberia, this was generally known as the " Siberian Government." In September of the same year a new Government was established at Ufa, known as the " Ufa Government " which was an all Russian Government. This latter resulted from a conference attended by some members of the Constituent Assembly, and was presided over by Mr. Avksentiev, former Minister of Interior in the Kerensky Cabinet. These two Governments coalesced early in November, and formed a Government known as, " All Russian Provisional Government " with a directorate of five members.

On the night of November 18 and 19, the Directorate was overthrown and Admiral Kolchak declared himself the " Supreme Ruler of Russia." A number of Russian officers, all Whites, engineered the coup d'etat and it was common gossip in Siberia, that General Knox (British) was one of the moving spirits in this change of Government. There can be no question that the British troops were marching around the streets of Omsk the night of the Coup and this had the effect of giving aid to the Russians, engineering the change. There can also be no doubt that General Knox had much influence with Admiral Kolchak, and he seemed to want everyone to know of this influence.

There were many different reactions noticeable in Eastern Siberia, to the assumption of power by Admiral Kolchak. Those Allies favouring an Autocratic Government for Russia were well pleased with the change and all the Russians who had held office in the Czarist Government were more than pleased, because this was the only movement since the downfall of the Czar, which gave promise that they might hope to be restored to their old governmental status. The peasants of Siberia were not ready to show their hand, until there was some evidence of intent of the Kolchak Government. They had had enough of fighting and did not intend to take part in any more Wars if they could help it. They were the ones always mobilized to do the fighting in all Russian Wars and had lost more, in killed, during the World War, than any other nation. Their families had been subjected to great hardships during the War, and when they returned to their homes they found their means of cultivating the land had been taken by the Military. I had the greatest sympathy for these people and found them generous, kindly, and very hospitable.

People have often said to me, "were they not very simple and ignorant," but you will not find these peas-ants so ignorant about the things pertaining to their own self-interest. Another erroneous impression in the United States is that these peasants do not desire an education. Everything I saw in Siberia refutes this. In passing through the villages, one would see the children going to school with no difference from the custom in the United States, except the boys carried their books in a knapsack, as a soldier carries his pack. Another indication of an interest in and a desire for education was the fact that nearly all peasant delegations that came to see me about their problems, and there were more than a hundred such delegations, had the village school-teacher as a member of the party.

When I first went to Siberia I conceived it to be my duty to study the peQple, their habits, their customs, their desires, and their aspirations, and it soon became a very fascinating work to me. I never talked to one of these peasants that I did not leave him with the thought that there is a human being with a generous and a big heart who literally carries out the injunction, " Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." These were a simple people, they reasoned simply. They had had no opportunity or means to study National or International questions and generally their vision only extended to limits of their own immediate interests. What opportunities to share in the benefits of modern civilization had been given these peasants, that would cause them to willingly take up arms to fight for either the Allies or the Central Powers? What reason did they have for thinking that by pouring the same old Russian wine from different bottles, they would have a better opportunity to enjoy the benefits and privileges of modern civilization than they had enjoyed under the Czar?

Admiral Kolchak surrounded himself with former Czarist officials and because these peasants would not take up arms and offer their lives to put these people back in power, they were kicked, beaten with knouts and murdered in cold blood by the thousands, and then the world called them "Bolsheviks." In Siberia, the word Bolshevik meant a human being who did not, by act and word, give encouragement to the restoration to power of representatives of Autocracy in Russia.

The Russian meaning of the term Bolshevik originated from the word " majority." It began to assume political significance in 1903, when the Russian Social Democratic Worker's Party assembled in London at the second Congress of the party. At this meeting, two points of view were manifested, one quite radical and revolutionary and the other, moderate and reformist. The adherents of the former, led by Lenin, were in a distinct majority at this meeting, and were called " Bolsheviks." The other side was called " Mensheviks," from the Russian word, minority. Up to 1912 the two groups remained in the same political party, but after that time their differences could not be reconciled.

Since 1918, the Bolshevist party has been known as the Russian Communist party. Since the Russian Revolution, the word has been indiscriminately used in the United States, and has been applied to all kinds of activities, the real meaning depending upon the sympathies and affiliations of the person speaking. The word, as used in the United States, has more the meaning of " minority" than " majority." It is generally used when speaking of the opposition to the dominant party or, at least, the person or persons in control. It is used when referring to church opposition, school op-position, town opposition, etc., etc. One gets no help by consulting the dictionary for a meaning of the word. If it had been limited to the meaning given in the Standard Dictionary, it could only be applied to the members of " the terroristic branch of the Democratic Party that became dominant in Russia during the revolution of March 1917." This definition does not even include the present Soviet Government, as they came into power in November, 1917.

The word was, and is, loosely used but always carries with it a malevolent meaning in the United States, while in Siberia it was used in a special political sense, and was applied to every one who did not support Kolchak and the autocratic class surrounding him.. The word has an entirely different meaning in the United States, especially when applied to Russians. The people of the United States pictured the Russian Bolsheviks, as men with a torch and a bomb, trying to destroy civilization. If any stigma is to attach to the word bolshevism as at present it does in the United States, then according to all moral preces the Russian peas-ant is the least deserving of this stigma, of any Russian class I saw in Siberia.

The political meaning of the word Bolshevik, as used in Siberia, took in all the representatives of such Zemstvo organizations, as were opposed to the ideas of Kolchak relative to the kind of Government that should be established in Russia. These men had the confidence of the people, among whom they lived, as shown by their election to the positions they held, by the votes of their own countrymen and neighbours.

No one in Siberia, exceing those belonging to the Kolchak supporters, enjoyed any of the boons of mod-ern civilization, such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of legal action, which are well recognized heritages of all civilized people. The Zemstvos, the dumas, and the cooperatives were such well known legal, reliable, and law abiding organizations, that it would have been difficult for Kolchak to have justified to the world, the oppressive measures used against these people if they had been referred to by their proper names. This could be, and was, easily avoided by putting all who were not Kolchak supporters good, bad, and indifferent, into one class and calling that class Bolsheviks, which out of Russia at least automatically cast a serious reflection upon the character of these men. How could these Zemstvo representatives and thousands of other Russians like them, no better and no worse, have escaped the stigma attached to them in the United States, due to their political classification as Bolsheviks in Siberia? There was only one way, and that was to disregard their principles, give up their own ideas of Government, take off their coats, jump in the Kolchak boat and pull.

Apparently the Immigration authorities in the United States employed the same political classification of Russians in Siberia as was used by Kolchak. I know of one Russian who was representing the co-operatives of Siberia, and took no part in the political differences, who received permission to come to the United States on business in 1919. My investigations convinced me, before this Russian left Vladivostok, that he was an honest, upright man. When he reached San Francisco he was taken in charge by the Immigration authorities, and stigmatized in the San Francisco press, as being probably the worst Bolshevik in Siberia. Why was this man a Bolshevik? He did not oppose Kolchak, but he was a Bolshevik because he was not in the Kolchak boat and pulling.

Now let us turn the picture and look at the other side. In 1919 Semeonoff sent a Captain of his Staff to Washington, and this emissary not only had no trouble in getting into the United States, but I saw,in the press that a certain prominent American had arranged for this Russian to make a talk on conditions in Siberia while on his way from San Francisco to Washington. I do not know the object of the visit of Semeonoff's agent, but he boastingly claimed that one object was to get me relieved from command of American troops. When this Russian returned to Vladivostok, he said the War Department had been very considerate, and had designated Colonel Cronin, United States Army, to escort him around Washington, and help him meet the prominent people. He also said that when he left Washington, Colonel Cronin assured him that I would be relieved before he got back to Vladivostok. This man represented Semeonoff and it is certainly fair to assume that he had the same moral and criminal character as his chief, whom he represented. Semeonoff's character was well known in Washington, therefore one can only assume that character was ignored, and political classification alone considered, in determining whether a Russian should be permitted to enter the United States. The general information for immigrants, is-sued by the United States Department of Labor, states:

"The immigration laws intend that only those aliens who are mentally sound, morally clean and physically fit, shall enter into the United States."

If Semeonoff was " morally clean," then I never saw a human being who was not morally clean. Did any one in Siberia ever report that he met the requirements of our law, in so far as being " morally clean," is concerned? I do not believe they did. The American Consul General, Mr. Harris, talked to me about Semeonoff, and, in fact, he read me part of a report he had made to the State Department in Washington, in with he referred forcefully to Semeonoff's character, and it is hardly possible, and I think very improbable, that Mr. Harris ever changed his mind about the character of Semeonoff.

The reaction of the workmen was more hostile to Kolchak than any other class, but this was natural, as in all countries the workmen are in a position to be more easily affected by the policy of their Government.

The British, the French, and the American State Department representatives were all very friendly to Admiral Kolchak from the start, but this friendship was to be expected from the British and the French who had been openly opposing the Soviets from the beginning of the Soviet regime. It is noticeable that the declaration of the British Government to the Russian people, August 7, 1918, printed in Current History, Vol. VIII, Part 2, contained no specific statement that the English would not intervene in the internal conflicts of the Russian people. This omission would not be so notice-able and not so indicative of intent, had the United States not asked all nations taking part in the movement in Siberia, to solemnly assure the Russian people that the powers, joining in the movement, did not in-tend to intervene in her internal conflicts. The United States and Japan did make such a specific promise and history will have to determine if these two nations kept this promise and if not, why not. In a book recently published, " The Soviets in World Affairs," written by Louis Fisher, Vol. I, on page 127, appears the following :

" Harris, the American representative (says Kolchak) showed me the greatest feeling of friendship and extraordinary sympathy."

A day after the coup, Mr. Harris promised the new dictator, so said Kolchak, United States aid, and to those of us who were in Siberia, during the regime of Admiral Kolchak, there was no question but that the American Consul General was an enthusiastic believer in him and helped him in every possible way. In discussing conditions with Consul General Harris, he said to me there was no hope of settling conditions except by the Cadet party, which was Kolchak's party.

Japan was not an ardent supporter of Admiral Kolchak, in fact, at first, she opposed the Admiral. On November 26 and 28, I received reports that appeared to me worthy of credence, which stated that the Japanese officer with Semeonoff was trying to get him to declare himself Dictator of Trans-Baikalia and seize the railroads and tunnels. On the 28th of November, ten days after Admiral Kolchak became Supreme Dictator, I had information that seemed reliable, that Semeonoff was directed from Tokio to oppose Kolchak and the Japanese representative in Siberia followed this policy. As soon as it was known that Japan was sup-porting Semeonoff with troops and money at Chita, and Kalmikoff, at Habarovsk; then it was known, in Siberia at least, that Japan did not desire conditions settled there, and a strong stable Government established in power. In March, 1918, japan asked the Allies to permit her alone to take the Chinese Eastern and Amur railroads as well as Vladivostok, if the Allies considered it necessary to occupy Eastern Siberia. Although this proposition was blocked by the United States, Japan had not given up hope of eventually accomplishing her desire when the Allies sent troops to Siberia.

Semeonoff and Kalmikoff soldiers, under the protection of Japanese troops, were roaming the country like wild animals, killing and robbing the people, and these murders could have been stopped any day Japan wished. If questions were asked about these brutal murders, the reply was that the people murdered were Bolsheviks and this explanation, apparently, satisfied the world. Conditions were represented as being horrible in Eastern Siberia, and that life was the cheapest thing there.

There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks as the world believes. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in East-ern Siberia, to every one killed by the Bolsheviks. It was my judgement when in Siberia, and is now, that Japan always hoped, by fostering these murderers, that the United States would become disgusted with conditions, withdraw her troops and request Japan to go in and clean up the situation.

Japanese Russian supporters were always the foci of malicious falsehoods about American troops. General Horvath came to me and told me that on a certain date, the Japanese controlled press was going to begin a violent and abusive campaign against Americans, and said their idea was that I would have to take action and if I did take action they hoped to succeed in having me relieved from command; and if I failed to notice it, Russians would have a contem for us, because they could not imagine anyone with soldiers at their disposal, permitting such to appear in the press unless these charges were true. The campaign of vilification started on the date that General Horvath said it would. I felt I had to stop such scurrilous articles, and took actions which did stop it, but not without much local criticism of the United States for advocating freedom of the press, and permitting their agent in Russia to prevent the " Russian " press from telling "facts."

The accuracy of statements concerning United States troops in Siberia can be fairly well judged by a comment of Louis Fisher in Vol. I, page 227, of his book entitled " Soviets in World Affairs." Mr. Fisher says:

" Kolchak too dislikes the conduct of the American."

This is probably absolutely true. His dislike did not extend to the behaviour or deportment of United States troops but was entirely due to the fact that they would not, and did not, aid his supporters to spread a reign of terror among the peasants and workmen, who had committed no crimes; who were living peaceful lives, and who could see no reason why they should take up arms and try to put Czarist officials in power. Mr. Fisher further states that Kolchak received a report, dated December 12, 1919, from an agent in Vladivostok, in which he said:

" The United States Soldiers are infected with Bolshevism."

"That most of them are Jews from the East Side of New York City who constantly agitate for mutinies."

These are characteristic of the charges that were made against Americans in Siberia and, although not substantiated by facts, they were constantly offered in an effort to force United States troops to join in the acts of terror against a helpless and peaceful citizenship, or failing in that to force them to leave Siberia, and thereby remove the little restraint we exerted by our presence.

So far as I know, no one in Washington ever gave to the public a single statement as to the orders given to American troops for their guidance in Siberia, or as to the outrages being committed by the Kolchak supporters. The policy of the United States was given to the public, but no information that I was to follow that policy.

Upon my departure from Siberia, I received a cable suggesting that I refrain from discussing Siberian questions, and there were many acts committed there that the participants must have hoped would never be disclosed. Reputable and disinterested writers, on intervention in Siberia, will obtain their information from all available sources and if no information as to the object of intervention is given out by the United States representatives, these writers must go to a probably prejudiced source for their information and such a source is almost sure to represent the United States as being recreant in the performance of their duty; not because of conduct, but because the Army failed to follow the line of action the speaker thought it should follow, and thereby encouraged bolshevism.

As representatives of England, France, and Japan, since the termination of intervention, have officially stated that the fear of bolshevism in the Far East had much to do with their acts in Siberia, one can not escape the conviction that these Governments were not entirely candid in their announcements just prior to intervention, as the word bolshevism was not mentioned in the public announcements given to the world by any nation taking part in Russian intervention.

As to Kolchak's statement, quoted in Mr. Fisher's book, it was well known that the Russian Kolchak sup-porters were constantly trying to discredit every Foreign representative in Siberia who did not support Kolchak and facts had nothing to do with their representations. This is proven by the statement that " most of the American troops were Jews from New York." Most of these troops came from men mobilized on the Pacific Coast. Why was such a statement made? Be-cause the Kolchak supporters had given up any hope of receiving active military support from American troops, and if the world and especially the Czarist officials surrounding Kolchak could be made to believe that the United States had sent a command composed of Russian Jews to Siberia, the reason we did not sup-port Kolchak would appear evident. These false reports were not occasional, but appeared almost daily for several months and, at one time, they became so virulent that I notified Mr. Soukine, Kolchak's Minis-ter of Foreign Affairs, that if they did not stop, I would arrest the editor of one paper and put a padlock on the building in which this paper was published. This drastic act on my part was occasioned by the paper publishing a statement that all Americans were degenerates, and other statements which common decency makes it impossible for me to repeat.

I was directed from 'Washington that, in the future, I would deal through the State Department in such matters. This appeared to me to be a question where diplomatic language and procedure could not be effectively used, but I succeeded in abating, to some extent, this particularly virulent and coarse propaganda. During the period of these violent outbursts I was notified through a Kolchak liason officer, that two Czarist Russian General officers, both supporters of Kolchak, would stop this propaganda against me and other Americans, if I would pay them twenty thousand dollars a month.

I believe the reason Japan wanted our troops out of Siberia, and wanted the United States to ask her to settle conditions, was that she thought this would absolve her from the solemn assurance to the Russian people, made at the request of Mr. Wilson, not to impair Russia's territorial integrity now or hereafter. Japan had recently come to be considered one of the five big powers of the world and she was naturally very desirous that her action should be in consonance with the ideas of other big powers, as to the solemnity of obligations involved in international agreements. This required cooperation.

The assumption of power by Kolchak was unexpected by the Czechs. They had put the new Siberian Government in power all along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and, as previously stated, the Czech did not like the sound of Supreme Ruler. General Gaida complicated matters by announcing that he favoured the Dictatorship before the Czech National Council could formulate its policy. He stated that the Russians could not be ruled by kindness or persuasion, but only by the whip and bayonet. He also expressed the opinion that a strong dictator was necessary to bring order and to expel bolshevism. This statement was circulated widely and increased Gaida's popularity with the Russians sup-porting Admiral Kolchak. The effect was very different with the Czechs. It became clear that Gaida's Division heartily disapproved of his views, and bitter criticism of him and his Russian associates spread rapidly. His men objected to the Russian officers on his Staff, and attributed their military failures to Russian methods. The aversion of the Czech for the Russian was thus much increased and both officers and men became insolent to the Russians. Czechs were openly saying that the Czech non-commissioned officers were better than the Russian officers. It became known on November 20, that the Czech National Council had decided to issue a proclamation opposing the Dictatorship, on the ground that the Czechs could not approve an illegal establishment of a Government without the consent of those to be governed; and those authorized to form a Government. Gaida then made disparaging statements about the Czech Council and tried to suppress all forms of propaganda against the Kolchak regime. These actions of Gaida's served to further alienate his troops and cause them to determine not to participate in the suppression of any uprising that might occur against Kolchak troops. The Czech leaders became very much divided, some with what was known as the ", constituent " group and some of the others violently opposed to the constituent group.

During this intense feeling among the Czechs, Gaida ordered the 5th Czech Regiment to the front for an attack on Perm. The Regiment flatly refused to go and sent delegates to the council to explain their reasons, and the reasons presented were:

1st A disinclination to fight in Russian quarrels. If the Allies really wished to fight the Bolsheviks, they would send assistance.
2nd Fighting now would benefit the Omsk Government which they did not wish to support. . . .
7th Doubt as to whether fighting Bolshevism was what the Allies desired.

Soon after the coup d'etat, an uprising had been planned by workers of the Ural factories, but the Czechs were able to prevent it. The Czech officers, or those higher in authority, were very anxious to take some action that would remove the stigma coming from the refusal of the 5th Regiment to go to the front in obedience to Gaida's orders, as well as to prevent the spread of dissension in the ranks. General Syrovy got Gaida to Cheliabinsk, and then he gave the order to the 5th Regiment to move to the front, but stated that activities would be held up until the arrival of General Stefanek, the War Minister of Czecho-Slovakia.

On November 4, a telegram came from President Masaryk asking the Czechs to hold on as Allied help was coming. I have no knowledge as to where President Masaryk.got his information, but, presumably it came from the French. While I was in Siberia, I saw a communication written in French and signed by Major Guinet (French) and Mr. De Witt C. Poole (American), telling the Czechs, Allies were coming and to hold on to the railroad.

This was rather interesting to me, as I had been definitely told American troops would not go west of Irkutsk. If American troops were not to go to the assistance of the Czechs, I could not understand why Mr. Poole should take part in telling them Allied troops were coming. This, again, looked like lack of team work on the part of the Americans.

General Syrovy stated that the Czechs felt badly about the Omsk Government, for it seemed as if they had betrayed their responsibility to the Russian people in the matter of safeguarding their rights. There was an evident anxiety on the part of the Czechs, as to whether the Kolchak adherents would act in accord with the Czech views as to the rights of the people. The Czechs were removed from the front which improved the situation, and Gaida was granted a leave of absence without any request coming from him.

On December 24, Gaida was appointed senior Commander of all Siberian forces in the Ekaterinburg region, which was undoubtedly a reward for his services to Kolchak, and he immediately began planning for a military movement. The Czechs, as was to be expected, had difficulties with the Kolchak troops used in this movement.

By January 20, 1919, all Czech troops in the front were replaced by White Russians and the feeling was such, by this time, that the Russian White Army was glad to see the Czechs go. Some of the villages, how-ever, where the Czechs had been quartered were sorry to see them go, and asked them to remain and settle down as inhabitants. It was stated that many Czechs gave serious consideration to this invitation, though it is not known how many did acce. The feeling was such that the Czechs could not get out without a further complication with the Kolchak Russians over surplus arms and equipment they were to turn over to them. These Czechs, in Siberia, were remarkable soldiers and always looked the part. There seemed to be no triflers in their ranks, and when they were assigned to a military duty they brooked no interference with their proper performance of that duty.

During my entire stay in Siberia the official relations between the representatives of England, France, and Japan on one side and myself on the other, steadily be-came more strained, and these representatives seemed to have no patience with anyone who did not actively support Kolchak. At that time I personally felt, that if Admiral Kolchak could carry out his reported ideas, there was some hope that he would establish a Government with views between the extreme factions, that might be acceable to the great mass of Russians. I particularly felt this way after he gave an interview to Mr. Sharkey, Associated Press, on Russian New Year, of 1919, which purported to give Kolchak's views as to the principles upon which he hoped to establish a Government in Siberia. , I later came to the conclusion that he did not have the confidence of the mass of the people and therefore could not establish a Government. With reference to this interview I took my first step into Russian politics. The result was not encouraging to say the least, and this was my first and last effort to try to act as mediator between two Russian factions.

Some representatives of the Social-Revolutionists, I remember a Mr. Gaiman and a Mr. Moravsky, both former members of the " Derber Government," in Siberia, came to see me, and I invited their attention to the statement of principles sent out by Admiral Kolchak, and told them that these were the same principles of Government they had told me they advocated. They laughed and said I did not understand Russia, and that this interview was for consumion in the United States. They said Admiral Kolchak and the people around him had no intention to carry out this announced policy. I, however, insisted upon these gentlemen telling me whether they would support Admiral Kolchak if he would carry out these announced policies. They finally told me they would, and the only thing they wanted was some means of assuring themselves that these announced policies were being carried out. I thought this was fair enough and I asked General Romanovsky, who was, at that time, handling political affairs for the Omsk Government, to come to my office, but when I told him what these gentlemen had said and asked him if he thought it possible to get together and try to stop some of the useless spilling of Russian blood, he flew into a rage and said:

" The idea of these people speaking of condition upon which they would support the Omsk Government, and before long, such characters, as I had been talking to would be glad to come to the Omsk Government, put their heads on the ground, beg for forgiveness and for an opportunity to support Admiral Kolchak."

I began early in 1919 to realize that United States Consul General Harris was opposed to my views of "non-interference in the internal affairs of Russia," and supported Kolchak where he could. I also began to sense that I had opposition in Washington. I had recently been on duty in Washington and still had many Army friends there so I began trying to find who were my real friends and who were my critics. My service there enabled me to tell, at least to my own satisfaction, in what offices my actions would receive sympathetic consideration, and where they would be criticized, if possible. For example, I received a cable from Washington, containing a rather sharp, pungent criticism of me for lack of supervision of my censorship regulation, winding up by telling me that I would give this my personal attention. I personally examined all communications from my office, and could find no violation of censorship regulations. After this examination, I realized that Brigadier General Marlborough Churchill, head of Military Information Division, where censor-ship questions were handled, was anxious, at the be-hest of someone, to be critical. I then had to watch my communications which, under the rules of the War Department, would be checked by the Adjutant General to Military Information Division, and later events amply justified my judgement. I am glad to record that, with the exceion of the Military Information Division, I not only have no criticism of any branch of the War Department, but have always been most grateful for the cooperation and help I received. To avoid what I conceived would probably be unfair consideration of papers that would naturally go to the Military information Division, I frequently departed from the prescribed rules of correspondence in the War Department, and sent some communications to the Chief of Staff instead of to the Adjutant General. After I had examined the critical cable relative to my alleged carelessness in handling censorship questions, I cabled to General March, Chief of Staff, telling him I could find nothing wrong with censorship at my Headquarters, and expressed a regret that the cable did not specify wherein there was neglect. I received a reply from General March saying my views on censorship were exactly correct, and he would see that I was not annoyed by any more communications of that kind.

Soon after I arrived in Siberia, fifteen officers and very high class men reported to me from Military Intelligence Office in Washington, for Military Intelligence work in Siberia. The majority of them, as I re-member, came from Educational Institutions, and I was very much pleased with their appearance as well as their standing and reputation in the United States. I was careful to see that all of these officers understood the orders :

" Not to interfere in political affairs, and not to intervene in internal conflicts."

I then sent them out to various parts of Siberia, all at railroad towns with a view to getting reports on the military, political, social, and economic conditions in Siberia. I soon received a cablegram from the War Department, stating that the Government expected to get their information as to conditions in Siberia from the representatives of the State Department. This cable puzzled me very much. While it contained no instructions to me, the meaning seemed clear that the Government wanted me to know that what I said of Siberia, or of conditions there, would be ignored. Such a peculiar cablegram as this had some significance or meaning which was not entirely disclosed, and if the State Department wanted to know the real conditions in Siberia, why did they propose to ignore the information coming from the great majority of United States representatives? The Army was in a much better position to get the facts, than the State Department, be-cause of the much larger. number of observers, and the greater number of places from which reports were received, and I can not admit that the Army observers had less intelligence than the Consular agents of the State Department in Siberia. If the State Department did not attach any importance to the Army reports, why not throw them in a waste basket? Why tell me they were going to ignore my reports ? The facts of the matter were, these Army reports were pinching some-where. They wanted information along a certain line, as was disclosed by their cable sent to Mr. August Heid, representative of the War Trade Board, functioning under the State Department, that he, Mr. Heid, was not sending the kind of information the State Department wanted him to send out of Siberia. The Military was not supporting any faction and was, there-fore, in a position to report the facts as the observers saw them, regardless of whether the reports were favourable or unfavourable to any faction. I communicated with the War Department, asking what this cable meant and received a reply from General March saying I was sending just the information he wanted, and to keep it up. It was evident to me then that Consul General Harris or the Russian Division of the State Department in Washington, both of whom were Kolchak supporters, were not pleased with the information the Military was sending, relative to the Omsk regime. I was quite annoyed, after receiving General March's cablegram, as it appeared to me that the State Department, or some one in that Department, had sized me up as a weak man who could easily be frightened, as well as easily deterred from performing what I conceived to be my duty.

At this time there was considerable criticism in the United States of the action of American troops in Siberia. This criticism took different forms, some suggesting that the Americans had become bolshevistic; some suggesting that we could watch the situation from the United States, as well as from Siberia; and some were critical of my selection to command the American forces, because of my lack of experience in the command of large bodies of troops. Mr. George Harvey, of Harvey's Weekly, seemed to be the most severe critic. He, of course, as usual, used his sarcasm, not only against me, but against the Secretary of War because of my selection for the Siberian command. These criticisms were very familiar, as they were almost as common as my meals in Siberia. The American Consul at Vladivostok was cabling to the State Department each day, without comment, the libelous, false and scurrilous articles appearing in the Vladivostok press about the American troops. These articles, and the criticism of the American troops in the United States, were built around the charge of being bolshevistic. This charge could not have been based upon any act of the American troops, because there was not a single incident where they gave aid or comfort to the Bolsheviks, but the charge was the same that was lodged against every one in Siberia who did not support Kolchak, by Kolchak adherents, which included Consul General Harris.

Evidently this idea became so wide spread in the United States that the Government, in one case at least, decided to watch Americans who had seen service in Siberia. This statement is based upon an incident that took place at the Commodore Hotel in New York City, in November, 1921. A self-appointed committee had made arrangements for as many of the Americans as possible, with service in Siberia, to meet at a dinner given at the Commodore Hotel in New York. There were about sixty people at this dinner, and all had seen service or were relatives of those who had seen service in Siberia. Admiral Knight and I were both present. After we sat down at the table, a man who was unknown to any of the committee came in to the room and also took a seat at the table. The senior member of the committee found an opportunity and asked this man who he was. The man showed him a Department of Justice badge and said he had been ordered from Washington to be present at this meeting, that he was going to remain, and he advised the representative of the committee not to cause any trouble. Nothing was said about the incident until after the dinner, when the representative of the committee saw the Assistant Manager of the hotel and asked for an explanation. The Assistant Manager said the man had shown him credentials and papers, which made it impossible for him to do anything except take him to the dining room. There is no doubt in my mind that the Department of Justice agent was sent to this dinner by some official of the United States Government, and so far as I know, the practice of sending secretly, and without the con-sent of the guests, an agent of the Department of Justice to a private . dinner is only resorted to when there is fear of subversive activity against the United States. Practically every person at this dinner had done their best for the United States during the War; they were proud of their service for their country, and the country should have been grateful to them for this service. All who knew of this incident felt' mortified and hurt. If I had known of this man's presence at the time of the dinner, I would have advised demanding of the hotel management that he be removed from the dining room and, in case of refusal, I would have advised all the dinner guests to leave the hotel, and I could certainly not have sat quietly at a dinner table where the Department of Justice was watching my acts, or my speech. This, after Admiral Knight had given more than forty years of his life and I had given more than thirty-seven of mine, to the service of our country.

In December, 1918, another effort was made to prevent freedom of action of the United States Military in Siberia. General Knox came to my office and showed me a communication from the British Government, approving his recommendation that General Janin (French) would command all Russian and Allied forces operating against the Bolsheviks, and that he, General Knox, would have command of the lines of communication, and also have charge of the training of the troops. I suppose he wanted to get my reaction to his proposition, as he knew well the American troops were not fighting Bolsheviks, and were not being controlled by either General Knox or General Janin.

In my judgement, it would have been most unfortunate if the United States had taken any action that would have placed the use of American troops under the direction of English, French, or Japanese in Siberia. There were constant efforts being made to bring about this situation and, if it had been done, no one can doubt that the American troops would have been used to kill Russians for their political beliefs. This would have been bad enough, but there is another side to the picture that I believe is of more importance to the American people, and that is, that American troops would also have been used to bring resentment against the United States by the Russian people. Situations could have been created for this specific purpose.

The English and French can not be charged with guarding a railroad that was being used for the exclusive use of Kolchak and against the interest of the great mass of Russians, because these nations did not send enough troops to Siberia to enable them to take part in guarding the railway. Was this failure to aid in guarding the railroad designed to escape the resentment of the people which came upon the other nations who did use troops to extend the Russian War, by guarding the railroads, and in this way, give assistance to the losing side? The British had two,or three times as many officers in Siberia as did the United States, but few soldiers. Notwithstanding this fact, I find that Mr. Fisher in Vol. I, page 197 of his, " Soviets in the World Affairs," says :

" The Commander-in-Chief of all the interventionists' strength with Kolchak, was at one time, the British General, Knox, and later the French General, Janin."

This is not a fact, and it would be interesting to know where Mr. Fisher got his information, as no foreigner ever commanded American troops while I was in Siberia. Why, and by whom was such information given out? It is fair to assume that some English or French representative gave out the information, as they thought this report would add to the prestige of England and France.

On December 13, 1918, General Knox told me that England had sent him material for arming and equip-ping 100,000 Russians. On the same date I notified the War Department as follows :

" All information that I am able to obtain leads me to the conclusion that the Government, headed by Admiral Kolchak, can not last."

I also stated in the same letter:

" Russians continue to inform me, that because of our presence here, the autocratic class are enabled to try to re-establish an autocratic form of government, the United States is losing prestige and the people are not sure as to our belief in a representative form of Government for other countries."

The Acting Secretary of State notified the Secretary of War that:

"The views expressed by General Graves vary in some degree from those of other representatives of this Government in Siberia."

By December 1, 1918, the actions of Ataman Kalmikoff, of the Ussuri Cossacks had become very embarrassing to me. The United States had asked Japan to join in the limited objects for which American troops were sent to Siberia and every act of Japan, or Japanese paid Russian agents, was, logically, a discredit or a credit to the United States; and Russians were sure to think; because the United States had invited Japan to join her in action in Siberia, that she must be working with her. Japan, in her intent to divide the people and prevent a strong Government from emerging in Siberia, soon had Semeonoff and Kalmikoff in her employ. It is hard to imagine a man like Kalmikoff existing in mod-ern civilization, and there was hardly a day passed without some report of the terrible atrocities committed by him or his troops. On December 1, I reported to the War Department, in part:

" I, of course, under my instructions to take no part in the internal squabbles could do nothing, with the exceion that I have reported to the Japanese Head-quarters that the excesses of Kalmikoff should be stopped and that his actions were a disgrace to civilization. I did this, and so informed them that I did it, be-cause it is well known that he was being paid by Japan and, that if Japan should stop supporting him, his excesses would stop immediately."

I later proposed by letter to the Japanese Commander that we notify Kalmikoff in writing the next time he or his men murdered a Russian, that we would use such force as was necessary to arrest him and turn him over to the Russians for trial by the civil court. I received a reply from Japanese Headquarters saying:

" Kalmikoff had promised them, on November 28, that he would not kill any more people, and that he had kept that promise but, if I desired, they would join me in notifying him as I had suggested."

It was evident that Kalmikoff did not kill, after that, where Americans could verify the murder, but it was also evident that he was taking his victims where Americans could not see their bodies. Two women came to my office from a town two or three hundred miles from Vladivostok, and told me Kalmikoff had come through their village and had taken their husbands. They begged me to help find out if these men were alive and if alive, where Kalmikoff had taken them. I directed the Commanding Officer at Habarovsk to ask Kalmikoff where these men were. Kalmikoff replied that they had escaped, and he gave the Commanding Officer, what purported to be, a copy of instructions he had sent to all stations to see that they were recaured. It later developed that when his train was passing over a lake, Kalmikoff had it stop while he had stones tied to the necks of these men, and they were thrown into the lake. Reports of the terrible atrocities being committed by Kalmikoff troops continued to reach American Headquarters almost daily, but as I had no means of verifying the truth of these stories I could take no action.

The beginning of Kalmikoff's power in the Spring of 1918 was when he was selected Ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks. This Cossack assembly authorized him to seek a loan from the Allies for the purpose of enabling the Cossacks to finance their spring planting. Japan made the loan on condition that the Ussuri Cossacks would not join the Bolshevik forces. The money, advanced by Japan, enabled Kalmikoff to go to Progranichnaya and begin organizing a Division of Cossacks, with a Japanese Major as adviser in the organization of the troops. This information was furnished by Kalmikoff's agents in Vladivostok.

During the Ussuri campaign, July to September, 1918, Kalmikoff's Cossacks participated, and entered Habarovsk with Japanese troops, September 5 and 6, 1918. Kalmikoff remained in Habarovsk and carried on his regime of terror, extortion and bloodshed, which eventually caused his own troops to mutiny and seek the protection of the American troops. Under the pre-text of combatting bolshevism, he resorted to the unscrupulous arrest of people of some means, tortured them to secure their money and executed some on the ground of bolshevism. These arrests were so frequent that all classes of the population were terrorized and it was estimated that there were several hundred per-sons executed by Kalmikoff troops in the vicinity of Habarovsk. These murders we established as best we could from peasants and depositions of local legal authorities. Kalmikoff's troops began flogging and striking members of his own command and on December 6, the Intelligence officer of the 27th Infantry reported that the situation was becoming serious. There is no question about the disloyalty of, at least, one half of the troops under Kalmikoff, and on December 28, a number of his men appeared at Headquarters of the 27th infantry, asking permission to enlist in the United States Army, and many wanted assistance in getting away from Habarovsk. The Japanese sensed trouble and ordered all buildings in Habarovsk searched for arms. The search resulted in finding 218 rifles, 138 pistols and some ammunition for the same.

On the nights of January 27 and 28, 1919, seven hundred of Kalmikoff's troops deserted. Three hundred of these men went into hiding in near by towns; about thirty asked protection of the Chinese troops, and three hundred and ninety-eight, with animals and arms, including 4 guns and 3 machine guns, came in a body to Headquarters 27th Infantry, and told the American Commander if he would give them protection from Kalmikoff, they would surrender all their arms and equipment; but if the American Commander would not protect them, they would return in a body and fight it out with the remainder of Kalmikoff's troops. Ac-cording to Japanese statement there still remained about four hundred Cossacks with Kalmikoff. The Commanding Officer said in his report:

" To prevent bloodshed and plunder in garrison, city and vicinity and for the safety of our troops, I placed the deserters under guard and rendered them powerless for plunder and disorder. This was accomplished quietly and at the wish of the mutineers who were with-out officials."

I approved Colonel Styer's action but could not approve his suggestion that they might be turned over to the senior officer, recognized by Horvath and Kolchak, for reorganization or for discharge. I felt conditions were too uncertain, and if these men should be turned over to any Kolchak Russian, there was a considerable chance that they might get into the hands of Kalmikoff and that meant certain death for all of them. I notified Colonel Styer that the disposition of these men was a question for their own decision and one in which the Americans could take no part. I decided this on the ground that Kalmikoff was not recognized as control-ling any legal body of men and did not recognize any superior Russian authority, but was a hireling and puppet of Japan. As was to be expected, the Japanese were very much exercised over the mutiny of Kalmikoff's men and their Chief of Staff came to see me and later wrote me a letter asking my view. To this I replied :

" First - Such soldiers will not be delivered, by the American forces, to Kalmikoff, Horvath or the representatives of either at Habarovsk, or elsewhere, but will be released at Habarovsk and permitted to go where they please."

" Second - Upon such release, they will be given reasonable protection against persecution by Kalmikoff, or his forces, on groundless charges, or charges of desertion, rebellion or mutiny."

" Third - While yet under control of American forces, any of such soldiers will be delivered to the local civil authorities upon service of Judicial warrants, for murder or other crimes, violative of Russian laws, provided that there shall accompany such warrants a synopsis of the evidence against the accused person indicating prima facia evidence of guilt."

" Fourth - All this is but reasonable protection to prevent ruthless sacrifice of human lives, and for the proper protection of our own soldiers and property."

The Japanese then asked that the deserters be placed under a joint guard of Japanese and Americans. This, of course, was not acceded to by the Americans. The

Japanese Commander at Habarovsk then submitted a memorandum to Colonel Styer containing the following :

" First - For what reason and with what responsibility has your detachment received armed soldiers deserting Ataman Kalmikoff's detachment? "

" Second- The desertion involved, and your receion of the soldier, is an event within Kalmikoff's detachment and is simply a matter of its Military discipline. This case is believed as interference with the interior administration of Kalmikoff's detachment. What is your opinion of it? "

" Third -What is your opinion as to the disposition of the Russian soldiers that you have received in your detachment? "

The Japanese seemed determined to inject themselves into this question and it was known, as well as anything could be known, without legal documentary evidence, that Japan was paying, controlling, and had equipped this body of murderers. Colonel Styer telegraphed to Vladivostok the substance of the Japanese Commander's question. I notified him that the questions would be handled in Vladivostok, and for him not to release any of these prisoners without authority from me.

Shortly after this, a Colonel of the General Staff from Japanese Headquarters came to see me and after telling me that the Japanese Chief of Staff was ill, he said he had come to request me to return the prisoners to Kalmikoff. I replied that this would never be done. He then asked me to turn them over to the Japanese and let them settle it. I told him that I considered his suggestion bordered on an insult, and that I had no intention of asking Japanese approval or disapproval of my acts, and that the interview was over. He replied that General Inagaki would come to see me about it, and I told him that I would not discuss this question again with any representative of Japan.

In a few days General Inagaki, the Japanese Chief of Staff, appeared and apologized for the action of the General Staff Colonel, and said his suggestion was in-excusable and that Japanese Headquarters did not approve of his action, and he hoped I would overlook the matter. I told him that I was glad to know that his Headquarters did not approve of the Colonel's action and, so far as I was concerned, we would drop the question. I felt sure this Colonel had been sent to American Headquarters by Japanese higher authority.

On February 4, 1919, Colonel Styer telegraphed:

" There is no semblance of discipline left in Kalmikoff's force, His Government from Nikolsk to Iman is a disgrace to the Allies, who must tacitly approve it, if only by their presence. His power of life and death has been so indiscriminately used as to create a reign of terror, and the life of no soldier or civilian is safe. Have restricted our men to limits of garrison to pre-vent possible trouble with Kalmikoff's undisciplined remnants. The Cossack officers of rank were quartered in the Japanese Headquarters building."

The problem of what to do with the deserters was complicated by the fact that, in the course of the mu-tiny, a Cossack had been wounded and had later died of his wounds, and there was a possibility that the murderer might be among the men under the protection of the United States. Seven of these men had expressed a desire to be released and were allowed to go from the United States protection. Colonel Styer was very anxious to get rid of them and again suggested that he turn them over to Russian officers designated by General Ivanoff-Rinoff.

I replied :

"The difficulty in acting as you suggest is that we do not recognize any Russian Army and consequently do not recognize Kalmikoff, and while agreeing with you, we do not want to protect a murderer, it is not believed practicable to permit Russians of Ivanoff-Rinoff's selection to make the necessary investigation, among the men you are now holding, to locate the murderer. However, you should make -such investigation as you can with a view to determining if the murderer is among the men you have. We cannot turn these men over to anyone except upon the specific request of the men themselves. My view of the situation is that you simply disarmed a band of men to prevent bloodshed. The men may be permitted to go as individuals, or in a body, when ever they want to go."

On February 22, Colonel Styer reported that the situation regarding the mutineers was working out satisfactorily along the lines approved by me, and the large majority would shortly be released, and on March 15, he reported that only thirty-five prisoners remained and that they would be released within three days.

This incident gave Japan an excellent opportunity to start their controlled local press in spreading anti-American propaganda and especially against the United States military forces. General Oi, Japanese Commander, had shown his hand to such an extent that Americans felt that if we should have a conflict with Kalmikoff, we would have to reckon with the Japanese forces under the command of General Oi. Kalmikoff asserted that, " no violence or cruelty had ever been done in his detachment, which stands for law and order and defends citizens from any kind of injustice."

The situation at Habarovsk became so tense that Colonel Styer wrote General Oi a letter in part, as follows :

" Although Ataman Kalmikoff's detachment is armed, maintained and supported by the Japanese Government, still no one claims to be responsible. Kalmikoff is responsible to no one and no Nation assumes responsibility for his acts. On several occasions I have reported the conduct of this detachment towards the Americans, and each time you have informed me that you had no authority over Kalmikoff. The mere fact that he is controlled by the Japanese, and supported by them, makes you responsible for his acts. I am of the opinion, that unless you control this individual, a clash between his men and our troops is imminent."

I sent a copy of this communication to the Japanese Commander at Vladivostok, with the following:

" In view of the fact that Kalmikoff's detachment has been armed, equipped, supported by and serving under the Japanese forces, I request that the proper measures be taken to restrain this remnant of his forces. In case the Japanese forces are no longer responsible for the action of these men, I request that I be so advised."

General Otani replied :

" I have the honor to assure you that the Japanese forces have no responsibility, whatever, in connection with any behavior on the part of Kalmikoff's troops. In view, however, of the fact that the Japanese Government has hitherto assisted them in their equipment and supplies, and that the Japanese troops have been operating in cooperation with them, we feel it our duty to see that Kalmikoff be duly advised and that a satisfactory and smooth solution be reached in connection with the matter lately informed by Colonel Styer, as it is feared that a serious consequence may ensue. to-ward the maintenance of peace and order, in the event of a failure of a successful settlement of the question. Assuring you, sir, of the best wishes for our everlasting friendship, I remain,"

Colonel Styer handled the Kalmikoff incident, with the Japanese at Habarovsk, in a very diplomatic and satisfactory manner.

The Japanese policy is to select boys who give promise of being suitable for military service, and then see that they are educated and trained. They send young officers for training to various countries, with a view to utilizing these officers where their training seems best suited to their particular ability.

In my judgement, General Oi would not have been adverse to seeing a clash between the American forces and Kalmikoff's men.

As soon as the Ussuri Cossacks found an opportunity they deposed Kalmikoff as Ataman of the Ussuri Cos-sacks and as soon as the terror of his power was gone, they repudiated him and all his works. On February 4, 1919, the Cossacks issued a public statement asking the American Command to liberate from Kalmikoff's control the Cossacks who still remained in his unit. Kalmikoff still continued to keep quite a force around him, and his force when at Habarovsk was always under the protection of Japanese troops. When these men left Habarovsk for any purpose, there were a suf.* ficient number of Cossacks to handle any resistance to punishment by Kalmikoff's men that might be made by the peaceably inclined inhabitants.

The Japanese first approached me to return to Kalmikoff the horses, arms, and equipment surrendered to Colonel Styer, but I would not consent to their request. They then told me that all of these things be-longed to japan. I told the Japanese Chief of Staff that if Japan would notify me in writing that she had armed this murderer, that the property had never been paid for by Kalmikoff, and if they would identify their property, and sign a recei for it, I would let them have it. This was done and the recei sent to the War Department for file with the records.

As the Winter of 1918-19 approached we anticipated that the worst enemy we would have would be cold and disease. We had pictured the cold in Siberia as being much worse than it really was, consequently, our preparation for the winter proved very satisfactory. The climate at Vladivostok is relatively mild for a cold country and the troops at Harbin and Habarovsk, where it was colder, suffered very little as they were well clothed, housed, and fed. I have never lived in Montana or Dakota, but I have pictured the climate of Siberia very much like that of North Dakota. The chief, characteristic is its extremes and the range from day to night varies about 10 degrees F to 30 degrees F. The mean temperature at four different stations is shown by the following data, gathered by the Medical Department United States Army, while American troops were in Siberia:

The rainfall in Siberia is not great and the snowfall is comparatively slight. While the snowfall in the mountains around Lake Baikal is very heavy, east and west of these mountains the fall is so slight that wheeled vehicles are used all winter. There was very little snow in Vladivostok and we had no trouble in operating our motor vehicles. The evil effects of the low temperature are much less than might be expected because of the absence of wind, and the principal danger from the cold comes from not realizing how cold it is, and failing to wear fur protectors for the nose, ears, and hands. Personally, I saw this happen only once during my two winters in Vladivostok. I was walking with an officer of my staff, and I noticed the tip of his nose was turning white but we got some snow and rubbed his nose with it until the circulation was re-stored and then finished our walk of four miles. In these cold days the sun is so bright and the air so still and exhilarating that one seldom feels fatigued.

The winter begins the latter part of October, and is freezing all waters by the end of November. September and October are delightful months although there is more wind in the fall and spring than during the winter months. The harbour freezes early in December and breaks up early in April. By the use of ice-breakers, ships are able to enter the harbour of Vladivostok during the entire winter, even when the ice in the bay is about thirty inches thick.

In March, 1920, one of our Transports, returning to Manila from Vladivostok, was caught in an ice-flow just out of the harbour and was helpless. They wire-lensed the situation, tugs were sent to the rescue and they soon broke an opening so the Transport could get out. No damage was done and the boat proceeded on to Manila.

From the stand point of an American, the sanitary conditions were deplorable. This is probably not too strong a characterization of sanitary conditions even in former times, but it was now complicated by the breaking up of families, due to the World War and the Civil War, and resulting in a great percentage of the people trying to reach relatives or friends. This latter movement, resulting in all railroad yards being crowded with trains filled with human beings crowding into stations and any other heated place, made the sanitary situation look almost hopeless. The Chief Surgeon in describing conditions said:

" A general descriion of the sanitary situation in Siberia is most readily conceived by the perfectly truthful remark that practically none exists."

A few of the buildings in Vladivostok have driven wells a few hundred feet deep and have their own water supply, and this was the case in the building we obtained for American Headquarters. Practically all towns in Siberia, including Vladivostok, depend almost exclusively upon surface wells for their water supply, and this situation is not helped any by the water being de-livered in cans carried by filthy Chinese coolies.

The Chief Surgeon reported the prevalent diseases as being, "plague, typhus, relapsing fever, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, and malignant sore throat."

The social conditions in Vladivostok were almost unbelievable, and a common expression was that Harbin used to be the worst city in the world but that Vladivostok was running it a close second.

Many of the young men brought into service by the draft had never been away from home, and suffered very much from nostalgia.

The women of the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. rendered magnificent service.in helping with the entertainment of, not only American soldiers and sailors, but soldiers belonging to the Czecho-Slovak forces. Orders were issued soon after my arrival forbidding the use of intoxicating liquor, requiring all soldiers to have a pass if out at night, and requiring all officers to have permission of their Commanding Officer if they were to be out after midnight. This caused much criticism as being an unnecessary restriction upon the freedom of action of Americans, but I had received disturbing reports which convinced me it was a wise move.

When typhus fever became quite prevalent, and no one could tell whether it was safe to ride in a public car or not, we reserved cars and made up our own train. This train consisted of sleeping car, dining car, and a hospital car. The train was thoroughly cleaned and kept in charge of a United States representative at all times. Members of the Command were ordered not to travel on any other train except in case of emergency, and this train was kept moving from station to station practically all the time. When any of the Command moved as individuals they had a place to sleep and to eat and boiled water to drink. The hospital car was made from a second class passenger coach, permitting a twelve bed ward to be installed, using the standee bunks as used on Transports. The Medical Officers considered this type of bed more satisfactory than the regular berths installed in cars with compartments. In view of the unsanitary conditions in Vladivostok, I could not understand how we could escape some epidemic but we did. The medical care of the Command was very important, and the results were most gratifying, showing that the Medical Officers and the nurses were very faithful in the performance of their duties.

The question of obtaining a suitable building for a hospital in Vladivostok was a difficult one, but we finally found a group of buildings, about eight miles from American Headquarters, that proved to be satisfactory. This group would house all the necessary personnel except the female nurses. A large detached brick building, about half a mile from the other buildings, was obtained; this would accommodate the nurses and they seemed perfectly willing to live there, and after being installed in this building appeared to be fairly comfortable. The War Department cabled me that a hundred female nurses were in San Francisco, and would leave for Vladivostok on the next army Transport. I did not want these nurses because of the conditions relative to accommodations, and the absence of any recreation for them, so I cabled asking that they send but twenty-five, which was approved, and the twenty-five came. They proved to be a great help, and I was very glad to have them as they were very self-reliant, and gave me no trouble by requests for better conditions, which I would have been glad to have given them, if I could.

Siberian Adventure