

New additions to mss. as of Dec. 1, 1981

① orig p. 172 = new ¶ after "Plebeian...nil!"
(with 2 new fns # 3 + 4)

② orig p. 188 = new ¶ before final ¶ That page
(with new fn # 20)

③ orig p. 231 = long insert (4-5 new ¶s) with
3 new fns, # 24, 25, 26
plus rewrite of end ¶ That page, with
*fn to join same page re Scheerle

④ orig p. 305
new p. 273 Top = A VIEW ¹⁹⁵⁰⁵

~~orig p. 306~~
new p. 274 begins final pages

ALSO orig p. 135 has Q from Melville
to begin Ch. VII

Q at beginning of Chapter VII

copy 135

100

122

In
Q
The

"Quite an original" : ... for original characters in fiction, a grateful reader will, on meeting with one, keep the anniversary of that day.... Their rarity may still the more appear from this, that, while characters, merely singular, imply but singular ~~ideas~~ so to speak, original ones, truly so, imply original instincts. In short, a due conception of what is to be held for this sort of personage in fiction would make him almost as much of a prodigy there, as in real history is a law-giver, a revolutionising philosopher, or the founder of a new religion....

The original character is like a revolving Drummond light, raying away from itself all round it -- everything is lit by it, everything starts up to it.... there follows upon the adequate conception of such a character, an effect, in its way, akin to that which in Genesis attends upon the beginning of things.

Herman Melville, The Confidence Man

135 : ,

14985

Insert for p. 172 after "Plekhanov ... nil!"

The emphasis that Lenin put on "dialectic proper, as a philosophic science" separated him from all other post-Mark Marxists, not only up to the Russian Revolution but also after the conquest of power. When he wrote to the editors of the projected new journal, Under the Banner of Marxism, asking them to consider themselves the "Materialist Friends of the Hegelian Dialectic," he stressed that they should let Hegel speak for himself, quoting his writings extensively. What was most manifest of what he had gained from the 1914-15 Hegel studies was that the Hegelian dialectic needs to be studied "in and for itself." He articulated this most daringly in the 1915 essay, "On Dialectics";

"...clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge. (3) (3)

What stands out in his Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic is the length of time he spent in the Doctrine of Notion, especially as its last chapter reached the turning point of absolute negativity in the Absolute Method. Again, he stopped to quote Hegel:

"In the absolute method the Notion preserves itself in its otherness, and the universal in its particularisation, in the Judgement and in reality...." Then Lenin concluded: This extract is not at all bad as a kind of summing up of dialectics." (4) (4)

The reason Hegelian dialectics was so alive to Lenin was not due entirely to the profundity of his study. Rather, it was the objective world situation -- the capitalist crisis that brought about the simultaneity of World War I and the collapse of esta-
blished Marxism -- which led the revolutionary materialist, Lenin, to single out the Absolute Method of the ^{philosopher,} idealist, Hegel. With absolute negativity, Lenin worked out a political transformation into opposites: "Turn the imperialist war into civil war."

(3) Lenin, Collected Works, 38:363

(4) Lenin, Collected Works, 38:231

Insert for p. 188, before final paragraph

One of the very few post-Marx Marxists who had early grasped the fact that Marx had recreated the Hegelian dialectic even before he openly broke with bourgeois society was Mikhail Lifshitz. In The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx I, ¹⁰ he traces Hegelian inheritance this/from Marx's 1841 doctoral thesis on Epicurus to Capital, concluding that Marx's "reflections upon ancient world show the historical analogies permeating the works of 1841-2 remained with the mature Marx ... he never renounced this inheritance." (p. 89) Because he refused to separate out a "theory of aesthetics" from the totality of Marx's philosophy of history, holding tight to its integrality in Marx's world view, Lifshitz introduces Marx's dominant concept of "Revolution in Permanenz" (p. 42) into his analysis of Marx's 1841-2 doctoral dissertation and early articles on freedom of the press.

for p. 188 -- ftn to insert

19. The relevance of this book for today is two-fold. First and foremost, of course, is the Hegelian dialectic that Marx developed throughout his life. Second, is the contrast between Lifshitz and Lukacs; in their relationship to Stalin. This book was written in 1933 when Stalin had total ~~XXXXXXXX~~ power; but there is not a single reference to Stalin, as "philosopher" or otherwise. On the other hand, Lukacu' The Young Hegel (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1976) was published after Stalin's death; and yet it manifests so great a kowtowing to Stalin that Lukacs links Stalin and Lenin as "philosophers of the age of imperialism," thereby creating total confusion not just on the relationship of Lenin to Stalin, but on the historic break of Leninism with his own philosophic past in his Philosophic Notebooks.

14989

Above all, the fetishism of commodities, the dialectic of thing-ifying (dinlich) the living Subject, the laborer, transforming him into but an appendage of a machine, so revolted Marx that once again, in Volume II, ^{Marx} he declared his indebtedness to the Hegelian dialectic. In a footnote (which Engels had left out, in his reorganization of the manuscripts for Volume II) Marx wrote:

In a review of the first volume of Capital, Mr. Duhring notes that, in my zealous devotion to the schema of Hegelian logic, I even discovered the Hegelian forms of the syllogism in the process of circulation. My relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel, and the presumptuous chattering of the epizones who think they have buried this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me. Nevertheless, I have taken the liberty of adopting towards my master a critical attitude, disencumbering his dialectic of its mysticism and thus putting it through a profound change, etc. 24

(24)

We must not forget that Marx wrote this after Volume I had already been published. Contrast this to the empty methodology of Roman Rosdolsky who concluded, after his forced identification of the Grundrisse and Capital, that one "no longer has to bite into the sour apple and 'thoroughly study the whole of Hegel's Logic' in order to understand Marx's Capital -- one can arrive at the same end, directly, by studying the Rough Draft." 25

(25)

* It is fantastic how the latest editions of his letters have tried to "clean up" Marx's expression, "Scheiss", as if it meant ~~SMIXXXX~~ "business". ~~IXMXXMX~~ I prefer the Dona Torr translation.

INSERT
(correct)

Naturally, ~~Marx's~~ Marx's reference to Hegel as "master" ^{was not} meant in any schoolboy sense. Even when the young Marx had considered himself a Left Hegelian ^{and} belonged to the Doctors' Club of the Young Hegelians, he was neither imitative nor arbitrary in his attitude to Hegel. Rather, as we saw ^{at} the time he ^{was working} worked on his doctoral thesis, he was approaching the threshold of ~~his~~ ^{own} new continent of thought and revolution ^{by elaborating} while ^{the} seeing revolution ^{as essence} lodged in the Hegelian dialectic. This is why the mature Marx kept repeating that Hegel's dialectic was the source "of all dialectic." ^{it} Instead of using the dialectic as ~~if it were~~ a tool to be "applied", Marx recreated it on the objective-subjective ^{of historical developments that} basis ~~as it~~ emerged out of the production relations of labor and capital, with labor as the "grave-digger". Clearly, the unifying whole of Marx's world view was the new Subject -- the proletariat. ^{Marx's} The idea of ^{was} History ^{that of the} not only ~~as~~ past but as that which live working men and women achieve in transforming reality. here and now ~~transforming~~ ^{transforming} themselves ^{as well,} ~~in~~ ^{through} the process of revolution into new, all-rounded individuals of a classless society. ~~He would not let~~ ^{the} Duhrings ~~treat~~ Hegel as a "dead dog"; he wanted ^{to combat} ~~to combat~~ them ^{with} ~~with~~ the fact that the long, arduous, 2,500-year trek of human development that Hegel had dialectically traced was, indeed, the basis of the new developments ^{for} their day.

26

The question of fetishism reappears in volume 3, after Marx has analyzed the concrete that concerns capitalist -- profit, rent, interest and prices. In ^{his} A letter to Engels ^{of} 30 April 1868, Marx dismisses all these phenomena in ~~the~~ volume 3: "... we have, in conclusion, the class struggle, into which the movement of the whole Scheisse is resolved." [✓] The necessity for this is further stressed as Marx returns once more to describe just how, under capitalism, human relations are reified, turned into things:

26 See "The Philosophy of Mind: A Movement from Practice?" in Philosophy and Evolution, pp. 33-46, for an analysis of what our age could see at the point where Marx's "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" ended with a sentence from the Philosophy of Mind (para 382): "The Absolute is Mind -- This is the supreme definition of the Absolute."

News
p 275
off
048 305

(orig p 305
p 274 begins A 1980's View)

As against the first discovery of Marx's 1844 Humanist Essays by Ryazanov in the 1820s, their rediscovery in our age had ramifications undreamed of by any of the post-Marx Marxist. This ~~is~~ was so because the rediscovery followed the 1950s movement from practice that was itself a form of theory and that challenged the movement from theory for a totally new relationship of practice to theory. Once the slogan "Bread and Freedom" issued from that first revolt from under totalitarian state-capitalist tyranny calling itself Communist -- in East Germany on 17 June 1953 -- what Marx had called "vulgar communism" ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ could no longer be considered merely rhetorical, from which his "new Humanism" distinguished itself only theoretically. The revolts that erupted in East Europe in the 1950s/and that continue to this day/left not an iota of doubt that, in fact and in theory, the masses were rebelling against existing Communism, seeing it as the imperialist state-capitalist tyranny that it is. The rebellious men and women thereby made it clear that Marx's designation of his philosophy as "a new ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Humanism" either meant classless, totally new human relations in life and in philosophy, or it meant nothing.

The decisive determinant in Marx's thought was "revolution in permanence." Our age saw this concept in a totally new way when the 1949 Chinese Revolution led to the republication of the Grundrisse which included both the phenomenal section on "Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations" and a new world concept of the "Asiatic mode of production." Above all, Marx's 1857-58 work was permeated through and through with his new Humanism now spelled out as "the absolute movement of becoming."

As against the debates around the "Asiatic mode of production" that followed the defeated 1925-27 Chinese Revolution and were heated in by the factional debates between Trotsky and Stalin, the debates in the 1950s and 1960s rested on the new ground developed by Marx in the Grundrisse. At the same time, the successful 1949 Chinese national revolution and the Afro-Asian, Middle East and Latin American revolutions ⁽²⁶⁾ which ~~signified~~ ^{in Wretched of the Earth} the rise of a new Third World, disclosed a totally new dimension in philosophy. Frantz Fanon articulated it the most profoundly when he said that the "natives' challenge to the colonial world" was not "a treatise on the universal but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute." Nor did the international dimension escape him: "This new humanity," he wrote, "cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others National consciousness, which is not nationalism, is the only thing that will give us an international dimension."

The fact that a new light could be cast on today's colonial revolutions by a work Marx wrote ~~100~~ one hundred years ago, -- that this was the mature Marx who could be seen adhering

aggressively to Hegelian dialectical language -- made it impossible for post-Marx Marxists and non-Marxists alike to dismiss Marx's rootedness in the Hegelian dialectic as a mere matter of style. What confronted ^{both} revolutionaries and serious scholars ~~XXXX~~ was the need to re-examine Hegel "in and for himself." This became obvious in 1970 when a multitude of conferences on the ~~XXXX~~ one hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth and the ~~XX~~ two hundredth of Hegel's kept criss-crossing. Since then there has been so great a flood of Hegel studies, new critical editions and translations of Hegel's works, and Hegel conferences that the 1970 ~~Hegelianism~~ was clearly but the start of a whole decade of such studies. *

In the early 1970s ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~, still other manuscripts that had never before seen the light of day -- ~~Marx's~~ Marx's Ethnological Notebooks ~~XXXXXX~~ ~~XXXX~~ -- were transcribed. The fact that, by then, Women's Liberation had developed from an Idea whose time has come to a Movement ~~XX~~ helped us ^{XXXX} other forces of revolution as Reason. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ What was new in these last writings from Marx's pen is that, on the one hand, Marx was returning to his first discovery of a new continent of thought when he singled out the Man/Woman relationship as the most revealing of all relationships; and and, on the other hand, he was developing so new a concept of "revolution in permanence" that, in 1882, he was projecting something as startling as the possibility of revolution coming in backward lands ahead of the advanced countries.

Without such a vision of new revolutions, a new individual, a new universal, a new society, new human relations, we would be forced to tailend one or another form of reforms just when the age of nuclear Titans -- the United States and Russia -- threaten the very survival of civilization as we have known it. The myriad crises in our age have shown, over and over again, from Russia to China, from Cuba to Iran, from Africa to Pol Pot's Cambodia, that without a philosophy of revolution ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ activism spends itself in mere anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism, without ever revealing what it is for. We have been made to see anew that, just as the movement from practice disclosed a break in the Absolute Idea that required both a new relationship of practice to theory, and a new unity of practice and theory, so that new unity is but a beginning: Absolute Idea as New Beginning. Clearly, along with the actual struggles for the self-determination of nations, we need what Hegel called "self-determination in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak."

It isn't ^{because} ~~XXXX~~ we are ^{and} "smarter" that we can see so much more than other post-Marx Marxists. Rather, it is because of the maturity of our age. It is true that other post-Marx Marxists have rested on a truncated Marxism; it is equally true that no other generation could have seen the problematic of our age, much less solve our problems. Only live human beings can recreate the revolutionary dialectic forever anew.

End with original final # of p. 306.

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26. This is not the place to develop the Latin American revolutions, elsewhere. I have written on them, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ See my essay, "The Unfinished Latin American Revolutions," included in the bilingual pamphlet Latin America's Revolutions, in Reality, in Thought, which ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ includes also "The Peasant Dimension in Latin America: Its Test of the Relation of Theory to Organization," by Mike Plug; "Latin America: Revolution and Theory," by Eugene Walker; and "El Salvador in Revolution," by Francisco.