

FROM HEGEL TO NIETSCHE, the revolution in 19th c. thought  
 by Karl Löwith  
 (Translated from Ger. by David E. Green, Holt, Rinehart & Winston,  
 NY, 1964; 1st ed. in Zurich 1941; foreword by author signed Sendai, Japan,  
 Spring 1939)

THIS IS ABSOLUTELY THE MOST BEAUTIFUL AND PROFOUND WORK ON HEGEL AND  
 MARK DESPITE HIS ANTI-MARKISM & IN A GREAT SENSE ALSO ANTI OR AT LEAST  
 NON-HEGELIANISM AND TOTALLY PRO-CHRISTIANITY. Such profound understanding  
 of "enemies" is certainly not true of a single person writing nowadays.

Foreword, "In contrast to academic petrification of Hegel's system by  
 scholars of Hegel...  
 vi"...even if only to be able to transcend an age as an age, a point of view is  
 necessary which will transcend the bare events of the age...  
 The process of shift of meaning is never concluded, because, in his, it  
 is never determined at the beginning what will result at the end. The  
 purpose of these studies is solely to point out the decisive turning point bet.  
 Hegel's consummation & Nietzsche's new beginning, in order, with the light of the  
 present, to illumine the epoch-making significance of an episode which has  
 fallen into oblivion."

PART ONE  
 I The Eschatological Meaning of Hegel's Consummation of the  
 His. of the World & the Spirit

p.31: "For Hegel, the his. of phil. is not a process parallel to or outside of the  
 world, but the heart of world his., that dominates both equally is the  
 Absolute in the form of 'world spirit', the essence of which is movement, & hence  
 his. & historicopolitical discussions

unconditioned power of his. is presented as 'time which conquers all.' & 'primal  
 destiny. Here we read for the first time of the 'world spirit' which has knowledge  
 of itself in every form, either crude or highly developed, but in any case,  
 follows phenomenology, as the his. of the unfolding of the spirit of the cultural  
 stages of knowledge, here the systematic stages of thought & his. relationships are  
 even more inseparable, since they have no empirically determined relationship,  
 but rather interpenetrate."

p.32: "On the principle of freedom of the spirit Hegel also constructs  
 the his. of the world with a view toward a fulfilled end."

p.35: "But because Hegel displaces the Christian expectation of the end of  
 the world of time into the course of the world process & the absoluteness of  
 faith into the rational realm of his., it is only logical for him to understand  
 the last great event in the his. of the world & the spirit as the consummation  
 of the beginning."

Q Hegel, Briefe, I, 194 (p.403, ftn38) "when the realm of ideas has been revolutionized,  
 reality can no longer resist."

Q Heine: "The heads which phil. has used for reflection can be  
 cut off later by the rev. for whatever purposes it likes. But  
 phil. would never have been able to use the heads cut off by the  
 rev. if the latter had preceded it."

Handwritten notes on the left margin:  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"

Handwritten notes on the right margin:  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"  
 "Hegel's system is a system of spirit"

Handwritten notes on the left margin:  
 "World spirit is an absolute"  
 "World spirit is an absolute"  
 "World spirit is an absolute"

Handwritten notes in a box at the bottom:  
 "The heads which phil. has used for reflection can be cut off later by the rev. for whatever purposes it likes. But phil. would never have been able to use the heads cut off by the rev. if the latter had preceded it."

With a sum  
Re-  
Review

after  
conclusion  
great need  
bridge

II. Old Hegelians, Young Hegelians, Neo-Hegelians  
Lb with calls attention to Mr's view of div. of world of theory & practice into 2  
c.K. Marx (1818-1883) mutually exclusive totalities

p. 92: "Of all the leftwing Hegelians, he was not only  
the most radical, but also the only one who was  
a match for Hegel in conceptual acuity & also  
in erudition. How well schooled he is in Hegel  
is shown less by his early writings referring directly to Hegel, which were  
influenced by Feuerbach, than by Das Kapital. The analyses presented in this  
wk., altho far removed from Hegel in content, are unthinkable without the incor-  
poration of Hegel's manner of reducing a phenomenon to a notion."

Mr's  
p. 92: "His 1st & also last criticism of Hegel begins with an antithesis to  
Hegel's consummation. The ques. which moves Mr in his dissertation concerns  
the possibility of a new beginning after that conclusion."  
Here Lb with quotes from Marx's doctoral dissertation: "Greek phil. seems  
to encounter what a good tragedy should not encounter: a feeble ending.  
With Aristotle, the Macedonian Alexander of Greek phil., the obj. his  
of phil. in Greece comes to a halt. Epicureans, Stoics, skeptics, all seem an  
inappropriate postscript, completely out of proportion to their mighty premises."  
1/17/13 (then, after showing that "decomposition products" of Gk phil. became

p. 93  
archetypes of Roman spirit, Mr continues: "Furthermore, is it not  
a remarkable phenomenon that new systems appear after the Platonic  
& Aristotelian philosophers who made phil. all-inclusive, systems  
which do not depend upon these previous ample intellectual forms,  
but rather, reaching further back, turn to the simplest schools:  
in physics, to the natural philosophers; in ethics, to the Socratic school?"

(Then, after the parallel to Hegel & what can come after his  
all-incl. system? Obviously, only after a radical disengagement  
of Hegel's phil. through a "suspension" of it which will also  
"realize" it. Lb with summarizes Mr, thusly: "PHIL. IS ALWAYS  
SUCH A 'NODAL POINT' where its abstract principle has become totally concrete, as  
in the case of Aristotle & Hegel. Then the possibility of cont'd. dev. in a  
straight line is interrupted; a full circle has been described. 2 totalities now  
stand confronting each others: an all-incl. phil. & opposite it, the actual world of  
complete non-phil. For H's reconciliation with reality was not within reality,  
but only with it, in the element of comprehension. Now phil. must "turn outward"  
& engage the world." (p. 95) For Hegel's principle is also Mr's principle: the unity  
of reason & reality, & reality itself as a union of  
essence & existence. Therefore, Mr is forced to attack  
in 2 directions: against the real world & against existing phil.  
This is so because he seeks to unite both in an all-incl. totality of theory &  
practice." Q Mr: "Here we can see the curriculum vitae of a phil. narrowed down  
to its subpoint, just as the death of a hero can be  
made to tell the story of his life."

As a  
rough  
sketch  
he has  
made  
a  
rough  
sketch  
of  
the  
totality  
of  
phil.  
in  
Greece  
comes  
to  
a  
halt.  
Epicureans,  
Stoics,  
skeptics,  
all  
seem  
an  
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premises.  
Then,  
after  
showing  
that  
"decomposition  
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of  
Gk  
phil.  
became  
archetypes  
of  
Roman  
spirit,  
Mr  
continues:  
"Furthermore,  
is  
it  
not  
a  
remarkable  
phenomenon  
that  
new  
systems  
appear  
after  
the  
Platonic  
&  
Aristotelian  
philosophers  
who  
made  
phil.  
all-inclusive,  
systems  
which  
do  
not  
depend  
upon  
these  
previous  
ample  
intellectual  
forms,  
but  
rather,  
reaching  
further  
back,  
turn  
to  
the  
simplest  
schools:  
in  
physics,  
to  
the  
natural  
philosophers;  
in  
ethics,  
to  
the  
Socratic  
school?"  
(Then,  
after  
the  
parallel  
to  
Hegel  
&  
what  
can  
come  
after  
his  
all-incl.  
system?  
Obviously,  
only  
after  
a  
radical  
disengagement  
of  
Hegel's  
phil.  
through  
a  
"suspension"  
of  
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which  
will  
also  
"realize"  
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Lb  
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Mr,  
thusly:  
"PHIL.  
IS  
ALWAYS  
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A  
'NODAL  
POINT'  
where  
its  
abstract  
principle  
has  
become  
totally  
concrete,  
as  
in  
the  
case  
of  
Aristotle  
&  
Hegel.  
Then  
the  
possibility  
of  
cont'd.  
dev. in  
a  
straight  
line  
is  
interrupted;  
a  
full  
circle  
has  
been  
described.  
2  
totalities  
now  
stand  
confronting  
each  
others:  
an  
all-incl.  
phil. &  
opposite  
it,  
the  
actual  
world  
of  
complete  
non-phil.  
For  
H's  
reconciliation  
with  
reality  
was  
not  
within  
reality,  
but  
only  
with  
it,  
in  
the  
element  
of  
comprehension.  
Now  
phil. must  
"turn  
outward"  
&  
engage  
the  
world."  
(p. 95)  
For  
Hegel's  
principle  
is  
also  
Mr's  
principle:  
the  
unity  
of  
reason  
&  
reality,  
&  
reality  
itself  
as  
a  
union  
of  
essence  
&  
existence.  
Therefore,  
Mr  
is  
forced  
to  
attack  
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directions:  
against  
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real  
world  
&  
against  
existing  
phil.  
This  
is  
so  
because  
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seeks  
to  
unite  
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all-incl.  
totality  
of  
theory  
&  
practice."  
Q  
Mr:  
"Here  
we  
can  
see  
the  
curriculum  
vitae  
of  
a  
phil.  
narrowed  
down  
to  
its  
subpoint,  
just  
as  
the  
death  
of  
a  
hero  
can  
be  
made  
to  
tell  
the  
story  
of  
his  
life."

From p. 3 to p. 3 (Stn/p. 186 re Kierkegaard; his uniqueness of this movement cannot be pinned down by such vague terms as "irrationalism" (not a mere byproduct of his pol.-eco. analyses; they are p. 98 re Mr's his. studies: "they are an essential component of his basic conception of the entire human world as being historical...")

p. 99: "With regard to the rel. of phil. to reality, Marx took up a 2-fold position: he opposed the practical demand of a simple negation of phil.... The one side believes that Ger. phil. does not belong to reality & would like to abrogate phil. without realizing it. True criticism must do both. It is a critical analysis of the modern stage at the same time a dissolution of prev. pol. consciousness; the final, most universal expression of which is H's phil. of right.... (p. 100) This dial. unity in Mr's evaluation of Ger. phil. & reality differentiates him from both Old & Young Hegelianism, which still lacked the practical or material viewpoint necessary for the comprehension of the real his. of the world."

Q Mr's Ger. Ideology (section on Feuerbach re Young Hegelians): "Their polemic against Hegel & against each other is limited to the fact that each takes a page of the Hegelian system & turns it against the whole (as well as) against the pages taken out by the others."

Lowith also recognizes effect of Marx's discovery on his opponents as well as followers: "In opposition to this entire Ger. ideology, Mr developed his materialist view of his, which has since determined the thought of (non-Marxist) anti-Marxists more than they themselves realize" Q Mr against "abstract empiricists" & their "lifeless facts." "Marx declares this conditionality of all his existence alone to be unconditional. Hegel's metaphysics of the his. of the spirit is developed THEREBY TO THE MOST EXTREME POSITION POSSIBLE, MADE TEMPORAL & PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF HIS." p. 115 "The term 'existence' is a scholastic conceit... I am glad to get rid of it after everything I find shared in this deathly but not yet dead world."

(NB NB NB Lowith is also excellent on Kierkegaard p. 110ff. "If Kierkegaard is not taken as a mere 'exception' but as an outstanding phenomenon WITHIN the his. movement of his age, it becomes clear that his 'INDIVIDUALITY' WAS NOT AT ALL INDIVIDUAL, but a widespread reaction to the contemporary condition of the world.")

See part on Schelling on p. 115 & listeners to his (1841) Berlin lecture incl. Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Engels & Brecht & on p. 118: "In Schelling, the problem of being in the anti-Hegelian movement arrived at the point where Heidegger once more took it up. For who could deny that the 'facticity' of Dasein which lies in the brute fact of Dasein, that Geworfenheit & Entwurf correspond to "immediate existence" & "breaking away" from this necessary accident?

p. 204 p. 414: "Only 1 (inadequate) attempt has been made to work out the his. connection bet. Heidegger's phil. position & that of both Kierkegaard & Mr: the essays of M. Beck & H. Marcuse in the special issue devoted to Heidegger's Sein und Zeit of Philosophische Hefte No. 1 (Berlin, 1928) Feb 1928"

Re "exhaustion" of Hegelian phil. & return to Kant, p. 120: "Seen in the context of the real total course of the century, however, this apparently so unmotivated return to Kant can be explained: THE BOURGEOIS INTELLIGENTSIA HAD CEASED IN PRACTICE TO BE AN HISTORICALLY ORIENTED CLASS, thereby losing the initiative & impact of their thought."

Refurbishing of Hegelian Phil. by the Neg-Hegelians, B. Croce's distinction bet. "dead" (re not only phil. of nature & religion but logic) & living (obj. spirit) to the extent that its abs. systematic claim can be reduced to an his. claim: p. 120

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Part Two Studies in the His. of the Bourgeois-Christian World

I. The Problem of Bourgeois Society

II. The Problem of Work

p.274 Lowith says that the 1844 MSS of Ger. Ideology is the most significant event in the his. of post-Hegelian phil.

Lowith's (or his translator's) translation of Mx is worth noting: (ftn. (re French ch.) "1. The object as such presents itself to the consciousness as vanishing."

2. The alienation of self-consciousness produces reification.
3. This alienation has a positive meaning as well as negative.
4. It has this aspect of the obj., of its self-removal; has the positive meaning, or comes to know the worthlessness of the same, through its alienation of itself as an obj. or as the object for the sake of the inseparable unity of prosely.
5. It has this meaning not only for us in itself but for its own self.

6. This also implies the converse aspect; it likewise abolishes & retracts this alienation & objectification, thus keeping its otherness as such."

And in the text itself Lowith summarizes Marx's position, thus (p.279): Hegel's self-consciousness flatters itself with the illusion that its active knowledge in its otherness has reconstituted the self, because it knows nothing of any real externality; it knows only a recoverable alienation of itself. But the fact that self-consciousness is at one with itself in its own otherness means that man possesses his true human nature in the existing order of law, politics & economics. The merely theoretical abolition of alienation in practice leaves the alienated world exactly as it is. Hegel's apparent criticism which formally denies the existing powers while actually assuming their content is a false positive; a phil. dissolution & restoration of empirical reality... What he describes is not a human process at all: it is divine process within man, & its actual subj. is A.I."

And Lowith even sees the true nature of materialism as Marx conceives it: "Materialism in this context does not refer to an 'eco. basis' but rather the physical, obj. existence of real men & things.... (But) Lowith insists that, when he turns to Marx's statement that the obj. conditions must 1st be abolished to achieve wholeness of man, this incidental modification which turns 'abolition' into destruction differentiates Marx methodologically from Hegel, & to this extent represents a basic divergence; for the rest, he takes over H's CATEGORIES & PRESENSES THEM IN MATERIAL FORM, EVEN IN CAPITAL." (Reference is to I,1,6. Also ftn. 62 on p. 436: CAP. III, 166, "This reduction of dial. negation to a one-sided concept of simple destruction is typical of the radicalism of all the leftwing Hegelians...." But the real question is Lowith is very profound also on sociology & even defends, in a way, Engels's claim to the prol. being heir to Ger. phil., saying "However repugnant this statement might appear to bourgeois phil., it was not without foundation. Ever since the turn of the c. it has been the basic weakness of bourgeois education that it has been the education of an educated class, bldg. a wall of separation against the wkg. class & losing the spiritual horizon for the universal problem of work." AND THE FTN. 73 (p. 436) is to Heidegger's concept of care, which, "in accordance with its theological origin in Augustine's cura, HAS NO CREATIVE OVERTONES."

III. The Problem of Education

Lowith's remark (p.289) that Hegel still considered humanistic education that which educated man for life in the polis reminds me of Marx's quotation from H. on education in a ftn. in CAP., where he says it is curious for a bourgeois to say that he says about educ. & everyman, but hurrah, etc. He calls von Humboldt's "humanism" "aristocratic educ. individualism."

Lowth again p.92 How well schooled he (Hx) is in Hegel is shown less in his early writings referring directly to Hegel, which were influenced by Feuerbach than by CAP. The analyses presented in this work, with far removed from Hegel in content, are unthinkable without the ing. of Hegel's manner of reducing (TRANSFORMING) what the heck is the Ger. word, rd) a phenomenon into a notion." Commodity Notion

He determined actual course of his, by changes in material world but basically original dialogue with H remained after his transition to criticism of the ecc.... The ques, which moves Marx in his dissertation concerns the possibility of new beginnings AFTER the conclusion

p.93 For Hegel's principle is also Hx's principle: the unity of reason & reality reality itself as a union of essence & existence...

p.96 DIAL. OF THEORY & PRACTICE

Neither spiritualism nor mat. understand... activity which contributes most to the creation of the human world. With Marx the will to change the world does not mean direct action alone, but at the same time a criticism of previous interpretations of the world

TRANSFORMATION OF BEING & CONSCIOUSNESS

For ex., the pol. is to be transformed both as actual eco. system & as eco. theory, for the latter is the consciousness of the former

"Using Engels' procedure, popular Hxis has simplified the dial. rel. bet. theory & practice by freezing it upon the abstract mat. basis, but the rel. of which to the theoretical 'superstructure' can be inverted with equal ease, as H. Weber shows. If, ON THE CONTRARY, MARX'S ORIGINAL INSIGHT IS ADHERED TO THEN EVEN...."

TOGETHER WITH PHIL. ECO. CRITICISM STANDS IN THE SERVICE OF HIS

THIS IS THE STARTING POINT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF MARX'S PECULIARLY "MAT."... entire human world as being his referred at one time to "ABSTRACT EMPIRICISTS" to whom life is a collection of p.102 "lifeless facts"... Marx declares this conditionality of all his experience alone to be unconditional. Hegel's metaphysics of his, of the spirit is developed thereby to the most extreme position possible, MADE TEMPORAL & PLACED IN THE SERVICE OF HIS.

From this his point of view Hx sees all previous Hxis in the role of mere "prehis," leading up to a total transformation of the existing eco. situation, the way in which man produce their physical & intell. life. To this 'NODAL POINT' in the Hxis. of phil. there corresponds a POINT OF INTERSECTION in his. of the world bet. future & the past/

154 Commodity merchandise commodity use value exchange value  
P.155: A phenomenological analysis of this commodity problem is given in the 1st portion of CAP, in which Marx exhibits the commodity character of every (we) produce. IN COMMODITIES HE SEES REVEALED THE BASIC ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF OUR ENTIRE PHYSICAL WORLD, its COMMODITY FORM. IT CHARACTERIZE BOTH ALL

Thus CAP, also is more than merely a criticism of pol. eco.; it is also criticism of bourgeois society guided by cap. eco., the "ECO. CELL" of which is the commodity form assumed by all products of labor. (RD INCL. ITSELF)

"To discover the process which led to this perversion Marx undertook his analysis of the (obj. appearance) of the mod. social conditions of labor in the 'fetish nature' of commodities... FETISHISM INSEPARABLE FROM THE PROD. OF COMMODITIES. It is possible to alter price of commodities but not commodity form

Commodity Fetishism  
in L.H.C.

Hegel's metaphysics of the Spirit 14615  
is built solely to the most extreme position possible  
made temporal & placed in the service of the  
FUTURE

Hegel's metaphysics of the Spirit  
is built solely to the most extreme position possible  
made temporal & placed in the service of the  
FUTURE  
Hegel's metaphysics of the Spirit  
is built solely to the most extreme position possible  
made temporal & placed in the service of the  
FUTURE

P.92. Mr's 1st and last criticism of Hegel begins with an ANTITHESIS  
to Hegel's consummation. The ques. which moves Mr in his dissertation  
concerns HOW beginning AFTER the conclusion.

2 totalities now stand confronting each other: an all-incl.phil.&  
opposed to it, the ACTUAL WORLD of  
complete non-phil.....  
THIS 2-EDGED BEHAVIOR IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIV. OF THE ENTIRE  
WORLD OF THEORY & PRACTICE INTO 2 mutually exclusive totalities....  
immanent material

P.95: "H's system is seen as a single abstract totality, having as its OTHER side  
a TOTAL IRRATIONALITY....Therefore the  
new way of philosophizing is aware of itself only in contrast to the  
complete system; it does not yet understand that

Hegelian phil. is the most appropriate realization of the latter. For H's  
principle is also Mr's principle: the unity of reason & reality & reality  
itself as a union of essence & existence....attacks in 2 directions..because  
he seeks to unite BOTH IN AN ALL-INCL. TOTALITY OF THEORY & PRACTICE.....  
ITS OWN DISSOLUTION of

On the other hand, one can argue backward from the nature of the 'REV.' to  
the HEG. character of Hegelian phil. & Mr: "Here we see the curriculum vitae  
of a phil. narrowed down to its subj. point, just as the death of a hero  
can be said to tell the story of his life."

"Mr had such a radical understand-  
ing of the NEW SITUATION he could dev.from a critic of the H phil. of rt. to  
the author of CAP."

P.96: "BECAUSE H's phil. does not incl. the world of theory  
and of practice, essence and existence,  
it must necessarily compare itself with what exists & accommodate itself. The  
entire concrete content of what is to be comprehended is always PREdetermined  
for it by what—in the sense of that which exist—'is'."

"THE DIAL. OF THEORY &  
PRACTICE forms the basis not only Mr's criticism of the idealistic phil. of  
the spirit BUT ALSO of his criticism of FEUERBACH'S MAT. PHIL....  
neither spiritualism  
nor mat. understand. REV. critical activity, which contributes  
most to the creation of the human world....With Mr, the will to change the  
world does NOT mean direct action-ALONE, but AT THE SAME & CRITICISM OF PREVIOUS  
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WORLD, A TRANSFORMATION of being AND consciousness; for ex.,  
pol.ecc.' is to be transformed both as actual eco.system & as eco.theory, for  
the latter is consciousness of the former."

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P.97: "If, on the contrary, (rd.contrary to Hegel's freezing rel.of theory to  
practice on abstract material basis)  
Mr's original insight is adhered to, then (even H's 'theory' can be seen as  
PRACTICAL. For the deeper reason why Hegel's system allows the content  
of his comprehension to be advanced WITHOUT SEEKING TO ALTER IT thru 'criticism'  
lies NOT ONLY in what it 'interprets' but in what it strives for as practical  
goal. Hegel's comprehension sought to make its peace with reality." PROMETHEAN

Hegel  
peace  
with  
reality

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NB While in Ger. H underwent eclipse "in Russia the Hegelianism of the 40s in the form of Biblical Marxism, Leninism, underwent a continuous dev. down to the present. Made his (p.135)

Phil in service of his age

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MK I, I, p. 668: "it is therefore the duty of his, the beyond of truth having vanished, to est. the truth of this world. Philosophy is in the service of his. Its primary duty, once the sacred image of human self-estrangement has been unmasked, is to unmask self-estrangement in all its unholy forms..." Together with phil. etc. criticism stands in the service of his. THIS IS THE STARTING POINT FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF HEGEL'S PECULIARLY "HIS." MAT. His historical studies... are not a by-product of his pol. eco. analyses; they are an essential component of his basic conception of the ENTIRE HUMAN WORLD AS BEING HIS."

Phil + Real

p.99: With regard to the rel. of phil. to reality, H took up a bold position; he opposed the practical demand of a simple negation of phil., & also the merely theoretical criticism of the pol. party.. TRUE CRITICISM MUST DO BOTH..

p.102  
Q Hx on real his. -- I believe it is from Ger. Ideology.

Future Phil. world

\*\*\*\*\*  
p.128: "Hegel did not claim absolute validity for system; rather, as a result of his HIS. knowledge, he was more the master of systematic thought than anyone before or after him. In his unification of all previous his. the accent does NOT lie on the previous, accentuated by Kroner, as the no. ref. to the FUTURE were intended. RATHER, the accent is on the entire "future far row", that is "finally", the world spirit has come, and this entirety is deliberate GOAL..

Phil in service of his age  
is an anticipated future

p.129: He, more than anyone else, encounters the present in an his. context based on the recollected past. IT IS NOT ACCIDENT THAT HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS CARRIED THEIR PHIL. INTO AN ANTICIPATED FUTURE, only to view their own per. from that point of view as "his." in the opposite sense of the word.

While H brought into the PRESENT what had been & what come to be in the past, the criticism of the existing order by the Young Hegelians brought into the present, from the opposite direction, the task of the future.

like an ever living present

p.129: the absolute claim can be explained from the fact that

H lived IN the consciousness of having grasped the absolute (for the 1st time) as it SHOULD be grasped IF IT IS TO HAVE ANY INFLUENCE ON REALITY, namely, as "constantly relativizing itself." The absoluteness of his system would then consist in ABS. RELATIVISM, because Hegel, -- in contrast to Kant -- represents the ABSOLUTE AS AN EVER PRESENT SPIRIT, IMMANENT IN REALITY.

IMMEDIATELY

"In any case, a basic evaluation of H's meaning for the present has to proceed from the fact that he was the 1st to make phil. aware of itself as the thought of time; this thesis affect the ENTIRE REL. of phil. to his his. reality of our times. The JOINING of the temporal character of phil. to its substantial content guarantees the PERMANENT IMP. OF HEGEL. Every phil. is the self-consciousness of its age, BUT this does mean that it is a mere (p.130) mirror of its age, BUT RATHER THAT EVERY GENERATION MUST UNDERTAKE THE TASK OF PHIL. WITH NEW STRENGTH & IN ITS OWN WAY PRECISELY BECAUSE THERE IS NO philosophia perennis in any external sense of eternity....

NOT mere mirror

Thus phil. becomes an eternally LIVING ACTIVITY... by viewing the past as having an effect on FUTURE, phil. becomes the consciousness of the age, & CONTINUITY becomes the principle of the his. process....

Every task

p.133: For H the Fr. Rev. was the great event; but he intentionally overlooked the possibilities arising from it, even though in his own per. it was obvious that the AGE OF REVOLUTIONS WAS JUST BEGINNING.

Phil as living activity





man appears only in the form of spirit, it contains within it  
the element of alienation. (frequently prepared worked out in a manner  
which is transparent to the external standpoint, the unhappy consciousness, the honest  
consciousness, the struggle of noble and base consciousness, etc. these individual  
sections contain, though alienated form, the critical elements of  
SUCH AS RELIGION, THE STATE, BOURGEOIS LIFE, ETC. ENTIRE SPHERES

The greatness of H's phen. lies in the  
comprehension of man's self-generation as a process... Thus H views work as  
man's development in 'proseity'//////Aside of from this positivism of idealistic  
speculation, H achieved an abstract understanding of the essential action of man  
AS he generates himself in the world, within his speculative system, he made  
distinctions which reach the nub of the matter. He had an "estranged insight"  
into real de-personalization, estrangement & reappropriation of man BUT REAL REAPPROPRIATION  
CAN COME ONLY THROUGH THE 'DESTRUCTION' of the estranged condition of our obj. work.

(RD Then Lowith notes that the incidental modification  
which turns 'abolition' into destruction DIFFERENTIATES MARX methodologically from Hegel  
& to this extent represents a basic divergence" but I do not understand since both  
H & M use 'abolition, not 'destruction' but M of course means genuine abolition  
& not just in thought. But then, Lowith continues (for the rest, he takes over H's  
categories & preserves them in material form, even in DAS Kapital.

Communism is constructed according to  
the concept of Hegelian phi. It is intended as the realization of the dial.  
unity bet. ind. action & de-personalization which is the outcome of H's HIS OF PHIL...  
(refers here to CAP? I.6; labor process) It is the practical way in which man,  
living in society, keeps the entire obj. world in subjection, as self-generated & also  
remains himself in his OTHERNESS. a total return of man who has become a stranger  
to himself within the obj. world which he has generated... (p.281)

"True C-ism on the other hand as Marx the Hegelian  
conceives it is a reappropriation of human nature.... Within this context (cap.)  
it is a 'genuine resolution of the conflict (bet. existence & essence,....  
It is the riddle of his solved.'

1840's  
Not covered against Under...  
but...  
M. W. W.