

Dialectics  
 human  
 for its own sake  
 in itself  
 few values & direction

G. 12/4/49

There are three movements in the Realm of Essence:

1. The truth is concrete. Hegel insists on that from the very beginning, where he insists upon the reality of show. At each stage the truth will become more concrete, more inclusive of all phenomena and all possibility - through show, to existence, to appearance, to actuality.
2. The antagonism between the absolute and the appearance will become more explicit, more posited at each stage, and at the same time, the unity will become so necessary that at a certain stage, inner and outer can no longer be kept apart.
3. The self which moves and which does the transcending of the opposite moves from the abstract principle of so doing (Ground-Leibnitz) to an absolute substance which is "the absolute activity of form and the power of necessity." Or bearing in mind the development from Leibnitz to Hegel, we see the principle of self-determination move from the individual monad to society or the social individual. In this movement, we have the revolutions of the 17th-18th-19th and 20th century -- and hence the mediations which emerge from the self-developing subject at each stage, all the way up to Stalinism, at each stage becoming more antagonistic, more posited.

5/27/49

There is a sequence of dialectical development which appears in every revolutionary period. There is a conquest, a leap forward started first of all abstractly, but in opposition to a previous period. This, which is in advance, the subject, becomes rationalised turning into, on the one hand, idealism and, on the other, positivism, the essence of both being that man is over here, nature is over there, and the gap to be bridged somehow. This is always totalitarian. Finally, a new synthesis is established.

For example, the great leap forward in the 17th century was the development of individuality. But what the philosophers (Hobbes) did was to take the individuals in their finitude, not as developing, but as they were (war of one against all) and, therefore, had to set a government over them.

You have the sequence in every development of philosophy. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke. Man had to find himself in nature -- therefore, at the beginning, the principle of unity of knowledge and of being. Bacon's discovery is that man is active in his world (see Hegel on Reason's Certainty, ~~and~~ Reason's Truth to get this dialectic round the initial affirmation and revolutionary advance to its degeneration into positivism.) At the beginning, it is revolutionary. Then Hobbes rationalises it and the counter-revolutionary establishes himself on a new basis, the old basis having been licked.

Ultimately this self-activity of the individual has to be re-instated. Locke does this for bourgeois society. What Locke fails to see in flourishing England, however, is the contradictions and negativity in this movement. Leibnitz establishes the latter as principle and did it for the same reason that Kant did it for Rousseau, i.e. the backwardness of Germany. Leibnitz's monads have more self-movement than Locke's because they contain this negativity, difference in the unity and, therefore, necessity for transcendence of differences.

Could not  
 be an abstract  
 in terms of  
 time

Franz  
Kant  
Fichte  
Schelling

We have the same sequence in Kant who establishes the primacy of the human intellect as process of cognition. Fichte occupies himself with this process in the negativity, where a Kant had postulated the reconciliation (infinite progress). Schelling resolved the contradiction in the same way that Hobbes had by a totalitarian ruler. Hegel, then, reaffirms the principle of self-acting intellect, insisting upon the process of mediation and the ultimate unity as a premise. As he insists continually, he could do this as contrasted with Fichte because he did not begin with the isolated individual but with society and history.

In Greece, first of all the Milesians get away from pure sense-certainty. Then comes Parmenides, of whom the atomists are merely a variation in establishing this principle of being-for-itself in a rationalist form. The breaking away from this rationalism to occupy themselves with the development of individuality comes in the sequence from Socrates to Aristotle. Within this broad sequence, we see the same dialectic from Socrates to Plato to Aristotle.

Working with this principle of broad sequence, and then internal sequence, we can see the analytic judgment in the 17th century with Locke and the Encyclopedists doing for society what Locke did for the individual. Then the synthetic judgment with Kant, whose inevitable result is Schelling. Dialectic reason and the speculative judgment emerges with Hegel.

7/1/49

Hegel (1) deals with Notion as the beginning - after Absolute Substance; (2) with Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant at the beginning of the Doctrine of Notion; (3) insists that the dialectic in the Realm of Notion is the movement of Universal Particular and Individual.

Classical  
Autonomy

The polemic in the Realm of Notion is against degrading the Universal into a fixed particular, i.e. the universal must be positive as a particular, but if particular is posited as the universal, it becomes isolated and fixed. And also against destroying the individuality of the modes by getting into the absolute like a shot out of a pistol.

Hegel

Development is absolute mediation of U, P, I, i.e. self-determination when growing internationalization; destruction of state machine when bourgeois state has reached highest stage of organization; including development of commodity production in Program then state monopoly, capitalism reached

Handwritten notes and scribbles at the bottom of the page, including names like "Platon", "Kant", and "Hegel".

7/9/49

Freedom, subjectivity, notion -- these are the categories by which we will gain knowledge of the objectively real. These constitute the eve of transformation of objective idealism into materialism.

What has to be overcome is not the personality, not the transcendental unity of apperception, but the empirical taking the given concrete to be the real.


Objective idealism, on the other hand, the notion, free creative power, the personality, the apparently abstract -- all these lead to materialism.

*Surin* What Marx said of Feuerbach, as Hegel had previously said of Kant, ~~is that he applied it to his own past.~~ If, at the period of revolution, there is in your mind any residuo of an independent actuality confronting the subject, an independent substance with its own inner necessity; if you do not think "independent actuality as having all its substantiality in the passage" (Encyc. 419) then, in thought, you will do what Kant did -- "affirm as true what was pronounced to be figments of thought and declare to be superfluous . . . that which it recognized as truth" (IL p. 226); and in practice you will restrain the proletariat from smashing up the state machine and seek instead merely to appropriate it.

*don't do* Instead of saying anything ~~seriously~~ *seriously* ~~resembling~~ *resembling* ~~the~~ *the* ~~in Hungary, 1902,~~

Plunge into freedom! You have to sense and to feel that every great leap forward in philosophic cognition become possible only when a new category, a new way of making the plunge become possible. It is at this point when the subject is creating freely a new unity of opposites (the opposites of thought and being) that the counter-revolution imposes again a duality upon it, reducing it to indifferent particulars, or modes of the Absolute, or Monads, to be ordered or organized. Not that there is anything accidental about this counter-revolution. It is inevitable so long as the subject is not the concrete universal contained within itself the totality.

The Logic moves this way: E.G.



7/29/49

Note that he is talking here about Method i.e. the form of the Absolute Idea i.e. the new stage of identity of theory and practice which we have just reached and not just about previous forms of cognition: (1) it is absolutely necessary that the Method begin with abstract universality, abstract self-relation, the simple and the universal, the in-itselfness of the Absolute. (II., pp. 469-472) Don't be hesitant about beginning there arbitrarily with categorical unconsciousness.

(2) But you have to see the differentiation within the Revolution for that is, after all, what we are dealing with. You cannot proceed any further unless you have recognized this internal differentiation. The alternative "here" is that it takes up again equally externally from the concrete, that which it left out in the abstract creation of the universal. Against it, Hegel reaffirms what he said in (1) and (2), calling them "this equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment, by which the universal determines itself out of itself to be its own Other" and says that this may be called the dialectic moment (p. 484).

9/4/49

U.P.I. These new categories arrive at certain moments of history when men have the conviction that they are already in full possession of the truth. Another extensive word about Der Weg, the process. It is not a movement in general, not just a growing or a developing "in general" as if it were merely quantitative expansion from something already existing, but a movement through contradiction, thru UPI

The self-movement of the proletariat to 2nd negation, unity of opposites, negation of negation, is only possible because of the self-movement to first negation.

To hold fast this contradiction in the proletariat and yet not to be dominated by it -- that is the core of the problem.

The Logic in general is divided into:

Being--U  
Essence--P - first negation  
Notion --I - second negation

Essence is the internally self-contradictory movement of capitalism, the movement through constant determination and transcendence of determination. This movement, in turn, has its own concrete UPI

Essence as such or, Show -- U  
Determinations of Reflection--P  
Ground -- I

The determinations of reflection give the particular way in which this process develops i.e. through Identity, Difference and Contradiction where Contradiction is the I of the Identity as U, the difference as P.

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The Ground, however, which is negation of negation, or Individual, is at the same time an abstract universal. It must therefore determine itself as particular. What is of interest to us is the way in which this particularity develops.

Existence - Thing Matter	Descartes Hobbes
Appearance - Law	Hume and then Kant
Essential Relation- Whole and Part Force and Manifestation Outer and Inner The Absolute	Kant and Fichte Schelling "

All of these categories which the abstract understanding, stuck in the Realm of Being, would regard as substratum are in reality the categories in which the philosophers sought to capture the essence of Ground or of revolt. Unless I am very much mistaken the movement of Capital, not to mention of political economy, can also be seen in this development of these categories - all hypostatizations (as the philosophers say) of the revolt of the proletariat. ./. . . .

1) On Ground, as a movement not only through opposition but through contradiction (hence not only first but second negation from the outset) This sticks in my mind because concretely I know that the greatest illumination for me and for everybody I talked to in France was by stating simply that passage from State and Revolution which quotes Marx's letter to Weydemeyer in 1852).

2) On the fact that the movement from Thing through Substance and finally to Subject (the Notion) are all stages of the self-determination through negativity of Ground. What we have to avoid, in other words, is thinking of Thing as if it were One (in the Realm of Being). 1

3) Hence these stages as constituting what Hegel calls a Becoming toward the Notion (II, II, 157), i.e. a development (in philosophical terms) from presupposition of an underlying Thing or substratum to an absolute self-mediation or substance (which substance is an absolute self-mediation but nevertheless not yet subject because 1) it remains a presupposition and 2) because it is actually a neutralization of opposition (as measure was a neutralization of multiplicity) and 3) because it is an Abgrund for individuality (L.152).

4) Hence it is not only the opposition in capitalist society which develops but the self-transcending Ground as revolt.

Worthy of note here is the sharp change that takes place at Appearance, i.e. between Existence and Essential Relation. It is at this point that you had the first big crisis in developing capitalism which manifested itself philosophically in Hume and then in Kant. I believe it is here that the transition from Absolute to Relative Surplus Value becomes necessary. Certainly it is here that the finitude of capitalism explicitly emerges. From that point on you have the infinity of the progress to overcome this finitude which moves through Kant to Fichte until Schelling establishes the Absolute to try to overcome it.

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