MIA > Archive > Fraina/Corey Archive > Decline of Am. Cap.
THE prophets of the pre-1929 “new capitalism” assumed that the “policy of high wages” had ended the antagonism between wages and profits. Enlightened employers, they insisted, recognized that prosperity depends upon the workers receiving a “balanced” and “proportional” share in production and productivity gains in the shape of increasingly higher wages. As that assumption was shattered by the depression, the prophets of Niraism assume that state intervention will “balance” wages and profits. But state capitalism aggravates, it does not abolish, this most fundamental antagonism of capitalist production.
It is assumed that the real purpose of Niraism, and of the state capitalism of which it is an expression, is to “balance” wages and profits and production and consumption, and thus “safeguard” prosperity. But this would mean control of all economic activity. It would mean control of production, prices, and consumption, of wages, profits, and income, of the output of capital goods and consumption goods, of capital accumulation and investment, of industry and agriculture. All of these elements, under capitalism, affect the antagonism between wages and profits, and are affected by it. Complete control of economic activity means the planned economy of socialism: it is impossible under the antagonistic, profit-making relations of capitalism. Incomplete control by the capitalist state, as in Italy and Germany, in France and Britain, and its American beginnings in Niraism, is an expression and aggravation of the decline of capitalism. “Controls” repress instead of liberate economic forces. The attempts to “ease” one disproportion create or intensify other disproportions. Thus “easing” the farmers’ burdens by inflation raised the prices of the goods they buy more than the prices of the goods they sell, and decreased purchasing power among the workers by lowering the real value of wages. The scope and objectives are limited by the desire to “save” capitalism. Under state capitalism all the essential relations of capitalist production are retained. Within modifications, limitations, and “controls,” economic activity moves in the same contradictory and antagonistic fashion as under “unfettered” capitalism, and the movement decrees that wages must lag behind profits.
Wages always lag behind profits. A general rise in wages may mean more consumption and production, but a general rise is rare, depending upon falling prices and labor’s militancy. The rise ends, moreover, in the fall of wages relatively to profits as employers increase the productivity of labor and profits. Wage increases are voluntarily granted only in exceptional cases: to “key” workers and on piece rates (afterward cut) to raise the productivity of labor, resulting in an absolute or relative decrease in total wages and a displacement of workers. Low wages may not necessarily mean low costs, but low wages and an increasing productivity of labor mean lower costs and higher profits.
The fatal flaw in the “policy of high wages” was this: Higher wages might mean more consumption, production, and profits, but as employers were free to raise or not to raise wages, the employers who did not raise wages would gain more than the employers who did, because in terms of a particular enterprise higher wages mean relatively lower profits.
The fatal flaw in the proposals of Niraism, of state capitalism in general, is this: If the “fixing” of minimum wages raises labor costs (although minimum tends to become maximum), profits must fall, and efforts to increase the productivity of labor to lower costs and raise profits must be intensified, resulting in an absolute or relative decrease in total wages and employment.
Profits are not made by paying the workers higher wages. They are made by forcing down wages relatively to profits, by appropriating more surplus value, more unpaid labor. If $1,000 million are added to wages it would increase consumption and production; the capitalists would make only a very small profit, however, on the additional output and sales. If the capitalists retain the $1,000 million as profits, their wealth is correspondingly augmented and its investment creates new claims upon labor, production, and income. It is not that part of labor’s product (wages) consumed by the workers as means of subsistence which enriches the capitalists, but that part of labor’s product (profits) converted into capital goods. Capitalist production means accumulation of capital, an increasing output and absorption of capital goods, thereby converting profits into capital and permitting an increasing exploitation of labor. Profits and wages must necessarily clash and profits beat down wages, whether capitalism is “unfettered” or under “controls.” The antagonism is revealed by the movement of cyclical revival:
In both revivals, employment and wages lagged behind production (and profits). It was the same after the minor depressions of 1924 and 1927. According to the Wall Street Journal: “It is a natural development for profits and production to forge ahead of employment and wages in recovery.” [2] But there was one significant difference: the unequal rise of production and of employment and wages was much greater in 1933 than in 1921. Not only was the inequality not overcome, it was aggravated.
Part of the greater lag of employment and wages behind output (and profits) was a result of the sharper cyclical decline of production in 1929-33. The minimum labor force maintained was capable of a larger increase in output than in 1921, without any large increase in employment and wages. But there were two more important factors. One was the higher productivity of labor, which, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, rose 12% in 1929-32 compared with only 7% in 1927-29 [3]; it rose again sharply in 1933. The other factor was the strong drive to “earn” profits to resume or increase dividends and strengthen depleted financial reserves. Profits shot up almost magically. In the first quarter of 1933, 205 large corporations in manufactures, mining, and services, with a “net worth” $7,443 million, had a deficit of $14,831,000; they made profits of $86,878,000 in the second quarter and of $129,576,000 in the third quarter. In the first nine months of 1933 their profits rose to $200,367,000 compared with $30,266,000 in the previous year. The net income of 125 corporations rose from $57 million in 1932 to $246 million in 1933, an increase of 331%. In the case of General Motors, profits rose from $165,000 to $83,214,000. [4] The rise in profits soared beyond the small rise in production and the smaller rise in employment, and wages. And in part of the third and all of the fourth quarter, higher profits were accompanied by decreasing production, employment, and wages.
The NRA was not in action in April-June, when employment and wages lagged behind the inflationary rise in production and profits. But the same condition prevailed in July and after, when the NRA was in action. The NRA, moreover, shared direct responsibility for the lag of wages behind production and profits. Its wage policy, in spite of the pretentious claims, was in accord with the employers’ interests. It set terribly low minimums, restrained workers on strike for higher wages, and cut real wages by the inflationary rise in prices.
The policy of fixing minimum wages was belated reformism. Always limited and largely illusory, it might have had some value during prosperity, in the epoch of the upswing of capitalism. In depression and decline, the policy merely “fixes” wages at prevailing low levels. Only a small part of the workers were affected by the minimum wages. Their practically permissive character, moreover, allowed employers to evade paying the minimums. Evasions involved all sorts of contemptible expedients and merciless pressure upon the most helpless workers, particularly Negro and “alien” workers. As bad as the evasions was the character of the minimums. In no case were they even an approach to a decent standard of living. In all cases the minimums were based on depression wage levels. In many cases they were below prevailing average wages.
There was some increase in some wage rates, mainly among the most exploited workers and only in comparison with the low depression levels; but that was offset by the lesser number of hours worked and the rise in the cost of living. In 312 New England companies, 90% operating under NRA codes, weekly hours worked fell 16% from June to October, 1933; average weekly earnings rose only 6%. According to the NRA Administrator in New York City, employment rose 20% from August 1 to November 1, payrolls only 13%. By November, hourly wage rates in sixteen producing and distributing industries had risen 5½¢ and average weekly earnings 3% over 1932. The low level of wages in many cases is demonstrated by one of the major reasons for the Civil Works Administration’s liquidation of its make-work activities which began in January, 1934; it was, according to the New York Post, “bowing to the demands of employers, particularly in the South, who say workers are quitting them to get on the government payroll at better wages.” [5] The CWA paid average wages of $9 to $14 weekly to the great majority of its workers!
The minimum wages tended, moreover, to become the maximum, a complaint made again and again by labor leaders, who did little about it. This affected all categories of workers. Among “white collar” workers, according to the New York University Employment Bureau, the NRA drove down wages: “The $20 to $22 job is now about a $15 job, because employers tend to keep their wages around the NRA minimum.” [6] Because of their unorganized condition, the technicians were hit hard. In one code qualified chemists got $14 weekly; in another, technical employees got 35¢ to 45¢ an hour. “The technicians now find themselves in many cases receiving about half the wages of skilled labor under the NRA codes. No provisions have been made for them in the codes of many industries, the technicians being conveniently regarded as ‘superintendents’ or ‘executives.’ In many cases the men are receiving only the minimum wage provided for unskilled labor.” [7] The result of the minimum wage “fixing” was a tendency to break down the differentials between skilled and unskilled and semi-skilled workers. It is desirable to decrease the differentials: they are largely artificial, altogether too great, and they create antagonisms between different groups of workers. But the NRA breaks down differentials not by raising the wages of the poorer-paid workers but by lowering the wages of the better-paid – a development characteristic of the decline of capitalism.
Real wages fell considerably because of the inflationary rise in prices and the cost of living. Food prices in December, 1933, were 7% higher than one year earlier. On December 1, 1933 the retail price index was 26.8 higher than in May; 10% less units were sold in 1933 than in the previous year. [8] Yet production was 10% higher, mainly because of increases in inventory stocks in anticipation of more inflation.
After nearly four years of depression the workers began to act. There was an upsurge of strikes for union recognition and of strikes for higher wages. But the NRA acted as a brake upon the efforts of the workers to raise wages. A favorite answer of employers to workers striking for higher wages was: “The demands are far beyond limits fixed by the code.” [9] Thus strikers were put in the position of fighting the government, as limits in the code were fixed by the government apparatus of the NRA. The codes were framed by representatives of capitalist government and capitalist industry; in most cases organized labor did not even get the meaningless courtesy of “advisory” participation. Employers appealed to the NRA against strikes, and its pressure was used to drive the workers back to work. Strikes were not made illegal, but the apparatus of the NRA was mobilized to discourage, prevent, and “settle” strikes. This included a National Labor Board to mediate, that is, suppress strikes. It was made clear that strikes were an “interference” with the recovery program. The discouragement of strikes and the driving of strikers back to work was assisted by the reactionary labor leaders, who considered the National Industrial Recovery Act a “charter of labor” the same leaders who in 1923-29 extolled the “policy of high wages” and the “new capitalism.”
Labor leaders and liberals declared that Niraism’s “recognition” of trade unions and collective bargaining was a great victory for the workers. But “recognition” was tied up with the NRA, an expression of state capitalism. It represents the imposition of state controls over independent unionism and the lowering of wages in the epoch of the decline of capitalism.
One of the motives of “recognition” was to prevent labor revolts jnd an upsurge of radical forces. The NRA program was beset with dangers. Revival was slow and incomplete, wages small and prices rising. Labor might revolt. It had to be cajoled and shackled. Direct repression was dangerous under the prevailing conditions: labor revolts might mean disaster. Hence the resort to cajolery and shackles. Millions spent on relief and “make work” schemes might make workers forget the billions handed out to corporations. “Recognition” of trade unions and collective bargaining would satisfy and intrench the union bureaucracy, which would act – and did – as a bulwark against an upsurge of labor militancy. At the beginning, moreover, state capitalism clings to formal democracy, decks itself in the older ideology, attempts to rule by “balancing” class interests.
Another motive of “recognition” was to secure mass support for the NRA and force it upon employers resisting its “controls.” Not all employers accept new developments, even when they are in their own interest, particularly if disadvantages are imposed upon some groups of employers. (The NRA increases the differentials in favor of the larger employers and corporations over the smaller.) State capitalism may use compulsion over certain capitalists or groups of capitalists. The struggle is not, however, one of government and labor against the capitalists. It is between capitalists who cling to old ideas and those who see the necessity of changes, with the government emphasizing the new conditions and new needs in the interest of the capitalists as a class. To accomplish its ends, government may use labor and liberal sentiment temporarily, within limits, and under safeguards. Thus strikes, in which workers’ blood was shed, and threats of strikes were a factor in the operators’ acceptance of the bituminous coal code.
There was danger, however, in mass support secured by union “recognition” and in promises, accepted seriously by the workers, of higher wages. The NRA acted accordingly.
Recognition was virtually limited to existing unions. The closed shop was rejected, because, according to General Hugh Johnson, NRA Administrator, it “would amount to employer coercion which is contrary to law ... especially if the union did not have 100% membership.” This was driven home by H.I. Harriman, president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States: “The closed shop is prohibited by the Recovery Act.” Under the NRA, there was, according to the National Industrial Conference Board, an increase of 180% in the number of company unions of one form or another; of 3,314 manufacturing and mining concerns employing 2,585,740 workers, 653 concerns, employing 1,163,575 workers had company unions, and only 416 concerns employing 240,394 workers recognized trade unions. [10]
The NRA developed an apparatus to control labor, prevent strikes, and restrict independent unionism. This appears in the mediation functions of the National Labor Board. It appears more clearly in the labor provisions of the Code of Fair Competition for the Bituminous Coal Industry. [11] In the preliminary hearings to frame the code, suggestions to give labor “adequate representation” were brushed aside by the operators’ objections. The code set up six divisional code authorities, all of whose members (except one, with no vote, appointed by the President of the United States) are representatives of the coal operators. No provision was made for a labor representative, nor for labor representatives on the governing body of the industry, the National Bituminous Industrial Board. Six labor boards, of three members each, were set up, all the members appointed by the President, one from nominations by “organizations of employees,” one from nominations of the divisional code authorities (on which only the employers and the government are represented), and one “a wholly impartial and disinterested representative of the President.” The code grants the operators measurable self-government in the form of what are virtually cartels, with powers to “prevent destructive price-cutting,” the government reserving, in state-capitalist fashion, the right to intervene. But labor is subordinated to the employers and the state: even labor’s one-third representation on the labor boards is under control of the President. The President can always find an amenable “labor leader.” This was demonstrated during one of the coal strikes involving 75,000 workers. At one o’clock in the morning President Roosevelt telephoned to Philip Murray, vice-president of the United Mine Workers of America. This was the conversation:
ROOSEVELT: Philip, I want you to get these men back to work.
MURRAY: If there’s anything in God’s world I can do for you, I will be glad to try.
In reporting the conversation to the strikers, Murray added:
“Any union or union officials who refuse to obey the President’s command will not live very long.” [12]
A formal protest was made by William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, and John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers of America, who declared that “the labor boards are meaningless and unsatisfactory to labor.” [13] The protest was unavailing. And the boards are not meaningless, they are an employer-state apparatus for the control of labor. The labor leaders then characteristically shifted their objective to a compromise, empty in itself but capable of being called a victory. They asked, and secured after much shilly-shallying, representation on the National Bituminous Coal Board in the person of John L. Lewis. [1*] But of the board’s members nine are direct representatives of the employers; five are appointed by the President, one for each divisional code authority on which employers alone are represented; and two are Presidential appointees at large. [14] Thus labor has one out of sixteen members on the National Coal Board, he is appointed by the President, and the appointment is not compulsory. It was a famous victory!
As strikes multiplied and the NRA felt more sure of itself, it moved toward the outlawry of strikes. This policy and its threat were expressed belligerently by General Johnson at the convention of the American Federation of Labor:
”The very foundations of organized labor are at test here and now ... Labor does not need to strike under the Roosevelt plan ... The plain, stark truth is that you cannot tolerate the strike. ... In the codes you are given complete and highly effective protection of your rights.” [15]
These developments are wholly in accord with the state-capitalist nature of Niraism. The NRA may change its forms or be replaced by another apparatus, but the labor-capital slant of state capitalism will remain the same.
The controls imposed upon capital are in the interest of capital. They release capital from restrictions, particularly the anti-trust laws, and implement its powers over industry and labor.
The controls imposed upon labor are not in the interest of labor. They institutionalize labor’s subordination to capital, progressively deprive unionism of its independence, and tend to outlaw strikes, labor’s most effective means of struggle for higher wages.
There is no contradiction in the NRA “recognizing” trade unions and collective bargaining while imposing safeguards and controls which limit labor’s independence and action. For state capitalism is, in one aspect, an attempt to “balance” class interests, since it still operates within the confines of bourgeois democracy. It must make concessions if only in words to the different classes. Thus unions and collective bargaining are recognized, labor is given representation, if only advisory, on arbitration and other tribunals, labor laws are adopted, and labor code authorities are set up. In pre-fascist Germany, where state capitalism was highly developed, a whole labor jurisprudence arose, a “constitutional labor order,” considered by the social-democrats a “step toward” socialism (it ended, however, in fascism). But the whole process proceeds within the limits of capitalism and on the basis of the state, and is consequently dominated by the economic and political weight of the capitalist class. The process, moreover, is an expression of the decline of capitalism, when concessions – if only relief – are a burden upon capital. As state capitalism attempts to reconcile economic and class antagonisms, they become constantly more acute. Hence the “recognition” of labor is accompanied by laws and acts for an increasing coercion of labor. The role of the state as strikebreaker becomes more necessary and is strengthened. In the epoch of the decline of capitalism, both employment and wages fall. The workers resist. Resistance tends to become revolutionary, as the burdens of decline are thrust upon the workers. The state intervenes more ruthlessly to deprive labor of the possibility of independent action and revolutionary initiative. This policy of suppression assumes its most complete and brutal forms under fascism ...
The upward movement of real wages in 1921-22 was conditioned by the militant struggles of labor against wage cuts. In 1933-34, although there was an upsurge of labor militancy, strikes were broken and the results limited by the NRA apparatus for the suppression of labor. (Later, distrustful of the NRA, labor was more successful.)
The upward movement of real wages in 1921-22 was conditioned by the fall in prices, which increased the purchasing power of wages. In 1933-34, real wages fell because of the desperate resort to inflation and the tendency of the NRA to maintain money wages at low, fixed levels.
The upward movement of real wages in 192122 was conditioned by the expansion of production; this transformed cyclical revival into a comparatively high level of prosperity. Revival seized upon the production of capital goods, the sustaining force in prosperity, because of the working of long-time factors of expansion. In 1933-34, revival was speculative and incomplete, it was not forced upward by an increasing production of capital goods, which lagged behind even the small increase in production. This was a result of exhaustion of the long-time factors of expansion, of the decline of American capitalism.
Niraism insists that its objective is to decrease unemployment and increase purchasing power. But the objective and the means are limited by the nature of capitalist production, and limited still more by the conditions of capitalist decline. In previous cyclical revivals, employment and purchasing power rose because of the onward sweep of recovery. The incomplete character of recovery forces Niraism more and more to expedients. Unemployment is “decreased” by “spreading” work and “making” work, measures with very definite limits. Purchasing power is “increased” by slightly raising total wages and lowering average wages: a peculiar way of increasing purchasing power, but profitable to the capitalists. “It is,” says a bourgeois economist, who urges drastic wage cuts, “the amount of the total wage bill and not the height of the average wage which affects the aggregate volume of spending. Indeed, two laborers each receiving $3 per day would be more certain to spend at once nearly all their income than would one wage-earner receiving $6 per day, for their wants would be more urgent.” [16] The smaller the wage the larger the proportion spent on immediate consumption; the “higher” the wage the larger the proportion saved, and labor’s savings are of course unnecessary where there is an abundance of idle capital or of unused capital equipment. Consumption is to be “increased” by depriving employed workers of that part of their wages which they might save and pay it to newly employed workers, forcing all wage income to be spent. Thus standards of living are lowered under the conditions of the decline of capitalism. Wages are being cut in all capitalist nations. The fascist government of Italy orders another cut in wages and salaries, after the cut in 1930 of 10% to 12%, in order that Italian capitalists may compete more effectively in the world market, where they are being “undersold.” Compensation is offered in the form of a simultaneous and equal cut in the prices of food, rent, and transportation, but this in practice never equals the cut in wages. In 1932, the German employers were permitted to pay newly employed workers about one-half of the prevailing wages. This policy of the von Papen government took the form, in the policy of its fascist successor, of permitting employers to cut the wages of employed workers if the “saving” was used to hire additional workers; the Hitler government justified the cuts as a means of “increasing” employment and “maintaining” payrolls. [17] These are the desperate resorts of capitalism tormented by decline and trying to save itself by thrusting the burdens of decline upon the workers.
Wages and employment lagged behind production and profits in the revival of 1921-22, in the prosperity of 1923-29, and in the “revival” of 1933-34. Nor was the lag a result of the NRA in its early stages depending more upon “persuasion” than “force,” placing faith in the voluntary action of “enlightened” employers, much in the manner of the “Golden Age” of pre-1929 prosperity. As Niraism becomes full-fledged state capitalism and “controls” are stiffened, the clash between wages and profits is sharpened. State intervention to “fix” wages and prices, and the general tendency of profits to fall under the conditions of decline, results in a greater drive to improve technological efficiency and raise the productivity of labor, which are not under control. Considering the problem from the angle of price-fixing, a bourgeois economist concludes: “Prices construed as ‘fair’ ... will put a premium on efforts to lower the cost of production for the sake of much higher profits. This will be done by investing more capital in order to increase the productivity of labor.” [18] That is assuming that prices are fixed downward. They may be fixed upward, and thereby directly increase profits and indirectly decrease wages. But as state capitalism operates in the orbit of the decline of capitalism, the tendency will be for profits to decrease. This sharpens the clash between profits and wages and multiplies capitalist efforts to lower wages in favor of profits. The government intervenes directly to cut wages, as in Germany and Italy.
Wages always lag behind profits. The lag assumes three major forms:
In the epoch of the upswing of capitalism there was a relative fall in the workers’ standards of living. In the epoch of decline there is an absolute fall in the workers’ standards of living. This means a return to the state of “increasing misery” characteristic of early capitalism, aggravated by all the burdens of imperialist wars ...
The conditions of capitalist decline, of which Niraism is an expression, limit the expansion of industry and the opportunities for profitable investment of capital. Profits tend to fall. The fall is all the greater because of the burdens of taxation imposed upon industry. These burdens result from the state pouring public money into industry, measures to safeguard profits, relief for the constantly growing masses of the needy unemployed, an increasing bureaucracy, and multiplication of the costs of armaments and war. The efforts to save capitalism are of a strangulating nature. Above all, they strangle the workers. All pretense of a policy of high wages is abandoned. The pack begins to bay in one swelling chorus: “Cut wages!” In the name of theory the economists of France, Germany, and Italy insist that wages must fall. W.A. Beveridge, A.C. Pigou, Henry Clay, and other English economists insist that wages must fall. In the United States, Prof. W.I. King [2*] and others insist that wages must fall. True, these American economists are now overwhelmed by the pretentious “high wage” chorus, but they will come into their own. And the economists base their arguments upon what is essentially the theory of laissez-faire economics, which was never very real and is almost wholly unreal in the age of monopoly capitalism and imperialism. State capitalism justifying wage cuts in the name of laissez-faire! The economists will generously admit that high wages are good, that they are a human and cultural necessity. But they must fall because of inexorable economic necessity. If wages fall employment will rise. Thus the economists abandon the hope of progress, and offer only the prospect of lower standards of living. And they forget that lower wages and lower costs are not necessarily translated into lower prices and higher demand, particularly in the epoch of the decline of capitalism. The economists insist that lower wages and lower costs are necessary to increase foreign trade; but they forget that all capitalist nations are lowering wages and costs and raising tariff barriers. Wages must be cut to increase profits and stimulate the production of capital goods; but capitalist industry is now capable of absorbing only a decreasing output of capital goods. The arguments of the economists are mere apologetics.
As profits fall or tend to fall, in the epoch of the decline of capitalism, wages are driven down to maintain profits. Wages can rise only when there is an unusual expansion of industry. As expansion becomes limited, wages must fall, absolutely and relatively. Increasingly larger numbers of workers become permanently unemployed. Their pressure tends to lower the wages of the employed workers and is used by the employers to beat down wages. Total and average wages fall. Low standards of living are lowered still more. The capitalist state imposes upon the workers as much as it can of the burdens of higher taxation. Relief and the social services are cut, and the bourgeois economists manufacture theories to justify the cut. The conditions of decline torment not only the workers, but constantly greater circles of “white collar” workers, professional workers, small businessmen, farmers. Out of these developments arise sharpened class antagonisms, the struggles of capitalism, fascism, communism: an era of social explosions and change.
1*. A few days after the coal code was adopted, Lewis signed a “collective bargaining” agreement with the non-union operators, which grants employers the exclusive right to hire and fire, prohibits strikes, and adds:
“Under no circumstances shall the operators discuss the matter under dispute with the mine committees or any representatives of the United Mine Workers of America during a suspension of work in violation of this agreement.” New York Times, September 22, 1933.
2*. King is an “objective” economist whose objectivity completely accepts and justifies capitalism. He considers economics a “science,” but a science which refuses to go beyond the relations and needs of capitalist production. It is an interesting phenomenon that the more “objective” the economist, the more he is an apologist of capitalism. Thus King urges, on what he insists are wholly scientific and objective grounds, that wage cuts are necessary to revive prosperity.
1. Based on reports of the Federal Reserve Board.
2. Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1933.
3. New York Times, December 17, 1933.
4. Federal Reserve Board, Bulletin, November 1933, p.173; New York Times, February 4, 1934.
5. Bruce Bliven, New England Waits, New Republic, December 20, 1933, p.158; New York Times, January 14, 1934; January 8, 1934; New York Evening Post, January 19, 1934.
6. Labor and the NRA, New Republic, October 25, 1933, p.310.
7. Editorial, Unions for Technicians,New Republic, January 24, 1934, p.296.
8. New York World-Telegram, January 2, 1934.
9. New York World-Telegram, September 26, 1933.
10. Labor the Sore Point, Business Week, September 9, 1933, p.5; New York Times, November 8, 1933; New York World-Tele gram, January 12, 1934.
11. New York Times, September 17, 1933; September 19, 1933.
12. New York Times, October 3, 1933.
13. New York Times, September 17, 1933.
14. New York Times, January 16, 1934.
15. New York Times, October n, 1933.
16. W.I. King, Capital, Risk, Enterprise and Profits, The Economic Foundations of Business, ed. by W.E. Spahr (1932), p.119.
17. New York Times, September 5, 1933; December 12, 1933; December 16, 1933.
18. W.W. Hay, Plant Overexpansion As a Logical Result of the Industrial Recovery Act, Annalist, July 28, 1933, p.115.
28.9.2007