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Tony Cliff

Russia: A Marxist analysis

Chapter XI:
The crisis in Soviet agriculture goes on ...
(Part 1)

Stalin’s inheritance: crises in agriculture

The legacy that Stalin left was an agriculture in crisis – not in the sense of facing complete breakdown, as during the collectivisation drive of the early 30’s when famine stalked the land, but bogged down in a slough of stagnation lasting already a quarter of a century.

Stagnation of the grain harvest

The greatest achievements of Stalin’s agricultural policies were claimed in the field of grain production. But it is precisely in this field that information on economic achievements under Stalin was more misleading than in any other.

At the very beginning of the collectivisation drive in 1929, Stalin promised that in some three years the USSR would be the greatest grain producing country in the world. [1] A couple of years later came the great famine. This did not prevent Stalin from repeating the declaration, and promising (on December 1, 1935) that within three or four years USSR grain output would be raised to 120-130 million tons. [2] This is virtually the same figure – 130 million tons – the 18th Party Congress planned for the end of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1942. And, oddly, the target for Plan after Plan remained in the region of the same amount. The Fourth Five-Year Plan aimed at 125 million tons of grain for 1950. At the 19th Party Congress (1952) Malenkov proudly announced that at last a harvest of 130 million tons of grain had been collected. He concluded triumphantly: “The grain problem, which in the past was regarded as our most acute and gravest problem, has thus been solved, solved definitely and finally.” [3] On the basis of this victory. the Congress set the target for the Fifth Five-Year Plan at a rise in grain output of 40-50 per cent [4], or an overall output of some 175 million tons in 1955. The assurance given by Malenkov in 1952 that there was enough grain was repeated in September 1953 by Khrushchev. [5] And one Soviet economist, following Malenkov and Khrushchev, went so far as to write in 1953 that in 1952 grain output was 95.1 per cent above the 1910-14 level. [6]

However, this was a paper victory, the result of a statistical trick. Up to 1933, the grain crop was calculated as the quantity harvested and stored. From 1933 it was computed on the basis of what was grown in the field, the so-called “biological yield”. From this figure 10 per cent was deducted, on the assumption that this is the average amount lost between field and barn. [A] The 1937 deductions for losses were discontinued altogether.

The two years 1933 and 1937 in which changes in statistical methods were introduced showed the greatest and most sudden jumps in gross output.

At last, on December 15th, 1958, Khruschev completely debunked the success story of Soviet grain, saying: “In actual fact, as regards grain production, the country remained for a long time at the level of pre-revolutionary Russia.” He went on to give the following figures to support this statement:

As you see, in sown areas, crop yield and grain returns, the country remained, in practice, at the same level as before the Revolution, though in numerical strength the population, and especially that of the industrial centres and cities, had considerably increased ... [8]

Thus the harvest in 1949-53 was only 91.7 million tons, hardly larger than in 1910-14. During the same period the population increased by some 30 per cent!

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Stagnation in livestock farming

As regards livestock farming, the revelations of the post-Stalin era are even more alarming.

As early as September 1953, Khrushchev, in his report to the Central Committee, painted the situation in sombre colours, giving the following figures:

It will be seen from these figures that the number of cows at the beginning of 1953 was 3.5 million less than at the beginning of 1941, and 8.9 million less than at the beginning of 1928. [9]

Actually, by choosing 1916 as the representative year for the Tsarist era, Khruschev managed to turn the livestock situation of the Stalinist era to better account than would otherwise have been the case. 1916 was a very bad year for livestock, which showed the ravages of the war.

Had 1913 been taken as a basis for comparison the drastic straits of Soviet livestock farming under Stalin would have been even more starkly revealed.

When Khrushchev delivered this report the Russian population was some 50 million larger than in 1916, the number of livestock smaller!

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Low productivity of labour in Soviet agriculture

Official sanction was at last given to an airing of this problem by Khrushchev. In a statement to the Central Committee in December, 1958, when he cited comparative Soviet and US statistics for labour expenditure per unit of product in USSR (average for 1956-7) and USA (1956) [10]:

Khrushchev suggested that the American figures “coloured up” the picture by underestimating labour expenditure, while Soviet figures perhaps overestimated them. Nevertheless he stressed that the gap was extremely wide.

An important result of the low productivity of labour in Soviet agriculture is the high proportion of the population engaged in farming. It was estimated that in April 1956 not less than 56.6 per cent Of the population of USSR lived in the countryside [11] and 43 per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture. [12] As against this, in the United States, only 9 per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture in 1960.

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Why stagnating agriculture became a major worry to the Kremlin

Ever since the beginning of the Five-Year Plans, the tempo of Russia’s industrial growth has depended ~n the flow of labour from the countryside to the towns-the number of people in the rural areas declined by some 7½ million in the 30 years 1926-1956 [13], while the urban population increased by 60.7 million – and on the parallel transference of agricultural products from the country to the towns. The peasant or his son went to town and there consumed the product that he would previously have consumed in the country. This process could continue up to a certain limit without a rise in the volume of agricultural output, but simply through an alteration in the distribution of the agricultural output as between town and country (as well as between home consumption and exports) The concomitant of such a pattern of industrial growth is not agricultural growth but a decline in hidden or open unemployment in the rural areas. But beyond certain limits, i.e., when rural unemployment has largely been absorbed, the growth of an industrial labour force through the syphoning off of labour to the towns must come as a result of a rise in the productivity of labour in agriculture.

(By the way, Russia reached this stage earlier than she would otherwise have done because of the ravages of the war on her population.)

Other reasons too, require such a rise for industrial growth.

With labour power in industry – that of workers and technicians alike – becoming progressively more skilled and intelligent, the needs of efficiency demand a higher standard of consumption – including food consumption – by the town population. After Stalin’s death it became clear that a considerable rise in living standards was a necessary requirement for further advance. An obvious condition for this is a marked rise in agricultural output and productivity of labour.

The very factors that made possible the wide and rapid industrial growth under Stalin now become an impediment to further advance, and this at a time when yet half the population is still on the land. Stalin’s policies were effective in getting surpluses syphoned off from the countryside. At the same time they prevented the growth of agriculture. And such a growth has become a supreme need for Soviet society.

Agriculture has become a dead weight that can retard the economic advance of Russia as a whole.

This probably explains why Khrushchev has stamped anxiously up and down the country, and spent more words-and probably more thought-on trying to overcome the agricultural crisis than on any other problem of Soviet life.

Stating the problem is one thing, solving it another.

Stalin’s heirs can follow one of two paths: (1) they can offer greater incentives to the agriculturists as producers on the collective farms and also on their private plots, or (2) they can introduce a greater regimentation of agriculture: undermine peasant individualism and transform collective farms into state farms.

The first path is fraught with difficulties. There have been some 25 years of Stalinist disincentives: agriculture has been starved of capital resources, agriculturists have received very niggardly prices for their produce, there has been a famine of consumer goods in the countryside, and rural housing has been shamelessly neglected; and all this has been done by an arbitrary bureaucratic management that has used the whip freely. It is very probable that a moderate rise in capital resources for agriculture, in consumer goods for the agriculturists, or in prices paid by the state for agricultural output may for a time – perhaps an extended time – have a disincentive rather than an incentive effect on the peasants: with higher prices, the will to work may decrease. Only massive incentives supplied over a very long period can overcome the past and spur the agriculturists on to increased activity. Unfortunately Khrushchev lacks both capital surpluses of any size and also time: and their acquisition is rendered impossible by the international situation which causes a fantastic waste on armaments and the bureaucratic management of the economy (of which the crisis in agriculture is one of the most important aspects).

What, then, about the second path, that of further regimentation of agriculture? This path is open. But further progress along it leads to diminishing returns. First it has disincentive effects; secondly it depends for success on widespread terror and rigid regimentation of the general labour force, so that agriculturists may not escape from agriculture into freer areas of activity. But then, the general need to relax terror and lessen the regimentation of labour puts this increased pressure out of the question.

As a result the post-Stalin policies in agriculture are a mixture of the carrot and the stick, each largely cancelling out the incentive effect of the other. The crisis in agriculture goes on unabated.

Let us give some details of the post-Stalin agricultural policies and their results.

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Larger carrots: Higher prices paid by the state for agricultural output

Since Stalin’s death four major revisions of prices paid by the state to agriculturists have occurred: in 1953, 1956, 1958 and 1962.

The disincentive nature of the obligatory delivery system was obvious to Stalin’s heirs, and immediately upon his demise they started tinkering with it. The first step was to raise the prices paid by the state for obligatory deliveries. Khrushchev stated in his September 1953 report to the Central Committee: “Procurement prices for obligatory deliveries of produce to the state are being increased more than 5.5 times in the case of cattle and poultry, 2 times in. the case of milk and butter, 2.5 times in the case of potatoes,, and an average of from 25 to 40 per cent in the case of vegetables.” [14]

The new higher quota prices were still, however, very low in relation to prices paid by the state for products bought above the norm of obligatory deliveries, and were yet lower compared to the prices paid by the consumer.

Thus, the ratio of the price paid for obligatory deliveries of grain and zakupka (contract buying) was 1:12.

The price paid for the obligatory delivery of butter was set in 1953 at 9 roubles per kilogram, but butter was being sold in state retail stores at 26-28 roubles per kilogram [15]

Again, the prices paid for obligatory deliveries of beef, even after being raised, were only 27 per cent of the ,state store selling prices; of pork, 26 per cent; milk, 28 per cent; potatoes, 39 per cent [16]; sunflower seed 8 per cent (of kolkhoz market prices). [17]

By 1955 the inefficiency of extreme differentials between obligatory delivery and above-quota prices became obvious, and it was decided in 1956 to raise the prices of obligatory deliveries of grain 2.5 times, while above-quota prices were reduced, so that the new differential for grain was a little over 3 :1. The differential for potatoes was now 1.6:1; vegetables, 1.4:1; meat, 2.5 :1; milk, 2.2:1; eggs, 2.5:1. [18]

A further move to rationalise the complex price system was made by Khruschchev on June 17, 1958, when he suggested that the Government abolish altogether the system of obligatory deliveries and unify the different types of procurement into a single system of state purchases.

Instead of the multiple price structure, single prices were now fixed by the state for each product within a region. Provision was made for an annual review of prices with a view to raising or lowering them to cover sharp fluctuations in output, thus paying more attention to the law of supply and demand.

Another feature of the new system was an emphasis on greater specialisation regionally. Under the old system practically every region was supposed to deliver grain to the government. Now regions cultivating a principal crop, say, cotton, or specialising in livestock production, might be exempt from grain deliveries.

Actually the new system did not mean the total abolition of obligatory deliveries. They have disappeared only in the sense that the purchase at extremely low prices has stopped. Available information shows that there was a redistribution of prices as between commodities, but in actual fact, as Khrushchev made clear, the state did not expect to pay any more for the total produce than it had paid hitherto. [19]

(The 1958 price revision was connected with the transfer of agricultural machinery from the MTS to the Kolkhozes [B] – so that henceforth farms would directly bear the costs of operating machinery as well as the burden of replacing and expanding the machinery stocks.)

The compulsory principle, however, remains. The government and local government agencies continue to fix the quantities of products to be delivered down to the individual kolkhoz, and the prices they fetch. The procedure prevailing in other countries whereby the producers sell whatever they wish continues to be substituted by marketing largely determined by government needs.

The government still has control over a large part of the kolkhoz output, regardless of the size of the crop or the needs of the kolkhoz members. The latter continue to shoulder the consequences of scarcity.

Altogether the continuous rise of prices paid to agriculturists has been impressive. The average price paid for agricultural goods by the state since Stalin’s death has changed as follows [21]:

A further upward revision of agricultural prices took place in June 1962. This was forced on the Kremlin by the serious meat shortages at the time. In a speech in March 1962 to the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of RSFSR, Khrushchev referred to the unprofitability of animal husbandry. Speaking of his native village, Kalinovka, he said: “... if you take pork and meat and poultry, the production of these at Kalinovka is unprofitable. For every centner of pork sold to the state the kolkhoz incurred a loss of 50 roubles, for every centner of chicken, 60 roubles, for every centner of duck, 6 roubles 60 kopeks. Egg production also runs at a loss. The cost of 1,000 eggs is 88 roubles, the selling price 67 roubles 70 kopeks.” [22] And Kalinovka kolkhoz was one of the best in the country! On June 1, the prices of all meat products were raised. Hitherto the state paid the farmers 59.1 roubles a centner of beef. They new price is 85-97 roubles (prices varying from republic to republic). The corresponding figures for bacon and ham are 82.3 and 120- 135; poultry, 82.2 and 100-160. [23]

The cash income of kolkhozes has increased rapidly since Stalin’s death. The total cash income of all kolkhozes, in millions of new roubles (introduced on January 1 1961), was: 2,070 in 1940, 3,420 in 1950; 9,520 in 1957; 13,680 in 1959: and 13,300 in 1960. [24]

Alas, with all the improvements in the prices paid to agriculturists for their produce, they continue to be on the whole a submerged section of the community with living standards considerably below those of the urban people – and these are far from being lavish. Thus, for instance, while the rural population made up about 53 per cent of the total population in 1958 [25], its share of state plus cooperative sales amounted to only 26 per cent of the total trade turnover that year. [26]

Kolkhoz members are further discriminated against by not being covered by any of the state social insurance schemes. Workers and other state employees are entitled to old-age pensions, disability pensions, sickness allowances, etc., at state expense. Not so the kolkhoz members: they are entitled only to support from the farm assistance funds, which are usually very meagre; old-age pensions. disability pensions, etc., are small compared with the state benefits. The kolkhoznik is also not entitled to a two-weeks’ paid holiday every year like the state workers and employees nor to the limitation of the working day as guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and by more recent laws and decrees.

Stalin’s heirs also took steps to give positive state aid to agriculture.

These occurred in three main directions: (1) the-Virgin Land Campaign, (2) the Maize Campaign, and (3) increased state capital investment in agriculture.

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The Virgin Land Campaign

A major project in Khrushchev’s agricultural policies was the opening up of virgin lands for grain cultivation.

In the years 1953 to 1958 the sown grain area of the USSR was increased by about 35 million hectares, or some 17 per cent [27] – an area almost equal to the combined arable land area of France, West Germany and Britain. These figures in themselves denote a most impressive achievement.

In appraising them, however, certain considerations must be taken into account.

First of all, the weather in the Northern Kazakhstan. and Western Siberian region is extremely unreliable. In Western Canada, where conditions are very similar, the accepted minimum annual precipitation necessary for cultivation is 13 inches. This shows for the fact that as much as 6, 7 or 8 inches of moisture are entirely lost as a result of evaporation, only the balance being Productive. The salinity of the soil also rises rapidly with each inch of declining precipitation and high salinity of course excludes cultivation. In the newly cultivated virgin areas of the USSR high salinity is a widespread phenomenon, and the annual precipitation is usually only 10-12 inches. The margin of moisture above what is lost in direct evaporation is therefore extremely small.

Soil erosion caused by wind, is also very widespread. The President of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the Kazakh SSR. Mukhamet Galiev, stated that some 4 to 5 million hectares of land were subject to wind erosion in the Republic. [28] Shallow ploughing. suggested by the agronomist T. Maltsev, and other measures are no real answer to the problem – they can only lessen erosion somewhat rather than prevent its spreading. The only really effective solution is to plant protective belts of trees, but this takes time and is very expensive.

Light precipitation and frequent drought, widespread salinity of the soil, a short growing season and high temperatures during the central period of crop growth, scorching winds from the desert blowing the soil about and often accompanying devastating droughts – all this makes cultivation in Northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia a very risky proposition.

Khrushchev, however, refused to be daunted by these difficulties. As he enquired of the 20th Congress: “Did we act correctly in developing virgin land in regions subject to drought? Study of the data available shows that even with periodic drought. grain raising in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals is profitable and economical y justified. If in five years we have only two good harvest years, one average and two bad years, then with the comparatively small expenditure which is required for raising grain crops in these conditions, grain can be grown with great advantage and obtained cheaply.” [29]

He expected at that time that the new cultivated land would cover not less than 28-30 million hectares and would produce “on the average no less than 2 milliard poods of grain annually” – or more than 32 million tons. [30]

This proved to be much too optimistic a forecast.

Thus, for instance, the supplies of grain from Altai Krai in Siberia have been falling year by year. In 1956 the average yield was 1.85 tons per hectare. In 1957 it sank to 1.38; in 1958 it was about 1, and in 1959 slightly less than 1. [31] The kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Kazakhstan delivered 15,561,000 tons of grain to the state in 1958, 11,446,000 tons in 1959, 10.5 million in 1960, 7.5 million in 1961. [32]

In launching the virgin land programme in 1954, Khrushchev expected an average yield of 20 bushels per acre, which corresponds more or less to average prairie farming in North America. In the first year, cashing in on stored fertility, the yield was 14.5 bushels. For the next seven years, on a falling curve (except for 1956), the average was 9.2 bushels. In 1963 it fell to a calamitous 5.2 bushels.

It remains a question whether the capital invested in the virgin lands could not have been more profitably employed in raising the very low productivity of land already under cultivation. The Ukraine, once famous as a granary, supplied about a third less grain to the state in the two years 1959-1960 than it had in the late 1940s.

As a long-term solution the reclamation of the virgin lands looks as doubtful a proposition as its record to date. In the years 1955, 1957, 1959 and 1960, 1961, 1963 the yields in the new virgin land areas proved very disappointing.

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The Maize Campaign

What of the second of Khrushchev’s projects, the Maize Campaign?

Up to the death of Stalin maize production in the USSR was limited to the southernmost part of European Russia (Northern Caucasus, Southern Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia). As far as the country as a whole was concerned it was a minor crop, it being generally accepted that maize could profitably be raised only in warm climates. But the temptation to expand maize production on a big scale was great. In the United States maize is the highest yielding major grain per acre. It is the basis on which the livestock industry, particularly hog raising, developed.

So in 1953 a new idea was disseminated, that maize could be grown anywhere, even in the Arctic Circle, and it became the pivot of a drive for a great upswing of agricultural production.

The expansion of maize acreage that followed was astonishing. While in 1953 less than 4 million hectares were under maize, a target of 28 million hectares was set for 1960 by the 20th Congress. Progress was swift, and maize covered 17.9 million hectares in 1955 [33], and 23.9 million in 1956. [34] This campaign also fell upon hard times.

The USSR has no maize belt similar to that of the United States with its unique combination of climatic and soil conditions. In most regions of the USSR it is either too dry or too cold for a good growth of maize.

After numerous failures, therefore, Khrushchev had to call a partial retreat. At an agricultural conference on March 30th, 1957, he declared:

In Moscow oblast, where the situation is above average, kolkhozes last year obtained a yield of 187 centners of maize at the milky-way stage of ripeness per hectare, and 84 centners of green fodder per hectare. Comrades from Ivanovo, Kaluga and other oblasts who spoke here have also given information about even lower maize silage yields. If we are going to get such low yields of maize for silage we should do better to plant potatoes ... Or, better still, sow a vetch-oats mixture ... Or, yet again, sow a clover-Timoty mixture ... The conclusion, therefore, is that maize must yield a minimum of 200-250 centners per hectare or it is not profitable. it would be better first of all to learn to grow it, and in the meantime to sow successfully other fodder crops which the kolkhozes have already learned to produce ... In comparing the yield of one crop with that of another, you should choose the crop which is most profitable under the conditions prevailing on the farms of the rayon in question.

Some of you may say: “What is this? You are sounding the retreat. You have been advocating maize all this time and now you have come around to this approach!” No, comrades, this is not a retreat. I have always regarded maize as the queen of field crops, and still do. There is no crop to compare with maize. But since she is a queen, she calls for a measure of respect; she needs careful tending. Then she will pay proper dividends to those who cultivate her. But if the queen of the field is put away in the backyard, what results can be expected: I repeat once more: maize is an excellent crop but as the saying goes: “He who is unable to catch the firebird should keep a wet hen” – at least some good will be derived by the farm. [35]

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Increased capital investment

A big increase in agricultural investment took place after Stalin’s death. The volume of capital invested in this sector of the economy rose by 73 per cent in 1954-55 and by a further 26 per cent in 1956-57 [36]; during the following two years there was a further increase of 19 per cent; and in both 1960 and 1961 it rose again by 22 per cent. [37] From 1956 to 1960 investments in agriculture amounted to 27,200 million roubles, compared with 13,900 million in the previous five years, that is, they almost doubled. [38]

As a result mechanical agricultural equipment improved considerably. The size of tractor parks (in 15 h.p. units) rose from 1,168,000 tractors in January, 1953, to 2,696,000 on 1 January, 1962. [39] The extra tractors partly served the virgin lands, but even taking this extension of area into account, the equipment per unit of cultivated land rose by some 25 per cent in the years 1953-58.

The number of combine harvesters rose from 282,000 in 1953 to 503,000 on 1 January, 1962. [40]

This improvement, however, is not yet sufficient to raise Russian agriculture to the status of a well-equipped sector of the economy. Although ploughing, the sowing of grain, cotton and sugar-beet, and the harvesting of grain in the kolkhozes was 90 per cent or over mechanised in 1960, maize and potato harvesting and hay mowing were 32, 20 and 53 per cent respectively mechanised, while mechanised water-supply was available for only about one-third of kolkhoz livestock, and inter-farm transport for a still smaller proportion.

Over the last few years the supply of agricultural machinery has not increased at all, but even declined. Thus in 1960 79,000 tractors were delivered to the countryside as against 208,000 in 1957. The corresponding figures for combines for harvesting maize were 13,000 and 55,000. [41] The situation hardly improved in 1961 when 92,400 tractors and 12,600 maize harvesting combines were supplied. [42]

Compared to the advanced countries of the West, the mechanical equipment of Soviet agriculture is poor. Thus, for instance, the numbers of tractors per 100 acres of arable land in USSR was 0.2 in 1960, while in the United Kingdom it was 2.48: W. Germany, 3.24; Belgium, 1.51; France,1.04; Netherlands, 2.60; USA, 2.5. [43] The number of combines per 1,000 acres of cereals was 0.8 in USSR, while in the United Kingdom it was 6.0; W. Germany, 2.60; France, 1.69; Belgium, 1.43. [44]

A comparison of the number of tractors per head of the agricultural population places Russia in an even worse light: thus Russia has nearly 20 times as many people employed in agriculture as the United States (even though Soviet tractors are bigger.)

Coming nearer home, compared with Soviet industry, the capital equipment of Soviet agriculture shows up very poorly. Thus in 1957 the total capital funds of the kolkhozes was 98.9 million roubles, or less than 3,000 roubles per able-bodied kolkhoznik. “Such an accumulation after tens of years of work in the kolkhozes is very modest indeed.” In comparison the investment per worker in industry at the beginning of 1957 (calculated in 1955 prices) was more than 44,000 roubles. [45]

The 60 per cent rise in the supply of fertilisers, the doubling of the annual tractor deliveries, the 2½-fold expansion in the annual capital investment in agriculture, all achieved within half a decade, have not been enough to overcome the crisis in agriculture. But without them the achievements would be even smaller.

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Dismantling some of Stalin’s organisational structures:
A short step back from overcentralised planning

In his report to the Central Committee in September 1953,Khrushchev blamed five factors for the failure of agriculture: overcentralised bureaucratic planning, mismanagement of the Machine Tractor Stations, misguided state procurement and price policies, economically harmful state discrimination against kolkhozniks’ private plots, and inadequate investment. And at the centre of this very overcentralised planning structure stood a person – Stalin – who was wholly out of touch with the countryside. As he firmly said in his “secret” speech at the 20th Congress:

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never travelled anywhere, did not meet city and kolkhoz workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces. He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture. Many films so pictured kolkhoz life that the tables were bending from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was actually so ... The last time he visited a village was in January 1928, when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces? [46]

In his Report to the Central Committee of the Party in September 1953, Khrushchev complained that the Ministry of Agriculture

is a very unwieldy structure, embracing as it does a multiplicity of divisions and departments which duplicate one another and whose work is often ineffective. Small wonder that the Ministry does not display promptness and precision in the guidance of its local organs, and allows bureaucracy and red tape to interfere with the decision of urgent problems. The Ministry has but slight knowledge of what is being done in practice, has no direct contact with the collective farms and MTSs. Without knowing what is really happening in the localities, the Ministry endeavours to regulate from the centre all the activities of the local agricultural organs, the collective farms and the MTSs, and all too often issues instructions on matters concerning which the localities do not need instruction. [47]

The shortcomings in the work of the Ministry are very glaringly reflected in the way it plans agriculture.

The plans include many unnecessary items which shackle the initiative of the local organs, the MTSs and the collective farms. Suffice it to say that the plans issued to the collective farms for crop growing and animal husbandry alone comprise 200 to 250 items ... The extremely large number of programmes assigned, each embracing a multiplicity of items, necessitates the compilation of an inordinate number of returns of all kinds ... In the course of the year every collective farm submits to its district agricultural authority returns covering some ten thousand different statistical items. The volume of statistical data the collective farms have to submit today is nearly eight times as great as it was before the war. [48]

Some seven months later Izvestia complained that the malady of centralised planning, topheavy bureaucracy and paper pyramids had still not been alleviated. “Papers, the compilation of directives, and resolutions, have concealed vital and practical work from officials of the Moldavian Republic Ministry of Agriculture. The Republic’s MTS receive a tremendous. number of orders and instructions from this Ministry. In two months alone they received 278 various report forms, of which the form for the laying in of seed stocks alone consisted of 266 items. Approximately 2,400 letters and an equal number of telegrams were sent out from the Kursk Province Agricultural Administration in the last quarter of 1953. About 5,000 directives – 40 documents per day – went out from the Sumy Province agricultural Administration in four months.” [49]

A month later, Pravda reported:

Outrageous facts pertaining to formal; bureaucratic methods of leadership on the part of the Union Ministries of Agriculture and State Farms were disclosed recently. Suffice it to say that during 11 months last year 3,846 orders, 2,330 circulars, 856,000 different letters and 67,300 telegrams were sent out to local areas and an average of 23 lb. of paper was used per day. Many of the directives appeared futile and impractical.

In one month the Vladimir Province Agricultural Administration sent 140 different directives, including 25 orders, to the Yuryev-Polsky MTS. In connection with sowing preparations Comrade Pitter, an official of this administration, demanded last December that the MTS make a report in reply to 281 questions put by him. Shortly afterwards, another official of this same administration demanded information on 925 points.

The Moldavian Republic Council of Ministers is very much taken up with paper work, having in 1953 adopted more than 1.500 resolutions and dispatched an enormous quantity of letters, telegrams, directives and instructions. The Ministry of Agriculture of this same republic sent 26,000 directives and letters of instruction to various organisations last year.

A considerable portion of the apparatus of Union Ministries and depots, of republic, province and district organisations and of specialists at enterprises, MTS and sovkhozes, is busy compiling reports, memoranda, resolutions, decisions, directives, telegrams, replies and accountings. Trained personnel are diverted from concrete, efficient work in guiding industry, transportation, agriculture and cultural construction, with a resultant serious lowering in the level of work of the apparatuses and great damage to agriculture.

It is essential to curtail correspondence drastically and as soon as possible, to end the flood of paper ... [50]

Khrushchev himself showed how ludicrous the situation was when he said:

... there are 422 administrations, departments and sections the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. The reorganisation carried out here has been such that now there is one chief for every two employees. [51]

Another evil of overcentralised planning was the tendency to overlook natural conditions, which are so important for the development of agriculture. In the words of Pravda: “The opinion was widespread that natural conditions are allegedly not an obstacle to the development of any branch of the economy in all regions of the country or that in any event they can easily’ be overcome. In particular, these notions have caused some economists to deny that there are zones and regions of agricultural specialisation which vary according to natural conditions.”

The result? “... the foisting of spring wheat on southern regions and particularly on the Ukraine, in the face of years of experience which have shown that winter wheat is more productive here. At the same time, it was planned to plant winter grains in regions of Siberia, the Urals and Kazakhstan for a number of years, despite the objections of local officials, and even though winter grains in these regions ordinarily produce considerably less than spring ones. Mechanical extension of the grass-field system to regions where it does not fit in with local conditions, in particular to the south and southeast, has caused major harm to agriculture. [52]

The procedure of “planning” started with the Ministry of Agriculture in Moscow, which decided the acreage of different crops to be sown from year to year, the number of livestock, and even the yield per acre; It passed down to the governments of the various republics and provinces of the Union which were responsible for the execution of these plans and which set local goals, including targets for each kolkhoz and sovkboz. The general meeting of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz members, having no legal power to reject the Plan, rubber-stamped it. Such planning, or, rather, bureaucratic dictation, of course stifles the initiative of the farmers.

It has been a major aim of the Kremlin after Stalin’s death to mitigate this overcentralisation.

The most important move towards decentralisation was made in January 1955 when Khrushchev announced an end to the central setting of a sowing and animal husbandry plan. He had no intention, however, of giving up all centralised direction of agriculture. The delivery quotas were still to be determined centrally, by the Council of Ministers which would issue a plan containing overall tasks for procurement of crops and livestock produce by compulsory deliveries, payment in kind to MTS, contract and other purchases, and also the overall amount of tractor work to be carried out by the MTS in the kolkhozes. This would pass down through the hierarchy to kolkhoz level. But the production plan of the individual kolkhoz would be drawn up by the kolkhoz itself “with the participation of the MTS”.

These concrete plans at the kolkhoz level for sown areas by crops and numbers of livestock by type were to be attuned to the fulfilment of the state procurement plan, for which purpose they had to be approved by the district executive committee, whose responsibility it was to see that this was done; if not, it was their duty to “instruct the kolkhozes to make the necessary changes in the plan”. [53]

Since the central procurement plan played a decisive role: in agricultural production generally, the freedom of the kolkhozes to plan the balance of their output could be Only marginal. But even this was an advance on the rigidity of the Stalinist system. Further important steps in the same direction of decentralisation of planning were brought about with the dismantling of the MTS and the abolition of the obligatory delivery system – with which we deal below. But here again it will be revealed that while Khrushchev is quite ready to admit that genuine decentralisation of agricultural planning is necessary, his methods are somewhat less spectacular – leaving intact a very large measure of bureaucratic regimentation.

Chapter 11 Index

Dismantling of the machine tractor stations

For a long time Stalin’s heirs could not make up their minds what to do with that important weapon of centralised control, the MTS, and they dallied between grasping it more firmly in their hands and relaxing the use made of it.

In the beginning of the post-Stalin era, it was decided to strengthen the role of the MTS in the management of kolkhoz agriculture.

One way of doing this was to transfer the labour force of kolkhozniks hitherto seasonably employed by the MTS to its permanent staff. The tractor drivers had been seasonably recruited from the kolkhoz, and this was not conducive to steady work and high labour productivity.

Another way of strengthening the role of the MTS was the appointment in September 1953, of a Party Secretary with a staff of Party Instructors for each MTS, and these were individually responsible for a specific kolkhoz. [54] Thus the MTS became, even more than hitherto, the focus of real power.

When, in addition to the monopoly over farm machinery, and the commission to the MTS Party Secretary of full responsibility for kolkhoz work, an added responsibility was delegated to the MTS in 1955 – that of getting in the procurements which had hitherto been the function of the Ministry of Procurements – the control of the MTS over kolkhoz production became practically complete.

In discussing the new function of the MTS, Khrushchev pointed out the central role they were to play in planning and procurement, saying: “In agriculture the MTS must be our stronghold. The main creators of goods in agriculture are the MTS, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Hence the conclusion: now that the MTS decide the outcome of production of the main agricultural products, they are able also to take upon themselves responsibility for conducting procurements in the kolkhozes. The MTS director and all his workers must be responsible not only for the output of agricultural produce, but also for the fulfilment of the procurements plan.” [55]

The new set-up did not fulfil its creators’ intentions and proved far from satisfactory. The existence of the MTS system parallel to the directorship of the kolkhozes meant a dualism of management in agriculture, or, as Khruschchev said sometime later: “Two bosses on the land.” [56]

The fact that the MTS had to serve a vast area added to inefficiency. Some tractors might be operating hundreds of miles away from their base, with which they often communicated by radio. Or a kolkhoz official who might require a tractor or combine-harvester for some urgent job might have to apply to very remote MTS headquarters.

Duality of management in itself caused friction and wastage. This was aggravated by the faulty pricing system prevailing for MTS services. For one and the same work there were varying rates of pay. Thus, to plough “with one and the same tractor, one and the same plough to one and the same depth, the rate of payment in kind in the Estonian SSR was, for grain, 35 kg. of grain, ... for fodder it is 35 litres of milk, and for potatoes, 200 kg. of potatoes.” [57] Expressed in monetary terms, these three categories of ploughing cost the kolkhoz 28 roubles, 42 roubles, and 106 roubles respectively.

The differences sometimes assumed quite fantastic proportions. One hectare of land ploughed for oil-bearing plants cost 4.40 roubles, while the same for sugar beet cost 256 roubles. [58]

The criterion of MTS success-measuring achievement in hectares of standard ploughing-was very crude. The effort to attain the greatest performance per tractor resulted in work being performed at a time when it was of no benefit. to the kolkhoz, or, if timely, it was performed hastily, and therefore badly. At the same time work was left undone because its equivalent in standard ploughing was less favourable than that of some less important operation. The advantage to the MTS of such practices was enhanced by its preoccupation with saving fuel, which was the biggest element in the cost of tractor, work. MTS workers who economised in fuel were given a special bonus, which led to the obvious result that lighter work in which less fuel was consumed was often performed at the expense of more important, but heavier fuel-consuming tasks. Another highly detrimental result was shallow ploughing.

The dual management of agriculture became particularly incongruous with the merging of the kolkhozes which often meant that one MTS was serving only a single large kolkhoz.

And so, at last after 30 years of the monstrous arrangement of “two bosses” on the land, early in 1958, there was an abrupt about-face – from heavy reliance on the MTS for centralised control, to their liquidation. After some limited public discussion by specialists. Khrushchev announced on January 22nd that the MTSs were to sell most of their machinery to the kolkhozes and thus be divested of their former vital functions. [59]

Chapter 11 (cont’d)

Chapter 11 Index

Footnotes

A. In practice such losses are much greater. In 1935, 20.5 per cent of the total winter rye crop, 23.6 per cent of spring barley and 21% per cent of oats were lost between field and barn in all kolkhozes. [7]

B. See below.

Notes

1. J.V. Stalin, Works, Russian, Vol.XII, p.132.

2. Pravda, 4 December 1935.

3. G. Malenkov, Report to the Nineteenth Party Con gress of the Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), Moscow 1952, p.66.

4. Ibid., p.68.

5. Pravda, 7 Sept. 1953

6. N. Anisimov, The Development of Agriculture in the Fifth Five-Year Plan, Russian, Moscow 1935, p.30.

7. Sotsialisticheskaya Rekonstruktsiya Selskogo Khozyaistva, 1937, No.5, pp.91-2. Quoted in Prokopovich, Biulleten Ekonomicheskogo Kabineta Prof. S.N. Prokopovicha, November-December 1937, No.138.

8. Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSTJ, 15-19, December. 1958, Russian, Moscow 1958, p.13

9. N.S. Khrushchev, Measures for the Further Development of Agriculture in the USSR, Moscow 1953, p.21.

10. Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 15-19 December 1958, Russian, Moscow 1958, p.80.

11. National Economy of the USSR in 1956, Russian, Moscow 1956, p.17.

12. Ibid., p.187.

13. ibid., p.17.

14. Khrushchev, Measures, etc, op. cit., p.16.

15. L. Volin, Soviet Agricultural Policy after Stalin – Results and Prospects, Journal of Farm Economics, May 1956.

16. Economic Survey of Europe in 1953, Geneva 1954, p.56.

17. A. Nebenzya, in Ekonomika Selsko Khozyaistva. 1958, No.4.

18. N. Nimitz, Soviet Agricultural Prices and Costs, Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Washington 1959, p.266.

19. Soviet News, 1 July 1958; Pravda, 21 June 1958.

20. Agriculture in the USSR. A Statistical Compilation, Russian, Moscow 1960, pp.60, 61, 204, 205.

21. Ibid., p.117.

22. Pravda, 28 March 1962.

23. Pravda, 1 June 1962.

24. Agriculture in the USSR. A Statistical Compilation, Russian, Moscow 1960, p.56; The National Economy of the USSR in 1960, Russian, Moscow 1961, p.492.

25. National Economy of USSR 1958, Russian, Moscow 1959, p.7.

26. Ibid., p.709.

27. Plenum of the C.C. etc., op. cit., p.14.

28. Izvestia, 16 November 1958.

29. Pravda, 15 February 1956.

30. ibid.

31. Sovetskaya Rossiya, 28 December 1959.

32. Pravda, 6 March 1962.

33. Pravda, 23 July 1955.

34. Pravda, 31 January 1957.

35. Pravda, 1 April 1957.

36. Selskaya Zhizn, 23 October 1962.

37. Pravda, 6 March 1962.

38. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Economic Survey of Europe 1961, Geneva 1962, Part I, pp.11-19.

39. N.S. Khrushchev’s Report to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., 17 October 1961, Pravda, 18 October 1961.

40. Pravda, 6 March 1962.

41. Pravda, 23 January 1961.

42. Pravda, 6 March 1962.

43. D.B. Wallace, Our Farmers can Compete, The Times Supplement on Agriculture, 5 December 1960.

44. Ibid.

45. S.G. Strumilin, On the Paths of Construction of Communism, Russian, Moscow 1959, p.67.

46. Khrushchev’s “secret” speech on Stalin, February 25, 1956, published in translation in The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism, New York 1956.

47. Khrushchev, Measures. etc., op. cit., p.73.

48. Ibid.

49. Izvestia, Editorial, 2 March 1954.

50. Pravda, 17 April 1954.

51. Speech to the Soviet of the Union, April 26 1954, Pravda, 27 April 1954.

52. A. Tulupnikov, On Planning and Balanced Development of Branches of Agriculture, Pravda, 4 October 1955.

53. Pravda, 11 March 1955.

54. Pravda, 13 September 1953.

55. Pravda, 3 February 1955.

56. Pravda, 25 January 1958.

57. Ekonomika Selskogo Khozyaistva, 1957, No.5, p.81.

58. Ibid., 1957, No.2, p.126.

59. Pravda, 25 January 1958.

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Last updated on 3.9.2002