MIA > Archive > Nicolai Bukharin
From International Press Correspondence, Vol. 3 No. 46, 28 June 1923, pp. 455–457.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
June 18, 1923
The utterances made by comrades of the Norwegian Party created the impression as if the Executive of the Comintern had underestimated the Norwegian Party. I repeat once agaln that the consider the Norwegian Party a great mass party of the working class, as one of the best and most important of our parties. It is this very reason which makes it our duty to criticize the erratic standpoint of the Norwegian comrades.
The question of centralism In the Communist International, the most important point of concern for the Norwegian comrades is by no means a new question. It arose in Its acutest form after the collapse of the Second International. The collapse of the Second International was also rooted in the fact that from the point of view of organization, it was simply a letter-box. It was not a miltant unified organization, it was not out for international mass action, and it was always dominated by the national aspect. Pompous speeches were delivered at its Congresses, but whenever it came to real action, the organization was not in it. The Hague Conference presented a similar exhibition last Autumn, when resolutions were passed in favour of the general strike, but when the time came for action, all these high-sounding resolutions proved mere scraps of paper, owing to the fact that there was no central and unified organization. Thus it was not by any accident that this lack of proper organization was pointed out at the very beginning of the crystalization of the communist idea. This was already stated at that time partly by us and partly by Rosa Luxemburg. In the following thesis:
The new International, which shall be founded, must he a unified organization. in which the national aspect is completely subordinated to the international, and eo ipso, the national decisions must be subordinated to the international decisions of the World Organization of the proletariat. Much was written anent this subject in the Scandinavian press at the time. I was then living in Scandinavia, and I found complete understanding upon this Question between the representatives of the Russian Party and the Scandinavian comrades. This thesis of the predominance of the international consciousness, of international decisions and of international opinion in the world organization of the proletariat, was. at that time, acknowledged everywhere in Austria and in Germany by the then left wing radicals, who were subsequently to be known as the communists. Taking a retrospective glance at the past history of the Third International, recalling the Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conferences as well as the first Congress of the Third International, we may see the constantly growing realization of this fundamental principle in practice, and after the founding of the Communist International at the time of the victories of the Russian army and of the great offensive of the working class of Western Europe, we see the growth of this fundamental Principle and its realization. It was at that time that comrade lull, one of the ideologists of the Majority of the Norwegian Party, wrote in the Sozialdemokrat to the effect that: “either the new International was going to exist, in that case it would become the centralized head-quarters of the World Revolution, or else it would not exist at all”. Thus we find that at the time of the great offensive of the working class, even the wavering elements were full of sympathy for the Communist International. and even the leading representative of the ideology of the present majority of the Norwegian Party recognized the necessity of centralization in our World Organization. Now. when the working class is on the defensive, all the wavering elements feel a revulsion from their pro-communist sentiments, and they begin to critize. The social basis of these criticisms economically as well as sociologically – consists of the remnants of petty bourgeois economy and ideology. In the arguments of the Norwegian comrades we may discover also Proudhonistic views, and this is conceivable because we have dealt here with representatives of parties who live in relative isolation in their petty bourgeois countries and are subject to these petty bourgeois views. A second reason is to be found in the mechanical application, to our own organization of methods that were quite proper with regard to the social-democracy. This gives rise to a certain historical “vis inertiae”. The methods that were formerly rightly applied to destroy the influence of the social-democratic leaders are now used against our own organization. Also here in Russia, we frequently had to encounter this “vis inertiae” in the minds of our comrades who. after the conquest of power by the proletariat, were clamouring against centralization of the army. A third reason for the erratic standpoint of the Norwegian comrades, is due to the situation in Norway and in Scandinavia generally. The Norwegian comrades have not gone through the experiences of war and revolutionary upheavals. The Scandinavian countries, unlike the other countries of Western Europe., were not carried away by the great whirl of world events: they have their being and feel themselves – comical as this may sound – to be, to some extent, to the pre-war period. They have not learnt the importance of the centralized fight against the bourgeois state. They have not yet sustained the blows of the whole brutality of the bourgeois state, and therefore the remnants of idyllic ideology persist in their minds. Amid the disturbed ocean of world history they live upon an island, so to speak: they, more than any other group of our Party, were isolated from the entire movement of the proletariat. All these reasons combined to form the present ideology of the majority of the Norwegian Party.
I now come to the proofs. The “profoundest” of them, as is usually the case, comes from a professor, from Comrade Bull. Comrade Bull, himself well versed in theories, always attempts to substantiate his tactical attitude by drawing all the possible consequences. I will now let Comrade Bull speak for himself.
“There is a difference between the working class (between its economic and social development and consequently also the revolutionary possibilities) in Russia, in the East, in South-Eastern and Western Europe. The Russia revolution was accomplished by a nation of illiterates, in a country where modern industry has hardly reached the age of manhood, where the working class is consequently quite new and without traditions: in a country where the autocracy had prevented the population from taking part in politics, where the Trade Unions were an impossibility, and so forth. Substantially the same conditions prevail in the East and in South Eastern Europe. The conditions in Western Europe are the very opposite. Universal popular education, century-old industries, a working class with strong traditions, long participation in politics, old established and strong Trade Unions, free public discussion, and so forth.”
And what tactical conclusions does he draw? He writes:
„Naturally the most prominent leaders of the International can see these things clearly In theory. But in practice the consequences are either ignored or they are imperfectly drawn, and this happens for two reasons: 1. The most prominent leaders are practically all Russians, and in their ideas they are naturally influenced by their own Russian experiences: 2. The Executive Committee – having ceased to consider the revolution in Germany as an immediate task – now concentrates its activity upon the East and upon South-Eastern Europe. This is a policy which has a very great deal in its favour, particularly from the standpoint of Russian foreign policy, and so forth, and so forth.“
Here we have the theoretical foundation of all the tactical Questions. Bull asserts, in tune with the bourgeois press, that the Communist International is a tool of the Russian Government, and that the workers of the West should therefore not be compelled to adapt themselves to these methods which befit only the backward conditions of barbaric Russia.
I believe that already at this Session It will be demonstrated that the Norwegian and Swedish comrades are holding such views in complete isolation, in our ranks. There cannot be any talk of an isolation of the proletariat of Western Europe, Including Sweden, from the Russian proletariat. The isolation of the Swedish comrades is due to the following reasons. We have gone through 3 revolutions, the Germans through one, Austria and a number of other countries have experienced tremendous oppression on the part of their bourgeoisie. With blood and iron they have been taught the necessity of international centralism. At first it was the theory of the Norwegians to unite with the rest of the West Europeans against Russia and to create another organisation. When this failed, we heard the new version by comrade Falk, who said that the Norwegian Party was a Communist Party, but that It relied on its own traditions. This is something quite different, and it is true. I fully admit that the Norwegian Party has its traditions its specific features, and that its development has created a special form of organisation. But how do we as the vanguard deal with these traditions? It is not our business to preserve them, but rather to overcome them by wise methods. By substituting a federation for the militant organisation of the proletariat, we would knock the bottom out of our movement. Now we are accused of the desire artificially to radicalize the Norwegian Party, then we are said to be too opportunist. Thus, for instance, the totally wrong allegation is made that the opportunist dangers are centred in our centralisation. In an article in the Arbeiderbladet, for instance, the situation is depicted as though centralization was the cause of the collapse of the Second International. Whereas, the actual reason of the collapse of the Second International was because it was not a centralized International. Another instance. In Tranmael’s article the statement is made that Moscow, i.e. the Communist International, is building from the top downwards. Among other things, we read in that article:
“This form of organization and membership, existent in Norway, is of paramount Importance to the socialist movement, for it thereby penetrates Into the heart of socialism, into the social economy. Thus the industries should be conquered from the workshops up and through the workers employed therein; perhaps slowly, but surely and with ever increasing influence we will gain the control over industrial life and production.”
Thus we see here the following idea: The workers are always to be won in the workshops, we take the control of production tn a few factories at first, then in a few more, and eventually in all of them. The bourgeoisie – mind you – allows us to all this without any interference. This is a perfectly opportunistic postulate which can find a place In the heads of those who have never tried the capture of the industries, who have never experienced the blows of the bourgeoisie. Our postulate for the revolution is that our fight for the conquest of the means of production shall be accompanied by civil war. Once we concede that the revolution is civil war, then we must co-ordinate and guide all our forces, then we conceive entirely differed necessities by way of organization. In these fights we will sustain the least number of victims if we will have these lights systematically centralized. The idea of the Norwegian Executive about the evolutionary course of events is based on the tact that the Norwegian comrades have not yet led in any real fighting; it is the syndicalist theory of “leaving the State alone”. The Norwegian comrades should recollect that we have already seen a certain evolution among the French syndicalists. The experiences of the war and of the revolution have caused a part of the French syndicalists to overcome these views. We have a living testimony in the person of Comrade Rosmer. Of course, centralism has its dangers, and particularly in times of peace these dangers were great But it is decidedly dangerous, in countries where the power has to be conquered by sanguinary struggles, to come along and say: We want no headquarters, because this involves the danger of bureaucratization. The Christiania proposal, in which the concrete ideas on organization are presented Lorn the standpoint of the Norwegian comrades, to put it briefly, would enforce democratic Wilsonism upon our Party. For instance, among other things it says that the deciding vote should be vested in the individual members. Does it mean that every member shall be absolutely autonomous, and subject to no discipline whatever? The fact is that Tranmael and Bell themselves enforce the most rigid discipline with regard to their faction. I believe that we would gain much more respect from the workers by telling them that there must be a central leadership, than my feeding them on illusions of self-determination, individualism and the like.
With regard to the question of the imperative mandate, we find the standpoint of the Norwegian Party wrong again. Let us take the conflicts within the various parties. Here imperative mandates can have the effect of Icing predestined against the eventual decision of the Executive. Thus we would have here a cause of permanent conflict. How could we have solved the French conflict if the French delegates had come here with imperative mandates? Also with regard to the election of the Executive members. I believe that the Fourth Congress has acted quite properly. The World Congress of the Communist International, the embodiment of the whole Labour movement, can also choose a comrade who represents the minority faction. Naturally this can be done only in an exceptional case, when it is imperatively dictated by the situation ... The demand that only such Executive delegates should be sent to national Party Congresses as are welcome to the parties concerned is technically impossible and also politically inexpedient. The same about the demand for the convening of a National Congress prior to the world Congress, in case the national sections would bind themselves by decisions of Party Congresses prior to the World Congress, this would unquestionably lead to conflicts. At the World Congress the experiences of all the sections are summed up, and, if the delegates come with imperative mandates, they are not in a position to change their attitude. Then again, the question of resignations, as to whether the Executive or the Party Executive shall have the right of vetoing such resignations, it has been shown in practice that in cases of emergency the Executive must frequently intervene. With regard to the question of the Youth, it is quite proper that the Youth organisations shall in all questions be subordinated to their respective parties: but when a conflict arises between the Party and the International, we cannot forbid the Youth organisation from taking a stand as Communists. With regard to internal intervention, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between internal and external questions. For instance, the personal composition of a Party Executive may be of international importance. Our conflicts with the Norwegian Party originated in the criticism of the attitude of the Executive in the French question. Ask any French comrade, whether the World Congress acted rightly or wrongly, whether or no an improvement was brought about? In a similar manner we intervened in various other countries, lately in Germany, and all these parties are now in a much better state after the intervention by the Executive. A new mental attitude towards the Communist International must be created within the Norwegian and Swedish Party. The mistrust of the Communist International must be overcome. The comrades and the parties who really helped establish the International, know how to appreciate and trust it. This must be the case also with the Norwegian Party. I conclude with the hope that our fraternal Norwegian Party will overcome its defects in the spirit of our principles.
Last updated on 2 September 2021