

Chapter IX

LONG-TERM BASES OF SOVIET-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION

WHEN ROOSEVELT SPOKE WITH STALIN AT YALTA about the project to raise the issue of independence for the colonial peoples in the United Nations' Conference, was he expressing a personal whim or a long-term trend of American policy? This is a very serious question, for if the answer is that America does not have and will not have, under our present organization of society, a consistent anticolonial policy, such an answer wipes out the prospects for any really long-term co-operation between this country and the Soviet Union. In that case, Soviet-American co-operation must remain on the precarious foundation of day-to-day agreement on current questions. But if, on the other hand, America has—or might reasonably be expected to have—a serious policy directed toward colonial liberation, that fact in itself provides a foundation for long-term co-operation.

It is my opinion, reached after long study and much hesitation, that the United States of America is in process of establishing a long-term policy directed toward the dissolution of the colonial system. This chapter is a condensed statement of the considerations that led me to this conclusion.

Because this issue goes deeper than current events, to the very structure of world power, I have had to answer the objections raised against my conclusion from the point of view of orthodox Marxism, i.e., the already established presumption of most Marxian thought that colonialism is an invariable and unalterable characteristic of capitalism in its final stage of development.

When the United States decided, before World War II, to grant independence to the Philippine Islands at a fixed future date (July 4, 1946), this was generally understood in the world as a special case, as a deviation from the standard pattern of imperialism brought about by special causes, but one which could not be expected fundamentally to alter the system of colonialism, in which it was expected the United States as a great imperialist power would ultimately demand its place.

It is now becoming clear, however, that the policy of the U.S. is more and more definitely and energetically orientating toward the dissolution of the system of colonial empire; the step of granting independence to the Philippines is now seen in the light, not of a special case, but of the first step in a comprehensive world policy. The United States is, tentatively and with many hesitations, but nonetheless definitely, setting itself a new imperial pattern from which colonialism is excluded.

This is a step of such profound consequences that one cannot judge lightly, upon the basis of surface events, that it is a serious long-term policy which will be carried to anything like its logical conclusions. Such a judgment can only be made upon the basis of a funda-

mental examination of economic factors and of the whole structure of world power relationships. Only if such an analysis reveals the operation of new relationships and factors, not before decisive, can it be assumed that the apparent new U.S. policy of anticolonialism is more than an ephemeral tactic, that it is indeed a long-term policy.

The question arises, first of all, whether the new anti-colonial trend of policy is nothing more than one of F.D.R.'s New Deal experiments, owing its vogue to the exigencies of wartime and soon to be discarded as the country returns to "normalcy."

There can be no doubt of Roosevelt's role in shaping and applying the new policy trend. In this respect it is one of the outstanding achievements of the Roosevelt New Deal. But it differs from most of the characteristic Roosevelt policies in this respect, that it never became the center of those violent controversies which raged around F.D.R. and that it always gained more universal acceptance (or at least toleration) than any other of the typical Roosevelt policies. It has had the active support of circles which were usually anti-Roosevelt. This comparative absence of sharp, stubborn and systematic opposition to the rise and development of anticolonialism as a prominent feature of U.S. foreign policy would seem to support the judgment that it is a fundamental and long-term trend with deep economic roots.

There is a wealth of evidence to support the foregoing general statement. I confine myself to citing two examples of comment from anti-Roosevelt journals at

the moment I was first drafting the basic argument of this chapter.

The *New York Herald Tribune* of January 3, 1946, in an editorial on the Anglo-American conflict over the terms of peace with Siam, in which the U.S. intervened to protect Siamese independence, proceeded to some illuminating generalizations. It said:

This episode adds one more lesson, the most recent of many, to illustrate the fact that British and American interests in the Far East are not identical. America and Britain stand for the same principles in many areas of the world, but it must be recognized, to make possible realistic American policy, that a Britain with vast colonies in Asia cannot have precisely the same viewpoint there as America. American policy in Asia, if it grows out of reasonable political and economic motives, should be based on a desire for peace and for profitable trade. Peace is not to be assured in Asia without giving Asiatic peoples an opportunity to realize within a reasonable limit of time their desire for self-government. Profitable trade cannot be carried on by America with poverty-stricken agricultural colonies, but only with nations which do considerable manufacturing and have a surplus income—free of imperialistic restrictions—with which to buy capital goods, such as electric generators, and luxury goods, such as automobiles. Even the most casual study of foreign-trade statistics supports this argument.

My second quotation is from the *United States News*, edited by David Lawrence, of December 28, 1945. From an article entitled "Stake in the Javanese Revolt: Fate of Colonial System," come the following revealing sentences:

Fate of the colonial system in the most populous area of the world is regarded by U.S. officials as at stake in the

outcome of the uprising in Java. . . . The U.S. position is that the Allied mandate to Lord Mountbatten does not extend beyond the job of disarming the Japanese and liberating the Allied prisoners and internees. This Government is not taking sides as between the British and Dutch on the one hand and the Indonesians on the other. Early in the fighting, the British were asked to remove any American labels from the Lend-Lease trucks and weapons they were using. Now the U.S. is urging an early settlement of issues between the Dutch and Indonesians. Meanwhile, no ships in Java's ports are being loaded, and rubber and sugar badly needed in this country are not available . . . Looking ahead, it appears that the whole question of colonial policy in Asia is to be laid on the doorstep of the United Nations organization. The U.S. will share in the responsibility for any decisions concerning that policy. And signs are multiplying that the old-time system of colonial imperialism may be doomed.

When such expressions come, as a matter of course, from typical spokesmen of Republican conservatism and big business, it may be assumed that the basis of support in all classes for the anticolonial policy initiated by Roosevelt is far broader and has deeper roots than was the case of most New Deal policies. It seems already to be established as a bipartisan national policy supported equally by capital and labor, and almost immune from serious challenge.

A great deal of confusion has arisen in public discussion about the U.S. anticolonial trend around the question of whether this country is becoming anti-imperialist. The violent controversies have contributed more heat than light.

"The age of imperialism is ended," declared Sumner

Welles, then Under-Secretary of State, in his famous speech of May 30, 1942, the first definite and official exposition of the new U.S. anticolonial policy.

Mr. Welles in this phrase obviously used the term "imperialism" as synonymous with "colonialism" or "the colonial system." Indeed, in the same paragraph, he so defined the term, when he went on to say: "The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized, as the civilized world long since recognized the right of an individual to his personal freedom. The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole—in all oceans and in all continents."

Among those whose understanding and definition of imperialism is much broader than colonialism, it is impossible, of course, to accept Mr. Welles's formulation that "the age of imperialism is ended" without making it sharply clear that what is meant is the colonial system and nothing more. There are deeper, more fundamental, manifestations of imperialism than the colonial system, and it makes only for confusion and misunderstanding (as well as illusions), to use the two terms as interchangeable.

The United States is not pursuing an anti-imperialist policy when it takes the line of anticolonialism, if imperialism is properly understood in its modern sense as the highest stage of capitalism in which finance capital and monopoly predominate and in which export of capital becomes the characteristic feature of the relations of the imperialist power with the rest of the world. On the contrary in this understanding of the term "imperialism" the United States is the most powerful im-

perialist country in the world. Indeed, American anti-colonialism gains its most immediately effective support precisely from the fact that it is an instrument of policy to promote more effectively the export of American capital.

In this sense, then, it must be said that U.S. anticolonialism, far from being anti-imperialist in its essential character, is the highest development of American imperialist policy.

Anticolonialism is a characteristic feature of America's new "pattern for empire" and is not anti-imperialistic in any fundamental definition of that term.

So much must be said as preliminary clearing of the ground of confusion generated by heated and hasty polemics conducted without sufficient respect for the supremacy of the objective fact over abstract generalizations.

Is the rise of anticolonial policy in America, the most powerful imperialist country, to be explained as one phase of the decline of imperialism? Is it caused by the declining power of imperialist forces within the world power-relationships? Is it a policy *forced upon* an unwilling imperialism by more powerful democratic influences? Such questions as these are related to, but are not identical with, the questions posed in the preceding paragraphs, and require separate detailed examination.

From one approach, it is unquestionable that imperialism, taken in its world aspects, has declined in its control over the lives of the peoples. One-sixth of the earth, the Soviet Union, is irrevocably socialist and

withdrawn from the orbit of imperialist control. The Axis empires have been crushed, eliminating the most reactionary and predatory centers of imperialist power. The forces of national liberation are rising to unprecedented heights among most of the peoples subject to alien rule. And within the countries of imperialist power, the labor and broadly democratic movements, which have definite anti-imperialist tendencies, are rising to a power and influence hitherto unknown. All these factors put immediate limits upon the freedom of action of imperialism and foreshadow its eventual elimination from the world.

None of these factors, however, can explain why it is *in America that this anticolonial policy has arisen*, rather than in France, or Holland, or Belgium, or Britain. The French imperialist power has declined perhaps most sharply of the surviving empires; it is faced with rebellion of colonial peoples in the sharpest forms; and of all the imperialist lands it contains undoubtedly the most active and powerful democratic people's movement, which dominated its Constituent Assembly. Why is it that France does not take the course of anticolonial policy, therefore, rather than the United States? But France, on the contrary, is reasserting her claims to colonial empire with renewed vigor. And there is no clear and unequivocal voice raised in the whole French democratic camp demanding freedom for the colonies.

Or examine the British situation. The British Empire is quite certainly in decline. No one insists upon this point more than the British imperialist leaders themselves. Their public lamentation over the terms of the

Anglo-American loan, in which they had to agree to a loosening of Empire economic ties in return for a big American credit, was a shrill dirge over the decline of Empire. They are faced by peoples in revolt everywhere. They are governed by the Labor Party, which has made at least gestures in the direction of anti-imperialism. Yet the British government continues fiercely and aggressively fighting for the maintenance of colonial empire and sheds bitter tears when it is forced by the U.S.A. to loosen the colonial economic bonds slightly as the price of a loan. There is certainly no sign of an anticolonial policy emerging in Britain, not even in the Labor Party!

The United States, on the other hand, which comes forward with an anticolonial policy, has not undergone a decline in its strength, but on the contrary has greatly increased it. It is not under the direct pressure of colonial revolts of any considerable magnitude. It retains its traditional inner political structure most nearly intact of all imperialist powers and has less of a democratic upsurge within the country. It retains the classical ideology of capitalism with fewer modifications than any other country. It has almost a monopoly of the world's capital available for export. It is unquestionably supreme among capitalist nations.

Certainly it is not from motives of weakness that the United States adopted the policy of anticolonialism. To the extent that there are serious weaknesses in the position of American capitalism, it must be said that American capitalists and statesmen are sublimely unconscious of the fact. They are dominated by a feeling of power

such as they never had before. It is on the background of this subjective feeling of American power that there has been developed the American policy looking to the liquidation of the colonial system.

In the period from the opening of World War I to the close of World War II, two great powers forged to the front to take precedence over all others. They are the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Modern imperialism is the latest (highest) stage of capitalism, in which a high degree of industrial monopoly in a few giant corporations is fused with banking capital, to dominate the life of the imperialist country. A characteristic feature of this imperialism is the export of capital and a struggle for the redivision of control of the world as market for capital export.

The Soviet Union has a radically new system of economy, socialist in character, which removes it from our definition of imperialist countries. It has no concentration of capital in private hands. It has no urge for the export of capital. Its whole economic concentration is inward, to its domestic market; it exports commodities only for the purpose of financing its needed imports. Thus, while the Soviet Union has been able with its socialist system to advance to the front rank of world powers, alongside the U.S.A., it is not an economic rival of the United States in the world market.

The United States is certainly, under our definition, an imperialist country, the most powerful that world history ever produced. It has the highest degree of monopoly (ten great corporations received over half of all

U.S. war contracts, while the one hundred largest held about eighty per cent); it exports capital to all the world; it is geared to the world market (especially since the terrific expansion of its durable goods industries during World War II).

It is a little difficult to remember that as late as 1914, the United States was only potentially a first-class power. It exerted less influence in Europe than did Italy; it exerted less influence in Asia and even in Latin America than did Britain. In 1914, the U.S.A. was still in the main a capital importing country, a field for investment by Britain, France, Germany, Holland, and Belgium, who held billions of dollars in U.S. industrial shares and other securities. The nineteenth-century industrial expansion of the U.S.A. was significantly dependent upon this flow of capital from abroad. In the period 1900-1914, the U.S.A. was already beginning to export capital, though almost entirely within the Americas and even there in a role subordinate to Britain, and was still importing more capital than she exported.

During World War I, the U.S.A. regained a large part of her securities held abroad. She ceased to import capital, and became a large-scale capital exporter. Between the two wars, the U.S.A. was the chief center of capital export for the world. During World War II, the U.S.A. was the main source of supply for her allies, insofar as they were supplied from outside their own borders, to the sum of about forty billion dollars under so-called Lend-lease. At the close of the war, in 1945, the U.S.A. emerged as the only country with a large surplus of capital for export.

In 1914, Britain was the dominant power in world trade and finance.

In 1945, the U.S.A. had so completely taken over Britain's former dominant position that the British found it necessary to accept, unwillingly, an American loan to avoid an immediate financial breakdown.

The United States has become banker-in-chief to the whole capitalist world. It is estimated that in excess of one hundred billion dollars of *idle private capital* seeking investment exists today in the United States.

A few historical comparisons will serve to add significance to these dry figures.

During the forty years of 1871-1910, capital securities issued in all countries of the world came to a total of approximately one hundred billion dollars. This sum is considerably less than that of U.S. government appropriations for the single fiscal year of 1943; it is not much above the average yearly cost to the U.S. alone of conducting World War II.

During World War II, the U.S. government directly invested in new war plants a sum almost ten times as great as the yearly average of all world capital investments over the four decades previous to World War I, the period of 1871-1910.

In 1910, the total volume of all financial securities, representing investments, outstanding in the entire world, was considerably less than half of today's total outstanding U.S. government securities.

Today practically every country that wishes to borrow money (and which one does not?) must come to America for it.

During the past thirty years the structure of world power has undergone profound transformations. Among these changes, one of the most far-reaching in consequences is that *the United States has been transformed from a debtor nation into the foremost factor in world industry and finance, into a world banker without a near rival.*

All this has taken place in the period from World War I to World War II.

That is why United States imperialism is flushed with a feeling of power.

The transformation in the relations of economic (and hence military) power, which brought the U.S.A. to predominance, reduced Britain to second-class position, and France, Holland, and Belgium even lower, has not been accompanied by a parallel transformation in the structure of political control of territories and peoples. There is a greater disparity than ever before among the nations in the distribution of economic and political power.

The British colonial system, together with those of France, Holland, etc., which was built upon former economic preponderance, remains as a political fact after the economic preponderance has shifted to America.

Defeat and elimination of the Axis have been assumed by the surviving colonial powers to signify the restoration to them intact of their former colonies, with additions, and the perpetuation of the colonial system with but slight modifications. Not one of the colonial powers has admitted even the discussion of a redistribution of

political control more in accordance with economic power. Their slogan was uttered by Churchill: "What we have we hold." The Labor government in England clings to the colonies as tenaciously as did the Tories.

In modern history the prime cause of wars has been precisely such shifts of economic power, and the consequent drive by the rising power to gain a corresponding redistribution of territorial control, when necessary by military power, by war.

The facts show that World War II has not overcome or eliminated such unevenness of development, but on the contrary has further emphasized it.

Lenin, in his famous book, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), posed the question as follows:

We ask, is there *under capitalism* any means of remedying this disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and "spheres of influence" by finance capital on the other side—other than by resorting to war? [*Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 90]

This situation in which the U.S. holds a practical monopoly of export capital while Britain (with France, etc.) holds a near-monopoly of colonies, undoubtedly contains all the factors which in the past gave birth to major wars.

The colonial powers, which now lack capital and must themselves borrow from the United States, withhold their colonial possessions from penetration by

American capital, in order to dictate terms to the U.S.A.—which she in turn feels she should dictate since she holds the cash, raw material of power.

Such was the essence of the conflict between Britain and America in the recently concluded negotiations for a big loan. Such is the moving force behind the adoption by America of the policy of liquidation of the colonial system.

If history always mechanically repeated old patterns, the United States would directly and simply demand that Britain should yield up her colonies to America, and back up the demand with military force. Such a prospect does not, however, appear to be imminent nor in the predictable future.

What seems to be shaping up is a new pattern of imperialism on the part of America. It is not new in principle, but it is new as a predominating policy. The United States is building its new pattern upon the fact, which was noted by Lenin in his book already quoted, when he wrote:

Finance capital is such a great, it may be said such a decisive force in all economic and international relations that it is capable of subordinating to itself, and actually does subordinate to itself, even states enjoying complete political independence. [*Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 74]

Lenin quoted, as exemplifying this fact, Schulze-Gavernitz' statement that:

South America, and especially Argentina, is so dependent financially on London that it ought to be described as almost a British commercial colony.

The United States has learned by experience that "states enjoying complete independence" could be swung over by (in the main) economic measures from the position of "British commercial colonies" to that of American commercial colonies. But where Britain held political sovereignty, as over India, the United States was checkmated. So why not make India an independent state? That would have the advantage of avoiding a costly and dangerous war and might present some other, even more important, advantages.

The United States today feels itself largely immune from the threat of *purely economic competition* on the world markets. It is noteworthy that Britain, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, when she felt herself similarly immune from effective competition, was also opposed to the colonial system and held the opinion that liberation of the colonies and their complete separation from Great Britain were inevitable and desirable. Disraeli said in 1852: "The colonies are millstones around our necks." It was the rise of effective economic competition on world markets that caused British statesmen to change their concept of the colonies from that of "millstones around our necks" to that of "the brightest jewels of the Royal Crown."

The anticolonial policy of the United States is thus, far from being anti-imperialist in its essential character, revealed as the sharpest weapon in the American arsenal for securing the redistribution of the markets of the world to correspond more closely with America's new position of economic dominance.

British colonial policy has always employed the social and economic contradictions existing among the colonial peoples as a major instrument to "divide and conquer." She has searched for and found those classes and groups within the colony which, each for its own special interests, is willing to become the tool, the instrument, the weapon for the subjugation of its own country to the imperialist ruler. The chief example of such native tools of imperialism is usually the feudal and semi-feudal ruling classes.

Thus in India, the key to British power lies in a multitude of native states, feudal principalities which have carried over into the mid-twentieth century the most backward Asiatic feudalism. Under the guise of profound respect for the customs and rights of the native population, the British imperial rulers have protected and fostered these most anachronistic and backward princely feudal regimes, and prevented them from being dissolved and swept away by the currents of modernization which surge in India as a whole. Even where feudal political regimes do not exist, the British base themselves upon the landlord class which holds the mass of the peasantry in an economic bondage that is but slightly different from that of ancient Asiatic feudalism.

The result of this system of colonial rule is that India is kept in a condition of incredible poverty and misery, worse than its original condition, because British industrial imports have crushed the economy of native handicraft without replacing it with a modern economy. The intensified poverty of India is made the instrument for squeezing out wealth for export to Britain.

When the United States approaches India, it also seeks native groups and classes which might work with America, rather than with the British exclusively. It finds them in the native bourgeoisie at the head of the organized national liberation movement, those who are fighting British domination. The United States can secure influence over these circles by supporting Indian national independence.

Associated with the native bourgeoisie in the fight for independence, but distinct from it, are the organized labor and peasant movements. The United States gains a sympathetic attitude from these broad democratic mass movements by its support of independence, even while this support remains rather vague and platonic.

Of course, the Indian people are aware that the United States has, in the past, given vague promises of support to independence movements of colonial peoples, only to repudiate those promises very quickly. That happened in the Philippines at the turn of the century. The United States made the Philippines her own colony, after promising independence in return for help against the Spanish. But American support of independence is taken more seriously now, precisely because the U.S. finally granted independence to the Philippines *after having found colonies unprofitable*.

Thus the United States, moved chiefly by the urge for new fields of capital export (an essentially imperialist motive), supports the bourgeois-democratic national liberation forces of India and, indirectly, with the labor and peasant movements which fight for Indian independence, comes out in opposition to the feudal and

semifeudal servants of British rule. The role is objectively a progressive one, regardless of one's judgment as to the intrinsic merits of its subjective motives. The United States policy toward India, and the colonies generally, is more and more definitely and energetically toward gaining for them the status of political independence—both as a means of removing British monopoly control without a war, or at least with Indians doing the necessary fighting, and further (perhaps more important in the long run) as a means of expanding the Indian market potential.

The *New York Herald Tribune*, already quoted, said: "Profitable trade cannot be carried on by America with poverty-stricken agricultural colonies, but only with nations which do considerable manufacturing and have a surplus income—free of imperialistic restrictions—with which to buy capital goods, such as electric generators, and luxury goods, such as automobiles."

This sentence is the key to American imperialist policy toward the colonies. Colonies are too restricted in their ability to absorb capital and capital goods to fit the needs of the United States. When the *Herald Tribune* speaks of "nations . . . free of imperialistic restrictions," it means free of colonial restrictions by Britain and, further, free from the fetters of feudalism that colonialism perpetuates. It does not mean free from the necessity of accepting American capital investments and buying American goods, especially capital goods. But it relies upon the fact that only America has capital for export.

Even if it were possible, therefore, for the United States to take over India and the other colonies as her own, transferring their control from Britain and the other colonial powers, this would not provide the markets needed by American industry. And it would raise insoluble problems, if nothing else were done, for the former owners. The United States requires new markets for huge volumes of goods, durable goods, capital goods, and fields for huge investments on the scale of her volume of idle capital. But such markets can only be provided by nations which are modernizing and industrializing themselves. Nations can be modernized and industrialized only when they are self-governing and independent.

It is for the purpose of expanding markets, markets primarily for America's greatly expanded durable goods industries and for the investment of America's enormous accumulations of idle capital, that the United States is developing the active policy of dissolution of the colonial system.

One of the main factors, perhaps the decisive one, in the world relationship of power that has facilitated the evolution of U.S. policy toward anticolonialism, is the fact that the other greatest power, the Soviet Union, is not a rival to the U.S. in the world market, that it is vigorously and unambiguously opposed to the whole colonial system.

In the formation of the United Nations organization, the central question in determining whether it has any serious possibility of success is whether the United

States and the Soviet Union can agree upon a common general approach to the most decisive problems still unsolved in world political relations. Among these unsolved problems the most explosive is undoubtedly that of the future of the colonies.

At Teheran, and more definitely at Yalta, Roosevelt raised with Stalin the question of the projected United Nations organization being given trusteeship over colonial territories with the mandate to transform them into self-governing nations in a given term of years. The Soviet Union expressed its support of this proposal. Roosevelt died on the eve of the San Francisco Conference and in the resulting confusion of changing administration in Washington the British succeeded in impressing upon American policy their opposition to colonial independence, or anything that would interpose any other authority between themselves and their colonies. The U.S. thereupon abandoned the project, while the Soviet Union stood firm in its support. The result, in combination with other backward steps taken by America at the moment, almost wrecked the United Nations in its first conference. For it was this projected joint policy on the colonial question which provided the foundation for a long-term collaboration between America and the Soviet Union and, therefore, prospects for success of the United Nations.

Cynics of both right and left who maintain that hopes for a durable peace are illusory base their case upon the supposed irreconcilability of interest between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., arising from their contrasting capitalistic and socialistic systems, which they contend make

impossible any common long-term policy toward practical questions involving the institutions that wield political power. Precisely this is involved in the colonial issue.

It must be admitted that if the United States permanently abandons the Roosevelt policy and swings back toward the old pattern of imperialist colonialism in any form, this would largely destroy any serious prospects for a durable peace. The prospects for a long peace must include national independence of the colonial lands. This can be achieved without civil wars only by collaboration between the two greatest powers.

Peace therefore depends, in the first place, upon the firmness with which the United States pursues the policy of liberation and independence for the colonies. It lies further in the question whether the essentially imperialist motives of the U.S. in this policy renders it impossible for the Soviet Union to reach a practical accord with America as to the means of such national liberation of the colonies.

There is involved here the problem of whether socialism and the highest developed capitalism can reach any basis of agreement in international affairs other than a day-to-day adjustment to avoid immediate conflict. This is a theoretical as well as a practical question. Since theory plays a great role in guiding the policy of the Soviet Union it would be well for Americans to understand the bearing of Marxian theory on this problem. It will provide a sounder basis of judgment as to the possible attitudes of Soviet leadership.

There is a shallow and dogmatic interpretation of

Marxian theory which says that war is inevitable between the Soviet Union and the United States, because any long-term co-operation between the two countries could only be brought about at the price of abandonment of Marxism by the Soviet leaders. The counterpart of this theory is Trotskyism, which says that the Soviet Union is avoiding war precisely by paying such a price. Both these interpretations are false.

Marxism, in its original form and as further developed by Lenin and Stalin, certainly sees war as the result of factors inherent in capitalism. So long as such factors are not effectively countered by other forces, working in the opposite direction, war must be considered "inevitable" (in the limited sense that it is the inevitable result of the actual forces at work). But Marxism does not establish the dogma that only universal socialism can prevent the "inevitable" war; it does not pose "the revolution" as the only effective factor that can overcome the obstacles to a durable peace; it does not close the door, theoretically, against the possibility of a relatively protracted period of peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist states.

Marxian theory requires, moreover, that to speak of the possibility of a long-term peace one should define the *new factors* which create that possibility in concrete reality rather than abstract theory. For it is of the essence of Marxism that it posits the supremacy of the fact over the idea.

Lenin attacked most sharply Kautsky's theory, "ultra-imperialism," that the union of many imperialist powers

would or could abolish war. In the course of that debate, Lenin answered Kautsky in the following words:

We will presume that *all* the imperialist countries conclude an alliance for the "peaceful" sharing out of these parts of Asia; this alliance would be an alliance of "internationally united finance capital." As a matter of fact, alliances of this kind have been made in the twentieth century, notably with regard to China. We ask, is it "conceivable," assuming that the capitalist system remains intact—and this is precisely the assumption that Kautsky does make—that such alliances would be more than temporary, that they would eliminate friction, conflicts and struggle in all and every possible form? This question only requires stating clearly enough to make it impossible for any but a negative answer to be given. [*Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 109]

Now the decisive point for the present argument, in this statement of Lenin, is the phrase "assuming that the capitalist system remains intact." For this is precisely what has not happened in the meantime. The socialist Soviet Union is a great and victorious power, and there is only one other first-class power remaining in the world, namely the U.S.A. The German, Japanese, and Italian empires have been shattered and eliminated; the allied colonial powers have been enormously weakened; and in a number of countries there have arisen new regimes of a character transitional toward socialism. The problem of peace and its possibility is now obviously quite different from that of which Lenin spoke in the quoted debate with Kautsky; his argument applied to today's problem would give a different answer on the

question of peace between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

As long ago as 1916, Lenin went out of his way to castigate the ultra-revolutionary phrase-mongers who spoke of making permanent war against imperialism. He quoted the words of a certain P. Kievsky, who thought it sufficient to justify a certain line of policy by bringing forward the consideration that thereby "we will be fighting against our mortal enemy, imperialism." Lenin ridiculed this phrase and pointed to it as an example of strong words hiding a poverty of argument. He went on to say:

But this argument is *wrong*. Imperialism is as much our "mortal" enemy as is capitalism. That is so. No Marxist will forget, however, that capitalism is progressive compared with feudalism and that imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence it is *not* our duty to support *every* struggle against imperialism. We will *not* support the struggle of the reactionary classes against imperialism; we will *not* support an uprising of the reactionary classes against imperialism and capitalism. [Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 299]

It was impossible in the past to find in these considerations any practical point of co-operation between Marxists and imperialists, because the latter in practice, in the policy of the colonial system, did not proceed to the elimination of feudalism but on the contrary fused with it, preserved it, as the instrument of holding down the peoples and subjecting them to alien rule.

But it is possible to find in these considerations the grounds of practical co-operation between Marxists and the anticolonial policy of Roosevelt, even though the

latter is subject to the most rigorous Marxian analysis as the highest development of modern finance-imperialism. For the Roosevelt anticolonial policy, consistently applied as a part of the whole complex of Roosevelt policies, is definitely progressive in its consequences on a world scale. It promotes democracy and the rise of living standards, it advances human freedom and the conquest of the forces of nature, and it paves the way for more profound historical progress.

The question of whether there is foundation for a long-range peace and co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union is thus found to be a question of whether the United States can adopt and carry out the Roosevelt policies. If the answer is yes to the latter question, then it is also yes to the former. It is a question, therefore, that must find its answer inside the United States. If the Roosevelt policy is victorious, there is the prospect of a durable peace; if the Roosevelt policies are overthrown irrevocably, then the prospect is for a more or less imminent world war.

Marxian theory supports the Roosevelt policy as the most practical expression of American national interest and the only sure road to peace. Marxian theory is not an obstacle to the Roosevelt policy, but its ally. This is the basic consideration which enables a Marxian to declare that peace is possible.