

endangers the very life of the nation. The Democratic Party must be won to democracy. And that is a problem not alone for Democrats, but for the nation.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM— SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS

WE HAVE BEEN discussing the problems of national unity on the assumption that, in its political aspects, it must be achieved through the dominant two-party system. We have rejected as impractical for the war period any general readjustment or regrouping of the party structure in our national political life. We have further assumed that the Communist Party, from whose standpoint this book is written, will continue its role in this period essentially as a minority party, however much or little it may grow, and that its contribution will be chiefly to deepen the political thought of the nation.

This does not dispose of the question, however, since new problems of pressing immediacy arise which are not answered even in general outline by our argument thus far.

The winning of national unity is a struggle *within* the two major parties, and a struggle *between* the two parties when and where the forces of national unity dominate one party while the opponents of national unity dominate the other. So far we have concentrated our attention on the struggle within each major party. Now, what happens in the struggle *between* the parties themselves?

Where the forces of national unity dominate *both* major

parties in a given state or locality, it must be our duty, as of all who follow this main line of reasoning, to do everything to help soften the sharp edges of antagonisms between those who agree in substance but are divided formally, and transform them into a co-operative rivalry as to who can most effectively serve the nation and its unity.

Since we are dealing with a *struggle*, however, there is no automatic guarantee of victory, and certainly no likelihood of victory in both parties in all states and localities. The appeasement, defeatist, and Fifth-Column elements, and all those who place their own special interests above those of the nation, are strong and active. In most states and localities they will probably dominate one or the other of the major parties and will fight for power. In such case, it is clearly the duty of those who place national unity for victory above all else to rally their forces around the one party where their point of view prevails.

But if the reactionaries and enemies of unity can win in one party, there is also the possibility they can win in both. Baron von Killinger's famous "Memorandum" platform for the Fifth Column definitely put forth such a directive for the capture and utilization of both major parties. And there is not the slightest doubt the effort is being made.

In New York State there is a typical example of this problem. The anti-Roosevelt, anti-unity forces control both major party tickets in the elections, and thus control the biggest state in the Union regardless of which party wins the election in November.

It seems clear that the New York Republican Party is definitely under the control of the Hoover-Landon-Vandenberg machine which nominated Thomas E. Dewey for Governor. The followers of Wendell Willkie made an

effort to head them off, but it was not strong enough even to go into the Convention for a fight.

At the same time the anti-Roosevelt Democrats of New York, under the leadership of state chairman James A. Farley, have boldly stepped forward to seize the state machinery from the national unity elements, and turn it against Roosevelt, by the nomination for governor of their agent, the present Attorney-General of the state, Mr. John Bennett.

In this situation, the national unity forces in the New York Democratic Party, tardy in preparing for the struggle, found themselves in a difficult corner. Mr. Farley, with the party machinery in his hands, had "sewed up" the nomination for his man by pledging convention delegates in advance before the issues had come into the open. The national unity forces had no organizational center for resisting this coup. With the President overwhelmed with war problems, the Farley gang counted on his being unable to intervene effectively.

In this critical situation, the American Labor Party, the balance of power in the last several elections in New York, found it necessary to break its traditional alliance with the Democratic Party and put its own candidate in the field.

We have repeated this New York story in some detail for the light it throws on the problem of the two-party system in every state and locality. It is an experience that should be studied everywhere. Certain conclusions must be drawn from it, which will be sustained by many other similar developments over the country.

The most important lesson is the value, even necessity under some circumstances, of additional and auxiliary forms of political organization, outside the two major parties or within them, to guarantee against the capture of both major

parties by the anti-unity forces. In New York the existence of the American Labor Party as an independent organization, and the fact that the Communist Party also has put up its ticket, has kept open the possibility for the voters to repudiate the reactionary bi-partisan coalition.

In the State of Washington, we find that the work of the Commonwealth Federation within the Democratic Party contributed decisively to the complete unification of the whole organization on a well defined win-the-war pro-Roosevelt program. Similar experiences could be cited from many places. In California, the trade unions have reached a high degree of unity on the political field, combining the forces of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the Railroad Brotherhoods, and exercising this united force in such a way as to unify the Democratic Party of that state as has never been achieved before in modern times. And so it goes.

It is necessary for labor to be prepared for an independent third ticket if and when both major parties resist all influences toward the national unity program and come under control of the anti-unity forces. Moral influences must be backed up by material threats of reprisals, if necessary, to overcome vested party machine interests and even conscript them for the national unity. For such a threat to be effective, it must be backed up by organized political strength, with clear-headed leadership.

Another phase of the New York experience will merit some examination. That is the factional struggle within the American Labor Party. Although the A.L.P. acted as a unit in repudiating Boss Farley and his coup against national unity, it was itself racked by a factional fight which weakened its influence and at times threatened to defeat its main political struggle. The A.L.P. factions, known as

“right wing” and “left wing,” came into existence early in 1940 over the issue of the Soviet-Finnish war; the “right wing” was ferociously anti-Soviet and idealized the government of Baron Mannerheim as a “model democracy,” going so far as to incite a United States declaration of war against the Soviet Union; the “left wing” took its stand on the necessity of cultivating American-Soviet friendship, and justified the Soviet Union in the moves which prepared for its present major war effort in alliance with the United States. The division on this issue was of unexampled bitterness, and crystallized the two factions, with the “right wing” in control of the State Committee of the American Labor Party while the “left wing” won the majority of the New York Committee. By 1942, the issues which had divided the two wings in 1940 had disappeared; both wings stood on identical programs, and even agreed on the most important candidates, while Baron Mannerheim had completely lost his democratic halo, standing fully in the camp of Hitler. Yet the factional fight continued, and the two wings went into the primaries to fight it out.

This unfortunate and damaging fight within the American Labor Party, even though it was united on program, shows how far-reaching are the forces of disunity, and how carefully they must be combated and defeated before they become too strong. It is little help to blame one side or the other, for unity in such cases must first be achieved by compromise and adjustment to allow the full spirit of unity to develop out of practical and successful joint work. It was just this spirit of compromise and adjustment which was lacking, however, in the “right wing” of the A.L.P. It is a matter of record that the “left wing” pleaded for unity up to the last moment, while the “right wing” self-righteously demanded “unconditional surrender” and the

scattering of their factional opponents. It is difficult to see how the “left wing” could do other than defend itself, for in the political as in the biological world, voluntary self-destruction is contrary to the laws of life and will never be adopted except by a sickly and degenerate body. It must be admitted, however, that in the heat of battle the “left wing” also uttered unwise words and hurled charges that will only make the inevitable unification more difficult.

For the American Labor Party must and will be fully united. Let other labor and progressive organizations learn from this experience to be ever on their guard against factional divisions which sap the strength needed for their big tasks, and nip them in the bud before they grow too fixed and deep. And it would be well to remember, also, that the attempt to head-off factional divisions by an arbitrary regime of rule-from-above by self-constituted leaderships or single factions will always have the opposite effect, and tend to make factionalism perpetual. Factional tendencies in mass organizations, in which no big principles are involved, must always be allayed and dissolved by a wise policy of conciliation and compromise. Such a policy can never degenerate into opportunism if the leadership is firmly orientated on a clear and principled program which is the basis of unity.

We have dealt with only a few, and the most typical, of the problems that arise when labor and the common people, struggling toward an effective national unity for victory in the war, consciously attempt to make use of the antiquated two-party structure and system we have inherited from our country’s political past. They are only an indication of the complex problems that are arising, and will continue to arise, as the American people forge

their national unity in spite of all difficulties, and in the process of overcoming all obstacles. National unity does not come from wishing, but only from sustained effort, deep thought, and wise understanding. Unity must be fought for and won, like the war of which it is a part.

## *Part Three* THE UNITED NATIONS

### CHAPTER XII

#### WHAT IS THE UNITED NATIONS?

THE United Nations constitutes the *world coalition* of governments which unite to defeat the Axis conquest of the world. We therefore speak of it as an entity, in the singular rather than the plural, in order to emphasize the *united* part of the name as that which is significant. We are concerned with the examination of this coalition taken as a whole.

Juridically the United Nations takes its origin from the "Declaration" signed in Washington January 1, 1942, by the representatives of twenty-six governments. This "Declaration" adopts as a common platform of the signatories the Atlantic Charter issued by Churchill and Roosevelt on August 14, 1941, pledges its adherents to employ their "full resources" for the war, to co-operate with each other and "not to make a separate armistice or peace," and it opens the coalition to "other nations" which make their contributions "in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."

The Atlantic Charter renounces all aims of aggrandizement, and of arbitrary territorial changes; it affirms the right of self-determination of all peoples, equal access to raw materials, the intention of "fullest collaboration" between nations for "economic advancement and social se-