Buddhadeva Bhattacharya
During the detention period of 1930-38 the national revolutionaries, including the Anushilanites, at last found the time for clarification of their ideas. It was during this period they ultimately realized the futility of individual terrorism and group armed action without mass involvement. They avidly read the marxist-leninist classics and after prolonged debates and discussions stretching over months and years in different detention camps finally veered round to marxism-leninism. 1 Except for a section of national revolutionaries, including Anushilan men, who went over to the Communist Consolidation and later the CPI,2 the majority of Anushilan members, though being convinced of marxism-leninism, still hesitated. While they accepted marxism in principle and held the Soviet Union in high esteem for her magnificent achievements in the field of a economic reconstruction they seriously doubted the efficacy of the Comintern as an agency for promoting world revolution and more particularly for aiding the anti-imperialist movements in colonies. These questions centred round the documents of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, namely Programme of the Communist International and more particularly Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies The role of the CPI during the CD movement further alienated them from it and the CI.
The policy decisions of the Sixth World Congress of the CI, it may be recalled, marked a shift in the attitude of the international communist movement towards the national democratic movements in the colonies and semi-colonies. Dealing specifically with India, the colonial thesis stated 'The basic tasks of the Indian communists consist in struggle against British imperialism for the emancipation of the country... The union of all communist groups and individual communists scattered throughout the country into a single, independent, and centralised party represents the first task of Indian Communists...In the trade unions, the Indian communists must mercilessly expose the nationalist-reformist leaders and carry on a decisive struggle for the conversion of the trade unions into genuine class organisations of the proletariat and for the replacement of the present reformist leadership by consistent revolutionary representatives from the mass of the workers... The communists must unmask the national reformism of the Indian National Congress and oppose all the phrases of the Swarajists, Gandhists, etc., about passive resistance...3
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern adopted a line, which as O.V. Kuusinen, the main speaker on the colonial question at that Congress, observed thirty years later at the 20th CPSU Congress, 'had a certain touch of sectarianism' in regard to the national bourgeoisie of the colonies and semicolonies.4
The attitude of the communists to the National Congress and the left forces at the time shows that despite their claim to the title of being a revolutionary party they had no understanding of the great historic forces that were at work in India. An important communist document "Draft Platform of Action" published in such authoritative organs as the Pravda and the International Press Correspondence in December 1930 says:
The greatest threat to the victory of Indian revolution is the fact that the great masses of our people still harbour illusions about the National Congress and have not realised that it represents the class Organisation of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the toiling masses of our country.5
So to the Indian communists the Congress was not the anti-imperialist organization of the Indian people fighting for national independence; it was a reactionary bourgeois organization working against the fundamental interests of the people. The accession of new strength to the Congress was not welcome the increasing support to the Congress was the greatest threat to the Indian revolution! The document continues:
The National Congress and Particularly its Left Wing, have done and are doing all in their power to restrain the struggle of the masses within the framework of the British imperialist Constitution and legislation. 6
The communists did not then work with the growing left forces; on the contrary they regarded them as their mortal enemies. The communist programme further says:
The most harmful and dangerous obstacle to the victory of the Indian revolution is the agitation carried on by the Left elements of the National Congress led by Jawaharl Nehru, Bose, Ginwala and others. 7
And again
The exposure of the Left Congress leaders who may once again undertake to set up a new party or organization like the former League of Independence, in order once again to bamboozle the mass of the workers, is the primarytask of our Party. Ruthless war on the Left national reformists is an essential condition if we are to isolate the latter from the workers and mass of the pesantry and mobilize the latter under the banner of the Communist Party and the anti-imperialist agrarian revolution in India. 8
The communists carried out their threat when the Congress Socialist Party was organized by the advanced radical elements in 1934 they instantly characterized it as Social Fascist'9
Far more important than this theoretical characterization of the National Congress and its 'left wing' was the attitude adopted towards the Civil Disobedience movement. Failing to implement their programme of general political strike and general no-rent and no-tax campaigns, they stood aloof from the movement.10 They characterized it not as a struggle but as a 'maneuver' of the Indian bourgeoisie to obtain concessions from imperialism. 11 Extremist sections even went to the point of posing it as a struggle of the Congress with the toiling masses of the country. The fundamental feature that they saw in the political situation of this time was the ever- growing mass movement. This movement, possessed of ex- plosive revolutionary potentialities, forced the Congress to step in, with the sole purpose of restraining the movement. Thus V. Chattopadhyaya wrote in the Inprecor (November 6, 1930): 'But the real struggle that is going on is not between the Congress and British Imperialism but between the Congress and Indian Revolutionary Movement.'12 R. P. Dutt in his 'Notes of the Month' in the Labour Monthly (May 1930) observed 'The Indian Congress leaders, headed by Gandhi representing the profoundly dissatisfied Indian bourgeoisie, are not part and parcel of the vast mass agitation now taking place in the country, however much it may appear that they are national leaders and instigators of the present revolt.'13
Anushilan and USRA revolutionaries who had by that time acquainted themselves with the marxist-leninist classics could well realize that it was elementary marxism and socialism that in colonial and dependent countries the first step towards the creation of a socialist society was national independence and the paramount duty of socialists-communists in these countries was to take a leading part in the struggle for liberation from imperialist domination- The policy of indifference and opposition to the Civil Disobedience movement, declaration of 'ruthless war' on left forces and splitting the trade unions pursued by the CPI at the time met with strong disapproval from Anushilan and HSRA men who spent best of their lives fighting imperialism. The 'ultra' 'left sectarian' line advocated by the CI and followed with stronger vehemence by the CPI was rejected by advanced Anushilan elements who were converted to marxism by that time not from a nationalist point of view they saw in this policy a wrong application of marxism- leninism in colonial situation and a reversal of Lenin's policy towards the national liberation struggle. This does not mean that all or majority of Anushilan men in the early thirties could judge the CI and CPI line from a marxist-leninist point of view. They could, however, 'feel that revolutionary rhetoric was but a poor substitute for genuine anti-imperialist actions. It needed more time and study to convince them- selves of the position taken up by those who critically examined the official communist line from marxist-leninist point of view.
The Seventh World Congress marked a right about-turn from the 'third period' formulations of the preceding congress. Because of foreign policy exigencies of the Soviet Union the general line of the CI took a new direction; a new 'adjustment' to the programme was to be made.14 The Seventh Congress directed the communists to work for the creation of anti-fascist Peace Front of all 'democratic and peace-loving' countries and an anti-fascist People's Front of all 'democratic parties' in each country. Communists became adherents of the 'lesser evil' policy ;15 this requited that, in the security interests of the Soviet Union, ideology be stretched to provide a distinction between fascist and non-fascist capitalists, between aggressive and non-aggressive bourgeois ruling circles. In the eyes of the CI 'bourgeois democracy is... a step forward compared with fascism.16 The world, according to the CI leadership, was separated into two camps the camp of war and the camp of peace.17
'Under these circumstances, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International did not declare that all capitalist states are equally responsible for unleashing imperialist war it concentrated its blows against the fascist instigators of war, against Germany, Japan and Italy,' asserted Manuilsky.18 Communists were asked not only to join hands with social democrats and other socialists who till yesterday were regarded as 'social fascists'; they were also advised to forge alliance with bourgeois parties in capitalist countries provided they supported the doctrine of collective defence against fascist aggression. Thus a new line was projected, which ordained the communists all over the world to subordinate the interests of revolutionary movement of their own countries for the sake of defending the Socialist Fatherland, since, in their view, defence of Soviet Union was also the fight against capitalism and imperialism. This was a logical outcome of Stalin's theory of 'final and irrevocable victory of socialism' in one country which will be discussed subsequently.
It was from the same perspective a new line was formulated regarding movements in the colonies. The main spokes- man on policy in the colonies, at the Seventh Congress, was the Chinese leader Wang Ming who severely chided the Indian Parry for its past failure to join actively in the anti- imperialist struggle- 'Our comrades in India have suffered for a long time from 'left' sectarian errors; they did not participate in all the mass demonstrations organised by the National Congress or organisations affiliated with it. At the same time the Indian communists did not possess sufficient forces independently to organise a powerful and mass anti-imperialist movement.19
The Indian communists were sharply reminded of the need to formulate a programme with a broad appeal. Referring to the demands incorporated in the new CPI thesis of 1934 Wang Ming said 'Such demands (like 'the establishment of an Indian Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic' etc.) on the part of our Indian comrades can serve as an example of how not to carry on the tactics of the anti- imperialist United Front.20 They were further advised not to disregard work within the National Congress and the national revolutionary and national-reformist organisations affiliated with it .... Both within and without the National Congress, the Indian communists must consolidate all the genuine anti imperialist forces of the country...21
Georgi Dimitrov in his report dealt with the case of India and advised his Indian comrades to work in the INC so as to develop further India's struggle for national independence. But his message was somewhat different from Wang Ming's.22 He emphasized the need to 'carry on active work inside the organizations which take part in the Indian National Congress, facilitating the process of crystallization of a national-revolutionary wing among them...'23
The full scope and meaning of the change in Comintern line on the colonies was not, it seems, fully understood by the CPI until the CPGB intervened. R Palme Dutt and Ben Bradley addressed a communication to the CPI entitled 'Anti-Imperialist People's Front in India'-generally known as the Dutt-Bradley thesis.24 In spelling out the methods for organizing the front, Dutt and Bradley focused exclusively on the Congress. Indeed, they asked, was not the Congress already 'the united front of the Indian people in the national struggle V It was now answered with a qualified 'yes.' 'The National Congress can play a great and a foremost part in the work of realizing the Anti-Imperialist People's Front. It is even possible that the National Congress, by the further transformation of its organization and programme, may become the form of realization of the Anti-imperialist People's Front...", 25 Dutt and Bradley also indicated the necessity for socialist-communist alliance. This plea for united front was supplemented by a direct appeal addressed over the heads of the CPI by Palme Dutt and Bradley to non-communists under the title of An Open Letter to Indian Patriots. '26
The Polit Bureau of the CPI welcomed this statement and held that the international situation demands acceptance of the policy.27 The implementation by the CPI of the Seventh Congress line was facilitated by the eagerness of the CSP for socialist unity.28 The communists seized this opportunity for infiltrating the ranks of the CSP. But that F is a different story. What is of more relevance here is the new line adopted by the CI and the CPI towards the dominant bourgeois reformist leadership of the National Congress. The CPI leaders felt that the old line had to be changed and the 'Congress was to be wooed29 While only a short time before, Nehru's 'socialism' had consisted only of 'pseudo-left phraseology,' after the April 1936 session of the INC the Ccmintern was hailing 'his brave plea for socialism in his historic address to the Congress30
By 1935-36 a large number of Anushilan adherents were converted to marxism-leninism and being armed with this theoretical equipment they could closely examine the impli- cations of the policy-lines formulated by the Communist International and their implementation by the CPI. More particularly, the Seventh World Congress line and Dutt- Bradley thesis were subjected to close scrutiny. 31 After prolonged debates and discussions, Anushlianites who were by that time convinced of mirxism-leninism clearly felt that the CI had lost its internationalist character and transformed itself into an agency for carrying out the foreign policy-line of the Soviet Union (this aspect has been discussed in a separate section below) and that the CPI's policy of shift from 'left sectarianism' of 1928/29-34 to 'United front' tactics of 1935 was not the product of its own independent judge- ment of the correlationship of class forces in the country vis-'a-vis imperialism but of its unquestioned, uncritical allegiance to the dictates from the international centre.
Dutt-Bradley thesis, they held, most undialectically applied the principle of unity and struggle to the concrete situation of India. Instead of giving the slogan of 'national unity on the basis of struggle' the communists were more intent upon projecting the perspective of 'national unity for national struggle.' The communists in their eagerness for building up 'Anti-imperialist People's Front' on the basis of 'national unity,' Anushilan marxists felt, were anxious not to drive out any of its components-that is, the bourgeoisie, even if the right-wing bourgeois leadership could not be persuaded or pressurized to take up a pro-struggle, anti-imperialist policy. Anushilan marxists feared that the Dutt-Bradley thesis would logically lead to capitulation to the dominant, compromising, right-wing leadership. (That this apprehension was proved to be true would be evident from the stand taken by the CPI leadership at Tripuri Congress of which more later).
Anushilan marxists, on the other hand, held that a considerable degree of unity among the broad sectors of the anti-imperialist masses had already been achieved under the Indian National Congrass and as such the INC provided the most suitable basis for the organizational realization of revolutionary anti-imperialist people's front. But they clearly understood that the INC was not already such a front-it had to be transformed into one. The dominant leadership of the INC was bourgeois reformist and the anti- imperialist massess were still prevented from exerting sufficient pressure on the leadership not being sufficiently organized themselves, the duty, as conceived by Anushilan marxists, was to wean away the anti-imperialist rank and file of the Congress from the bourgeois reformist leadership to isolate the latter, and assume the leadership of the Congress on behalf of the massess and transform it into a real anti-imperialist people's front. 32 This was in striking contrast to the line of thinking of the CPI about the formation of the anti-imperialist people's front. The CPI thought, according to Anushilan marxists, that with the increasing offensive of imperialism since the days of the general crisis of capitalism the Indian burgeoisie as whole barring a handful of rabid reactionaries had moved to the left and it would be possible to retain them (even the Congress right wing) within the AIPF. This line of thinking, as Anushilan marxists viewed it, was an 'illusion which fundamentally misunderstands the dual role of the Indian bourgeoise.'33
Under the circumstances, more advanced elements among Anushilan marxists felt the impelling necessity of preparing a document defining their ultimate aim, immediate objective and attitude towards anti-imperialist struggle from an authentic marxist-leninist point of view. By 1936 they thought of introducing a new marxist trend in Indian politics as an alternative to the current official communist line. The draft document of Anushilan marxists was prepared in the Deoli Detention Jail in Rajputana by the close of 1936 which was subsequently discussed and debated in different jails and detention camps34 It was only when all of them came out of jail in the middle of 1938 they adopted their thesis in September 1938.35
1. Incidentally, Jugantar leaders after coming out of jail decided to merge with Congress. For details, see Arun Chandra Guba, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
3. For Communist Consolidation, see Satyendra Narayan Mazuindar, op. cit., pp. 250-52, 259-61. 268, 270-3, 279, 282, 287. Detailed accounts of the pre-formative and formative stages of the Consolidation are given in Bejoy Kumar Sinha, In Andamans — the Indian Bastille) (Kanpur, 1939) and Nalini Das, Swadhinata Saingrasne Dwipantarer Bandi (Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1974).
3. Comintern and National & Colonial Questions Documents of Congresses, CPI, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 111-2.
4. R. A. Ulyanovsky (ed.) The Comintern and the East, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 1979, p. 434.
5. Inprecor.vol. X, no. 58 (18 December 1933), p. 1218. The 'Draft Platform of Action of the C.P. of India' has been included in Indian Communist Party Documents 1930-1956 (hereafter ICPD) published by the Democratic Research Service, Bombay, 1957, pp. 1-21. See p. 1 for the quotation given. 'The Draft' is also given as Appendix II in Sir Horace Williamson, India and Communism, Editions Indian. Calcutta, 1976, pp. 315-33.
6. ICPD, p. 1. Read 'restrain' for 'retain' in ICPD.
7. ibid., p. 8.
8. ibid., pp. 8-9. Emphasis added. Read 'bamboozle' for 'mobilize' in ICPD.
9. Madhu Limaye, Communist Party Facts and Fiction, Chetana Prakashan Ltd., Hyderabad (Deccan). 1951, p. 19.
10. '...it has to be admitted that due to the seriously sectarian understanding and the absence of a rousing call for joining the movement in the draft platform and because of its totally negative attitude towards Congress leadership—particularly its left wing-communists in genera' more or less kept aloof from the movement—Guidelines of the History of the Communist Party of India, Issued by the Central Party Education Department, Communist Party of India, New Delhi, 1974, p. 35.
The Draft Political Theses of the CPI acknowledged 'It A a fact that during the C.D. movement of 1930-31, Communists did not realise the full significance of the movement and objectively isolated themselves from the struggle of the masses.' Inprecor', Vol. XIV. no. 40 (20 July 1934), pp. 1024-34. See p. 1030 for the quotation given.
11. R. Palme Dutt, India Today, People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1949. pp. 339-41.
12. 'The Indian National Congress against Revolutionary Development.' Inprecor, vol. X. no. 50 (6 November 1930), p. 1035-6.
13. Quoted in L. P. Sinha, The Left Wing in India (1919-47), New Publishers, Muzaffarpur, 1965, p. 252.
14. Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974. pp. 47ff.
15. G. Adhskan (ed.), From Peace Front to People's War. People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1944, p. 252.
16. ibid., p. 251.
17. This is how Manuilsky summed up the situation. ibid., p. 3.
18. ibid., pp. 253-4.
19. Quoted in M. R. Masani, The Communist Party of India: Short History, Derek Verschoyle, London, 1954. pp. 55-7. Also Gene ID. Overstseet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, The Perennial Press. Bombay, 1969, p. 158.
20. M. R. Mescal, op. cit., p. 57 Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., p. 158.
21. M. R. Masani, op. cit., pp. 57-8; Overstreet and Windmilller, op. cit., p. 158.
22. Overstreet and Windmiller, op. cit., p. 158.
23. G. Adhikari (ad.), op. cit., p. 68 ; Inprecor, Vol. IV, no. 37 (20 August 1935), p 971.
24. Inprecor, Vol. XVI no. II (29 February 1936). pp. 297-300 Labour Monthly, March 1936. pp. 149-60.
25. Inprecor, op. cit., p. 298 ; Labour Monthly, op. cit., p. 152.
26. The Congress Socialist, March 1936 M. F. Masani, op. cit., p. 59.
27. Quoted in M. R. Masani, op. cit., p. 59.
28. Madhu Limaje, op. cit., pp. 24 & 29. For an account of CSP-CPI relations from the CSP point of view, see Jayaprakesh Narayan, Towards Struggle (ed. Yusuf Meherally), Padma Publications Ltd. Bombay, 1946. pp. 165-90.
29. M. F. Mesani. op. cit., p. 60.
30. S. Krishna, 'After the Lucknow Congress.' Inprecor, Vol. XVI, no. 30 (27 June 1936), p.803. The word 'socialism' was italicized in original.
31. Interview with Makhan Pal. 27 September 1978.
32. This line of thinking was reflected in The Thesis and Platform of Action of the R.S.P.L, 5th impression 1946, pp. 11-2, See note 61 below.
33. ibid., pp. 13-4.
34. Interview with Narendranath Des, 15 May 1976.
35. The Thesis and Platform of Action of the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India (R.S.P. I.) (Marxist-Leninist) What Revolutionary Socialism Stands For, 1st impression 1938.